Scientific method Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! {{Short description|Interplay between observation, experiment and theory in science}} {{Hatnote group| {{broader|Research|Epistemology}} {{other uses}} }} {{pp-vandalism|small=yes}} {{Use dmy dates|cs1-dates=ly|date=August 2021}} {{Copyedit|date=January 2024}}<!-- ←----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please do not change the following lead paragraph without first discussing it on the talk page: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --> [[File:The Scientific Method.svg|thumb|upright=1.2|The scientific method is often represented as an [[#Elements of the scientific method|ongoing process]]. This diagram represents one variant, and [[commons:Category:Scientific method|there are many others]].]] {{Science|expanded=Overview}} The '''scientific method''' is an [[Empirical evidence|empirical]] method for acquiring [[knowledge]] that has characterized the development of [[science]] since at least the 17th century. (For notable practitioners in previous centuries, see [[history of scientific method]].) The scientific method involves careful [[observation]] coupled with rigorous [[skepticism|scepticism]], because [[Philosophy of science#Observation inseparable from theory|cognitive assumptions]] can distort the interpretation of the [[Perception#Process and terminology|observation]]. Scientific inquiry includes creating a [[hypothesis]] through [[inductive reasoning]], testing it through experiments and statistical analysis, and adjusting or discarding the hypothesis based on the results.<ref name="principia">{{Cite book|title=Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica|last=Newton|first=Isaac|series=The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy |publisher=University of California Press|others=Includes "A Guide to Newton's Principia" by I. Bernard Cohen, pp. 1–370. (The ''Principia'' itself is on pp. 371–946)|isbn=978-0-520-08817-7|location=Berkeley, CA|date=1999|at=791–796 ("Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy"); ''see also'' [[Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica#Rules of Reason]]|translator-last=Cohen|translator-first=I. Bernard|trans-title=Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy|orig-year=1726 (3rd ed.)|translator-last2=Whitman|translator-first2=Anne|translator-last3=Budenz|translator-first3=Julia|title-link=Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|title=Oxford Dictionaries: British and World English|date=2016|chapter-url=http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/scientific-method|chapter=scientific method|access-date=28 May 2016|archive-date=2016-06-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160620062539/http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/scientific-method|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/383323|title=Oxford English Dictionary|via=OED Online|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|edition=3rd|location=Oxford|url-access=subscription|access-date=2018-05-31 |archive-date=2023-11-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112639/https://www.oed.com/dictionary/scientific-method_n|url-status=live}}</ref> Although procedures vary from one [[Branches of science|field of inquiry]] to another, the underlying [[#Process|process]] is often similar. The process in the scientific method involves making [[conjecture]]s (hypothetical explanations), deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions.<ref name="NA">{{cite wikisource|title=A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God|date=1908|first=Charles Sanders|last=Peirce|wslink=A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God|volume=7|pages=90–112|journal=Hibbert Journal}} with added notes. Reprinted with previously unpublished part, ''Collected Papers'' v. 6, paragraphs 452–85, ''The Essential Peirce'' v. 2, pp. 434–450, and elsewhere. N.B. 435.30 'living institution': Hibbert J. mis-transcribed 'living institution': ("constitution" for "institution")</ref> A hypothesis is a conjecture based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the question. The hypothesis might be very specific or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by conducting experiments or studies. A scientific hypothesis must be [[falsifiable]], implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested.{{sfnp|Popper|1959|p=273}} Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles.<ref name="allScience">{{harvp|Gauch|2003|p=3}}: "The scientific method 'is often misrepresented as a fixed sequence of steps,' rather than being seen for what it truly is, 'a highly variable and creative process' (AAAS 2000:18). The claim here is that science has general principles that must be mastered to increase productivity and enhance perspective, not that these principles provide a simple and automated sequence of steps to follow."</ref> Not all steps take place in every [[#Scientific inquiry|scientific inquiry]] (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|p=3}}<ref name="Inductive Science 1837">[[William Whewell]], ''History of Inductive Science'' (1837), and in ''Philosophy of Inductive Science'' (1840)</ref> {{TOC limit|3}} == History == {{Main|History of scientific method}} {{For timeline|Timeline of the history of the scientific method}} The history of scientific method considers changes in the methodology of scientific inquiry, as distinct from the [[history of science]] itself. The development of rules for [[scientific reasoning]] has not been straightforward; scientific method has been the subject of intense and recurring debate throughout the history of science, and eminent natural philosophers and scientists have argued for the primacy of one or another approach to establishing scientific knowledge. === Early empiricism === Different early expressions of [[empiricism]] and the scientific method can be found throughout history, for instance with the ancient [[Stoics]], [[Epicurus]],<ref name=Asmis>Elizabeth Asmis (1985) ''Epicurus' Scientific Method''. Cornell University Press</ref> [[Alhazen]],{{efn-ua|name= vacuum| Twenty-three hundred years ago, Aristotle proposed that a [[vacuum]] did not exist in nature; thirteen hundred years later, [[#alhazen|Alhazen disproved Aristotle's hypothesis]], using experiments on [[refraction]],<ref name=treatiseOnLight2>Alhacen (c.1035) ''Treatise on Light'' (رسالة في الضوء) as cited in [[Shmuel Sambursky]], ed. (1975) [https://archive.org/details/physicalthoughtf0000unse/page/136/mode/2up Physical thought from the Presocratics to the quantum physicists : an anthology], p.137</ref> thus deducing the existence of [[outer space]].<ref name= alhacenOnRefraction4.28 />}}{{efn|name= alhacenCharacterizes| ''[[Book of Optics]]'' (''circa'' 1027) After anatomical investigation of the human eye, and an exhaustive study of human visual perception, Alhacen characterizes the first postulate of [[Euclid's Optics]] as 'superfluous and useless' (Book I, [6.54] —thereby overturning Euclid's, Ptolemy's, and Galen's [[Emission theory (vision)|emission theory of vision, using logic and deduction from experiment. He showed Euclid's first postulate of Optics to be hypothetical only, and fails to account for his experiments.]]), and deduces that light must enter the eye, in order for us to see. He describes the [[camera obscura]] as part of this investigation.}}{{efn-ua|1=[[Alhazen]] argued the importance of forming questions and subsequently testing them: "How does light travel through transparent bodies? Light travels through transparent bodies in straight lines only... We have explained this exhaustively in our ''[[Book of Optics]]''.{{efn|name= straightLinesOnly }} But let us now mention something to prove this convincingly: the fact that light travels in straight lines is clearly observed in the lights which enter into dark rooms through holes.... [T]he entering light will be clearly observable in the dust which fills the air.<ref name=treatiseOnLight>Alhazen, ''Treatise on Light'' ({{lang|ar|رسالة في الضوء}}), translated into English from German by M. Schwarz, from [http://menadoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/dmg/periodical/pageview/30949 "Abhandlung über das Licht"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191230190424/http://menadoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/dmg/periodical/pageview/30949 |date=2019-12-30 }}, J. Baarmann (editor and translator from Arabic to German, 1882) ''[[Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft]]'' Vol '''36''' as quoted in {{harvp|Sambursky|1975|p=136}}.</ref> * He demonstrated his conjecture that "light travels through transparent bodies in straight lines only" by placing a straight stick or a taut thread next to the light beam, as quoted in {{harvp|Sambursky|1975|p=136}} to prove that light travels in a straight line. * [[David Hockney]] cites Alhazen several times as the likely source for the portraiture technique using the [[camera obscura]], which Hockney rediscovered with the aid of an optical suggestion from [[Charles M. Falco]]. ''Kitab al-Manazir'', which is Alhazen's ''[[Book of Optics]]'', at that time denoted ''Opticae Thesaurus, Alhazen Arabis'', was translated from Arabic into Latin for European use as early as 1270. Hockney cites Friedrich Risner's 1572 Basle edition of ''Opticae Thesaurus''. Hockney quotes Alhazen as the first clear description of the camera obscura.<ref name= truthSought4sake >{{harvp|Hockney|2006|p=240}}: "Truth is sought for its own sake. And those who are engaged upon the quest for anything for its own sake are not interested in other things. Finding the truth is difficult, and the road to it is rough." – [[Alhazen]] ([[Ibn Al-Haytham]] 965 – c. 1040) ''[[Critique of Ptolemy]]'', translated by S. Pines, ''Actes X Congrès internationale d'histoire des sciences'', Vol '''I''' Ithaca 1962, as quoted in {{harvp|Sambursky|1975|p=139}}. (This quotation is from Alhazen's critique of Ptolemy's books ''[[Almagest]]'', ''Planetary Hypotheses'', and {{cite book |title=Ptolemy's Theory of Visual Perception: An English Translation of the Optics |publisher=American Philosophical Society |isbn=9780871698629 |year=1996 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mhLVHR5QAQkC&dq=Opticae+thesaurus+alhazen&pg=PA59 |translator=A. Mark Smith |access-date=2021-11-27 |archive-date=2023-11-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112635/https://books.google.com/books?id=mhLVHR5QAQkC&dq=Opticae+thesaurus+alhazen&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q=Opticae%20thesaurus%20alhazen&f=false |url-status=live }})</ref>}} [[Ibn Sina|Avicenna]], [[Al-Biruni]],{{sfnp|Alikuzai|2013|p=154}}{{sfnp|Rozhanskaya|Levinova|1996}} [[Roger Bacon]]{{efn-lg|His assertions in the ''{{lang|la|Opus Majus}}'' that "theories supplied by reason should be verified by sensory data, aided by instruments, and corroborated by trustworthy witnesses"<ref>Bacon, ''Opus Majus'', Bk.&VI.</ref> were (and still are) considered "one of the first important formulations of the scientific method on record".{{sfnp|Borlik|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c_ShAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA132 132]}}}}, and [[William of Ockham]]. === The scientific revolution === In the [[scientific revolution]] of the 16th and 17th centuries, the not yet named method first gained significant traction. Some of the most important developments were the furthering of [[empiricism]] by [[Francis Bacon]] and [[Robert Hooke]],<ref>{{Cite book| last = Inwood | first = Stephen | title = The Forgotten Genius : The biography of Robert Hooke (1635–1703) | publisher = MacAdam/Cage Pub. |location=San Francisco | year = 2003 | isbn = 978-1-931561-56-3 |oclc=53006741 |pages=112–116}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=The posthumous works of Robert Hooke, M.D. S.R.S. Geom. Prof. Gresh. etc. |year=1705 |first=Robert |last=Hooke |editor-first=Richard |editor-last=Waller |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/b30454621_0001/page/3/mode/1up |chapter=First general: The present state of natural philosophy and wherein it is deficient}}</ref> the [[rationalist]] approach described by [[René Descartes]] and [[inductivism]], brought to particular prominence by and around [[Isaac Newton]]. From the 16th century onwards, experiments were advocated by [[Francis Bacon]], and performed by [[Giambattista della Porta]],<ref>{{cite conference |conference=The optics of Giovan Battista della Porta (1535–1615): A Reassessment Workshop at Technical University of Berlin, 24–25 October 2014 |url=http://www.wissensgeschichte-berlin.de/sites/default/files/2014_10_24_DellaPortaWS_Program_Abstracts.pdf |title=various papers |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527202632/http://www.wissensgeschichte-berlin.de/sites/default/files/2014_10_24_DellaPortaWS_Program_Abstracts.pdf |archive-date=2018-05-27}}</ref> [[Johannes Kepler]],{{refn|1=Kepler, Johannes (1604) ''Ad Vitellionem paralipomena, quibus astronomiae pars opticae traditur'' (Supplements to Witelo, in which the optical part of astronomy is treated){{efn|The full title translation is from {{harvp|Voelkel|2001|p=60}}.}} as cited in {{cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=A. Mark|title=What Is the History of Medieval Optics Really about?|journal=Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society|date=June 2004 |volume=148 |issue=2|pages=180–194|jstor=1558283 |pmid=15338543}} }}{{efn|name= Kepler1604| Kepler was driven to this experiment after observing the partial solar eclipse at Graz, July 10, 1600. He used Tycho Brahe's method of observation, which was to project the image of the Sun on a piece of paper through a pinhole aperture, instead of looking directly at the Sun. He disagreed with Brahe's conclusion that total eclipses of the Sun were impossible because there were historical accounts of total eclipses. Instead, he deduced that the size of the aperture controls the sharpness of the projected image (the larger the aperture, the more accurate the image – this fact is now fundamental for optical system design). {{harvp|Voelkel|2001|p=61}}, notes that Kepler's 1604 experiments produced the first correct account of vision and the eye, because he realized he could not accurately write about astronomical observation by ignoring the eye. {{harvp|Smith|2004|p=192}} recounts how Kepler used Giambattista della Porta's water-filled glass spheres to model the eye, and using an aperture to represent the entrance pupil of the eye, showed that the entire scene at the entrance pupil-focused on a single point of the rear of the glass sphere (representing the retina of the eye). This completed Kepler's investigation of the optical train, as it satisfied his application to astronomy.}} and [[Galileo Galilei]].{{efn-lg|name= empirical|...an experimental approach was advocated by Galileo in 1638 with the publication of ''[[Two New Sciences]]''.{{sfnp|Galileo Galilei|1638}}}} There was particular development aided by theoretical works by a skeptic [[Francisco Sanches]],{{sfnp|Sanches|1988}} by idealists as well as empiricists [[John Locke]], [[George Berkeley]], and [[David Hume]].{{efn-lg|name= particDev |1= Sanches and Locke were both physicians. By his training in Rome and France, Sanches sought a method of science beyond that of the Scholastic Aristotelian school. Botanical gardens were added to the universities in Sanches' time to aid medical training before the 1600s. ''See Locke [https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/John_Locke#An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding_(1689) (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]'' Berkeley served as foil to the materialist System of the World of Newton; Berkeley emphasizes that scientist should seek 'reduction to regularity'.<ref name= idealism >Lisa Downing, ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#3.2.3 (Fall 2021) George Berkeley, 3.2.3 Scientific explanation]</ref> Atherton (ed.) 1999 selects Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as part of the empiricist school.<ref>Margaret Atherton (ed.) 1999 [https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/iifXAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwik0tS18qOFAxXCj4kEHYLuD28Qre8FegQICxAD The Empiricists]</ref> }} === The canonical method === The early version of the canonical "sequence" of elements was first formulated in the 19th century. A sea voyage from America to Europe afforded [[C. S. Peirce]] the distance to clarify his ideas, gradually resulting in the [[hypothetico-deductive model]].{{sfnp|Godfrey-Smith|2003|p=236}} Formulated in the 20th century, the model has undergone significant revision since first proposed. The term "scientific method" emerged in the 19th century, as a result of significant institutional development of science, and terminologies establishing clear [[Demarcation problem|boundaries]] between science and non-science, such as "scientist" and "pseudoscience", appearing.{{sfnp|Thurs|2011}} Throughout the 1830s and 1850s, when Baconianism was popular, naturalists like William Whewell, John Herschel, John Stuart Mill engaged in debates over "induction" and "facts" and were focused on how to generate knowledge.{{sfnp|Thurs|2011}} In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a debate over [[Philosophical realism|realism]] vs. [[antirealism]] was conducted as powerful scientific theories extended beyond the realm of the observable.<ref name="auto">{{cite book |last=Achinstein |first= Peter |chapter=General Introduction |pages=1–5 |title=Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |date=2004 |isbn=978-0-8018-7943-2}}</ref> === Modern use and critical thought === {{anchor|theTermSci}}The term "scientific method" came into popular use in the twentieth century; [[#CITEREFDewey1910|Dewey's 1910 book]], ''[[How We Think]]'', inspired [[#aGuideline|popular guideline]]s,<ref name= cowles>{{harvp|Cowles|2020|p=264}}</ref> appearing in dictionaries and science textbooks, although there was little consensus over its meaning.