Justice
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Justice, in its broadest sense, is the concept that individuals are to be treated in a manner that is equitable and fair.[1]
A society in which justice has been achieved would be one in which individuals receive what they "deserve". The interpretation of what "deserve" means draws on a variety of fields and philosophies, like ethics, rationality, law, religion, equity and fairness. The state may be said to pursue justice by operating courts and enforcing their rulings.
History[edit]
A variety of philosophical and moral theories have been advanced to inform understanding of justice.
Early theories of justice were set out by the Ancient Greek philosophers Plato, in his work The Republic, and Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
Religious explanations of the justice can be grouped under divine command theory, which holds that justice issues from God.[2]
Western thinkers later advanced different theories of where foundations of justice lie. In the 17th century, philosophers such as John Locke said justice derives from natural law. Social contract theory, advocated by thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau said that justice derives from the mutual agreement of members of society to be governed in a political order. In the 19th century, utilitarian philosophers such as John Stuart Mill said that justice is served by what creates the best outcomes for the greatest number of people.
Modern frameworks include concepts such as distributive justice, egalitarianism, retributive justice, and restorative justice. Distributive justice considers what is fair based on what goods are to be distributed, between whom they are to be distributed, and what is the proper distribution. Egalitarians suggest justice can only exist within the coordinates of equality. Theories of retributive justice say justice is served by punishing wrongdoers, whereas restorative justice (also sometimes called "reparative justice") is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of victims and offenders.
Harmony and the early Greeks[edit]
Justice, according to Plato, is about balance and harmony. It represents the right relationship between conflicting aspects within an individual or a community. He defines justice as everyone having and doing what they are responsible for or what belongs to them. In other words, a just person is someone who contributes to society according to their unique abilities and receives what is proportionate to their contribution. They are in the right place, always striving to do their best, and reciprocating what they receive in a fair and equitable manner. This applies both at the individual level and at the organizational and societal levels. [3]
An example of a Justice according to Plato's character "Socrates" would be a person is born to be a cobbler (their nature), who has the virtue (temperance) of the economic class (social position), employed as a cobbler (occupation), and doing their work well (expertise) - thus benefitting the state's economy for all others' happiness which is has the Form of "Good". Contrariwise, an example of Injustice would be a person whose nature is that of a cobbler (their nature), who lacks the virtue (wisdom) needed from the ruling class (social position), and is employed as head of state (occupation), doing that work poorly (expertise) - thus ruining the government, military, and economy which provide for the happiness of all citizens which fits within the Form of "Bad"
To illustrate these ideas, Plato describes a person's as having three parts: reason, spirit, and desire. These parallel the three parts of a city in his philosophy, which he describes through the metaphor of a chariot: it functions effectively when the charioteer, representative of reason, successfully controls the two horses, symbolizing spirit and desire. Continuing on these themes, Plato theorizes that those who love wisdom, or philosophers, are the most ideal to govern because only they truly comprehend the nature of the good. Just like one would seek a doctor's expertise in matters of health rather than a farmer's, so should the city entrust its governance to someone knowledgeable about the good, rather than to politicians who might prioritize power over people's genuine needs. Socrates later used the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain (the common people), a group of untrustworthy advisors who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship's course (the politicians), and a navigator (the philosopher), the latter of whom being the only one who knows how to get the ship to port.[4]
Divine command and Religious Theories of Justice[edit]
Advocates of divine command theory say justice, and indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of God. Murder is wrong and must be punished, for instance, because God says it so. Some versions of the theory assert that God must be obeyed because of the nature of God's relationship with humanity, others assert that God must be obeyed because God is goodness itself, and thus doing God's command would be best for everyone.
