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Do not fill this in! {{Short description|1967–1970 civil war in Nigeria}} {{EngvarB|date=March 2023}} {{Use dmy dates|date=October 2021}} {{Infobox military conflict | conflict = Nigerian Civil War | partof = the [[Cold War]] and the [[decolonisation of Africa]] | image = {{multiple image|border=infobox|perrow=2/2/2|total_width=300 |image1= |image2= Godwin Alabi-Isama1.jpg |image3 = Starved girl.jpg |image4 = Calabar 1968.png |image5 = }} '''Clockwise from top left''': {{flatlist| * Brigadier-General [[Godwin Alabi-Isama]] of the [[Nigerian Army]] (second right) briefing Colonel [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] (third right) and Colonel Pedro Martins on the [[Pincer movement|Pincer strategy]] to defeat Biafra * Biafran child starving from the mass famine caused by the Nigerian blockade of [[Biafra]] * Makeshift airport in [[Calabar]] delivering international humanitarian aid to Biafra during the [[Biafran airlift]] }} | date = 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=07|day1=06|year1=1967|month2=01|day2=15|year2=1970}}) | place = Southeastern [[Nigeria]] | territory = Dissolution of the [[Republic of Biafra]] | result = Nigerian victory | combatant1 = {{plainlist| * {{flag|Nigeria}} * {{flag|United Arab Republic|name=Egypt}}{{efn|name="air"|[[Air support]]}} (until 1969) }} | combatant2 = {{plainlist |*{{flag|Biafra}}}} | combatant1a = | combatant2a = | commander1 = {{plainlist| * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Yakubu Gowon]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Hassan Katsina]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Mohammed Shuwa]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Benjamin Adekunle]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Theophilus Danjuma]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Shehu Musa Yar'Adua]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Murtala Mohammed]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Muhammadu Buhari]] * {{nowrap|{{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Ibrahim Babangida]]{{WIA}}}} * {{flagdeco|Nigeria}} [[Sani Abacha]] }} | commander2 = {{plainlist| * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu]] * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Philip Effiong]]{{surrendered}} * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Timothy Onwuatuegwu]]{{surrendered}} * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Albert Okonkwo]] * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Victor Banjo]]{{executed}} * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Ogbugo Kalu]]{{surrendered}} * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Joseph Achuzie]]{{surrendered}} * {{nowrap|{{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Timothy Onwuatuegwu]]{{KIA}}}} * {{flagdeco|Biafra}} [[Humphrey Chukwuka]] }} ---- {{collapsible list | title = Foreign mercenaries: | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Rolf Steiner]]<ref name ="jowett"/> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Taffy Williams]]<ref name ="jowett"/> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Jan Zumbach]]<ref name="tvp">{{cite web |last1=S.A |first1=Telewizja Polska |title=Starve a rebellious nation to death |url=https://weekly.tvp.pl/60806010/starve-a-rebellious-nation-to-death |website=tvpworld.com |language=en}}</ref> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Carl Gustaf von Rosen]]<ref name="tvp"/> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Lynn Garrison]]<ref>{{cite web |last1=Lionel |first1=Ekene |title=Lynn Garrison: Biafran War Pilot Speaks on His Exploits – Military Africa |date=15 April 2018 |url=https://www.military.africa/2018/04/exclusive-lynn-garrison-biafran-war-heroic-pilot-speaks-on-his-exploits/}}</ref> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Marc Goosens]]{{KIA}}<ref name="jowett">{{cite book |last1=Jowett |first1=Philip S. |last2=Ruggeri |first2=Raffaele |title=Modern African wars. 5: The Nigerian-Biafran war 1967-70 / Philip S. Jowett ; illustrated by Raffaele Ruggeri |date=2016 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |location=Oxford |isbn=9781472816115}}</ref> | {{flagicon|Biafra}} [[Roger Faulques]]<ref name="jowett"/> }} | units1 = {{Armed forces|Nigeria}} | units2 = {{Armed forces|Biafra}} * [[#Foreign mercenaries|Foreign mercenaries]] | strength1 = {{plainlist| * 85,000<ref name="REF0">Nkwocha, 2010: 156</ref>–150,000<ref name="REF00">Karl DeRouen & U. K. Heo (2007). ''Civil wars of the world: Major conflicts since World War II''. Tomo I. Santa Bárbara: ABC CLIO, p. 569. {{ISBN|978-1-85109-919-1}}.</ref> (1967) * 250,000 (1968){{citation needed|date=April 2023}} * 200,000<ref name="REF12"/>–250,000<ref name="REF00"/> (1970) }} | strength2 = {{plainlist| * 10,000<ref name="REF2002">Onyema Nkwocha (2010). ''The Republic of Biafra: Once Upon a Time in Nigeria: My Story of the Biafra-Nigerian Civil War – A Struggle for Survival (1967–1970)''. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, p. 25. {{ISBN|978-1-4520-6867-1}}.</ref>–100,000<ref name="REF00"/> (1967) * 110,000 (1968)<ref>West Africa. Londres: Afrimedia International, 1969, p. 1565. "Malnutrition affects adults less than children, half of whom have now died, reports Debrel, who also describes the reorganisation of the Biafran army after the 1968 defeats, making it a 'political' army of 110,000 men; its automatic weapons,{{nbsp}}..."</ref> * 50,000<ref name="REF12"/>–100,000<ref>Stan Chu Ilo (2006). ''The Face of Africa: Looking Beyond the Shadows''. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, p. 138. {{ISBN|978-1-4208-9705-0}}.</ref> (1970) }} | casualties3 = 45,000<ref name="REF12">Phillips, Charles, & Alan Axelrod (2005). "Nigerian-Biafran War". ''Encyclopedia of Wars''. Tomo II. New York: Facts On File, Inc., {{ISBN|978-0-8160-2853-5}}.</ref>–100,000<ref>Paul R. Bartrop (2012). ''A Biographical Encyclopedia of Contemporary Genocide''. Santa Bárbara: ABC-CLIO, p. 107. {{ISBN|978-0-313-38679-4}}.</ref><ref name="REF14">Bridgette Kasuka (2012). ''Prominent African Leaders Since Independence''. Bankole Kamara Taylor, p. 331. {{ISBN|978-1-4700-4358-2}}.</ref> combatants killed ----3,000,000-4,000,000 Biafran civilians died from famine during the Nigerian naval blockade<ref>{{harvnb|Stevenson|2014|p=314}}: "The mass killing during the Nigeria-Biafra War was the result of a 'deliberately imposed economic blockade on the inhabitants of Nigeria's southeastern region by the country's federal government' that led to an induced 'famine in which over two million people died of starvation and related diseases.'"</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=February 2023}} ---- 2,000,000–4,500,000 displaced,<ref>Godfrey Mwakikagile (2001). ''Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria''. Huntington: Nova Publishers, p. 176. {{ISBN|978-1-56072-967-9}}.</ref> 500,000 of whom fled abroad<ref>DeRouen & Heo, 2007: 570</ref> | campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Biafran War}} }} The '''Nigerian Civil War''' (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970), also known as the '''Biafran War''', was a [[civil war]] fought between [[Nigeria]] and the [[Republic of Biafra]], a [[Secession|secessionist state]] which had declared its [[independence]] from Nigeria in 1967. Nigeria was led by General [[Yakubu Gowon]], and [[Biafra]] by [[Lieutenant Colonel]] [[C. Odumegwu Ojukwu|Chukwuemeka "Emeka" Odumegwu Ojukwu]].