{{sfnp|Thurs|2011}} Although there was growth through the middle of the twentieth century,{{efn|name= deweySchool|1= The struggle to teach science has ranged from recitals of the Neo-platonic First Discourse during the Islamic Golden Age, to Dewey's Laboratory school in 1902. Cowles 2020 notes that Dewey regarded the Lab school as a collaboration between teachers and students. The five-step exposition was taken as mandatory, rather than descriptive. Dismayed by the Procrustean interpretation, Dewey attempted to tone down his five-step scheme by re-naming the steps to phases. The edit was ignored. <!-- Work in process. (see also: [[Talk:Scientific method/Archive 23#When did it become popular to teach the method as a sequence of steps?]])-->}} by the 1960s and 1970s numerous influential philosophers of science such as [[Thomas Kuhn]] and [[Paul Feyerabend]] had questioned the universality of the "scientific method" and in doing so largely replaced the notion of science as a homogeneous and universal method with that of it being a heterogeneous and local practice.{{sfnp|Thurs|2011}} In particular, {{anchor|critiquesOfFeyerabend}}Paul Feyerabend, in the 1975 first edition of his book ''[[Against Method]]'', argued against there being any universal rules of [[science]];<ref name="auto"/> [[Karl Popper]],{{efn-lg|Popper, in his 1963 publication of ''Conjectures and Refutations'' argued that merely [[Trial and error|Trial and Error]] can stand to be called a 'universal method'.<ref name= trialAndErr>{{ citation | mode=cs1 | url= http://www.paul-rosenfels.org/Popper.pdf | last= Popper | author-link= Karl Popper | date= 1963 | title= Conjectures and Refutations | pages=312–365 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013124349/http://www.paul-rosenfels.org/Popper.pdf |archive-date =2017-10-13 |ref=none | quote=If we have made this our task, then there is no more rational procedure than the method of trial and error--of conjecture and refutation}}</ref>}} Gauch 2003,<ref name= allScience /> and Tow 2010<ref name= tow /> disagree with Feyerabend's claim. Later stances include physicist [[Lee Smolin]]'s 2013 essay "There Is No Scientific Method",<ref name="Smolin 2013">{{cite web |url=http://bigthink.com/in-their-own-words/there-is-no-scientific-method |title=There is No Scientific Method |last1=Smolin |first1=Lee |access-date=2016-06-07 |date=May 2013 |archive-date=2016-08-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160807052038/http://bigthink.com/in-their-own-words/there-is-no-scientific-method |url-status=live }}</ref> in which he espouses two [[#ethicalPosition|ethical principle]]s,{{efn-lg|name= ethicalPosition|Lee Smolin, in his 2013 essay "There Is No Scientific Method",<ref name="Smolin 2013" /> espouses two [[#ethicalPosition|ethical principle]]s. Firstly: "we agree to tell the truth and we agree to be governed by rational argument from public evidence". And secondly, that ..."when the evidence is not sufficient to decide from rational argument, whether one point of view is right or another point of view is right, we agree to encourage competition and diversification". Thus echoing {{harvp|Popper|1963|p=viii}}}} and [[History of science|historian of science]] Daniel Thurs' chapter in the 2015 book ''Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science'', which concluded that the scientific method is a myth or, at best, an idealization.<ref>{{Citation | last = Thurs | first = Daniel P. | chapter = That the scientific method accurately reflects what scientists actually do | editor-last1 = Numbers | editor-first1 = Ronald L. | editor-link = Ronald L. Numbers | editor-last2 = Kampourakis | editor-first2 = Kostas | title = Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science | pages = 210–218 | publisher = Harvard University Press | year = 2015 | chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science | isbn = 978-0-674-91547-3 | quote = It's probably best to get the bad news out of the way first, the so-called scientific method is a myth. ... If typical formulations were accurate, the only location true science would be taking place in would be grade-school classrooms. | access-date = 2020-10-20 | archive-date = 2023-11-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112729/https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science#v=snippet&q=newton's%20apple%20and%20other%20myths%20about%20science&f=false | url-status = live }}</ref> As [[#Beliefs and biases|myth]]s are beliefs,<ref name= beliefCreatesReality /> they are subject to the [[narrative fallacy]] as Taleb points out.<ref name= narrativeFallacy /> Philosophers [[Robert Nola]] and Howard Sankey, in their 2007 book ''Theories of Scientific Method'', said that debates over the scientific method continue, and argued that Feyerabend, despite the title of ''Against Method'', accepted certain rules of method and attempted to justify those rules with a meta methodology.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Nola |first1=Robert |author1-link= Robert Nola |last2=Sankey |first2=Howard |date=2007 |title=Theories of Scientific Method: An Introduction |series=Philosophy and science |volume=2 |location=Montréal |publisher=[[McGill–Queen's University Press]] |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aKjgBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1], [https://books.google.com/books?id=aKjgBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA300 300] |isbn=9780773533448 |oclc=144602109 |doi=10.4324/9781315711959 |quote=There is a large core of people who think there is such a thing as a scientific method that can be justified, although not all agree as to what this might be. But there are also a growing number of people who think that there is no method to be justified. For some, the whole idea is yesteryear's debate, the continuation of which can be summed up as yet more of the proverbial 'flogging a dead horse'. We beg to differ. ... We shall claim that Feyerabend did endorse various scientific values, did accept rules of method (on a certain understanding of what these are), and did attempt to justify them using a meta methodology somewhat akin to the principle of [[reflective equilibrium]].}}</ref> Staddon (2017) argues it is a mistake to try following rules in the absence of an algorithmic scientific method; in that case, "science is best understood through examples".<ref name="Staddon 2017 p. ">{{cite book |last=Staddon |first=John | title=Scientific Method: How Science Works, Fails to Work, and Pretends to Work | publisher=Routledge | publication-place=New York | date=2017-12-01 | isbn=978-1-315-10070-8 | doi=10.4324/9781315100708 | page=}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/21425/StaddonHistoryofScienceSept2020.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y| title = Whatever Happened to History of Science?| date = 16 September 2020| access-date = 2021-08-27 | archive-date = 2021-08-27 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210827092318/https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/21425/StaddonHistoryofScienceSept2020.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y| url-status = live| last1 = Staddon| first1 = John|quote="science is best understood through examples"}}</ref> But algorithmic methods, such as ''disproof of existing theory by experiment'' have been used since [[Alhacen]] (1027) ''[[Book of Optics]]'',{{efn|name= alhacenCharacterizes}} and Galileo (1638) ''Two New Sciences'',{{sfnp|Galileo Galilei|1638}} and ''The Assayer''<ref name= ilSaggiatore /> still stand as scientific method. == Overview == There are different ways of outlining the basic method used for scientific inquiry and they are better considered as general principles than a fixed sequence of steps.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|p=3}} The [[scientific community]] and [[philosophers of science]] generally agree on the following classification of method components. These methodological elements and organization of procedures tend to be more characteristic of [[experimental science]]s than [[social science]]s. Nonetheless, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses, will resemble the cycle described below.{{anchor|epistemicCycle|Process}} The scientific method is an iterative, cyclical process through which information is continually revised.{{efn-lg|name=unifiedMethod|1= The topics of study, as expressed in the vocabulary of its scientists, are approached by a "single unified method".<ref name= cowles />{{rp|pp.8,13,33–35,60}} A topic is [[Unification of theories in physics|unified]] by its [[Predicate variable|predicate]]s, which describe a [[system]] of mathematical [[Expression (mathematics)|expression]]s.<ref name=Knight1989 >Kevin Knight (1989) [https://kevincrawfordknight.github.io/papers/unification-knight.pdf Unification: A Multidisciplinary Survey] ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1989 </ref>{{rp|93-94,113-117}} The values which a [[Predicate (mathematical logic)|predicate]] might take, then serve as [[Witness (mathematics)|witness]] to the validity of a predicated expression (that is, ''true'' or ''false''; 'predicted but not yet observed'; 'corroborates', etc.).}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Godfrey-Smith |first1=Peter |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k23egtSWrb8C |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |date=2009 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |location=Chicago |author-link=Peter Godfrey-Smith |access-date=2020-05-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112726/https://books.google.com/books?id=k23egtSWrb8C |archive-date=2023-11-29 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Brody-1993">{{harvp|Brody|1993|p=10}} calls this an ''[[#epistemicCycle|epistemic cycle]]''; these cycles can occur at high levels of abstraction.</ref> It is generally recognized to develop advances in knowledge through the following elements, in varying combinations or contributions:<ref name="Fixation">{{cite wikisource|title=The Fixation of Belief|first=Charles Sanders|last=Peirce|year=1877|wslink=The Fixation of Belief|volume=12|pages=1–15|journal=Popular Science Monthly}}.</ref><ref name="Vital">Peirce, Charles S., ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, in paragraph 582, from 1898: "... [rational] inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of self-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeply saturating its inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn what is true."</ref><!--ref>{{cite book|last1=Kuhn |first1=Thomas S.|title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 50th Anniversary Edition|date=2012 |publisher=University of Chicago Press|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-226-45811-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3eP5Y_OOuzwC|access-date=29 January 2018}}{{pn|date=August 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Galison |first1=Peter|title=How Experiments End|date=1987|publisher=University of Chicago Press|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-226-27915-2|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DN-9m2jSo8YC |access-date=29 January 2018}}</ref--> * Characterizations (observations, definitions, and measurements of the subject of inquiry) * Hypotheses (theoretical, hypothetical explanations of observations and measurements of the subject) * Predictions (inductive and deductive reasoning from the hypothesis or theory) * Experiments (tests of all of the above) Each element of the scientific method is subject to [[peer review]] for possible mistakes. These activities do not describe all that scientists do but [[#Beliefs and biases|apply mostly to experimental sciences]] (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology). The elements above are often taught in [[education|the educational system]] as "the scientific method".{{efn-ua|name= aQuestion| In the [[Inquiry-based learning|inquiry-based education]] paradigm, the stage of "characterization, observation, definition, ..." is more briefly summed up under the rubric of a Question. The question at some stage might be as basic as the [[5Ws]], or ''is this answer true?'', or ''who else might know this?'', or ''can I ask them?'', and so forth. The questions of the inquirer spiral until the goal is reached.}} The scientific method is not a single recipe: it requires intelligence, imagination, and creativity.<ref>{{harvp|Einstein|Infeld|1938|p=92}}: "To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science."</ref> In this sense, it is not a mindless set of standards and procedures to follow but is rather an [[#Evaluation and improvement|ongoing cycle]], constantly developing more useful, accurate, and comprehensive models and methods. For example, when Einstein developed the Special and General Theories of Relativity, he did not in any way refute or discount Newton's ''Principia''. On the contrary, if the astronomically massive, the feather-light, and the extremely fast are removed from Einstein's theories – all phenomena Newton could not have observed – Newton's equations are what remain. Einstein's theories are expansions and refinements of Newton's theories and, thus, increase confidence in Newton's work. {{anchor|aGuideline}}An iterative,<ref name="Brody-1993" /> pragmatic<ref name="truthSought4sake" /> scheme of the four points above is sometimes offered as a guideline for proceeding:<ref>{{cite journal |vauthors=Crawford S, Stucki L |year=1990 |title=Peer review and the changing research record |journal=Journal of the American Society for Information Science |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=223–228 |doi=10.1002/(SICI)1097-4571(199004)41:3<223::AID-ASI14>3.0.CO;2-3}}</ref> # Define a question # Gather information and resources (observe) # Form an explanatory hypothesis # Test the hypothesis by performing an experiment and collecting data in a [[Reproducibility|reproducible]] manner # Analyze the data # Interpret the data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for a new hypothesis # Publish results # Retest (frequently done by other scientists) The iterative cycle inherent in this step-by-step method goes from point 3 to 6 and back to 3 again. While this schema outlines a typical hypothesis/testing method,{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|loc=esp. chapters 5–8}} many philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, including [[Paul Feyerabend]],{{efn|name= descartes| "no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some of the philosophers". —Descartes<ref name= discourseOnMethod >[[René Descartes]] (1637) [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Discourse_on_the_Method/Part_2 Discourse on the Method/Part 2] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210901150801/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Discourse_on_the_Method/Part_2 |date=2021-09-01 }} Part II</ref> }} claim that such descriptions of scientific method have little relation to the ways that science is actually practiced. ==Elements of the scientific method== {{anchor|Context}}The basic elements of the scientific method are illustrated by the following example (which occurred from 1944 to 1953) from the discovery of the structure of DNA (marked with [[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] and indented). ===Characterizations=== <blockquote>{{Anchor|DNA-characterizations}}[[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] In 1950, it was known that [[genetic inheritance]] had a mathematical description, starting with the studies of [[Gregor Mendel]], and that DNA contained genetic information (Oswald Avery's ''transforming principle'').{{sfnp|McCarty|1985|page=252}} But the mechanism of storing genetic information (i.e., genes) in DNA was unclear. Researchers in [[William Lawrence Bragg|Bragg's]] laboratory at [[University of Cambridge|Cambridge University]] made [[X-ray]] [[diffraction]] pictures of various [[molecule]]s, starting with [[crystal]]s of [[salt]], and proceeding to more complicated substances. Using clues painstakingly assembled over decades, beginning with its chemical composition, it was determined that it should be possible to characterize the physical structure of DNA, and the X-ray images would be the vehicle.{{sfnp|McElheny|2004|p=34}}</blockquote>The scientific method depends upon increasingly sophisticated characterizations of the subjects of investigation. (The ''subjects'' can also be called [[:Category:Lists of unsolved problems|''unsolved problems'']] or the ''unknowns''.){{efn-ua|name= aQuestion}} For example, [[Benjamin Franklin]] conjectured, correctly, that [[St. Elmo's fire]] was [[electrical]] in [[nature]], but it has taken a long series of experiments and theoretical changes to establish this. While seeking the pertinent properties of the subjects, careful thought may also [[logical consequence|entail]] some definitions and [[observations]]; these observations often demand careful [[measurements]] and/or counting can take the form of expansive [[empirical research]]. A [[Research question|scientific question]] can refer to the explanation of a specific [[observation]],{{efn-ua|name= aQuestion}} as in "Why is the sky blue?" but can also be open-ended, as in "How can I [[Drug design|design a drug]] to cure this particular disease?" This stage frequently involves finding and evaluating evidence from previous experiments, personal scientific observations or assertions, as well as the work of other scientists. If the answer is already known, a different question that builds on the evidence can be posed. When applying the scientific method to research, determining a good question can be very difficult and it will affect the outcome of the investigation.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=C7pZftbI0ZMC |title=Translational and Experimental Clinical Research |publisher=Lippincott Williams & Wilkins |year=2005 |isbn=9780781755658 |editor-last1=Schuster |editor-first1=Daniel P. |chapter=Ch. 1 |access-date=2021-11-27 |editor-last2=Powers |editor-first2=William J. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112636/https://books.google.com/books?id=C7pZftbI0ZMC |archive-date=2023-11-29 |url-status=live}} This chapter also discusses the different types of research questions and how they are produced.</ref> The systematic, careful collection of measurements or counts of relevant quantities is often the critical difference between [[Pseudoscience|pseudo-sciences]], such as alchemy, and science, such as chemistry or biology. Scientific measurements are usually tabulated, graphed, or mapped, and statistical manipulations, such as [[correlation]] and [[regression analysis|regression]], performed on them. The measurements might be made in a controlled setting, such as a laboratory, or made on more or less inaccessible or unmanipulatable objects such as stars or human populations. The measurements often require [[#Instrumentation|specialized]] [[scientific instrument]]s such as [[thermometer]]s, [[Spectrometer|spectroscopes]], [[particle accelerator]]s, or [[voltmeter]]s, and the progress of a scientific field is usually intimately tied to their invention and improvement. {{Blockquote|text=I am not accustomed to saying anything with certainty after only one or two observations.|author=[[Andreas Vesalius]]|source=(1546)<ref> Andreas Vesalius, ''Epistola, Rationem, Modumque Propinandi Radicis Chynae Decocti'' (1546), p. 141. Quoted and translated in C.D. O'Malley, ''Andreas Vesalius of Brussels'', (1964), p. 116. As quoted by {{harvp|Bynum|Porter|2005|p=597}}: "Andreas Vesalius" </ref>}} ====Uncertainty==== Measurements in scientific work are also usually accompanied by estimates of their [[uncertainty]].<ref name="conjugatePairs" /> The uncertainty is often estimated by making repeated measurements of the desired quantity. Uncertainties may also be calculated by consideration of the uncertainties of the individual underlying quantities used. Counts of things, such as the number of people in a nation at a particular time, may also have an uncertainty due to [[data collection]] limitations. Or counts may represent a sample of desired quantities, with an uncertainty that depends upon the [[sampling method]] used and the number of samples taken. ====Definition==== The scientific definition of a term sometimes differs substantially from its [[natural language]] usage. For example, [[mass]] and [[weight]] overlap in meaning in common discourse, but have distinct meanings in [[mechanics]]. Scientific quantities are often characterized by their [[units of measurement|units of measure]] which can later be described in terms of conventional physical units when communicating the work. New theories are sometimes developed after realizing certain terms have not previously been sufficiently clearly defined. For example, [[Albert Einstein]]'s first paper on [[Special relativity|relativity]] begins by defining [[Relativity of simultaneity|simultaneity]] and the means for determining [[length]]. These ideas were skipped over by [[Isaac Newton]] with, "I do not define [[time in physics#Galileo: the flow of time|time]], space, place and [[motion (physics)|motion]], as being well known to all." Einstein's paper then demonstrates that they (viz., absolute time and length independent of motion) were approximations. [[Francis Crick]] cautions us that when characterizing a subject, however, it can be premature to define something when it remains ill-understood.<ref>Crick, Francis (1994), ''The Astonishing Hypothesis'' {{ISBN|0-684-19431-7}} p. 20 </ref> In Crick's study of [[consciousness]], he actually found it easier to study [[awareness]] in the [[visual system]], rather than to study [[free will]], for example. His cautionary example was the gene; the gene was much more poorly understood before Watson and Crick's pioneering discovery of the structure of DNA; it would have been counterproductive to spend much time on the definition of the gene, before them. ===Hypothesis development=== {{Main|Hypothesis formation}} <blockquote>{{Anchor|DNA-hypotheses}}[[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] [[Linus Pauling]] proposed that DNA might be a [[triple helix]].<ref>{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=40}}: October 1951 — "That's what a helix should look like!" Crick exclaimed in delight (This is the Cochran-Crick-Vand-Stokes theory of the transform of a helix).</ref><ref> {{harvp|Judson|1979|p=157}}. {{"'}}The structure that we propose is a three-chain structure, each chain being a helix' – Linus Pauling"</ref> This hypothesis was also considered by [[Francis Crick]] and [[James D. Watson]] but discarded. When Watson and Crick learned of Pauling's hypothesis, they understood from existing data that Pauling was wrong.<ref> {{harvp|McElheny|2004|pp=49–50}}: January 28, 1953 — Watson read Pauling's pre-print, and realized that in Pauling's model, DNA's phosphate groups had to be un-ionized. But DNA is an acid, which contradicts Pauling's model. </ref> and that Pauling would soon admit his difficulties with that structure.</blockquote>{{Anchor|Hypothesis}}A [[hypothesis]] is a suggested explanation of a phenomenon, or alternately a reasoned proposal suggesting a possible correlation between or among a set of phenomena. Normally hypotheses have the form of a [[mathematical model]]. Sometimes, but not always, they can also be formulated as [[existential quantification|existential statements]], stating that some particular instance of the phenomenon being studied has some characteristic and causal explanations, which have the general form of [[universal quantification|universal statements]], stating that every instance of the phenomenon has a particular characteristic. Scientists are free to use whatever resources they have – their own creativity, ideas from other fields, [[inductive reasoning]], [[Bayesian inference]], and so on – to imagine possible explanations for a phenomenon under study. {{anchor|noLogicalBridge}}Albert Einstein once observed that "there is no logical bridge between phenomena and their theoretical principles."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Einstein |first1=Albert |title=The World as I See It |date=1949 |publisher=Philosophical Library |location=New York |pages=24–28}}</ref>{{efn|name= leapIsInvolved |"A leap is involved in all thinking" —John Dewey<ref>{{harvp|Dewey|1910|p=26}}</ref> }} [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], borrowing a page from [[Aristotle]] (''[[Prior Analytics]]'', [[Inquiry#Abduction|2.25]])<ref name="aristotleAbduction">[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Organon_(Owen)/Prior_Analytics/Book_2#Chapter_25 Aristotle (trans. 1853) ''Prior Analytics'' 2.25] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910034741/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Organon_(Owen)/Prior_Analytics/Book_2#Chapter_25 |date=2021-09-10 }} via Wikisource</ref> described the incipient stages of [[inquiry]], instigated by the "irritation of doubt" to venture a plausible guess, as ''[[abductive reasoning]]''.<ref name="How">{{cite wikisource|title=How to Make Our Ideas Clear|first=Charles Sanders|last=Peirce|year=1877|wslink=How to Make Our Ideas Clear|volume=12|pages=286–302|journal=Popular Science Monthly}}</ref>{{rp|II,p.290}} The history of science is filled with stories of scientists claiming a "flash of inspiration", or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to support or refute their idea. [[Michael Polanyi]] made such creativity the centerpiece of his discussion of methodology. [[William Glen (geologist and historian)|William Glen]] observes that{{sfnp|Glen|1994|pp=37–38}} {{Blockquote|text=the success of a hypothesis, or its service to science, lies not simply in its perceived "truth", or power to displace, subsume or reduce a predecessor idea, but perhaps more in its ability to stimulate the research that will illuminate ... bald suppositions and areas of vagueness.|author= William Glen|title= ''The Mass-Extinction Debates'' }} In general, scientists tend to look for theories that are "[[Elegance|elegant]]" or "[[beauty|beautiful]]". Scientists often use these terms to refer to a theory that is following the known facts but is nevertheless relatively simple and easy to handle. [[Occam's Razor]] serves as a rule of thumb for choosing the most desirable amongst a group of equally explanatory hypotheses. To minimize the [[confirmation bias]] that results from entertaining a single hypothesis, [[strong inference]] emphasizes the need for entertaining multiple alternative hypotheses.<ref name="platt">{{cite journal |last=Platt |first=John R. |author-link=John R. Platt |date=16 October 1964 |title=Strong Inference |journal=Science |volume=146 |issue=3642 |pages=347– |doi=10.1126/science.146.3642.347|pmid=17739513 |bibcode=1964Sci...146..347P }}</ref> ===Predictions from the hypothesis=== {{Further|Prediction#Science}}<blockquote>{{Anchor|DNA-predictions}}[[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] [[James D. Watson]], [[Francis Crick]], and others hypothesized that DNA had a helical structure. This implied that DNA's X-ray diffraction pattern would be 'x shaped'.<ref name="Crick pp. 137–138">{{harvp|Judson|1979|pp=137–138}}: "Watson did enough work on [[Tobacco mosaic virus]] to produce the diffraction pattern for a helix, per Crick's work on the transform of a helix."</ref><ref name="McElheny 2004 43">{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=43}}: June 1952 — Watson had succeeded in getting X-ray pictures of TMV showing a diffraction pattern consistent with the transform of a helix.</ref> This prediction followed from the work of Cochran, Crick and Vand<ref name="HelixTransform">Cochran W, Crick FHC and Vand V. (1952) "The Structure of Synthetic Polypeptides. I. The Transform of Atoms on a Helix", ''[[Acta Crystallographica|Acta Crystallogr.]]'', '''5''', 581–586.</ref> (and independently by Stokes). The Cochran-Crick-Vand-Stokes theorem provided a mathematical explanation for the empirical observation that diffraction from helical structures produces x-shaped patterns. In their first paper, Watson and Crick also noted that the [[double helix]] structure they proposed provided a simple mechanism for [[DNA replication]], writing, "It has not escaped our notice that the specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material".<ref>{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=68}}: ''Nature'' April 25, 1953.</ref></blockquote>{{Anchor|Prediction}}Any useful hypothesis will enable [[prediction]]s, by [[reasoning]] including [[deductive reasoning]].{{efn-lg|1= From the hypothesis, deduce valid forms using [[Deductive reasoning#Modus ponens|modus ponens]], or using [[Deductive reasoning#Modus tollens|modus tollens]]. Avoid invalid forms such as [[affirming the consequent]].}} It might predict the outcome of an experiment in a laboratory setting or the observation of a phenomenon in nature. The prediction can also be statistical and deal only with probabilities. It is essential that the outcome of testing such a prediction be currently unknown. Only in this case does a successful outcome increase the probability that the hypothesis is true. If the outcome is already known, it is called a consequence and should have already been considered while [[#Hypothesis development|formulating the hypothesis]]. If the predictions are not accessible by observation or experience, the hypothesis is not yet testable and so will remain to that extent unscientific in a strict sense. A new technology or theory might make the necessary experiments feasible. For example, while a hypothesis on the existence of other intelligent species may be convincing with scientifically based speculation, no known experiment can test this hypothesis. Therefore, science itself can have little to say about the possibility. In the future, a new technique may allow for an experimental test and the speculation would then become part of accepted science. For example, Einstein's theory of [[general relativity]] makes several specific predictions about the observable structure of [[spacetime]], such as that [[light]] bends in a [[gravitational field]], and that the amount of bending depends in a precise way on the strength of that gravitational field. [[Arthur Eddington]]'s [[Eddington experiment|observations made during a 1919 solar eclipse]] supported General Relativity rather than Newtonian [[gravitation]].<ref>In March 1917, the [[Royal Astronomical Society]] announced that on May 29, 1919, the occasion of a [[total eclipse]] of the sun would afford favorable conditions for testing Einstein's [[General theory of relativity]]. One expedition, to [[Sobral, Ceará]], [[Brazil]], and Eddington's expedition to the island of [[Principe]] yielded a set of photographs, which, when compared to photographs taken at [[Sobral, Ceará|Sobral]] and at [[Greenwich Observatory]] showed that the deviation of light was measured to be 1.69 [[arc-second]]s, as compared to Einstein's desk prediction of 1.75 [[arc-second]]s. – Antonina Vallentin (1954), ''Einstein'', as quoted by Samuel Rapport and Helen Wright (1965), ''Physics'', New York: Washington Square Press, pp. 294–295.</ref> ===Experiments=== {{Main|Experiment}}<blockquote>{{Anchor|DNA-experiments}}[[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] Watson and Crick showed an initial (and incorrect) proposal for the structure of DNA to a team from [[King's College London]] – [[Rosalind Franklin]], [[Maurice Wilkins]], and [[Raymond Gosling]]. Franklin immediately spotted the flaws which concerned the water content. Later Watson saw Franklin's [[photo 51]], a detailed X-ray diffraction image, which showed an X-shape<ref>{{cite web |title=The Secret of Photo 51 |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/photo51/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831201252/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/photo51/ |archive-date=2017-08-31 |access-date=2017-09-11 |work=NOVA |publisher=PBS}}</ref><ref name=photo51Explained >[[Cynthia Wolberger]] [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tMuMRY1oDo (2021) Photograph 51 explained]</ref> and was able to confirm the structure was helical.<ref name="TeaTime">{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=52}}: Friday, January 30, 1953. Tea time — Franklin confronts Watson and his paper – "Of course it [Pauling's pre-print] is wrong. DNA is not a helix." However, Watson then visits Wilkins' office, sees [[photo 51]], and immediately recognizes the diffraction pattern of a helical structure. But additional questions remained, requiring additional iterations of their research. For example, the number of strands in the backbone of the helix (Crick suspected 2 strands, but cautioned Watson to examine that more critically), the location of the base pairs (inside the backbone or outside the backbone), etc. One key point was that they realized that the quickest way to reach a result was not to continue a mathematical analysis, but to build a physical model. Later that evening — Watson urges Wilkins to begin model-building immediately. But Wilkins agrees to do so only after Franklin's departure.</ref><ref name="Watson 1968 167">{{harvp|Watson|1968|p=167}}: "The instant I saw the picture my mouth fell open and my pulse began to race." Page 168 shows the X-shaped pattern of the B-form of [[DNA]], clearly indicating crucial details of its helical structure to Watson and Crick.</ref>{{efn|name= nextItemToSettle| The goal shifts: after observing the x-ray diffraction pattern of DNA,<ref name=TeaTime /><ref name=photo51Explained /> and as time was of the essence,<ref name=econ/> Watson and Crick realize that fastest way to discover DNA's structure was not by mathematical analysis,<ref name= reasonsFirstRule /> but by [[#DNA-iterations|building physical models]].<ref name= SameShape />}}</blockquote> {{anchor|suitableTest|Testing|Crucial experiment}}Once predictions are made, they can be sought by experiments. If the test results contradict the predictions, the hypotheses which entailed them are called into question and become less tenable. Sometimes the experiments are conducted incorrectly or are not very well designed when compared to a [[crucial experiment]]. If the experimental results confirm the predictions, then the hypotheses are considered more likely to be correct, but might still be wrong and continue to be subject to [[#Evaluation and improvement|further testing.]] The [[experimental control]] is a technique for dealing with observational error. This technique uses [[#the control group|the contrast between multiple samples, or observations, or populations, under differing conditions]], to see what varies or what remains the same. We vary the conditions for the acts of measurement, to help isolate what has changed. [[Mill's canons]] can then help us figure out what the important factor is.<ref>[[John Stuart Mill|Mill, John Stuart]], "A System of Logic", University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002, {{ISBN|1-4102-0252-6}}.</ref> [[Factor analysis]] is one technique for discovering the important factor in an effect. Depending on the predictions, the experiments can have different shapes. It could be a classical experiment in a laboratory setting, a [[double-blind]] study or an archaeological [[excavation (archaeology)|excavation]]. Even taking a plane from [[New York City|New York]] to [[Paris]] is an experiment that tests the [[aerodynamics|aerodynamical]] hypotheses used for constructing the plane. These institutions thereby reduce the research function to a cost/benefit,<ref name="conjugatePairs" /> which is expressed as money, and the time and attention of the researchers to be expended,<ref name="conjugatePairs" /> in exchange for a report to their constituents.<ref name="nsf">National Science Foundation (NSF) (2021) [https://www.nsf.gov/oig/reports/ NSF Reports] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817165231/https://www.nsf.gov/oig/reports/|date=2021-08-17}} and [https://www.nsf.gov/news/ News] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210820162008/https://www.nsf.gov/news/|date=2021-08-20}}</ref> Current large instruments, such as CERN's [[Large Hadron Collider]] (LHC),<ref name="lhc">{{Cite web |title=LHC long term schedule |url=https://lhc-commissioning.web.cern.ch/lhc-commissioning/schedule/LHC-long-term.