An early meditation on the divine command theory by Plato can be found in his dialogue, Euthyphro. Called the Euthyphro dilemma, it goes as follows: "Is what is morally good commanded by the gods because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by the gods?" The implication is that if the latter is true, then justice is beyond mortal understanding; if the former is true, then morality exists independently from the gods, and is therefore subject to the judgment of mortals. A response, popularized in two contexts by Immanuel Kant and C. S. Lewis, is that it is deductively valid to say that the existence of an objective morality implies the existence of God and vice versa.
Jews, Christians, and Muslims traditionally believe that justice is a present, real, right, and, specifically, governing concept along with mercy, and that justice is ultimately derived from and held by God. According to the Bible, such institutions as the Mosaic Law were created by God to require the Israelites to live by and apply God's standards of justice.
The Hebrew Bible describes God as saying about the Judeo-Christian patriarch Abraham: "No, for I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice;...." (Genesis 18:19, NRSV). The Psalmist describes God as having "Righteousness and justice [as] the foundation of [His] throne;...." (Psalms 89:14, NRSV).
The New Testament also describes God and Jesus Christ as having and displaying justice, often in comparison with God displaying and supporting mercy (Matthew 5:7).
Natural law[edit]
For advocates of the theory that justice is part of natural law (e.g., John Locke), justice inheres in the nature of man.[6]
Despotism and skepticism[edit]
In Republic by Plato, the character Thrasymachus argues that justice is the interest of the strong – merely a name for what the powerful or cunning ruler has imposed on the people.
Mutual agreement[edit]
Advocates of the social contract say that justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone; or, in many versions, from what they would agree to under hypothetical conditions including equality and absence of bias. This account is considered further below, under 'Justice as Fairness'. The absence of bias refers to an equal ground for all people involved in a disagreement (or trial in some cases).Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Category handler/data' not found.Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Category handler/data' not found.[<span title="Script error: No such module "delink".">citation needed]
Subordinate value[edit]
According to utilitarian thinkers including John Stuart Mill, justice is not as fundamental as we often think. Rather, it is derived from the more basic standard of rightness, consequentialism: what is right is what has the best consequences (usually measured by the total or average welfare caused). So, the proper principles of justice are those that tend to have the best consequences. These rules may turn out to be familiar ones such as keeping contracts; but equally, they may not, depending on the facts about real consequences. Either way, what is important is those consequences, and justice is important, if at all, only as derived from that fundamental standard. Mill tries to explain our mistaken belief that justice is overwhelmingly important by arguing that it derives from two natural human tendencies: our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, or the feeling of self-defense and our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in another's place, sympathy. So, when we see someone harmed, we project ourselves into their situation and feel a desire to retaliate on their behalf. If this process is the source of our feelings about justice, that ought to undermine our confidence in them.[7]
Instrumental theories of justice[edit]
Instrumental theories of justice look at the consequences of punishment for wrongdoing, looking at questions such as:
- why punish?
- who should be punished?
- what punishment should they receive?
In broad terms, utilitarian theories look forward to the future consequences of punishment, retributive theories look back to particular acts of wrongdoing and attempt to match them with appropriate punishment, and restorative theories look at the needs of victims and society and seek to repair the harms from wrongdoing.
Utilitarianism[edit]
According to the utilitarian, justice requires the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals. Punishment fights crime in three ways:[8]
- Deterrence. The credible threat of punishment might lead people to make different choices; well-designed threats might lead people to make choices that maximize welfare. This matches some strong intuitions about just punishment: that it should generally be proportional to the crime.
- Rehabilitation. Punishment might make "bad people" into "better" ones. For the utilitarian, all that "bad person" can mean is "person who's likely to cause unwanted things (like suffering)". So, utilitarianism could recommend punishment that changes someone such that they are less likely to cause bad things.
- Security/Incapacitation. Perhaps there are people who are irredeemable causers of bad things. If so, imprisoning them might maximize welfare by limiting their opportunities to cause harm and therefore the benefit lies within protecting society.