<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite web |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria |title=Nigeria – Independent Nigeria |website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-01-22}}</ref> [[Biafra]] represented the nationalist aspirations of the [[Igbo people|Igbo ethnic group]], whose leadership felt they could no longer coexist with the [[Federal government of Nigeria|federal government]] dominated by the interests of the Muslim [[Hausa-Fulani]]s of Northern Nigeria.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Daly |first=Samuel Fury Childs |date=2020 |title=A Nation on Paper: Making a State in the Republic of Biafra |url=https://www.academia.edu/44202942 |journal=Comparative Studies in Society and History |volume=62 |issue=4 |pages=868–894 |doi=10.1017/S0010417520000316 |s2cid=224852757}}</ref> The conflict resulted from political, economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions which preceded the [[United Kingdom|United Kingdom's]] formal [[decolonisation]] [[Colonial Nigeria|of Nigeria]] from 1960 to 1963. Immediate causes of the war in 1966 included [[1966 Nigerian coup d'état|a military coup]], [[1966 Nigerian counter-coup|a counter-coup]], and [[1966 anti-Igbo pogrom|anti-Igbo pogroms]] in [[Northern Region, Nigeria|Northern Nigeria]].<ref name="auto3">{{Cite journal |last=Plotnicov |first=Leonard |date=1971 |title=An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos |jstor=159448 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=297–305 |issn=0022-278X |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00024976|s2cid=154565379 }}</ref> Within a year, Nigerian government troops surrounded [[Biafra]], and captured coastal oil facilities and the city of [[Port Harcourt]]. A [[Blockade of Biafra|blockade was imposed]] as a deliberate policy during the ensuing stalemate which led to the mass starvation of Biafran civilians.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Campbell|first=Colin|date=1987-03-29|title=Starvation Was The Policy|language=en-US|work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/29/books/starvation-was-the-policy.html |access-date=2021-04-17|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> During the {{frac|2|1|2}} years of the war, there were about 100,000 overall military casualties, while between 500,000 and 2 million Biafran civilians died of starvation.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/BIAFRA.HTM|title=ICE Case Studies: The Biafran War|date=1997|website=American University: ICE Case Studies|publisher=American University|access-date=6 November 2016|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170214103207/http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/biafra.htm|archive-date=14 February 2017}}</ref> Alongside the concurrent [[Vietnam War]], the Nigerian Civil War was one of the first wars in human history to be televised to a global audience.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Samuel Fury Childs |title=A history of the Republic of Biafra : law, crime, and the Nigerian Civil War |date=2020 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |isbn=9781108887748 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref> In mid-1968, images of malnourished and starving Biafran children saturated the mass media of [[Western countries]]. The plight of the starving Biafrans became a ''[[cause célèbre]]'' in foreign countries, enabling a significant rise in the funding and prominence of international [[non-governmental organisations]] (NGOs). Biafra received international humanitarian aid from civilians during the [[Biafran airlift]], an event which inspired the formation of [[Doctors Without Borders]] following the end of the war. The [[United Kingdom]] and the [[Soviet Union]] were the main supporters of the Nigerian government, while [[France]], [[Israel]] (after 1968) and some other countries supported [[Biafra]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Chinua|first=Achebe|title=There was a country: a personal history of Biafra|publisher=pearson|year=2012}}</ref> The United States' official position was one of neutrality, considering Nigeria as "a responsibility of Britain",<ref>{{cite thesis |last=Luepke |first=Anna-Katharina |date=2018 |title=The 'Other Side' of the Nigeria-Biafra War: A Transnational History |type=PhD |page=2 |publisher=Bangor University |url=https://research.bangor.ac.uk/portal/files/22128193/LUEPKE_The_Other_Side_Final.pdf |access-date=10 Jan 2023|quote=The United States, on the other hand, professed neutrality considering Nigeria, in the words of an American diplomat, as ‘a responsibility of Britain’. |quote-page=2}}</ref> but some interpret the refusal to recognise Biafra as favouring the Nigerian government.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 |volume=XXIV: Africa |publisher=Office of the Historian, US State Department |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d396 |access-date=2022-04-25 }}</ref><ref>{{cite thesis |last=Luepke |first=Anna-Katharina |date=2018 |title=The 'Other Side' of the Nigeria-Biafra War: A Transnational History |type=PhD |page=104 |publisher=Bangor University |url=https://research.bangor.ac.uk/portal/files/22128193/LUEPKE_The_Other_Side_Final.pdf |access-date=10 Jan 2023|quote=Despite remaining officially neutral and declaring an arms embargo on both sides, the United States leaned more towards federal Nigeria. A report prepared for president Nixon in January 1969 sees U.S. options as limited, arguing that ‘our role is important but it alone will not ensure a solution’ and ‘to the degree that we have leverage, we have it only with the Feds’. The U.S. thus followed a policy described in the report in the following terms: ‘support the Feds diplomatically, endorse “One Nigeria” with Ibo protection but refuse to sell arms’. |quote-page=104}}</ref> The war highlighted challenges within [[pan-Africanism]] during the early stages of African independence from colonial rule, suggesting that the diverse nature of African peoples may present obstacles to achieving common unity. Additionally, it shed light on initial shortcomings within the [[Organization of African Unity]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ayittey |first1=George B. N. |title=The United States of Africa: A Revisit |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |date=November 2010 |volume=632 |issue=1 |pages=86–102 |doi=10.1177/0002716210378988|s2cid=145436388 }}</ref> The war also resulted in the political marginalization of the Igbo people, as Nigeria has not had another Igbo president since the end of the war, leading some Igbo people to believe they are being unfairly punished for the war.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ugwueze |first1=Michael I. |title=Biafra War Documentaries: Explaining Continual Resurgence of Secessionist Agitations in the South-East, Nigeria |journal=Civil Wars |date=3 April 2021 |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=207–233 |doi=10.1080/13698249.2021.1903781|s2cid=233593634 }}</ref> [[Igbo nationalism]] has emerged since the end of the war, as well as various neo-Biafran secessionist groups such as the [[Indigenous People of Biafra]] and [[Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Onuoha |first1=G. |title=The politics of 'hope' and 'despair': Generational dimensions to Igbo nationalism in post-civil war Nigeria |journal=African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie |date=2014 |volume=18 |issue=1 |pages=2–26 |doi=10.4314/asr.v18i1 |doi-broken-date=31 January 2024 |url=https://www.ajol.info/index.php/asr/article/view/113647 |language=en |issn=1027-4332}}</ref> All the Post-Biafra groups were aimed at agitating for memories and interest of all easterners. ==Background== ===Ethnic division=== This [[civil war]] can be connected to the [[Colonial Nigeria#Amalgamation|colonial amalgamation]] in 1914 of the [[Northern Nigeria Protectorate|Northern Protectorate]], [[Lagos Colony]], and [[Southern Nigeria Protectorate]], which was intended for better administration due to the proximity of these [[protectorate]]s {{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}. However, the change did not take into consideration the differences in the culture and religions of the people in each area. Competition for political and economic power exacerbated tensions.