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200425105121/https://lhc-commissioning.web.cern.ch/lhc-commissioning/schedule/LHC-long-term.htm |archive-date=2020-04-25 |access-date=2021-08-22 |website=lhc-commissioning.web.cern.ch}} (2021)</ref> or [[LIGO]],<ref name="ligo">{{cite web |title=ligo.caltech.edu (1999) Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory |url=https://www.ligo.caltech.edu/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210901125538/https://www.ligo.caltech.edu/ |archive-date=2021-09-01 |access-date=2021-08-30}}</ref> or the [[National Ignition Facility]] (NIF),<ref name="nif">{{cite web |title=NIF (2021) What Is the National Ignition Facility? |url=https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/what-is-nif |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170731064919/https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/what-is-nif |archive-date=2017-07-31 |access-date=2021-08-22}}</ref> or the [[International Space Station]] (ISS),<ref name="iss">{{cite web |date=12 January 2015 |title=ISS (2021) International Space Station |url=https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050907073730/http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/index.html |archive-date=2005-09-07 |access-date=2021-08-22}}</ref> or the [[James Webb Space Telescope]] (JWST),<ref name="jwst">{{cite web |title=JWST (2021) WEBB Space Telescope |url=https://www.jwst.nasa.gov/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120104225155/http://www.jwst.nasa.gov/ |archive-date=2012-01-04 |access-date=2021-08-22}}</ref><ref name="jwstDeploymentSeq">James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RzGLKQ7_KZQ (12 Nov 2021) James Webb Space Telescope Deployment Sequence (Nominal)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211223035530/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RzGLKQ7_KZQ|date=2021-12-23}} highlights the predictions from launch to day+29,</ref> entail expected costs of billions of dollars, and timeframes extending over decades. These kinds of institutions affect public policy, on a national or even international basis, and the researchers would require shared access to such machines and their [[#otherScientists|adjunct infrastructure]].{{efn-lg|name= feedTheMachinery| The machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be fed with facts of observation. —[[C.S. Peirce]]<ref name= How/>}}<ref name="Crutchfield" >{{cite web|url=http://csc.ucdavis.edu/~chaos/chaos/talks/CSTheorySFIRetreat.pdf|title=James Crutchfield (2003) "Complex Systems Theory?"|access-date=2018-05-27 |archive-date=2021-04-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418204840/http://csc.ucdavis.edu/~chaos/chaos/talks/CSTheorySFIRetreat.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> {{anchor|ethicalPosition}}Scientists assume an attitude of openness and accountability on the part of those experimenting. Detailed record-keeping is essential, to aid in recording and reporting on the experimental results, and supports the effectiveness and integrity of the procedure. They will also assist in reproducing the experimental results, likely by others. Traces of this approach can be seen in the work of [[Hipparchus]] (190–120 BCE), when determining a value for the precession of the Earth, while [[Scientific control|controlled experiments]] can be seen in the works of [[Muhammad ibn Jābir al-Harrānī al-Battānī|al-Battani]] (853–929 CE)<ref>[[Muhammad ibn Jābir al-Harrānī al-Battānī|al-Battani]], ''De Motu Stellarum'' [[Latin translations of the 12th century|translation from Arabic to Latin in 1116]], as cited by E. S. Kennedy, ''A Survey of Islamic Astronomical Tables,'' (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, 46, 2), Philadelphia, 1956, pp. 10–11, 32–34.</ref> and [[#alhazen|Alhazen]] (965–1039 CE).{{sfnp|Smith|2001b}}{{efn|''[[Book of Optics]]'' Book II [3.52] to [3.66] Summary p.444 for Alhazen's experiments on color; pp.343—394 for his physiological experiments on the eye{{sfnp|Smith|2001b}} }}{{efn|name= straightLinesOnly |''[[Book of Optics]]'' Book Seven, Chapter Two [2.1] p.220: — light travels through transparent bodies, such as air, water, glass, transparent stones, in straight lines. "Indeed, this is observable by means of experiment".<ref name= smith2010 >{{harvp|Smith|2010|p=220}} Book Seven covers refraction.</ref> }} ===Communication and iteration=== {{See also|Scientific literature|Scholarly communication}} <blockquote> {{Anchor|DNA-iterations}}[[File:DNA icon.svg|frameless|22x22px|link=|alt=DNA label]] Watson and Crick then produced their model, using this information along with the previously known information about DNA's composition, especially Chargaff's rules of base pairing.<ref name="SameShape">{{harvp|McElheny|2004|pp=57–59}}: Saturday, February 28, 1953 — Watson found the base-pairing mechanism which explained [[Chargaff's rules]] using his cardboard models.</ref> After considerable fruitless experimentation, being discouraged by their superior from continuing, and numerous false starts,<ref>{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=53}}: The weekend (January 31 – February 1) — After seeing photo 51, Watson informed Bragg of the X-ray diffraction image of DNA in B form. Bragg permitted them to restart their research on DNA (that is, model building).</ref><ref>{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=54}}: Sunday, February 8, 1953 — Maurice Wilkes gave Watson and Crick permission to work on models, as Wilkes would not be building models until Franklin left DNA research.</ref><ref>{{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=56}}: [[Jerry Donohue]], on sabbatical from Pauling's lab and visiting Cambridge, advises Watson that the textbook form of the base pairs was incorrect for DNA base pairs; rather, the keto form of the base pairs should be used instead. This form allowed the bases' hydrogen bonds to pair 'unlike' with 'unlike', rather than to pair 'like' with 'like', as Watson was inclined to model, based on the textbook statements. On February 27, 1953, Watson was convinced enough to make cardboard models of the nucleotides in their keto form.</ref> Watson and Crick were able to infer the essential structure of [[DNA]] by concrete [[model (abstract)|modeling]] [[DNA#History|of the physical shapes]] of the [[nucleotide]]s which comprise it.<ref name="SameShape" /><ref> {{harvp|Watson|1968|pp=194–197}}: "Suddenly I became aware that an [[adenine]]-[[thymine]] pair held together by two [[hydrogen bond]]s was identical in shape to a [[guanine]]-[[cytosine]] pair held together by at least two hydrogen bonds. ..."</ref><ref> {{harvp|McElheny|2004|p=57}}: Saturday, February 28, 1953 — Watson tried 'like with like' and admitted these base pairs didn't have hydrogen bonds that line up. But after trying 'unlike with unlike', and getting [[Jerry Donohue]]'s approval, the base pairs turned out to be identical in shape (as Watson stated above in his 1968 ''Double Helix'' memoir quoted above). Watson now felt confident enough to inform Crick. (Of course, 'unlike with unlike' increases the number of possible [[codon]]s, if this scheme were a [[genetic code]].) </ref> They were guided by the bond lengths which had been deduced by [[Linus Pauling]] and by [[Rosalind Franklin]]'s X-ray diffraction images. </blockquote> {{Anchor|Analysis}}The scientific method is iterative. At any stage, it is possible to refine its [[accuracy and precision]], so that some consideration will lead the scientist to repeat an earlier part of the process. Failure to develop an interesting hypothesis may lead a scientist to re-define the subject under consideration. Failure of a hypothesis to produce interesting and testable predictions may lead to reconsideration of the hypothesis or of the definition of the subject. Failure of an experiment to produce interesting results may lead a scientist to reconsider the experimental method, the hypothesis, or the definition of the subject. {{anchor|alhazen}}This manner of iteration can span decades and sometimes centuries. [[Academic publishing#Types of academic paper|Published papers]] can be built upon. For example: By 1027, [[Alhazen]], based on his measurements of the [[refraction]] of light, was able to deduce that [[outer space]] was less dense than [[air]], that is: "the body of the heavens is rarer than the body of air".<ref name="alhacenOnRefraction4.28">{{harvp|Smith|2010}} Book 7, [4.28] p.270</ref> In 1079 [[Ibn Mu'adh al-Jayyani|Ibn Mu'adh]]'s ''Treatise On Twilight'' was able to infer that Earth's atmosphere was 50 miles thick, based on [[atmospheric refraction]] of the sun's rays.{{efn|name= crepusculis|1= The Sun's rays are still visible at [[twilight]] in the morning and evening due to atmospheric refraction even when the depression angle of the sun is 18° below the horizon.<ref name= brGoldstein >Goldstein, Bernard R. (1977) [[Ibn Mu'adh al-Jayyani|Ibn Mu'adh]]'s "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/41133483 (1079) Treatise On Twilight and the Height of the Atmosphere] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921011840/https://www.jstor.org/stable/41133483 |date=2022-09-21 }}" ''[[Archive for History of Exact Sciences]]'' Vol. '''17''', No. 2 (21.VII.1977), pp. 97-118 (22 pages) JSTOR. (''Treatise On Twilight'' was printed by F Risner in ''Opticae Thesaurus'' (1572) as ''Liber de crepusculis'', but attributed to Alhazen rather than Ibn Mu'adh.)</ref> }} This is why the scientific method is often represented as circular – new information leads to new characterisations, and the cycle of science continues. Measurements collected [[Research data archiving| can be archived]], passed onwards and used by others. {{anchor|otherScientists}}Other scientists may start their own research and [[#aGuideline |enter the process]] at any stage. They might adopt the characterization and formulate their own hypothesis, or they might adopt the hypothesis and deduce their own predictions. Often the experiment is not done by the person who made the prediction, and the characterization is based on experiments done by someone else. Published results of experiments can also serve as a hypothesis predicting their own reproducibility. ==Scientific integrity== {{Main|Scientific integrity}} ===Confirmation<!--Linked from [[Confirmation (disambiguation)]]-->=== {{Main|Reproducibility}} Science is a social enterprise, and scientific work tends to be accepted by the scientific community when it has been confirmed. Crucially, experimental and theoretical results must be reproduced by others within the scientific community. Researchers have given their lives for this vision; [[Georg Wilhelm Richmann]] was killed by [[ball lightning]] (1753) when attempting to replicate the 1752 kite-flying experiment of [[Benjamin Franklin]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Krider |first=E. Philip |date=Jan 2006 |title=Benjamin Franklin and lightning rods |journal=Physics Today |volume=59 |issue=1 |page=42 |doi=10.1063/1.2180176 |bibcode=2006PhT....59a..42K |s2cid=110623159 |quote=On 6 August 1753, the Swedish scientist Georg Wilhelm Richmann was electrocuted in St. Petersburg ...|doi-access=free }}</ref> {{anchor|Evaluation and improvement}}If an experiment cannot be [[Reproducibility|repeated]] to produce the same results, this implies that the original results might have been in error. As a result, it is common for a single experiment to be performed multiple times, especially when there are uncontrolled variables or other indications of [[Observational error|experimental error]]. For significant or surprising results, other scientists may also attempt to replicate the results for themselves, especially if those results would be important to their own work.<ref>{{cite web |title=Reconstruction of Galileo Galilei's experiment – the inclined plane |url=http://www.fyysika.ee/vorgustik/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Reconstruction-of-Galileo-Galilei.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140429075745/http://www.fyysika.ee/vorgustik/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Reconstruction-of-Galileo-Galilei.pdf |archive-date=2014-04-29 |access-date=2014-04-28}}</ref> Replication has become a contentious issue in social and biomedical science where treatments are administered to groups of individuals. Typically an ''experimental group'' gets the treatment, such as a drug, and the ''control group'' gets a placebo. [[John Ioannidis]] in 2005 pointed out that the method being used has led to many findings that cannot be replicated.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Ioannidis |first=John P. A. |date=August 2005 |title=Why most published research findings are false |journal=[[PLOS Medicine]] |volume=2 |issue=8 |pages=e124 |doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 |pmc=1182327 |pmid=16060722 |doi-access=free}}</ref> The process of [[peer review]] involves the evaluation of the experiment by experts, who typically give their opinions anonymously. Some journals request that the experimenter provide lists of possible peer reviewers, especially if the field is highly specialized. Peer review does not certify the correctness of the results, only that, in the opinion of the reviewer, the experiments themselves were sound (based on the description supplied by the experimenter). If the work passes peer review, which occasionally may require new experiments requested by the reviewers, it will be published in a peer-reviewed [[Academic journal|scientific journal]]. The specific journal that publishes the results indicates the perceived quality of the work.{{efn-lg|In ''Two New Sciences'', there are three 'reviewers': Simplicio, Sagredo, and Salviati, who serve as foil, antagonist, and protagonist. Galileo speaks for himself only briefly. But Einstein's 1905 papers were not peer-reviewed before their publication.}} Scientists typically are careful in recording their data, a requirement promoted by [[Ludwik Fleck]] (1896–1961) and others.{{sfnp|Fleck|1979|pp=xxvii–xxviii}} Though not typically required, they might be requested to [[Data sharing|supply this data]] to other scientists who wish to replicate their original results (or parts of their original results), extending to the sharing of any experimental samples that may be difficult to obtain.<ref>"[http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/index.htm NIH Data Sharing Policy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120513171213/http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/index.htm|date=2012-05-13}}."</ref> To protect against bad science and fraudulent data, government research-granting agencies such as the [[National Science Foundation]], and science journals, including ''Nature'' and ''Science'', have a policy that researchers must archive their data and methods so that other researchers can test the data and methods and build on the research that has gone before. [[Scientific data archiving]] can be done at several national archives in the U.S. or the [[World Data Center]]. ===Beliefs and biases=== {{multiple image | align = right | direction = vertical | width = 220 | image1 = Jean Louis Théodore Géricault 001.jpg | caption1 = Flying gallop as shown by this painting ([[Théodore Géricault]], 1821) is [[Falsifiability|falsified]]; see below. | image2 = The Horse in Motion high res.jpg | caption2 = [[Sallie Gardner at a Gallop|Muybridge's photographs]] of ''The Horse in Motion'', 1878, were used to answer the question of whether all four feet of a galloping horse are ever off the ground at the same time. This demonstrates a use of photography as an experimental tool in science. }} Scientific methodology often directs that [[Hypothesis|hypotheses]] be tested in [[Scientific control|controlled]] conditions wherever possible. This is frequently possible in certain areas, such as in the biological sciences, and more difficult in other areas, such as in astronomy. The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have the effect of diminishing the potentially harmful effects of circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, pre-existing beliefs can alter the interpretation of results, as in [[confirmation bias]]; this is a [[heuristic]] that leads a person with a particular belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if another observer might disagree (in other words, people tend to observe what they expect to observe).<ref name= beliefCreatesReality >[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S006526010860146X Mark Snyder (1984) When Belief Creates Reality] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210824183700/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S006526010860146X |date=2021-08-24 }} ''Advances in Experimental Social Psychology'' Volume '''18''', 1984, Pages 247-305</ref> {{Blockquote|text=[T]he action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained.|author=[[C.S. Peirce]]|source=''How to Make Our Ideas Clear'' (1877)<ref name= How/>}} A historical example is the belief that the legs of a [[Horse gallop|galloping]] horse are splayed at the point when none of the horse's legs touch the ground, to the point of this image being included in paintings by its supporters. However, the first stop-action pictures of a horse's gallop by [[Eadweard Muybridge]] showed this to be false, and that the legs are instead gathered together.<ref>{{harvp|Needham |Wang|1954|p=166}} shows how the 'flying gallop' image propagated from China to the West.</ref> Another important human bias that plays a role is a preference for new, surprising statements (see ''[[Appeal to novelty]]''), which can result in a search for evidence that the new is true.{{sfnp|Goldhaber|Nieto|2010|page=940}} Poorly attested beliefs can be believed and acted upon via a less rigorous heuristic.<ref name= mythIsAbelief >Ronald R. Sims (2003). ''Ethics and corporate social responsibility: Why giants fall.'' p. 21: {{"'}}A myth is a belief given uncritical acceptance by members of a group ...' – Weiss, ''Business Ethics'' p. 15."