So, the reason for punishment is the maximization of welfare, and punishment should be of whomever, and of whatever form and severity, are needed to meet that goal. This may sometimes justify punishing the innocent, or inflicting disproportionately severe punishments, when that will have the best consequences overall (perhaps executing a few suspected shoplifters live on television would be an effective deterrent to shoplifting, for instance). It also suggests that punishment might turn out never to be right, depending on the facts about what actual consequences it has.[9]
Retributivism[edit]
The retributivist argues that consequentialism is wrong, as it argues that all guilty individuals deserve appropriate punishment, based on the conviction that punishment should be proportional to the crime and for all the guilty.[10] However, it is sometimes said that retributivism is merely revenge in disguise.[11] However, there are differences between retribution and revenge: the former is impartial and has a scale of appropriateness, whereas the latter is personal and potentially unlimited in scale.[12]
Restorative justice[edit]
Restorative justice is a justice approach that prioritizes the needs of victims and offenders, focusing on their needs rather than abstract legal principles. It encourages active participation from victims and encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions, leading to higher satisfaction rates.
Restorative justice fosters dialogue between victim and offender shows the highest rates of victim satisfaction and offender accountability.[13]
Mixed theories[edit]
Some modern philosophers have said that Utilitarian and Retributive theories are not mutually exclusive. For example, Andrew von Hirsch, in his 1976 book Doing Justice, suggested that we have a moral obligation to punish greater crimes more than lesser ones.[14] However, so long as we adhere to that constraint then utilitarian ideals would play a significant secondary role.
Theories[edit]
Introduction[edit]
It has been said[15] that 'systematic' or 'programmatic' political and moral philosophy in the West begins, in Plato's Republic, with the question, 'What is Justice?'[16] According to most contemporary theories of justice, justice is overwhelmingly important: John Rawls claims that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."[17] In classical approaches, evident from Plato through to Rawls, the concept of 'justice' is always construed in logical or 'etymological' opposition to the concept of injustice. Such approaches cite various examples of injustice, as problems which a theory of justice must overcome. A number of post-World War II approaches do, however, challenge that seemingly obvious dualism between those two concepts.[18] Justice can be thought of as distinct from benevolence, charity, prudence, mercy, generosity, or compassion, although these dimensions are regularly understood to also be interlinked. Justice is the concept of cardinal virtues, of which it is one.[19] Metaphysical justice has often been associated with concepts of fate, reincarnation or Divine Providence, i.e., with a life in accordance with a cosmic plan.
The equivalence of justice and fairness has been historically and culturally established.[20]
Equality before the law[edit]
Law raises important and complex issues about equality, fairness, and justice. There is an old saying that 'All are equal before the law'. The belief in equality before the law is called legal egalitarianism. In criticism of this belief, the author Anatole France said in 1894, "In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets, and steal loaves of bread."[21] With this saying, France illustrated the fundamental shortcoming of a theory of legal equality that remains blind to social inequality; the same law applied to all may have disproportionately harmful effects on the least powerful.
Relational justice[edit]
Relational justice examines individual connections and societal relationships, focusing on normative and political aspects. Rawls' theory of justice aims to distribute social goods to benefit the poor, but does not consider power relations, political structures, or social meanings. Even Rawls' self-respect is not compatible with distribution.[22] Iris Marion Young charges that distributive accounts of justice fail to provide an adequate way of conceptualizing political justice in that they fail to take into account many of the demands of ordinary life and that a relational view of justice grounded upon understanding the differences among social groups offers a better approach, one which acknowledges unjust power relations among individuals, groups, and institutional structures.[23] Young Kim also takes a relational approach to the question of justice, but departs from Iris Marion Young's political advocacy of group rights and instead, he emphasizes the individual and moral aspects of justice.[24] As to its moral aspects, he said that justice includes responsible actions based on rational and autonomous moral agency, with the individual as the proper bearer of rights and responsibilities. Politically, he maintains that the proper context for justice is a form of liberalism with the traditional elements of liberty and equality, together with the concepts of diversity and tolerance.