<ref name="Britannica"/> [[Nigeria]] gained independence from the [[United Kingdom]] on 1 October 1960, with a population of 45.2 million made up of more than 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups {{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}. When the colony of Nigeria was created, its three largest ethnic groups were the [[Igbo people|Igbo]], who formed about 60–70% of the population in the southeast;<ref>{{Cite web |title=Igbo {{!}} people |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Igbo |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |language=en |access-date=2020-05-11}}</ref> the [[Hausa-Fulani]] of the [[Sokoto Caliphate]], who formed about 67% of the population in the northern part of the territory;<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Orji I. |first=Ema |title=Issues on ethnicity and governance in Nigeria: A universal human Right perspectives. |url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1819&context=ilj |journal=Fordham International Law Journal |volume=25 |issue=2 2001 Article 4}}</ref> and the [[Yoruba people|Yoruba]], who formed about 75% of the population in the southwest.<ref name=":0"/> Although these groups have their homelands, by the 1960s, the people were dispersed across Nigeria, with all three ethnic groups represented substantially in major cities. When the war broke out in 1967, there were still 5,000 Igbos in [[Lagos]].<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), pp. 32–33. "The Ibo like the Hausa and Yoruba, are found in hundreds in all towns and cities throughout the Federation. Even at the period of the Civil War, they numbered more than 5,000 in Lagos alone."</ref> The semi-[[feudal]] and [[Muslim]] Hausa-Fulani in the north were traditionally ruled by a conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of [[emir]]s who in turn owed their ultimate allegiance to the [[Sultan of Sokoto]], whom they regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=Sokoto Caliphate|url=https://irepos.unijos.edu.ng/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2541/1/20181218113229.pdf}}</ref> Apart from the Hausa-Fulani, the [[Kanuri people|Kanuri]] were another dominant majority Muslim ethnic group that had key figures in the war. They made up about 5% of Nigeria's population and were the dominant ethnic group in the [[North-Eastern State|North-Eastern state]]. They historically successfully resisted the Sokoto Caliphate during the 19th-century through their millennium-long [[Kanem–Bornu Empire|Kanem-Bornu empire]]. The southernmost part of the region known as the [[Middle Belt]] had large populations of Christian and Animist populations. Through missionary activities and the 'Northernisation' policy of the [[Northern Region, Nigeria|Regional Government]], the subregion had a significant western-educated population. Several key figures on the Nigerian side of the war came from this subregion, such as Yakubu Gowon and Theophilus Danjuma, both of whom are Christians.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kirk-Greene |first=A. H. M. |date=1967 |title=The Peoples of Nigeria: The Cultural Background to the Crisis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/720702 |journal=African Affairs |volume=66 |issue=262 |pages=3–11 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a095561 |jstor=720702 |issn=0001-9909}}</ref> The [[Yoruba people|Yoruba]] [[political system]] in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, also consisted of a series of [[monarch]]s, the [[Oba (ruler)|Oba]]. The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less [[autocratic]] than those in the north.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nwafor-Ejelinma |first=Ndubisi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AXff8YkxVG0C&pg=PA21 |title=Ndi-Igbo of Nigeria: Identity Showcase |date=August 2012 |publisher=Trafford Publishing |isbn=978-1-4669-3892-2 |language=en}}</ref> The political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater [[upward mobility]], based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The particularity of the problem with Nigeria @ 59|url=https://www.thecable.ng/the-particularity-of-the-problem-with-nigeria-59|date=2019-10-01|website=TheCable|language=en-US|access-date=2020-05-24}}</ref> In contrast to the two other groups, Igbos and the ethnic groups of the [[Niger Delta]] in the southeast lived mostly in autonomous, democratically organised communities, although there were E''ze'' or monarchs in many of the ancient cities, such as the [[Kingdom of Nri]]. At its zenith, the Kingdom controlled most of Igboland, including influence on the [[Anioma people]], [[Arochukwu]] (which controlled [[slavery]] in Igbo), and [[Onitsha]] territory. Unlike the other two regions, decisions within the Igbo communities were made by a general assembly in which men and women participated.<ref>{{Google books |id=Zm7sWUbDWakC |page=25 |title=Ijeaku, Nnamdi }}</ref> Considering this participation by women in this civil war, the study ''Female fighters and the fates of rebellions: How mobilizing women influences conflict duration'' by Reed M. Wood oberved that there was a longer duration of wars between rebel groups and the number of women that participated within the conflict at hand. In discussing the correlation between conflicts of longer duration and a high rate of participation of women, the study suggests that gender norms and the general ways in which "an armed group recruits as well as who it recruits may subsequently influence its behaviors during the conflict and the manner in which the conflict unfolds."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Female fighters and the fates of rebellions: How mobilizing women influences conflict duration |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353791811}}</ref> The differing [[political system]]s and structures reflected and produced divergent customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through a village head designated by the emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political decisions were to be submitted to. As with many other [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] religious and political systems, leadership positions were given to persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors. A chief function of this political system in this context was to maintain conservative values, which caused many Hausa-Fulani to view economic and social innovation as subversive or sacrilegious.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Abutu|first=Dan|title=THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR|url=https://www.academia.edu/26022821|language=en}}</ref> In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos and other Biafrans often participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to [[Arbitration|arbitrate]] disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth.<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), pp. 34–35. "In principle, authority in the local community was formerly exercised by a body of elders which met in council presided over by the head of the senior lineage and included heads of other lineage and sub-lineage. Councils were concerned mainly with offenses, religion, and public issues likely to break up the solidarity of the group, village or town. Men of influence, particularly men of wealth, who held titles, and were members of local Ozo and Eze lodges, frequently dominated the lineage heads, but there was no formal concentration of authority in a single individual. Among the Ibo, even where there was no title taking, a man of wealth could attain considerable political power, apart from any authority derived from his place in a kinship system.