</ref> {{anchor|robustTheory}}Goldhaber and Nieto published in 2010 the observation that if theoretical structures with "many closely neighboring subjects are described by connecting theoretical concepts, then the theoretical structure acquires a robustness which makes it increasingly hard{{snd}}though certainly never impossible{{snd}}to overturn".{{sfnp|Goldhaber|Nieto|2010|page=942}} When a narrative is constructed its elements become easier to believe.{{sfnp|Lakatos|1976|pp=1—19}}<ref name= narrativeFallacy >{{harvp|Taleb|2007|p=72}} lists ways to avoid the narrative fallacy and confirmation bias; the narrative fallacy being a substitute for explanation.</ref> {{anchor|genesisOfScientificFact}}{{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=27}} notes "Words and ideas are originally phonetic and mental equivalences of the experiences coinciding with them. ... Such proto-ideas are at first always too broad and insufficiently specialized. ... Once a structurally complete and closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that contradicts it". Sometimes, these relations have their elements assumed ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'', or contain some other logical or methodological flaw in the process that ultimately produced them. [[Donald M. MacKay]] has analyzed these elements in terms of limits to the accuracy of measurement and has related them to instrumental elements in a category of measurement.{{efn-lg|name= macKay| 1=The scientific method requires testing and validation [[Empirical evidence|''a posteriori'']] before ideas are accepted.<ref name= conjugatePairs>{{cite book |quote=Invariably one came up against fundamental physical limits to the accuracy of measurement. ... The art of physical measurement seemed to be a matter of compromise, of choosing between reciprocally related uncertainties. ... Multiplying together the conjugate pairs of uncertainty limits mentioned, however, I found that they formed invariant products of not one but two distinct kinds. ... The first group of limits were calculable ''a priori'' from a specification of the instrument. The second group could be calculated only ''a posteriori'' from a specification of what was ''done'' with the instrument. ... In the first case each unit [of information] would add one additional ''dimension'' (conceptual category), whereas in the second each unit would add one additional ''atomic fact''. |pages=1–4 |last=MacKay |first=Donald M. |year=1969 |title=Information, Mechanism, and Meaning |place=Cambridge, MA |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=0-262-63032-X}} </ref>}} == Deductive & inductive reasoning == {{Main|Deductive reasoning|Inductive reasoning}} Deductive reasoning is the building of knowledge based on what has been shown to be true before. It requires the assumption of fact established prior, and, given the truth of the assumptions, a valid deduction guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Inductive reasoning builds knowledge not from established truth, but from a body of observations. It requires stringent scepticism regarding observed phenomena, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of initial perceptions. [[File:Perihelio.svg|right|thumb|[[Apsidal precession|Precession]] of the [[Perihelion and aphelion|perihelion]]{{snd}}exaggerated in the case of Mercury, but observed in the case of [[S2 (star)|S2]]'s [[apsidal precession]] around [[Sagittarius A*]]<ref>{{cite web |date=16 April 2020 |title=ESO Telescope Sees Star Dance Around Supermassive Black Hole, Proves Einstein Right |url=https://www.eso.org/public/news/eso2006/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200515210420/https://www.eso.org/public/news/eso2006/ |archive-date=2020-05-15 |access-date=2020-04-17 |work=Science Release |publisher=[[European Southern Observatory]]}}</ref>]] An example for how inductive and deductive reasoning works can be found in the [[history of gravitational theory]].{{efn|The philosophy of knowledge arising through observation is also called [[inductivism]]. A radical proponent of this approach to knowledge was [[John Stuart Mill]] who took all knowledge – even mathematical knowledge – to arise from experience through induction. The inductivist approach is still common place, though Mill's extreme views are outdated today.<ref name="Psillos 2013">{{cite book | last=Psillos | first=Stathis | title=Reason and Rationality | chapter=1. Reason and Science | publisher=DE GRUYTER | date=2013-12-31 | isbn=978-3-11-032514-0 | doi=10.1515/9783110325867.33 | page=33–52}}</ref>{{rp|35}}}} It took thousands of years of measurements, from the [[Chaldea]]n, [[India]]n, [[History of Iran|Persian]], [[Greece|Greek]], [[Arabs|Arabic]], and [[Ethnic groups in Europe|European]] astronomers, to fully record the motion of planet [[Earth]].{{efn|name=Astronomy101 |1= [[Hipparchus]] used his own observations of the stars, as well as the observations by Chaldean and Babylonian astronomers to estimate Earth's precession.<ref name=astron101 >Brad Snowder's Astronomy Pages [https://astro101.wwu.edu/a101_precession.html ( Precession of the Equinox]</ref>}} Newton was able to include those measurements into the consequences of his [[Newton's laws of motion|laws of motion]] in 1727.{{efn|name= keplerNewton |1= Isaac Newton (1727) [[Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica#Book 3, De mundi systemate|On the System of the World]] condensed Kepler's law of for the planetary motion of Mars, Galileo's law of falling bodies, the motion of the planets of the Solar system, etc. into consequences of his three laws of motion.<ref name= systOfWorld >[[Isaac Newton]] (1727) [[Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica#Book 3, De mundi systemate|On the System of the World]]</ref> ''See Motte's translation ([https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Mathematical_Principles_of_Natural_Philosophy_(1846)/The_System_of_the_World 1846])''}} Another common example of inductive reasoning is the observation of a [[counterexample]] to current theory inducing the need for new ideas. [[Urbain Le Verrier|Le Verrier]] in 1859 pointed out problems with the [[Perihelion and aphelion|perihelion]] of [[Mercury (planet)|Mercury]] that showed Newton's theory to be at least incomplete. The observed difference of Mercury's [[Apsidal precession|precession]] between Newtonian theory and observation was one of the things that occurred to [[Albert Einstein]] as a possible early test of his [[theory of relativity]]. His relativistic calculations matched observation much more closely than Newtonian theory did.{{efn|name=LeVerrier1859 |1=The difference is approximately 43 arc-seconds per century. And the precession of Mercury's orbit is cited in [[Tests of general relativity]]: U. Le Verrier (1859), (in French), [https://archive.org/stream/comptesrendusheb49acad#page/378/mode/2up "Lettre de M. Le Verrier à M. Faye sur la théorie de Mercure et sur le mouvement du périhélie de cette planète"], Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences (Paris), vol. 49 (1859), pp.379–383.}} Though, today's [[Standard Model]] of physics suggests that we still do not know at least some of the concepts surrounding Einstein's theory, it holds to this day and is being built on deductively. A theory being assumed as true and subsequently built on is a common example of deductive reasoning. Theory building on Einstein's achievement will simply state that 'we have shown that this case fulfils the conditions under which general/special relativity applies, therefore its conclusions apply also'. If it was properly shown that 'this case' fulfils the conditions, the conclusion follows. An extension of this is the assumption of a solution to an open problem. This weaker kind of deductive reasoning will get used in current research, when multiple scientists or even teams of researchers are all gradually solving specific cases in working towards proving a larger theory. This often sees hypotheses being revised again and again as new proof emerges. This way of presenting inductive and deductive reasoning shows part of why science is often presented as being a cycle of iteration. It is important to keep in mind that that cycle's foundations lie in reasoning, and not wholly in the following of procedure. ==Scientific inquiry== Scientific inquiry generally aims to obtain [[knowledge]] in the form of [[#suitableTest|testable explanations]]<ref name="SuitableTest">Peirce, Charles S., Carnegie application (L75, 1902), ''New Elements of Mathematics'' v. 4, pp. 37–38: "For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis that explains the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment."</ref><ref name="econ">Peirce, Charles S. (1902), Carnegie application, see MS L75.329330, from [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 Draft D] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524021101/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27|date=2011-05-24}} of Memoir 27: "Consequently, to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later, if we had not troubled ourselves to make the discovery. Consequently, the art of discovery is purely a question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic is concerned, the leading doctrine concerning the art of discovery. Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be governed by economical considerations."</ref> that scientists can use to [[Predictability|predict]] the results of future experiments. This allows scientists to gain a better understanding of the topic under study, and later to use that understanding to intervene in its causal mechanisms (such as to cure disease). The better an explanation is at making predictions, the more useful it frequently can be, and the more likely it will continue to explain a body of evidence better than its alternatives. The most successful explanations – those that explain and make accurate predictions in a wide range of circumstances – are often called [[scientific theories]].{{efn-ua|name= aQuestion}} Most experimental results do not produce large changes in human understanding; improvements in theoretical scientific understanding typically result from a gradual process of development over time, sometimes across different domains of science.<ref>Stanovich, Keith E. (2007). ''How to Think Straight About Psychology''. Boston: Pearson Education. p. 123</ref> Scientific models vary in the extent to which they have been experimentally tested and for how long, and in their acceptance in the scientific community. In general, explanations become accepted over time as evidence accumulates on a given topic, and the explanation in question proves more powerful than its alternatives at explaining the evidence. Often subsequent researchers re-formulate the explanations over time, or combined explanations to produce new explanations. The ubiquitous element in the scientific method is [[empiricism]]. This is in opposition to stringent forms of [[rationalism]]: the scientific method embodies the position that reason alone cannot solve a particular scientific problem. A strong formulation of the scientific method is not always aligned with a form of [[empiricism]] in which the empirical data is put forward in the form of experience or other abstracted forms of knowledge; in [[#aModel|current scientific practice]], however, the use of [[scientific modelling]] and reliance on abstract typologies and theories is normally accepted. The scientific method counters claims that [[revelation]], political or religious [[dogma]], appeals to tradition, commonly held beliefs, common sense, or currently held theories pose the only possible means of demonstrating truth.<ref name= truthSought4sake /><ref name="reasonsFirstRule">{{cite book |last=Peirce |first=Charles S. |title=Collected Papers |year=1899 |series=v. 1 |at=paragraphs 135–140 |chapter=F.R.L. [First Rule of Logic] |quote=... in order to learn, one must desire to learn ... |access-date=2012-01-06 |chapter-url=http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm |archive-date=January 6, 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name= tow /> Tow sees the scientific method in terms of an [[evolutionary algorithm]] applied to science and technology.<ref name= tow> {{cite book | last1 = Tow | first1 = David Hunter | title = The Future of Life: A Unified Theory of Evolution | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=c0wecGHSpTQC | series = Future of Life Series | publisher = Future of Life Media | publication-date = 2010 | page = 262 | access-date = 2016-12-11 | quote = On further examination, however, the scientific method bears a striking similarity to the larger process of evolution itself. [...] Of great significance is the evolutionary algorithm, which uses a simplified subset of the process of natural evolution applied to find the solution to problems that are too complex to solve by traditional analytic methods. In essence, it is a process of accelerated and rigorous trial and error building on previous knowledge to refine an existing hypothesis, or discarding it altogether to find a better model. [...] The evolutionary algorithm is a technique derived from the evolution of knowledge processing applied within the context of science and technology, itself an outcome of evolution. The scientific method continues to evolve through adaptive reward, trial and error, and application of the method to itself. | date = 2010-09-11 }} </ref> ===Properties of scientific inquiry=== Scientific knowledge is closely tied to [[Empirical evidence|empirical findings]] and can remain subject to [[falsifiability|falsification]] if new experimental observations are incompatible with what is found. That is, no theory can ever be considered final since new problematic evidence might be discovered. If such evidence is found, a new theory may be proposed, or (more commonly) it is found that modifications to the previous theory are sufficient to explain the new evidence. The strength of a theory relates to how long it has persisted without major alteration to its core principles. Theories can also become subsumed by other theories. For example, Newton's laws explained thousands of years of scientific observations of the planets [[#Another example: precession of Mercury|almost perfectly]]. However, these laws were then determined to be special cases of a more general theory ([[Theory of relativity|relativity]]), which explained both the (previously unexplained) exceptions to Newton's laws and predicted and explained other observations such as the deflection of [[light]] by [[gravity]]. Thus, in certain cases independent, unconnected, scientific observations can be connected, unified by principles of increasing explanatory power.{{sfnp|Brody|1993 |pp=44–45}}{{sfnp|Goldhaber|Nieto|2010|page=942}} Since new theories might be more comprehensive than what preceded them, and thus be able to explain more than previous ones, successor theories might be able to meet a higher standard by explaining a larger body of observations than their predecessors.{{sfnp|Brody|1993|pp=44–45}} For example, the theory of [[evolution]] explains the [[Biodiversity|diversity of life on Earth]], how species adapt to their environments, and many other [[pattern]]s observed in the natural world;<ref name="Hall08">{{cite book |editor1-last = Hall |editor1-first = B.K. |editor2-last = Hallgrímsson |editor2-first = B. |title = Strickberger's Evolution |year = 2008 |edition = 4th |publisher = Jones & Bartlett |isbn = 978-0-7637-0066-9 |url = https://archive.org/details/strickbergersevo0000hall/page/762 |page = [https://archive.org/details/strickbergersevo0000hall/page/762 762] }}</ref><ref name="Cracraft05">{{cite book | editor1-last = Cracraft | editor1-first = J. | editor2-last = Donoghue | editor2-first = M.J. | title = Assembling the tree of life | publisher = Oxford University Press | year = 2005 | page = 592 | isbn = 978-0-19-517234-8 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=6lXTP0YU6_kC&q=Assembling+the+tree+of+life | access-date = 2020-10-20 | archive-date = 2023-11-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112730/https://books.google.com/books?id=6lXTP0YU6_kC&q=Assembling+the+tree+of+life#v=snippet&q=Assembling%20the%20tree%20of%20life&f=false | url-status = live }}</ref> its most recent major modification was unification with [[genetics]] to form the [[Extended evolutionary synthesis|modern evolutionary synthesis]]. In subsequent modifications, it has also subsumed aspects of many other fields such as [[biochemistry]] and [[molecular biology]].<ref name= tow/> ===Models of scientific inquiry=== {{Main|Models of scientific inquiry}} The classical model of scientific inquiry [[History of scientific method#Aristotle|derives from Aristotle]],<ref> {{cite book |author=[[Aristotle]] |chapter=[[Prior Analytics]] |translator=Hugh Tredennick |pages=181–531 |title=Aristotle, Volume 1 |series=[[Loeb Classical Library]] |publisher=William Heinemann |place=London |year=1938}} </ref> who distinguished the forms of approximate and exact reasoning, set out the threefold scheme of [[abductive reasoning|abductive]], [[deductive reasoning|deductive]], and [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] [[inference]], and also treated the compound forms such as reasoning by [[analogy]]. The [[hypothetico-deductive model]] or method is a proposed description of the scientific method. Here, predictions from the hypothesis are central: if one assumes the hypothesis to be true, what consequences follow? If a subsequent empirical investigation does not demonstrate that these consequences or predictions correspond to the observable world, the hypothesis can be concluded to be false. In 1877,<ref name="Fixation" /> [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] (1839–1914) characterized inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth ''per se'' but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubts born of surprises, disagreements, and the like, and to reach a [[#Beliefs and biases|secure belief]], the belief being that on which one is prepared to act. He framed scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not mere verbal or [[hyperbolic doubt]], which he held to be fruitless.