Classical liberalism[edit]
Equality before the law is one of the basic principles of classical liberalism.[25][26] Classical liberalism calls for equality before the law, not for equality of outcome.[25] Classical liberalism opposes pursuing group rights at the expense of individual rights.[26] In addition to equality, individual liberty serves as a core notion of classical liberalism. As to the liberty component, British social and political theorist, philosopher, and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin identifies positive and negative liberty in "Two Concepts of Liberty",[27] subscribing to a view of negative liberty, in the form of freedom from governmental interference. He further extends the concept of negative liberty in endorsing John Stuart Mills' harm principle: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection",[28] which represents a classical liberal view of liberty.[29]
Equality[edit]
In political theory, liberalism includes two traditional elements: liberty and equality. Most contemporary theories of justice emphasize the concept of equality, including Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. For Ronald Dworkin, a complex notion of equality is the sovereign political virtue.[30] Dworkin raises the question of whether society is under a duty of justice to help those responsible for the fact that they need help. Complications arise in distinguishing matters of choice and matters of chance, as well as justice for future generations in the redistribution of resources that he advocates.[31]
Equity[edit]
In legal theory, equity is seen as the concept connecting law to justice, since law cannot be applied without reference to justice.[32] In that context, justice is seen as 'the rationale and the ethical foundation of equity'.[33]
Theories of sentencing[edit]
In criminal law, a sentence forms the final explicit act of a judge-ruled process, and also the symbolic principal act connected to his function.[34] The sentence can generally involve a decree of imprisonment, a fine and/or other punishments against a defendant convicted of a crime. Laws may specify the range of penalties that can be imposed for various offenses, and sentencing guidelines sometimes regulate what punishment within those ranges can be imposed given a certain set of offense and offender characteristics.[35] The most common purposes of sentencing in legal theory are:
Theory | Aim of theory | Suitable punishment |
---|---|---|
Retribution | Punishment imposed for no reason other than an offense being committed, on the basis that if proportionate, punishment is morally acceptable as a response that satisfies the aggrieved party, their intimates and society. |
|
Deterrence |
|
|
Rehabilitation | To reform the offender's behavior |
|
Incapacitation | Offender is made incapable of committing further crime to protect society at large from crime |
|
Reparation | Repayment to victim(s) or to community |
|
Denunciation | Society expressing its disapproval reinforcing moral boundaries |
|
In civil cases the decision is usually known as a verdict, or judgment, rather than a sentence.[36] Civil cases are settled primarily by means of monetary compensation for harm done ("damages") and orders intended to prevent future harm (for example injunctions). Under some legal systems an award of damages involves some scope for retribution, denunciation and deterrence, by means of additional categories of damages beyond simple compensation, covering a punitive effect, social disapprobation, and potentially, deterrence, and occasionally disgorgement (forfeit of any gain, even if no loss was caused to the other party).