{{nbsp}}... New laws which affected the community required the consent of the community concerned as expressed at a public meeting."</ref> The Igbo had been substantially victimised in the [[Atlantic slave trade]]; in the year 1790, it was reported that of 20,000 people sold each year from [[Kingdom of Bonny|Bonny]], 16,000 were Igbo.<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), p. 30. "Bonny, which became one of the principal slave markets on the coast, was largely peopled by Ibo. In 1790, according to Adams, 16,000 out of the 20,000 slaves sold there annually were Ibos. The last British slaver sailed from Bonny in 1808, though the trade continued until 1841."</ref> With their emphasis upon social achievement and political participation, the Igbo adapted to and challenged colonial rule in innovative ways.<ref name="Britannica"/> These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and perhaps enhanced by the [[Colonial Nigeria|colonial government in Nigeria]]. In the north, the colonial government found it convenient to [[indirect rule|rule indirectly]] through the emirs, thus perpetuating rather than changing the [[Indigenous peoples|indigenous]] authoritarian political system. Christian [[missionaries]] were excluded from the north, and the area thus remained virtually closed to European cultural influence.<ref>{{Cite web |title=6: Christian Missionary Activities in West Africa – History Textbook |url=https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/6-christian-missionary-activities-in-west-africa/ |access-date=2022-07-07 |language=en-GB}}</ref> By contrast, the richest of the Igbo often sent their sons to British universities, with the intention of preparing them to work with the British. During the ensuing years, the northern emirs maintained their traditional political and religious institutions, while reinforcing their [[social structure]]. At the time of independence in 1960, the north was by far the most underdeveloped area in Nigeria. It had an English literacy rate of 2%, as compared to 19.2% in the east (literacy in [[Ajami script|Ajami]], local languages in Arabic script, learned in connection with religious education, was much higher). The west also enjoyed a much higher literacy level, as it was the first part of the country to have contact with western education and established a free primary education program under the pre-independence Western Regional Government.<ref name="ReferenceA">'' Biafra Story'', Frederick Forsyth, Leo Cooper, 2001 {{ISBN|0-85052-854-2}}</ref><ref>Pierri, ''A New Entry into the World Oil Market'' (2013), p. 108. "The North had developed very differently from the rest of the country, for it lagged far behind the South in terms of European-educated population. Hence, Northerners feared that incorporation into an independent and unitary Nigerian State molded according to European standards would cause their cultural and political submission to the South."</ref> In the west, the missionaries rapidly introduced Western forms of education. Consequently, the Yoruba were the first group in Nigeria to adopt Western bureaucratic social norms. They made up the first classes of African civil servants, doctors, lawyers, and other technicians and professionals.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Causes, and Consequences of Rapid Erosion of Cultural Values in a Traditional African Society |last1=Wahab |first1=E. O. |last2=Odunsi |first2=S. O. |date=2012 |journal=Journal of Anthropology |language=en |last3=Ajiboye |first3=O. E. |volume=2012 |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1155/2012/327061 |doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Missionary|Missionaries]] were introduced at a later date in eastern areas because the British experienced [[Anglo-Aro War|difficulty establishing firm control]] over the highly autonomous communities there.<ref>Audrey Chapman, "Civil War in Nigeria," ''Midstream'', Feb 1968</ref> However, the Igbo and other Biafran people actively embraced Western education, and they overwhelmingly came to adopt Christianity. Population pressure in the Igbo homeland, combined with aspirations for monetary wages, drove thousands of Igbos to other parts of Nigeria in search of work. By the 1960s, Igbo political culture was more unified and the region relatively prosperous, with tradesmen and literate elites active not just in the traditionally Igbo east, but throughout Nigeria.<ref>Oliver, Roland and Atmore, Anthony. ''Africa Since 1800''. 1994, p. 270</ref> By 1966, the traditional ethnic and religious differences between northerners and the Igbo were exacerbated by new differences in education and economic class.<ref name="Jeyifo2013"/><ref name=":1" /> ===Politics and economics of federalism=== The colonial administration divided Nigeria into three regions—North, West and East—something which exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social differences among Nigeria's different [[ethnic group]]s. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. There were also widespread reports of [[fraud]] during Nigeria's first [[census]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ipobinusa.org/nigeria-britains-creation|title=NIGERIA: BRITAIN'S CREATION HANDED OVER TO THE FULANI|website=Indigenous People of Biafra USA|language=en-US|access-date=2019-04-13}}</ref> and even today population remains a highly political issue in Nigeria. On this basis, the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively formed political parties that were largely regional and based on ethnic [[allegiance]]s: the [[Northern People's Congress]] (NPC) in the North; the [[Action Group (Nigeria)|Action Group]] in the West (AG); and the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons]] (NCNC) in the East. Although these parties were not exclusively [[Homogeneous charge compression ignition|homogeneous]] in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up, the disintegration of Nigeria resulted largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe.<ref name="Britannica"/><ref>{{Cite book|last=Azikiwe|first=Nnamdi|title=The development of political parties in Nigeria: office of the commissioner in U.K for eastern regions of Nigeria, London; (1961) Zik: A selection of the speeches of Dr. Nnamdi A. : A peace proposals for ending the Nigeria Civil War|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1970}}</ref> The basis of modern Nigeria formed in 1914 when the United Kingdom amalgamated the [[Northern Nigeria Protectorate|Northern]] and [[Southern Nigeria Protectorate|Southern]] protectorates. Beginning with the Northern Protectorate, the [[British Empire|British]] implemented a system of [[indirect rule]] of which they exerted influence through alliances with local forces. This system worked so well, Colonial Governor [[Frederick Lugard]] successfully lobbied to extend it to the Southern [[Protectorate]] through amalgamation. In this way, a foreign and hierarchical system of governance was imposed on the Igbos.<ref name="Ejiogu2013">{{cite journal |first=E. C. |last=Ejiogu |title=Chinua Achebe on Biafra: An Elaborate Deconstruction |journal=[[Journal of Asian and African Studies]] |volume=48 |issue=6 |pages=653–670 |year=2013 |doi=10.1177/0021909613506457 |s2cid=145129982 }}</ref> [[Intellectual]]s began to agitate for greater rights and independence.<ref>Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 53–73. "...