{{efn|1="What one does not in the least doubt one should not pretend to doubt; but a man should train himself to doubt," said Peirce in a brief intellectual autobiography.<ref>{{cite book |contributor-last=Ketner |contributor-first=Kenneth Laine |year=2009 |contribution=Charles Sanders Peirce: Interdisciplinary Scientist |last=Peirce |first=Charles S. |editor-last=Bisanz |editor-first=Elize |title=The Logic of Interdisciplinarity |publisher=Akademie Verlag |place=Berlin}}</ref> Peirce held that actual, genuine doubt originates externally, usually in surprise, but also that it is to be sought and cultivated, "provided only that it be the weighty and noble metal itself, and no counterfeit nor paper substitute".<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Peirce |first=Charles S. |date=October 1905 |title=Issues of Pragmaticism |magazine=The Monist |volume=XV |number=4 |pages=481–499, see [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart15hegeuoft#page/484/mode/1up p. 484], and [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart15hegeuoft#page/491/mode/1up p. 491]}} Reprinted in ''Collected Papers'' v. 5, paragraphs 438–463, see 443 and 451.</ref>}} ==Philosophy==<!--Section set to frame 'usefulness' in order to encourage perspectives that advance discussion; not (just) critique without context. Keep in mind, that 'useful' needs to be the consideration of your source, and not any interpretation of it.--> {{See also|Philosophy of science|Sociology of scientific knowledge}} {{anchor|Characterization}} Philosophy of science looks at [[#polyaFirstUnderstand|the underpinning logic]] of the scientific method, at what separates [[Demarcation problem|science from non-science]], and the [[Research ethics|ethic]] that is implicit in science. There are basic assumptions, derived from philosophy by at least one prominent scientist,{{efn-ua|name= introspection| [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page%3APopular_Science_Monthly_Volume_12.djvu/300 Never fail to recognize an idea]... .— C. S. Peirce, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE, SECOND PAPER. —HOW TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR. ''Popular Science Monthly'' '''Volume 12''', January 1878, p.286<ref name= How/>}}<ref name=comprehensibility/> that form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.<ref name=comprehensibility>Einstein, Albert (1936, 1956) One may say "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility." From the article "Physics and Reality" (1936), reprinted in ''Out of My Later Years'' (1956). 'It is one of the great realizations of Immanuel Kant that the setting up of a real external world would be senseless without this comprehensibility.'</ref> These assumptions from [[naturalism (philosophy)|methodological naturalism]] form a basis on which science may be grounded. [[Logical positivism|Logical positivist]], [[empiricism|empiricist]], [[falsifiability|falsificationist]], and other theories have criticized these assumptions and given alternative accounts of the logic of science, but each has also itself been criticized. There are several kinds of modern philosophical conceptualizations and attempts at definitions of the method of science.{{efn-lg|There is no universally agreed upon definition of the method of science. This was expressed with [[Neurath's boat]] already in 1913. There is however a consensus that stating this somewhat nihilistic assertion without introduction and in too unexpected a fashion is counterproductive, confusing, and can even be damaging. There may never be one, too. As [[Steven Weinberg|Weinberg]] described it in 1995:<ref name="Weinberg 1995">Weinberg, (1995) “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live”, page: 8</ref> {{Quote|quote=The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend.}}}} The one attempted by the ''unificationists'', who argue for the existence of a unified definition that is useful (or at least 'works' in every context of science). The ''pluralists'', arguing degrees of science being too fractured for a universal definition of its method to by useful. And those, who argue that the very attempt at definition is already detrimental to the free flow of ideas. Additionally, there have been views on the social framework in which science is done, and the impact of the sciences social envrionment on research. Also, there is 'scientific method' as popularised by Dewey in ''How We Think'' (1910) and Karl Pearson in ''Grammar of Science'' (1892), as used in fairly uncritical manner in education. === Pluralism === {{Main|Scientific pluralism}} Scientific pluralism is a position within the [[philosophy of science]] that rejects various proposed [[unity of science|unities]] of scientific method and subject matter. Scientific pluralists hold that science is not unified in one or more of the following ways: the [[metaphysics]] of its subject matter, the [[epistemology]] of scientific knowledge, or the [[research methods]] and models that should be used. Some pluralists believe that pluralism is necessary due to the nature of science. Others say that since [[scientific discipline]]s already vary in practice, there is no reason to believe this variation is wrong until a specific unification is [[empirically]] proven. Finally, some hold that pluralism should be allowed for [[normative]] reasons, even if unity were possible in theory. === Unificationism === {{Main|Unity of science}} Unificationism, in science, was a central tenet of [[logical positivism]].<ref name="Neurath† Bonk 2011">{{cite book | last=Neurath† | first=Otto | author1-link=Otto Neurath| last2=Bonk | first2=Thomas | title=Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science | chapter=Unity of Science and Logical Empiricism: A Reply | publisher=Springer Netherlands | publication-place=Dordrecht | date=2011 | isbn=978-94-007-0142-7 | doi=10.1007/978-94-007-0143-4_2 | page=15–30}}</ref><ref name="McGill 1937">{{cite journal | last=McGill | first=V. J. | title=Logical Positivism and the Unity of Science | journal=Science & Society | publisher=Guilford Press | volume=1 | issue=4 | year=1937 | issn=00368237 | jstor=40399117 | pages=550–561 }}</ref> Different logical positivists construed this doctrine in several different ways, e.g. as a [[reductionism|reductionist]] thesis, that the objects investigated by the [[special sciences]] reduce to the objects of a common, putatively more basic domain of science, usually thought to be physics; as the thesis that all theories and results of the various sciences can or ought to be expressed in a common language or "universal slang"; or as the thesis that all the special sciences share a common scientific method. Development of the idea has been troubled by accelerated advancement in technology that has opened up many new ways to look at the world. {{Quote|quote=The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. |source=[[Steven Weinberg]], 1995<ref name="Weinberg 1995" />}} === Anti-formalism === {{Main|Anti-formalism in science}}<!--meant as an invitation to either find or write the relevant article, WP:REDLINK--> {{anchor|noMethod}}[[Paul Feyerabend]] examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a methodological process. In his book ''[[Against Method]]'' he argued that no description of scientific method [[#critiquesOfFeyerabend|could possibly be broad enough]] to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free [[methodology|methodological rules]] governing the progress of science. In essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science. He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be '[[#theTermSci|anything goes]]'.<ref>[[Paul Feyerabend|Feyerabend, Paul K.]], ''Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge'', 1st published, 1975. Reprinted, Verso, London, 1978. </ref> As has been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; [[Problem solving|problem solver]]s, and researchers are to be prudent with their resources during their inquiry.{{efn-ua|name= FRL-1.136 |{{harvp|Peirce|1899}} First rule of logic (F.R.L)<ref name= reasonsFirstRule /> Paragraph 1.136: From the first rule of logic, if we truly desire the goal of the inquiry we are not to waste our resources.<ref name=econ/><ref name= SuitableTest/> — [[Terence Tao]] wrote on the matter that not all approaches can be regarded as "equally suitable and deserving of equal resources" because such positions would "sap mathematics of its sense of direction and purpose".<ref name= taoTime >{{cite web | last=Tao | first=Terence | title=What is good mathematics? | website=arXiv.org | date=13 February 2007 | url=https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702396 | access-date=11 April 2024}}</ref>}} A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method. This research indicated that scientists frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses. This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.<ref name="Schickore Hangel 2019">{{cite journal | last=Schickore | first=Jutta | last2=Hangel | first2=Nora | title=“It might be this, it should be that…” uncertainty and doubt in day-to-day research practice | journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Science | volume=9 | issue=2 | date=2019 | issn=1879-4912 | doi=10.1007/s13194-019-0253-9 | page=}}</ref> === Myth, education, and scientific literacy === {{See also|Science education|Scientific literacy}} In education, the idea of a general and universal scientific method has been notably influential, and numerous studies (in the US) have shown that this framing of method often forms part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science.<ref name="Aikenhead 1987 pp. 459–487">{{cite journal | last=Aikenhead | first=Glen S. | title=High‐school graduates' beliefs about science‐technology‐society. III. Characteristics and limitations of scientific knowledge | journal=Science Education | volume=71 | issue=4 | date=1987 | issn=0036-8326 | doi=10.1002/sce.3730710402 | pages=459–487}}</ref><ref name="Osborne Simon Collins 2003 pp. 1049–1079">{{cite journal | last=Osborne | first=Jonathan | last2=Simon | first2=Shirley | last3=Collins | first3=Sue | title=Attitudes towards science: A review of the literature and its implications | journal=International Journal of Science Education | volume=25 | issue=9 | date=2003 | issn=0950-0693 | doi=10.1080/0950069032000032199 | pages=1049–1079}}</ref> This convention of traditional education has been argued against by scientists, as there is a consensus that educations' sequential elements and unified view of scientific method do not reflect how scientists actually work.<ref name="Bauer 1992 p. ">{{cite book | last=Bauer | first=Henry H. | title=Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method | publisher=University of Illinois Press | date=1992 | isbn=978-0-252-06436-4 | page=}}</ref><ref name="McComas 1996 pp. 10–16">{{cite journal | last=McComas | first=William F. | title=Ten Myths of Science: Reexamining What We Think We Know About the Nature of Science | journal=School Science and Mathematics | volume=96 | issue=1 | date=1996 | issn=0036-6803 | doi=10.1111/j.1949-8594.1996.tb10205.x | pages=10–16}}</ref><ref name="Wivagg 2002 pp. 645–646">{{cite journal | last=Wivagg | first=Dan | title=The Dogma of "The" Scientific Method | journal=The American Biology Teacher | volume=64 | issue=9 | date=2002-11-01 | issn=0002-7685 | doi=10.2307/4451400 | pages=645–646}}</ref> [[History of science|Historian of science]] Daniel Thurs' chapter in the 2015 book ''Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science'', concluded that the scientific method is a myth or, at best, an idealization.<ref>{{Citation | last = Thurs | first = Daniel P. | chapter = That the scientific method accurately reflects what scientists actually do | editor-last1 = Numbers | editor-first1 = Ronald L. | editor-link = Ronald L. Numbers | editor-last2 = Kampourakis | editor-first2 = Kostas | title = Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science | pages = 210–218 | publisher = Harvard University Press | year = 2015 | chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science | isbn = 978-0-674-91547-3 | quote = It's probably best to get the bad news out of the way first, the so-called scientific method is a myth. ... If typical formulations were accurate, the only location true science would be taking place in would be grade-school classrooms. | access-date = 2020-10-20 | archive-date = 2023-11-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112729/https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science#v=snippet&q=newton's%20apple%20and%20other%20myths%20about%20science&f=false | url-status = live }}</ref> Educations approach to scientific method was inspired by [[Karl Pearson|Karl Pearson’s]] ''Grammar of Science'' (1892),<ref>{{cite web| url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/scientific-method/| access-date=12 March 2024 |last1=Hepburn|first1=Brian|first2=Hanne|last2=Andersen|author-link2=Hanne Andersen (philosopher)| title=Scientific Method |work=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] (Summer 2021 Edition)|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|editor-link=Edward N. Zalta|orig-date=13 November 2015|date=1 June 2021|quote=The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.}}</ref> and [[#CITEREFDewey1910|Dewey's 1910 book]], ''[[How We Think]]''.<ref name= cowles>{{harvp|Cowles|2020|p=264}}</ref>{{efn|name= deweySchool}} Van der Ploeg (2016) indicated that Dewey's views{{efn|... in Dewey, John (1916) ''Democracy and Education''}} on education had long been used to further an idea of citizen education removed from "sound education", claiming that references to Dewey in such arguments were undue interpretations (of Dewey).<ref name="van der Ploeg 2016 pp. 145–159">{{cite journal | last=van der Ploeg | first=Piet | title=Dewey versus ‘Dewey’ on democracy and education | journal=Education, Citizenship and Social Justice | publisher=SAGE Publications | volume=11 | issue=2 | date=8 June 2016 | issn=1746-1979 | doi=10.1177/1746197916648283 | pages=145–159}}</ref> ===Sociology of knowledge=== {{Main|Sociology of scientific knowledge}} The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those ideas arise.{{efn-lg|{{Quote|quote=The sociology of knowledge is concerned with "the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises."<ref>Here, King quotes [[Peter L. Berger]] and [[Thomas Luckmann|Thomas Luckman]], [[The Social Construction of Reality|''The Social Construction of Reality'']] (London, 1967), 16.</ref> So, on this reading, the sociology of science may be taken to be considered with the analysis of the social context of scientific thought. But scientific thought, most sociologists concede, is distinguished from other modes of thought precisely by virtue of its immunity from social determination — insofar as it is governed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as it is rational it escapes determination by "non-logical" social forces. |source=M. D. King leading into his article on ''Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science (1971)''<ref name="King_JA1971">{{cite journal | last=King | first=M. D. | title=Reason, Tradition, and the Progressiveness of Science | journal=History and Theory | publisher=[Wesleyan University, Wiley] | volume=10 | issue=1 | year=1971 | issn=14682303 | jstor=2504396 | doi=10.2307/2504396 | pages=3–32}}</ref>}}}} ====Thought collectives==== A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is [[Ludwik Fleck|Fleck's]] thought, echoed in [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn's]] concept of [[normal science]]. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called [[Thought collective|''thought collectives'']]. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Harwood | first=Jonathan | title=Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge | journal=Social Studies of Science | volume=16 | number=1 | date=1986 | pages=173–187 | JSTOR=285293}}</ref>{{rp|177}} Comparably, following the [[field research]] in an academic scientific laboratory by [[Bruno Latour|Latour]] and [[Steve Woolgar|Woolgar]], [[Karin Knorr Cetina]] has conducted a comparative study of two scientific fields (namely [[Particle physics|high energy physics]] and [[molecular biology]]) to conclude that the epistemic practices and reasonings within both scientific communities are different enough to introduce the concept of "[[epistemic cultures]]", in contradiction with the idea that a so-called "scientific method" is unique and a unifying concept.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge|last=Knorr-Cetina |first=K. |date=1999|publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-25893-8|location=Cambridge, Mass.|oclc=39539508}}</ref>{{efn|Comparing 'epistemic cultures' with Fleck 1935, [[Thought collective]]s, (''denkkollektiven''): ''Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einfǖhrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv''<ref>As cited in {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=27}}, {{harvp|Fleck|1979|pp=38–50}}</ref> {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxvii}} recognizes that [[#genesisOfScientificFact|facts have lifetimes]], flourishing only after incubation periods. His selected question for investigation (1934) was "[[Thought collective#predicateIsNotStatement|HOW, THEN, DID THIS EMPIRICAL FACT ORIGINATE]] AND IN WHAT DOES IT CONSIST?".<ref>{{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxviii}}</ref> But by [[#genesisOfScientificFact|Fleck 1979, p.27]], the thought collectives within the respective fields will have to settle on common specialized terminology, publish their results and [[#Communication and community|further intercommunicate]] with their colleagues using the common terminology, in order to progress.