Evolutionary perspectives[edit]
Evolutionary ethics and evolution of morality suggest evolutionary bases for the concept of justice.[37] Biosocial criminology research says that human perceptions of what is appropriate criminal justice are based on how to respond to crimes in the ancestral small-group environment and that these responses may not always be appropriate for today's societies.[38]
Reactions to fairness[edit]
Studies at UCLA in 2008 have indicated that reactions to fairness are "wired" into the brain and that, "Fairness is activating the same part of the brain that responds to food in rats... This is consistent with the notion that being treated fairly satisfies a basic need".[39] Research conducted in 2003 at Emory University involving capuchin monkeys demonstrated that other cooperative animals also possess such a sense and that "inequity aversion may not be uniquely human".[40]
Institutions and justice[edit]
In a world where people are interconnected but they disagree, institutions are required to instantiate ideals of justice. These institutions may be justified by their approximate instantiation of justice, or they may be deeply unjust when compared with ideal standards – consider the institution of slavery. Justice is an ideal the world fails to live up to, sometimes due to deliberate opposition to justice despite understanding, which could be disastrous. The question of institutive justice raises issues of legitimacy, procedure, codification and interpretation, which are considered by legal theorists and by philosophers of law.[41] The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 emphasizes the need for strong institutions in order to uphold justice.[42]
Psychology[edit]
There has been research into victim's perspective of justice following crimes. Victims find respectful treatment, information and having a voice important for a sense of justice as well as the perception of a fair procedure.[43]
Pemberton et al propose a "Big 2" model of justice in terms agency and communion, membership in a society. Victims experience a loss of perception of agency due to a loss of control as well as a loss of communion if the offender is a member of their social group, but may also lose trust in others or institutions. It can shatter an individual's trust that they live in a just and moral world. This suggests that a sense of justice can be restored by increasing a sense of communion and agency rather than through retribution or restoration.[43]
Theories of distributive justice[edit]
Theories of distributive justice need to answer three questions:
- What goods are to be distributed? Is it to be wealth, power, respect, opportunities or some combination of these things?
- Between what entities are they to be distributed? Humans (dead, living, future), sentient beings, the members of a single society, nations?
- What is the proper distribution? Equal, meritocratic, according to social status, according to need, based on property rights and non-aggression?
Distributive justice theorists generally do not answer questions of who has the right to enforce a particular favored distribution, while property rights theorists say that there is no "favored distribution". Rather, distribution should be based simply on whatever distribution results from lawful interactions or transactions (that is, transactions which are not illicit).
Social justice[edit]
Social justice encompasses the just relationship between individuals and their society, often considering how privileges, opportunities, and wealth ought to be distributed among individuals.[44] Social justice is also associated with social mobility, especially the ease with which individuals and families may move between social strata.[45] Social justice is distinct from cosmopolitanism, which is the idea that all people belong to a single global community with a shared morality.[46] Social justice is also distinct from egalitarianism, which is the idea that all people are equal in terms of status, value, or rights, as social justice theories do not all require equality.[47] For example, sociologist George C. Homans suggested that the root of the concept of justice is that each person should receive rewards that are proportional to their contributions.[48][49]
Economist Friedrich Hayek said that the concept of social justice was meaningless, saying that justice is a result of individual behavior and unpredictable market forces.[50] Social justice is closely related to the concept of relational justice, which is about the just relationship with individuals who possess features in common such as nationality, or who are engaged in cooperation or negotiation.[51][52]
Fairness[edit]
In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls used a social contract argument to show that justice, and especially distributive justice, is a form of fairness: an impartial distribution of goods. Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves behind a veil of ignorance that denies us all knowledge of our personalities, social statuses, moral characters, wealth, talents and life plans, and then asks what theory of justice we would choose to govern our society when the veil is lifted, if we wanted to do the best that we could for ourselves. We do not know who in particular we are, and therefore can not bias the decision in our own favor. So, the decision-in-ignorance models fairness, because it excludes selfish bias. Rawls said that each of us would reject the utilitarian theory of justice that we should maximize welfare (see below) because of the risk that we might turn out to be someone whose own good is sacrificed for greater benefits for others. Instead, we would endorse Rawls's two principles of justice:
- Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
- Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
- to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
- attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.[53]
This imagined choice justifies these principles as the principles of justice for us, because we would agree to them in a fair decision procedure. Rawls's theory distinguishes two kinds of goods – (1) the good of liberty rights and (2) social and economic goods, i.e. wealth, income and power – and applies different distributions to them – equality between citizens for (1), equality unless inequality improves the position of the worst off for (2).
In one sense, theories of distributive justice may assert that everyone should get what they deserve. Theories vary on the meaning of what is "deserved". The main distinction is between theories that say the basis of just deserts ought to be held equally by everyone, and therefore derive egalitarian accounts of distributive justice – and theories that say the basis of just deserts is unequally distributed on the basis of, for instance, hard work, and therefore derive accounts of distributive justice by which some should have more than others.