{{nbsp}}there was a tendency for British officials to build social barriers between themselves and Westernised Nigerians which, on the one hand, gave strength to nationalistic paroxysms. The Westernised Nigerian was an isolated individual, possibly because he was seen as a potential rival. He thus became a creature left to seek his own salvation. All that was left for him then was to seek expression in nationalistic organisations."</ref> The size of this intellectual class increased significantly in the 1950s, with the massive expansion of the national education program.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 17–18.</ref> During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the campaign for independence from British rule. Northern leaders, fearful that independence would mean political and [[Economy|economic]] domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the continuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, anxious to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nwadike |first=Jerome Agu |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MhhD6NOcBUgC&pg=PA10 |title=A Biafran Soldier'S Survival from the Jaws of Death: Nigerian – Biafran Civil War |date=2010-09-25 |publisher=Xlibris Corporation |isbn=978-1-4535-1381-1 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Patrick A. |first=Anwunah |title=The Nigeria -Biafra War (1967 -1970): my memoirs |publisher=Spectrum Books Limited |year=2007}}</ref> However, the two Southern regions had significant cultural and ideological differences, leading to discord between the two Southern political parties. Firstly, the AG favoured a loose confederacy of regions in the emergent Nigerian nation whereby each region would be in total control of its own distinct territory. The status of Lagos was a sore point for the AG, which did not want Lagos, a Yoruba town situated in Western Nigeria (which was at that time the federal capital and seat of national government) to be designated as the capital of Nigeria, if it meant loss of Yoruba [[sovereignty]]. The AG insisted that Lagos must be completely recognised as a Yoruba town without any loss of identity, control or autonomy by the Yoruba. Contrary to this position, the NCNC was anxious to declare Lagos, by virtue of it being the "Federal Capital Territory" as "no man's land"—a declaration which as could be expected angered the AG, which offered to help fund the development of another territory in Nigeria as [[Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria)|"Federal Capital Territory"]] and then threatened secession from Nigeria if it didn't get its way. The threat of secession by the AG was tabled, documented and recorded in numerous constitutional conferences, including the constitutional conference held in London in 1954 with the demand that a right of secession be enshrined in the constitution of the emerging Nigerian nation to allow any part of the emergent nation to opt out of Nigeria, should the need arise.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914 |first=Tekena N. |last=Tamuno |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=8 |issue=4 |pages=563–584 |doi=10.1017/s0022278x00023909 |jstor=159090 |year=1970|s2cid=153672623 }}</ref> This proposal for inclusion of right of secession by the regions in independent Nigeria by the AG was rejected and resisted by NCNC which vehemently argued for a tightly bound united/unitary structured nation because it viewed the provision of a secession clause as detrimental to the formation of a unitary Nigerian state. In the face of sustained opposition by the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons|NCNC]] delegates, later joined by the NPC and backed by threats to view maintenance of the inclusion of secession by the AG as treasonable by the British, the AG was forced to renounce its position of inclusion of the right of secession a part of the Nigerian constitution. Had such a provision been made in the Nigerian constitution, later events which led to the Nigerian/Biafran civil war may have been avoided. The pre-independence alliance between the NCNC and the NPC against the aspirations of the AG would later set the tone for political governance of independent Nigeria by the NCNC/NPC and lead to disaster in later years in Nigeria.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 3. "On 31st March 1953, Anthony Enaharo of the Action Group (AG) tabled a motion in the House of Representatives in Lagos which called for independence in 1956. The National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which had earlier committed itself to a 1956 independence date, during its annual party convention held in Kano in August 1951, supported the Enahoro motion, while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) rejected it out of hand. Instead, the NPC sought an amendment to the motion and advocated independence 'as soon as practicable.'"</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Madiebo|first=Alex|title=The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War|publisher=Fourth Dimension Publishers|year=1980}}</ref> Northern–Southern tension manifested firstly in the [[1945 Jos riots]]<ref name="auto3"/> and again on 1 May 1953, as [[1953 Kano riot|fighting in the Northern city of Kano]].<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 9. "It slipped several more notches after the vulgarity of the Lagos mob – <u>con mutunci</u>, personal humiliation through public abuse, is to the Hausa a worse offense than physical assault – and the Kano riots. If 1953 was to become one of the Biafran points of no return because of the slaughter of Ibos in Kano, it had never been anything less in the NPC demonology of the South because of their treatment by politicians and proletariat alike in Lagos."</ref> The political parties tended to focus on building power in their own regions, resulting in an incoherent and disunified dynamic in the federal government.<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 12. "Once (a) the principle of federalism (b) the quality of Nigerian federalism (loose and lopsided, the very negation of classic Whearism) had been agreed on by the Nigerian leaders, the direction from 1954 onwards was progressively towards the construction of impregnable bases of power within each Region. Nearly every move can be analysed in terms of increasing the rigidity of the Regional cores and inhibiting the effective extension of the central authority."</ref> In 1946, the British [[Federalism in Nigeria|divided]] the Southern Region into the Western Region and the [[Eastern Region, Nigeria|Eastern Region]]. Each government was entitled to collect [[Royalty payment|royalties]] from resources extracted within its area. This changed in 1956 when [[Shell Nigeria|Shell]]-[[BP]] found large petroleum deposits in the Eastern region. A Commission led by [[Jeremy Raisman|Sir Jeremy Raisman]] and [[Ronald Tress]] determined that resource royalties would now enter a "Distributable Pools Account" with the money split between different parts of government (50% to region of origin, 20% to federal government, 30% to other regions).<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 115–116.</ref> To ensure continuing influence, the British government promoted unity in the Northern bloc and secessionist sentiments among and within the two Southern regions. The Nigerian government, following independence, promoted discord in the West with the creation of a new [[Mid-Western Region, Nigeria|Mid-Western Region]] in an area with oil potential.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 116–117. "In the struggle over the national wealth, control depended on who dominated the government at the centre. With Southern Nigeria virtually split into two, the North, which was now by far the largest region, had the upper hand. British Colonial Officers also encouraged it to promote the philosophy of one North in order to maintain its political control.