<ref>{{harvp|Fleck | 1979|p=27}}</ref> {{see also|Cognitive revolution|Perceptual control theory#The methodology of modeling, and PCT as model}}}} ====Situated cognition and relativism==== {{See also|postpositivism|Relativism}} On the idea of Fleck's ''thought collectives'' sociologists built the concept of "[[situated cognition]]": that the perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views.<!--even writing out "Social constructivism" and "Solipsism" feels like assigning undue weight to fringe theories here--> [[Norwood Russell Hanson]], [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]] have done extensive work on the [[perception|"theory-laden" character]] of observation. Hanson (1958) first coined the term for the idea that all observation is dependent on [[Situated cognition|the conceptual framework of the observer]], using the concept of [[gestalt psychology|gestalt]] to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description.<ref>{{Citation |last=Hanson |first=Norwood |title=Patterns of Discovery |year=1958 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-05197-2 }}</ref> He opens Chapter 1 with a discussion of the [[Golgi apparatus|Golgi bodies]] and their initial rejection as an artefact of staining technique, and a discussion of [[Tycho Brahe|Brahe]] and [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler]] observing the dawn and seeing a "different" sunrise despite the same physiological phenomenon.{{efn|name= Kepler1604 }}{{efn|Brahe and Kepler are two different observers, [[intersubjectivity]] validates Hanson.}} Kuhn<ref>{{cite book |last=Kuhn |first=Thomas S. |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |publisher=University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago, IL |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4432-5544-8 |page=113 |title-link=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}<!--ISBN matches 2009 publication, not the 1962.--> </ref> and Feyerabend<ref>Feyerabend, Paul K (1960) "Patterns of Discovery" The Philosophical Review (1960) vol. 69 (2) pp. 247–252</ref> acknowledge the pioneering significance of Hanson's work.{{clarify inline|reason=this paragraph does not do well explaining things and giving context/ the notes may need clarification as well|date=April 2024}} Criticisms such as Kuhn's and Feyerabend's led to the [[strong programme]], a radical approach to the [[sociology of science]]. The [[postmodernism|postmodernist]] critiques of science, especially in its extreme variants of "[[social constructivism]]" and "[[solipsism]]", have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the [[science wars]], is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between the postmodernist and [[Scientific realism|realist]] camps. Whereas postmodernists assert that scientific knowledge is simply another discourse (this term has special meaning in this context) and not representative of any form of fundamental truth, [[Scientific realism|realists]] in the scientific community maintain that scientific knowledge does reveal real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate method of deriving truth.<ref>For example: * ''Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science'', The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 * ''Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science'', Picador. 1999 * ''The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy'', University of Nebraska Press, 2000 {{ISBN|0-8032-7995-7}} * ''A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science'', Oxford University Press, 2000 * ''Intellectual Impostures'', Economist Books, 2003</ref> ==Limits of method== ===Role of chance in discovery=== {{Main|Role of chance in scientific discoveries}} [[File:Sample of penicillin mould presented by Alexander Fleming to Douglas Macleod, 1935 (9672239344).jpg|thumb|left<!--#lefty anarchy-->|A famous example of discovery being stumbled upon was Alexander Fleming's [[Alexander Fleming#Discovery of penicillin|discovery of Penicillin]]. One of his bacteria cultures got contaminated with mould in which surroundings the bacteria had died off; thereby the method of discovery was simply knowing what to look out for.]] Somewhere between 33% and 50% of all [[Scientific discovery|scientific discoveries]] are estimated to have been ''stumbled upon'', rather than sought out. This may explain why scientists so often express that they were lucky.<ref name=DunbarLuck>Dunbar, K., & Fugelsang, J. (2005). Causal thinking in science: How scientists and students interpret the unexpected. In M.E. Gorman, R.D. Tweney, D. Gooding & A. Kincannon (Eds.), Scientific and Technical Thinking (pp. 57–79). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</ref> [[Louis Pasteur]] is credited with the famous saying that "Luck favours the prepared mind", but some psychologists have begun to study what it means to be 'prepared for luck' in the scientific context. Research is showing that scientists are taught various heuristics that tend to harness chance and the unexpected.<ref name="DunbarLuck"/><ref name="Oliver, J.E. 1991">{{cite book |last=Oliver |first=J.E. |year=1991 |chapter=Ch 2 |title=The incomplete guide to the art of discovery |place=New York |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=9780231076203}}</ref> This is what [[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]] calls "Anti-fragility"; while some systems of investigation are fragile in the face of [[human error]], human bias, and randomness, the scientific method is more than resistant or tough – it actually benefits from such randomness in many ways (it is anti-fragile). Taleb believes that the more anti-fragile the system, the more it will flourish in the real world.<ref name=Anti-fragility>{{cite web |last=Taleb |first=Nassim N. |title=Antifragility — or— The Property Of Disorder-Loving Systems |url=http://www.edge.org/q2011/q11_3.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=2013-05-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130507124322/http://www.edge.org/q2011/q11_3.html}}</ref> {{anchor|startWithBugs}}Psychologist Kevin Dunbar says the process of discovery often starts with researchers finding bugs in their experiments. These unexpected results lead researchers to try to fix what they ''think'' is an error in their method. Eventually, the researcher decides the error is too persistent and systematic to be a coincidence. The highly controlled, cautious, and curious aspects of the scientific method are thus what make it well suited for identifying such persistent systematic errors. At this point, the researcher will begin to think of theoretical explanations for the error, often seeking the help of colleagues across different domains of expertise.<ref name="DunbarLuck"/><ref name="Oliver, J.E. 1991"/> === Relationship with statistics === When the scientific method employs statistics as a key part of its arsenal, there are mathematical and practical issues that can have a deleterious effect on the reliability of the output of scientific methods. This is described in a popular 2005 scientific paper "[[Why Most Published Research Findings Are False]]" by [[John Ioannidis]], which is considered foundational to the field of [[metascience]].<ref name="mostRwrong">{{Cite journal|title = Why Most Published Research Findings Are False|journal = PLOS Medicine|date = 2005-08-01|issn = 1549-1277|pmc = 1182327|pmid = 16060722|volume = 2|issue = 8|pages = e124|doi = 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124|first = John P.A.|last = Ioannidis | doi-access=free }}</ref> Much research in metascience seeks to identify poor use of statistics and improve its use, an example being the [[misuse of p-values]].<ref>{{cite journal| url = https://pubs.asahq.org/anesthesiology/article/60/5/505/29253/Regarding-the-Misuse-of-t-Tests| title = Regarding the Misuse of ''t'' Tests| journal = Anesthesiology| date = May 1984| volume = 60| issue = 5| pages = 505| doi = 10.1097/00000542-198405000-00026| last1 = Schaefer| first1 = Carl F| pmid = 6711862| access-date = 2021-08-29 | archive-date = 2021-08-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210829012031/https://pubs.asahq.org/anesthesiology/article/60/5/505/29253/Regarding-the-Misuse-of-t-Tests| url-status = live| doi-access = free}}</ref> The particular points raised are statistical ("The smaller the studies conducted in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true" and "The greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true.") and economical ("The greater the financial and other interests and prejudices in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true" and "The hotter a scientific field (with more scientific teams involved), the less likely the research findings are to be true.") Hence: "Most research findings are false for most research designs and for most fields" and "As shown, the majority of modern biomedical research is operating in areas with very low pre- and poststudy probability for true findings." However: "Nevertheless, most new discoveries will continue to stem from hypothesis-generating research with low or very low pre-study odds," which means that *new* discoveries will come from research that, when that research started, had low or very low odds (a low or very low chance) of succeeding. Hence, if the scientific method is used to expand the frontiers of knowledge, research into areas that are outside the mainstream will yield the newest discoveries.{{copy edit inline|reason=this paragraph consists of many quotations that are not worked into the text very well.|date=April 2024}} ===Science of complex systems=== Science applied to complex systems can involve elements such as [[transdisciplinarity]], [[systems theory]], [[control theory#Open-loop and closed-loop (feedback) control|control theory]], and [[scientific modelling]].<ref name= tow/> In general, the scientific method may be difficult to apply stringently to diverse, interconnected systems and large data sets. In particular, practices used within [[Big data]], such as [[predictive analytics]], may be considered to be at odds with the scientific method,<ref>Anderson, Chris (2008) [http://www.uvm.edu/~pdodds/files/papers/others/2008/anderson2008a.pdf The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502005844/http://www.uvm.edu/pdodds/files/papers/others/2008/anderson2008a.pdf |date=2021-05-02 }}. Wired Magazine 16.07</ref> as some of the data may have been stripped of the parameters which might be material in alternative hypotheses for an explanation; thus the stripped data would only serve to support the null hypothesis in the predictive analytics application. {{harvp| Fleck| 1979 |pp=38–50}} notes "a [[#startWithBugs|scientific discovery remains incomplete without considerations of the social practices]] that condition it".<ref name= bigDataCanBeIncomplete>[[Ludwik Fleck]] (1979) ''[https://worldpece.org/sites/default/files/artifacts/media/pdf/fleck_et_al._-_2008_-_genesis_and_development_of_a_scientific_fact.pdf Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210826194119/https://worldpece.org/sites/default/files/artifacts/media/pdf/fleck_et_al._-_2008_-_genesis_and_development_of_a_scientific_fact.pdf |date=2021-08-26 }}''</ref> ==Relationship with mathematics== Science is the process of gathering, comparing, and evaluating proposed models against [[observable]]s. {{anchor|aModel}}A model can be a simulation, mathematical or chemical formula, or set of proposed steps. Science is like mathematics in that researchers in both disciplines try to distinguish what is ''known'' from what is ''unknown'' at each stage of discovery. Models, in both science and mathematics, need to be internally consistent and also ought to be ''[[falsifiable]]'' (capable of disproof). In mathematics, a statement need not yet be proved; at such a stage, that statement would be called a [[conjecture]].<ref>{{harvp|Pólya|1957|p=131}} in the section on 'Modern [[heuristic]]': "When we are working intensively, we feel keenly the progress of our work; we are elated when our progress is rapid, we are depressed when it is slow."</ref> Mathematical work and scientific work can inspire each other.<ref name= ilSaggiatore > "Philosophy [i.e., physics] is written in this grand book – I mean the universe – which stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is wandering around in a dark labyrinth." – Galileo Galilei, ''Il Saggiatore'' (''[[The Assayer]]'', 1623), as translated by [[Stillman Drake]] (1957), ''Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo'' pp. 237–238, as quoted by {{harvp|di Francia|1981|p=10}}. </ref> For example, the technical concept of [[time]] arose in [[science]], and timelessness was a hallmark of a mathematical topic. But today, the [[Poincaré conjecture]] has been proved using time as a mathematical concept in which objects can flow (see [[Ricci flow]]).<ref>Huai-Dong Cao and Xi-Ping Zhu [https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0612069.pdf (3 Dec 2006) Hamilton-Perelman’s Proof of the Poincaré Conjecture and the Geometrization Conjecture] *revised from H.D.Cao and X.P.Zhu ''Asian J. Math.'', '''10'''(2) (2006), 165–492.</ref> Nevertheless, the connection between mathematics and reality (and so science to the extent it describes reality) remains obscure. [[Eugene Wigner]]'s paper, "[[The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences]]", is a very well-known account of the issue from a Nobel Prize-winning physicist. In fact, some observers (including some well-known mathematicians such as [[Gregory Chaitin]], and others such as [[Where Mathematics Comes From|Lakoff and Núñez]]) have suggested that mathematics is the result of practitioner bias and human limitation (including cultural ones), somewhat like the post-modernist view of science.<ref name= WMCF >George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez (2000) [[Where Mathematics Comes From]] </ref> [[George Pólya]]'s work on [[problem solving]],<ref name= findIt >"If you can't solve a problem, then there is an easier problem you can solve: find it." —{{harvp|Pólya|1957|p=114}}</ref> the construction of mathematical [[Mathematical proof|proofs]], and [[heuristic]]<ref> George Pólya (1954), ''Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning Volume I: Induction and Analogy in Mathematics''. </ref><ref> George Pólya (1954), ''Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning Volume II: Patterns of Plausible Reasoning''. </ref> show that the mathematical method and the scientific method differ in detail, while nevertheless resembling each other in using iterative or recursive steps. {| class="wikitable" |- | !scope="col"|[[How to Solve It|Mathematical method]] !scope="col"|[[#Elements of the scientific method|Scientific method]] |- !scope="row"|1 | [[Understanding]] | [[#Characterizations|Characterization from experience and observation]] |- !scope="row"|2 | [[Analysis]] | [[#Hypothesis development|Hypothesis: a proposed explanation]] |- !scope="row"|3 | [[wikt:synthesis|Synthesis]] | [[#Predictions from the hypothesis|Deduction: prediction from the hypothesis]] |- !scope="row"|4 | [[Review]]/[[Generalization|Extend]] | [[#Experiments|Test and experiment]] |} {{anchor|polyaFirstUnderstand}} In Pólya's view, ''understanding'' involves restating unfamiliar definitions in your own words, resorting to geometrical figures, and questioning what we know and do not know already; ''analysis'', which Pólya takes from [[Pappus of Alexandria|Pappus]],{{sfnp|Pólya|1957|p=142}} involves free and heuristic construction of plausible arguments, [[working backward from the goal]], and devising a plan for constructing the proof; ''synthesis'' is the strict [[Euclid]]ean exposition of step-by-step details{{sfnp|Pólya|1957|p=144}} of the proof; ''review'' involves reconsidering and re-examining the result and the path taken to it. {{anchor|proofsAndRefutations}}Building on Pólya's work, [[Imre Lakatos]] argued that mathematicians actually use contradiction, criticism, and revision as principles for improving their work.<ref>{{harvp|Lakatos|1976}} documents the development, by generations of mathematicians, of [[Euler's formula for polyhedra]].</ref>{{efn-lg|name= stillwell'sReviewOfGray'sBioOfPoincaré}} In like manner to science, where truth is sought, but certainty is not found, in ''[[Proofs and Refutations]]'', what Lakatos tried to establish was that no theorem of [[informal mathematics]] is final or perfect. This means that, in non-axiomatic mathematics, we should not think that a theorem is ultimately true, only that no [[counterexample]] has yet been found. Once a counterexample, i.e. an entity contradicting/not explained by the theorem is found, we adjust the theorem, possibly extending the domain of its validity. This is a continuous way our knowledge accumulates, through the logic and process of proofs and refutations. (However, if axioms are given for a branch of mathematics, this creates a logical system —Wittgenstein 1921 ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'' 5.13; Lakatos claimed that proofs from such a system were [[Tautology (logic)|tautological]], i.e. [[logical truth|internally logically true]], by [[string rewriting system|rewriting forms]], as shown by Poincaré, who demonstrated the technique of transforming tautologically true forms (viz. the [[Euler characteristic]]) into or out of forms from [[homology (mathematics)|homology]],<ref name= eulerPoincaré >H.S.M. Coxeter (1973) ''Regular Polytopes'' {{ISBN| 9780486614809}}, Chapter IX "Poincaré's proof of Euler's formula"</ref> or more abstractly, from [[homological algebra]].<ref>{{cite web| url = https://faculty.math.illinois.edu/K-theory/0245/survey.pdf| title = Charles A. Weibel (ca. 1995) History of Homological Algebra| access-date = 2021-08-28 | archive-date = 2021-09-06 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210906014123/https://faculty.math.illinois.edu/K-theory/0245/survey.pdf| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>Henri Poincaré, Sur l’[[Analysis Situs (paper)|analysis situs]], ''Comptes rendusde l’Academie des Sciences'' '''115''' (1892), 633–636. as cited by {{harvp| Lakatos| 1976 |p=162}}</ref>{{efn-lg|name= stillwell'sReviewOfGray'sBioOfPoincaré|Stillwell's review (p. 381) of Poincaré's efforts on the [[Euler characteristic]] notes that it took ''five'' iterations for Poincaré to arrive at the ''[[homology sphere#Poincaré homology sphere|Poincaré homology sphere]]''.