According to meritocratic theories, goods, especially wealth and social status, should be distributed to match individual merit, which is usually understood as some combination of talent and hard work. According to needs-based theories, goods, especially such basic goods as food, shelter and medical care, should be distributed to meet individuals' basic needs for them. Marxism is a needs-based theory, expressed succinctly in Marx's slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need".[54] According to contribution-based theories, goods should be distributed to match an individual's contribution to the overall social good.
Property rights[edit]
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick said that distributive justice is not a matter of the whole distribution matching an ideal pattern, but of each individual entitlement having the right kind of history. It is just that a person has some good (especially, some property right) if and only if they came to have it by a history made up entirely of events of two kinds:
- Just acquisition, especially by working on unowned things; and
- Just transfer, that is free gift, sale or other agreement, but not theft (i.e. by force or fraud).
If the chain of events leading up to the person having something meets this criterion, they are entitled to it: that they possess it is just, and what anyone else does or does not have or need is irrelevant.
On the basis of this theory of distributive justice, Nozick said that all attempts to redistribute goods according to an ideal pattern, without the consent of their owners, are theft. In particular, redistributive taxation is theft.
Some property rights theorists (such as Nozick) also take a consequentialist view of distributive justice and say that property rights based justice also has the effect of maximizing the overall wealth of an economic system. They explain that voluntary (non-coerced) transactions always have a property called Pareto efficiency. The result is that the world is better off in an absolute sense and no one is worse off. They say that respecting property rights maximizes the number of Pareto efficient transactions in the world and minimized the number of non-Pareto efficient transactions in the world (i.e. transactions where someone is made worse off). The result is that the world will have generated the greatest total benefit from the limited, scarce resources available in the world. Further, this will have been accomplished without taking anything away from anyone unlawfully.
Welfare-maximization[edit]
According to the utilitarian, justice requires the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals.[55] This may require sacrifice of some for the good of others, so long as everyone's good is taken impartially into account. Utilitarianism, in general, says that the standard of justification for actions, institutions, or the whole world, is impartial welfare consequentialism, and only indirectly, if at all, to do with rights, property, need, or any other non-utilitarian criterion. These other criteria might be indirectly important, to the extent that human welfare involves them. But even then, such demands as human rights would only be elements in the calculation of overall welfare, not uncrossable barriers to action.
See also[edit]
Other pages[edit]
Types of justice[edit]
References[edit]
- ↑
- ↑
- ↑ Plato, Republic trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- ↑ Plato, Republic trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- ↑ Cuban Law's Blindfold, 23.
- ↑ See via Google Books
- ↑ John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 5.
- ↑ "Punishment | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 5 October 2023.
- ↑ C.L. Ten, 'Crime and Punishment' in Peter Singer ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993): 366–372.
- ↑ "Punishment". California State University. Archived from the original on 13 April 2021. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
- ↑ Ted Honderich, Punishment: The supposed justifications (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), Chapter 1.
- ↑ "Retribution vs Revenge - What's the difference?". 9 October 2015.
- ↑ Michael Braswell, and John Fuller, Corrections, Peacemaking and Restorative Justice: Transforming Individuals and Institutions (Routledge, 2014).
- ↑ Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (Lebanon NH: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1976). ISBN 9780930350833
- ↑ See, e.g., Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013), pp. 4–10, 50–60.
- ↑ Plato, The Republic, Book I, 331b–c.
- ↑ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3
- ↑ *See, e.g., Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013).
- Clive Barnett The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory
- ↑ Wenar, Leif (2021), "John Rawls", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 20 May 2021
- ↑
- ↑ (France, The Red Lily, Chapter VII).
- ↑ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015), ch.10 (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ↑ Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Oxford University Press, 1990).