{{nbsp}}... In an attempt to weaken the opposition the ruling coalition (NPC and NCNC) sponsored a crisis within the Western Region parliament culminating in the declaration of a State of Emergency in the Region in 1962. In 1963, the Western Region was further split into two. This effectively separated the core Yoruba group from the minorities. Interestingly, the new Mid-Western Region, dominated by minorities also had prospects for oil exploration."</ref> The new constitution of 1946 also proclaimed that "The entire property in and control of all [[mineral oil]]s, in, under, or upon any lands, in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in, the Crown."<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 11.</ref> The United Kingdom profited significantly from a fivefold rise in Nigerian exports amidst the post-war economic boom.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 19–20. "But Nigeria was still a British colony, with a political economy that existed principally to serve British interests."</ref> ==Independence and First Republic== Nigeria gained independence on 1 October 1960, and the [[First Nigerian Republic|First Republic]] came to be on 1 October 1963. The first prime minister of Nigeria, [[Abubakar Tafawa Balewa]], was a northerner and [[Organizational founder|co-founder]] of the Northern People's Congress. He formed an alliance with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons party, and its popular nationalist leader [[Nnamdi Azikiwe|Nnamdi "Zik" Azikiwe]], who became [[List of governors and governors-general of Nigeria|Governor General]] and then President. The Yoruba-aligned Action Group, the third major party, played the opposition role.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), p. 109.</ref> Workers became increasingly aggrieved by low wages and bad conditions, especially when they compared their lot to the lifestyles of [[politician]]s in Lagos. Most wage earners lived in the Lagos area, and many lived in overcrowded dangerous housing. Labour activity including strikes intensified in 1963, culminating in a nationwide general strike in June 1964. Strikers disobeyed an ultimatum to return to work and at one point were dispersed by riot police. Eventually, they did win wage increases. The strike included people from all ethnic groups.<ref>Diamond, ''Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria'' (1988), chapter 6: "The 1964 General Strike" (pp. 162–189).</ref> Retired Brigadier General H. M. Njoku later wrote that the general strike heavily exacerbated tensions between the Army and ordinary [[civilian]]s and put pressure on the Army to take action against a government which was widely perceived as corrupt.<ref>Nkoku, ''A Tragedy Without Heroes'' (1987), p. 4. "The general resentment against a corrupt and stagnant regime continued. The Army as part of the population was not sympathetic to the government. Workers were urging the soldiers, whom they saw guarding the strategic places, to overthrow the government. Some angry workers spat on the troops. / Markets close to Army barracks purposely raised prices of foodstuffs in order to infuriate the troops.{{nbsp}}... It was feared that the workers would overthrow the government. They could have very easily done it had they realised their strength and remained united. At the height of the strike, only one platoon – thirty men – was the Army reserve, and it had no transports and no wireless sets. The army was in a state of near mutiny."</ref> The [[Nigerian parliamentary election, 1964|1964 elections]], which involved heavy campaigning all year, brought ethnic and regional divisions into focus. Resentment of politicians ran high, and many campaigners feared for their safety while touring the country. The Army was repeatedly deployed to [[Benué State|Tiv Division]], killing hundreds and arresting thousands of [[Tiv people]] agitating for self-determination.<ref name="Diamond1988chapter7">Diamond, ''Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria'' (1988), chapter 7: "The 1964 Federal Election Crisis" (pp. 190–247).</ref><ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 36. "In the middle belt, the Tiv were in open revolt against the NPC government in Kaduna. Well-organised groups of the opposition UMBC attacked opponents, and easily identifiable state officials and institutions, especially those associated with law and order. Scores of police, members of the judiciary and tax officials were killed, while several police posts, courthouses and local government establishments were destroyed during the campaign. Altogether hundreds of civilians died during the emergency, many of whom had been killed by the police during a scorched earth counter-insurgency operation. While the deployment of the military ultimately suppressed the uprising, the political demands for Tiv self-government went unheeded."</ref> Widespread reports of fraud tarnished the election's legitimacy.<ref name="Diamond1988chapter7"/> [[Western State (Nigeria)|Westerners]] especially resented the political domination of the Northern People's Congress, many of whose candidates ran unopposed in the election. Violence spread throughout the country, and some began to flee the North and West, some to [[Benin|Dahomey]].<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 36–40. "A virtual state of civil war prevailed as rival political groups attacked each other, killing, maiming and burning. Thousands of people fled to the neighboring Benin Republic (then called Dahomey) into exile."</ref> The apparent domination of the political system by the North, and the chaos breaking out across the country, motivated elements within the military to consider decisive action.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 40. "There was now a popular and mass opposition to a regime which the majority of the west's electorate felt had been imposed on them by the NPC. / There were also rumblings in the military over the violence in the west, and most importantly the Balwea government's inability to deal with the situation. For quite a while, but particularly since the December 1964 bogus elections, sections of the middle-ranking officer corps had been extremely incensed by the larceny and absolutism of the NPC rule, some of whose features had also affected the military itself in various fundamental ways. The fact that Nigeria appeared to be stuck indefinitely in an NPC, north-dominated political quagmire provided the impetus for the military coup d'état that occurred in the country in January 1966."</ref> In addition to Shell-BP, the British reaped profits from mining and commerce. The British-owned [[United Africa Company of Nigeria|United Africa Company]] alone controlled 41.3% of all Nigeria's foreign trade.<ref>"Thus northern privilege and political hegemony became the dual ''internal'' lever with which the United Kingdom used in reinforcing its control of Nigeria's economy in the early years of independence. On the eve of the coup, the United Kingdom's success story was phenomenal. Apart from South Africa, Nigeria was the site of the United Kingdom's highest economic and industrial investment in Africa with a total worth of £1.5 billion. The British government controlled a near-50 per cent shares in Shell-BP (the predominant oil prospecting company in Nigeria) and 60 per cent shares in the Amalgamated Tin Mining (Nigeria) Ltd., a major prospecting tin, cobalt and iron ore mining company. In the non-mining sector of the economy, John Holt and Company, Ltd., owned by a British family, was one of the two largest in the country, with branches located in the principal towns and cities. The United Africa Company (UAC), another British enterprise, accounted for about 41.3 per cent of Nigeria's entire import and export trade."