<ref name= stillwell>John Stillwell, reviewer (Apr 2014). ''Notices of the AMS.'' '''61''' (4), pp. 378–383, on Jeremy Gray's (2013) ''Henri Poincaré: A Scientific Biography'' ([http://www.ams.org/notices/201404/rnoti-p378.pdf PDF] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704205514/http://www.ams.org/notices/201404/rnoti-p378.pdf |date=2021-07-04 }}).</ref>}} Lakatos proposed an account of mathematical knowledge based on Polya's idea of [[heuristic]]s. In ''Proofs and Refutations'', Lakatos gave several basic rules for finding proofs and counterexamples to conjectures. He thought that mathematical '[[thought experiment]]s' are a valid way to discover mathematical conjectures and proofs.{{sfnp|Lakatos|1976|p=55}} [[Carl Friedrich Gauss|Gauss]], when asked how he came about his [[theorem]]s, once replied "durch planmässiges Tattonieren" (through [[Constructivism (mathematics)|systematic palpable experimentation]]).{{sfnp|Mackay|1991|p=100}} ==See also== * {{Annotated link|Empirical limits in science}} * {{Annotated link|Evidence-based practices}} * {{Annotated link|Methodology}} * {{Annotated link|Metascience}} * {{Annotated link|Quantitative research}} * [[Research transparency]] * {{Annotated link|Scientific law}} * {{Annotated link|Testability}} <!--* {{Annotated link|Sociology of scientific knowledge}}--> * {{Annotated link|Timeline of the history of scientific method}} ==Notes== {{Notelist|33em}} ===Notes: Problem-solving via scientific method<!--Examples of the method of science-->=== {{Quote|quote=If there is no algorithmic scientific method, then science is best understood through examples.|source=[[John Staddon]]<ref name="Staddon 2020">{{cite book | last=Staddon | first=John Eric Rayner | title=Whatever happened to history of science? How scholarship became politicized story-telling | publisher=Duke University, Center for the History of Political Economy | place=Durham, NC | series=CHOPE working paper | date=October 2020 | url= https://hdl.handle.net/10161/21425 | access-date=6 April 2024 | page=}} Full quote: "I tend to agree with Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method to the extent that if there is no algorithmic ''scientific method'', then science is best understood through examples[.]"</ref>}} {{Notelist-ua|33em}} ===Notes: Philosophical expressions of method=== {{Notelist-lg|33em}} ==References== {{Reflist | group= Note}} {{Reflist}} ==Sources== {{Refbegin|33em |indent=yes}} * {{cite book |last1=Rozhanskaya |first1=Mariam |last2=Levinova |first2=I. 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Memoir of a researcher in the [[Avery–MacLeod–McCarty experiment]]. * {{Citation|first=Victor K.|last=McElheny|title=Watson & DNA: Making a scientific revolution|year=2004 |publisher=Basic Books|isbn=978-0-7382-0866-4}}. * {{Citation|editor-first1=Forest Ray|editor-last1=Moulton|editor-first2=Justus J.|editor-last2=Schifferes |year=1960|title=The Autobiography of Science|publisher=Doubleday|edition=2nd}}. * {{Citation| year=1954 | last1=Needham |first1=Joseph| last2=Wang |first2=Ling (王玲)|author1-link=Joseph Needham|author2-link=Wang Ling (historian)|title=Science and Civilisation in China ''Vol. 1:'' Introductory Orientations |publisher=Cambridge University Press |title-link=Science and Civilisation in China}} * {{Citation|last=Newton|first=Isaac|year=1999|author-link=Isaac Newton|orig-year=1687, 1713, 1726 |title=Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica|publisher=University of California Press| isbn= 978-0-520-08817-7 | ref={{harvid|Newton transl|1999}} |title-link=Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica}}, Third edition. From [[I. Bernard Cohen]] and Anne Whitman's 1999 translation. * {{Citation|last=Ørsted|first=Hans Christian | year=1997| author-link=Hans Christian Ørsted|title=Selected Scientific Works of Hans Christian Ørsted| publisher=Princeton |isbn=978-0-691-04334-0 }}. Translated to English by Karen Jelved, Andrew D. Jackson, and Ole Knudsen, (translators 1997). * Peirce, C.S. – see [[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography]]. * {{Citation|last=Poincaré|first=Henri|author-link=Henri Poincaré|title=Science and Hypothesis|year=1905|place=London|publisher=Walter Scott Publishing|via=The Mead Project|url=http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Poincare/Poincare_1905_toc.html|access-date=2007-08-01|archive-date=2007-09-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929132850/http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Poincare/Poincare_1905_toc.html|url-status=live}}. * {{Citation|year=1957 |last=Pólya|first=George|author-link=George Pólya|title=How to Solve It |publisher=Princeton University Press|edition=2nd|oclc=4140462|title-link=How to Solve It}} ({{cite book |title=''Reprint'' |year=2009 |isbn=978-4-87187-830-2|oclc=706968824|last1=Pólya |first1=George |publisher=Ishi Press International }}} * {{Citation|year=1959 |last= Popper |first= Karl R. | author-link= Karl Popper | title= The Logic of Scientific Discovery |title-link= The Logic of Scientific Discovery |edition=English |orig-year=1934}}. * {{Citation |last=Popper |first=Karl R. |year=1963 |title=Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge |publisher=Routledge |isbn=0-415-28594-1}}. * {{Citation |year=2005 |last=Popper |first=Karl R. |author-link=Karl Popper |title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery |publisher=Taylor & Francis e-Library |isbn=0-203-99462-0 |orig-year=1959, English ed. |url=http://www.cosmopolitanuniversity.ac/library/LogicofScientificDiscoveryPopper1959.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130722012855/http://www.cosmopolitanuniversity.ac/library/LogicofScientificDiscoveryPopper1959.pdf |archive-date=2013-07-22 |url-status=dead }}. * {{Citation |editor-first=Shmuel |editor-last=Sambursky |editor-link=Shmuel Sambursky |year=1975 |title=Physical Thought from the Presocratics to the Quantum Physicists |publisher=Pica Press |isbn=978-0-87663-712-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/physicalthoughtf0000unse/ }}. ** Reviewed in {{Citation |last=Hoffmann |first=Banesh |year=1976 |title='Because it's there': Man's struggle to understand Nature |journal=Physics Today |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=51–53 |doi=10.1063/1.3023315 |bibcode=1976PhT....29b..51S}}. * {{Citation|author-link1=Francisco Sanches| last1=Sanches |first1=Francisco|year=1988|orig-year=1581 |title=That Nothing is Known (Quod nihil scitur)|editor-last1=Limbrick |editor-first1=Elaine |editor-last2=Thomson |editor-first2=Douglas | publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge | isbn= 978-0-521-35077-8 |oclc=462156333 }} Critical edition. * {{cite journal |last=Smith |first=A. Mark |title= Alhacen's Theory of Visual Perception: A Critical Edition, with English Translation and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen's "De aspectibus", the Medieval Latin Version of Ibn al-Haytham's "Kitāb al-Manāẓir": Volume One: Introduction and Latin text |journal= Transactions of the American Philosophical Society |volume= 91 |issue= 4 |pages= 1–337 |date= 2001a |jstor= 3657358 |doi= 10.2307/3657358}} * {{cite journal |last=Smith |first=A. Mark |title= Alhacen's Theory of Visual Perception: A Critical Edition, with English Translation and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen's "De aspectibus", the Medieval Latin Version of Ibn al-Haytham's "Kitāb al-Manāẓir": Volume Two: English translation|journal= Transactions of the American Philosophical Society |volume= 91 |issue= 5 |pages= 339–819 |date= 2001b |jstor= 3657357 |doi= 10.2307/3657357}} * {{cite journal |last=Smith |first=A. Mark |year= 2010 |title= ALHACEN ON REFRACTION: A Critical Edition, with English Translation and Commentary, of Book 7 of Alhacen's ''De Aspectibus''. Volume One: Introduction and Latin Text. Volume Two: English Translation |journal=Transactions of the American Philosophical Society |volume= 100|issue= 3|pages= |jstor=20787647}} * {{cite book |last1=Thurs |first1=Daniel |editor1-last=Shank |editor1-first=Michael |editor2-last=Numbers |editor2-first=Ronald |editor3-last=Harrison |editor3-first=Peter |title=Wrestling with Nature: From Omens to Science |date=2011 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago |isbn=978-0-226-31783-0 |pages=307–336 |chapter=12. Scientific Methods}} * {{Citation | first = Nassim Nicholas | last = Taleb | author-link = Nassim Nicholas Taleb | title = The Black Swan | year = 2007 | publisher = Random House | isbn = 978-1-4000-6351-2 | title-link = The Black Swan (Taleb book) }} * {{citation |last=Voelkel |first=James R. |year=2001 |title=Johannes Kepler and the New Astronomy |publisher=Oxford University Press}} * {{Citation|first=James D.|last=Watson|author-link=James D. Watson|year=1968|title=The Double Helix|location= New York| publisher=Atheneum|id= Library of Congress card number 68-16217|title-link=The Double Helix}}. {{Refend}} ==Further reading== {{Refbegin|33em |indent=yes}} * [[Henry H. Bauer|Bauer, Henry H.]], ''Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method'', University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL, 1992 * [[William Ian Beardmore Beveridge|Beveridge, William I.B.]], ''The Art of Scientific Investigation'', [[Heinemann (book publisher)|Heinemann]], Melbourne, Australia, 1950. * [[Richard J. Bernstein|Bernstein, Richard J.]], ''Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis'', University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1983. * [[Baruch A. Brody|Brody, Baruch A.]] and Capaldi, Nicholas, [https://books.google.com/books?id=d1heAAAAIAAJ ''Science: Men, Methods, Goals: A Reader: Methods of Physical Science''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413233902/https://books.google.com/books?id=d1heAAAAIAAJ |date=2023-04-13 }}, W.A. Benjamin, 1968 * [[Baruch A. Brody|Brody, Baruch A.]] and [[Richard Grandy|Grandy, Richard E.]], ''Readings in the Philosophy of Science'', 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989. * [[Arthur W. Burks|Burks, Arthur W.]], ''Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence'', University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977. * [[Alan Chalmers|Chalmers, Alan]], ''[[What Is This Thing Called Science?]]''. Queensland University Press and Open University Press, 1976. * {{citation |last=Crick|first=Francis|author-link=Francis Crick|title=What Mad Pursuit: A Personal View of Scientific Discovery|year=1988|location=New York|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=978-0-465-09137-9|title-link=What Mad Pursuit: A Personal View of Scientific Discovery}}. * {{citation |first= A.C. |last= Crombie | title= Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700 | location= Oxford |year= 1953 |publisher=Clarendon}} * [[John Earman|Earman, John]] (ed.), ''Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science'', University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA, 1992. * [[Bas C. van Fraassen|Fraassen, Bas C. van]], ''The Scientific Image'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980. * {{Citation|last=Franklin |first=James |author-link=James Franklin (philosopher) |year=2009|title=What Science Knows: And How It Knows It|location=New York|publisher=Encounter Books| isbn=978-1-59403-207-3}}. * [[Hans-Georg Gadamer|Gadamer, Hans-Georg]], ''Reason in the Age of Science'', Frederick G. Lawrence (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981. * [[Ronald N. Giere|Giere, Ronald N.]] (ed.), ''Cognitive Models of Science'', vol. 15 in 'Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science', University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1992. * [[Ian Hacking|Hacking, Ian]], ''Representing and Intervening, Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. * [[Werner Heisenberg|Heisenberg, Werner]], ''Physics and Beyond, Encounters and Conversations'', A.J. Pomerans (trans.), Harper and Row, New York, 1971, pp. 63–64. * [[Gerald Holton|Holton, Gerald]], ''[[Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein]]'', 1st edition 1973, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988. * [[Karin Knorr Cetina]], {{cite book | last = Knorr Cetina | first = Karin | title = Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge | publisher = Harvard University Press | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | year = 1999 | isbn = 978-0-674-25894-5 | title-link = Epistemic cultures }} * [[Thomas S. Kuhn|Kuhn, Thomas S.]], ''The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change'', University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1977. * [[Bruno Latour|Latour, Bruno]], ''Science in Action, How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. * Losee, John, ''A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972. 2nd edition, 1980. * [[Nicholas Maxwell|Maxwell, Nicholas]], ''The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Paperback 2003. * [[Nicholas Maxwell|Maxwell, Nicholas]], [http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html ''Understanding Scientific Progress''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180220210819/http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html |date=2018-02-20 }}, Paragon House, St. Paul, Minnesota, 2017. * {{cite web |editor-link=William McComas |editor-last=McComas |editor-first=William F. |title=The Principal Elements of the Nature of Science: Dispelling the Myths |work=The Nature of Science in Science Education |pages=53–70 |publisher=Kluwer Academic Publishers |place=Netherlands |year=1998 |url=http://coehp.uark.edu/pase/TheMythsOfScience.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=2014-07-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140701110930/http://coehp.uark.edu/pase/TheMythsOfScience.pdf }} * [[Cheryl Misak|Misak, Cheryl J.]], ''Truth and the End of Inquiry, A Peircean Account of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. * [[Naomi Oreskes|Oreskes, Naomi]], "Masked Confusion: A trusted source of health information misleads the public by prioritizing rigor over reality", ''[[Scientific American]]'', vol. 329, no. 4 (November 2023), pp. 90–91. * Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo (ed.), ''Language and Learning, The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980. * [[Karl R. Popper|Popper, Karl R.]], ''Unended Quest, An Intellectual Autobiography'', Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1982. * [[Hilary Putnam|Putnam, Hilary]], ''Renewing Philosophy'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. * [[Richard Rorty|Rorty, Richard]], ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979. * [[Wesley C. Salmon|Salmon, Wesley C.]], ''Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'', University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1990. * [[Abner Shimony|Shimony, Abner]], ''Search for a Naturalistic World View: Vol. 1, Scientific Method and Epistemology, Vol. 2, Natural Science and Metaphysics'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. * [[Paul Thagard|Thagard, Paul]], ''Conceptual Revolutions'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992. * [[John Ziman|Ziman, John]] (2000). ''Real Science: what it is, and what it means''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{Refend}} ==External links== {{Commons category}} {{Wikibooks|The Scientific Method}} {{Wikiversity|Thinking Scientifically}} {{Library resources box |by=no |onlinebooks=no |others=no |about=yes |label=Scientific method}} * {{cite SEP |url-id=scientific-method |title=Scientific Method |last=Andersen |first=Hanne|author-link=Hanne Andersen (philosopher)|last2=Hepburn |first2=Brian}} * {{cite IEP |url-id=conf-ind |title=Confirmation and Induction}} * {{PhilPapers|category|scientific-method}} * {{InPho|idea|1916}} * [http://www.geo.sunysb.edu/esp/files/scientific-method.html An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and a scientific method] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180101173949/http://www.geo.sunysb.edu/esp/files/scientific-method.html |date=2018-01-01 }} by Steven D. Schafersman. * [http://teacher.nsrl.rochester.edu/phy_labs/AppendixE/AppendixE.html Introduction to the scientific method] at the [[University of Rochester]] * [http://zenodo.org/record/6336021#.YmafclMpBKM The scientific method from a philosophical perspective] * [http://www.galilean-library.org/theory.html Theory-ladenness] by Paul Newall at The Galilean Library * [https://web.archive.org/web/20060428080832/http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/office/ganderson/es10/lectures/lecture01/lecture01.html Lecture on Scientific Method by Greg Anderson] (archived 28 April 2006) * [http://www.sciencemadesimple.com/scientific_method.html Using the scientific method for designing science fair projects] * [http://emotionalcompetency.com/sci/booktoc.html ''Scientific Methods'' an online book by Richard D. Jarrard] * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b240PGCMwV0 Richard Feynman on the Key to Science] (one minute, three seconds), from the Cornell Lectures. * [https://archive.today/20130121134726/http://www.dbskeptic.com/2010/03/14/what-it-means-to-be-scientifically-proven/ Lectures on the Scientific Method] by Nick Josh Karean, [[Kevin Padian]], [[Michael Shermer]] and [[Richard Dawkins]] (archived 21 January 2013). * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yk5IWzTfWeM "How Do We Know What Is True?" (animated video; 2:52)] {{Philosophy of science}} {{Science and technology studies}} {{Authority control}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Scientific Method}} [[Category:Scientific method| ]] [[Category:Scientific revolution]] [[Category:Philosophy of science]] [[Category:Empiricism]] Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. 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