- ↑ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015) (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Chandran Kukathas, "Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective", in The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, ed. Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, Ethikon Series in Comparative Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 61 (ISBN 0-691-09993-6).
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Mark Evans, ed., Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism: Evidence and Experience (London: Routledge, 2001), 55 (ISBN 1-57958-339-3).
- ↑ Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969)
- ↑ John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford University Press, 1998)
- ↑ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015), p.79 (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ↑ (Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2000)
- ↑ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015), ch.7 (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ↑
- ↑ Titi, Catharine (14 August 2023). "International law in quest for justice". OUPblog. Retrieved 18 February 2024.
- ↑ "laws rules justice".
- ↑ "sentencing guidelines" (PDF). Library of Congress.
- ↑ "how court works".
- ↑
- ↑
- ↑
- ↑ Nature 425, 297–299 (18 September 2003)
- ↑ David Miller (26 June 2017). "Justice". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- ↑ Doss, Eric. "Sustainable Development Goal 16". United Nations and the Rule of Law. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
- ↑ 43.0 43.1
- ↑ "social justice | Definition of social justice in English by Oxford Dictionaries". Oxford Dictionaries | English. Archived from the original on 14 January 2017. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
- ↑
- ↑ Kleingeld, Pauline; Brown, Eric (2014), "Cosmopolitanism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 14 December 2018
- ↑ "egalitarianism | Definition of egalitarianism in English by Oxford Dictionaries". Oxford Dictionaries | English. Archived from the original on 13 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
- ↑
- ↑
- ↑
- ↑ Poblet, Marta; Casanovas, Pompeu (2008), "Concepts and Fields of Relational Justice", Computable Models of the Law, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4884, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 323–339, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_21, ISBN 978-3-540-85568-2
- ↑
- ↑ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 266.
- ↑ Karl Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program' in Karl Marx: Selected writings ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 564–70 [569].
- ↑ "The Project Gutenberg eBook of on Liberty, by John Stuart Mill". gutenberg.org. Retrieved 3 May 2019.
Further reading[edit]
- Clive Barnett, The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2017), ISBN 978-0-8203-5152-0
- Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
- Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003)
- Harry Brighouse, Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004)
- Anthony Duff & David Garland eds, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Colin Farrelly, An Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory (London: Sage, 2004)
- David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
- Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An anthology (2nd edition, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2006), Part III
- Serge Guinchard, La justice et ses institutions (Judicial institutions), Dalloz editor, 12 edition, 2013
- Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013)
- Ted Honderich, Punishment: The supposed justifications (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969)
- James Konow (2003) "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories", Journal of Economic Literature, 41(4)pp. 1188–1239
- Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An introduction (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988)
- John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974)
- Marek Piechowiak, Plato's Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity (2nd edition, revised and extended, Berlin: Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2021), ISBN 978-3-631-84524-0.
- C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A philosophical introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
- Plato, Republic trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- David Schmidtz, Elements of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)
- Peter Singer ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Part IV
- Telford Taylor, Constance Baker Motley, and James Feibleman (1975) Perspectives on Justice, Northwestern University Press ISBN 0-8101-0453-9
- Catharine Titi, The Function of Equity in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2021), ISBN 9780198868002
- Reinhold Zippelius, Rechtsphilosophie, §§ 11–22 (6th edition, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), ISBN 978-3-406-61191-9
External links[edit]
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- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries:
- Distributive Justice, by Michael Allingham
- Punishment, by Kevin Murtagh
- Western Theories of Justice, by Wayne P. Pomerleau
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries:
- "Justice" by David Miller
- "Distributive Justice" by Julian Lamont
- "Justice as a Virtue" by Michael Slote
- "Punishment" by Hugo Adam Bedau and Erin Kelly
- United Nations Rule of Law: Informal Justice, on the relationship between informal/community justice, the rule of law and the United Nations
- Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? , a series of 12 videos on the subject of justice by Harvard University's Michael Sandel, with reading materials and comments from participants.
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