</ref> At 516,000 barrels per day, Nigeria had become the tenth-biggest oil exporter in the world.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), p. 116.</ref> Though the [[Nigeria Regiment]] had fought for the United Kingdom in both the [[World War I|First]] and [[Second World War]]s, the army Nigeria inherited upon [[independence]] in 1960 was an internal security force designed and trained to assist the police in putting down challenges to authority rather than to fight a war.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 20">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 20</ref> The Indian historian Pradeep Barua called the Nigerian Army in 1960 "a glorified police force", and even after independence, the Nigerian military retained the role it held under the British in the 1950s.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 20"/> The Nigerian Army did not conduct field training, and notably lacked heavy weapons.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 20"/> Before 1948, Nigerians were not allowed to hold officer's commissions, and only in 1948 were certain promising Nigerian recruits allowed to attend [[Royal Military Academy Sandhurst|Sandhurst]] for officer training while at the same time Nigerian NCOs were allowed to become officers if they completed a course in officer training at [[Mons Officer Cadet School|Mons Hall]] or Eaton Hall in England.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 22">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 22</ref> Despite the reforms, only an average of two Nigerians per year were awarded officers' commissions between 1948–55 and only seven per year from 1955 to 1960.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 22"/> At the time of independence in 1960, of the 257 officers commanding the Nigeria Regiment which became the Nigerian Army, only 57 were Nigerians.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 22"/> Using the "[[martial race]]s" theory first developed under the [[British Raj|Raj]] in 19th-century [[India]], the colonial government had decided that peoples from northern Nigeria such as the Hausa, Kiv, and Kanuri were the hard "[[martial race]]s" whose recruitment was encouraged while the peoples from southern Nigeria such as the Igbos and the Yoruba were viewed as too soft to make for good soldiers and hence their [[recruitment]] was discouraged.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 21">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 21</ref> As a result, by 1958, men from northern Nigeria made up 62% of the Nigeria Regiment while men from the south and the west made up only 36%.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 21"/> In 1958, the policy was changed: henceforward men from the north would make up only 50% of the soldiers while men from the southeast and southwest were each to make up 25%. The new policy was retained after independence.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 21"/> The previously favoured northerners whose egos had been stoked by being told by their officers that they were the tough and hardy "martial races" greatly resented the change in recruitment policies, all the more as after independence in 1960 there were opportunities for Nigerian men to serve as officers that had not existed prior to independence.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 21"/> As men from the southeast and southwest were generally much better educated than men from the north, they were much more likely to be promoted to officers in the newly founded Nigerian Army, which provoked further resentment from the northerners.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 22"/> At the same time, as a part of Nigerianisation policy, it was government policy to send home the British officers who had been retained after independence, by promoting as many Nigerians as possible until by 1966 there were no more British officers.<ref>Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 23</ref> As part of the Nigerianisation policy, educational standards for officers were drastically lowered with only a high school diploma being necessary for an officer's commission while at the same time Nigerianisation resulted in an extremely youthful officer corps, full of ambitious men who disliked the Sandhurst graduates who served in the high command as blocking further chances for promotion.<ref>Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) pp. 22–24</ref> A group of Igbo officers formed a conspiracy to overthrow the government, seeing the northern prime minister, Sir [[Abubakar Tafawa Balewa]], as allegedly plundering the oil wealth of the southeast.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p.9">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 9</ref> ===Military coups=== On 15 January 1966, Major [[Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu|Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu]], Major [[Emmanuel Ifeajuna]], and other junior Army officers (mostly majors and captains) attempted a [[1966 Nigerian coup d'état|coup d'état]]. The two major political leaders of the north, the Prime Minister, Sir [[Abubakar Tafawa Balewa]] and the Premier of the northern region, Sir [[Ahmadu Bello]] were killed by Major Nzeogwu. Also murdered was Bello's wife and officers of Northern extraction. The President, Sir [[Nnamdi Azikiwe]], an Igbo, was on an extended vacation in the West Indies. He did not return until days after the coup. There was widespread suspicion that the Igbo coup plotters had tipped him and other Igbo leaders off regarding the pending coup. In addition to the killings of the Northern political leaders, the Premier of the Western region, Ladoke Akintola and Yoruba senior military officers were also killed. This "Coup of the Five Majors" has been described in some quarters as Nigeria's only revolutionary coup.<ref>Alexander Madiebo (1980) ''The Nigerian Revolution and the Nigerian Civil War''; Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu.</ref> This was the first coup in the short life of Nigeria's nascent second democracy. Claims of electoral fraud were one of the reasons given by the coup plotters. Besides killing much of Nigeria's elite, the Coup also saw much of the leadership of the Nigerian Federal Army killed with seven officers holding the rank above colonel killed.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p.9"/> Of the seven officers killed, four were northerners, two were from the southeast and one was from the Midwest. Only one was an Igbo.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p.9"/> This coup was, however, not seen as a revolutionary coup by other sections of Nigerians, especially in the Northern and Western sections and by later revisionists of Nigerian coups. Some alleged, mostly from Eastern part of Nigeria, that the majors sought to spring Action Group leader [[Obafemi Awolowo]] out of jail and make him head of the new government. Their intention was to dismantle the Northern-dominated power structure but their efforts to take power were unsuccessful. [[Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi]], an Igbo and loyalist head of the [[Nigerian Army]], suppressed coup operations in the South and he was declared head of state on 16 January after the surrender of the majors.<ref name="Britannica"/> <blockquote>In the end though, the majors were not in the position to embark on this political goal. While their 15th January coup succeeded in seizing political control in the north, it failed in the south, especially in the Lagos-Ibadan-Abeokuta military district where loyalist troops led by army commander Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi succeeded in crushing the revolt. Apart from Ifeajuna who fled the country after the collapse of their coup, the other two January Majors, and the rest of the military officers involved in the revolt, later surrendered to the loyalist High Command and were subsequently detained as a federal investigation of the event began.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 52–55.</ref><ref>''Nigerian Civil War''; Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu.</ref></blockquote> Aguyi-Ironsi suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament. He abolished the regional confederated form of government and pursued unitary policies favoured by the NCNC, having apparently been influenced by NCNC political philosophy. He, however, appointed Colonel [[Hassan Katsina]], son of [[Katsina]] emir [[Usman Nagogo]], to govern the Northern Region, indicating some willingness to maintain cooperation with this bloc.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 55. "But perhaps, most importantly, Aguyi-Ironsi's choice of Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina, the son of the powerful emir of Katsina as the governor of the north, was the clearest signal to the north, and the rest of the country, that his government would not undermine the north's two decades of political hegemony in the federation. Aguyi-Ironsi had already said as much in a number of contacts he made with northern leaders, including the Sultan of Sokoto, soon after the failed majors' coup. Although he had no qualms regarding ignoring the West and leaving in jail the leader of the AG (Obafemi Awolowo), he was anxious to reassure the north of the good intentions of his regime, especially in the light of the deaths of Bello and Balewa during the coup attempt."</ref> He also preferentially released northern politicians from jail (enabling them to plan his forthcoming overthrow).<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 55–56. "In fact to underscore Ironsi's goodwill to the north, the new head of state ordered the release of most northern politicians from detention by February (1966), without a reciprocal gesture to their southern counterparts. The released northerners took up positions in the various local government administration in the emirats and, ironically, had ample opportunity to plan and execute the massacre of Igbo civilians living in the north, first in May, 1966, and later in July 1966, which were coupled with the overthrow and murder of Aguyi-Ironsi himself (ironically enough, soon after Aguyi-Ironsi completed a conference with northern emirs), and scores of Igbo military personnel, and the September–October 1966 phase of the pogrom which brought the grisly tally of Igbo killed to 80,000 – 100,000 and the expulsion of 2 million others from the north and elsewhere in the federation."</ref> Aguyi-Ironsi rejected a British offer of military support but promised to protect British interests.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 56. "Britain had offered to send in troops to support Aguyi-Ironsi and his loyalist forces, after Nzeogwu threatened (on January 16) to march on Lagos and the south, from his Kaduna base, to enforce the control of the January Majors nationwide. While Aguyi-Ironsi discreetly turned down the British offer, he however informed London that its interests in Nigeria, the primary British pre-occupation, would be preserved by his government. This meant that the radical reforms of the Nigerian economy envisaged by the revolting majors, now known by Aguyi-Ironsi and in diplomatic circles in Lagos, would not be implemented. But for the British, the very presence of the Aguyi-Ironsi administration, the fastidious circumstances of its origins notwithstanding, had already breached a cardinal tenet of the post-colonial political order in Nigeria which they had worked so assiduously between 1952–1960 to construct: that political leadership within the country to oversee these enormous British interests should come from the north."</ref> Ironsi fatally did not bring the failed plotters to trial as required by then-military law and as advised by most northern and western officers, rather, coup plotters were maintained in the military on full pay, and some were even promoted while awaiting trial. The coup, despite its failures, was seen by many as primarily benefiting the Igbo peoples, as the plotters received no repercussions for their actions and no significant Igbo political leaders were affected. While those that executed the coup were mostly Northern, most of the known plotters were Igbo and the military and political leadership of Western and Northern regions had been largely bloodily eliminated while the Eastern military/political leadership was largely untouched. However, Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have made numerous attempts to please Northerners. The other events that also fuelled suspicions of a so-called "Igbo conspiracy" were the killing of Northern leaders, and the killing of the Brigadier-General [[Samuel Ademulegun|Ademulegun's]] pregnant wife by the coup executioners.<ref name="Britannica"/> Among the Igbo people, reaction to the coup was mixed.<ref name=Anwunah>{{Cite book |last=Anwunah |first=Patrick A. |date=2007 |title=The Nigeria-Biafra War (1967–1970): my memoirs |location=Ibadan |publisher=Spectrum |isbn=978-978-029-651-3 |page=328 |quote=The Igbos failed as a people to disassociate themselves from the bloody killings of 15 January 1966. What the Igbos did or failed to do, fuelled the fears and suspicions that all Igbos supported the Coup of 15 January 1966. In actual fact, some Igbos liked the coup whilst others did not.}}</ref> Despite the overwhelming contradictions of the coup being executed by mostly Northern soldiers (such as John Atom Kpera, later military governor of [[Benue State]]), the killing of Igbo soldier Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Unegbe by coup executioners, and Ironsi's termination of an Igbo-led coup, the ease by which Ironsi stopped the coup led to suspicion that the Igbo coup plotters planned all along to pave the way for Ironsi to take the reins of power in Nigeria.<!-- Apparently, Ironsi did succeed in quieting the Western Region, and in the first part of 1966 there were a few months of relatively less violence.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 58.</ref> Commenting this out for now pending verification in another source. --> Colonel [[Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu|Odumegwu Ojukwu]] became military governor of the Eastern Region at this time.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), p. 115.</ref><ref name="Britannica"/> On 24 May 1966, the military government issued Unification Decree #34, which would have replaced the federation with a more centralised system. The Northern bloc found this decree intolerable.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), p. 115. "Instead, many Northerners were alarmed that the military era would lead to an Igbo domination, especially when on May 24, 1966, the government issued Unification Decree No. 34, through which the federation was abolished and replaced with a unitary system. To Northerners this meant nothing but Igbo domination, facing the prospect of being occupied and ruled by Southern military and civil servants and lacking the safeguard of being involved in the government according to ethnic group divisions."</ref> In the face of provocation from the Eastern media which repeatedly showed humiliating posters and cartoons of the slain northern politicians, on the night of 29 July 1966, northern soldiers at Abeokuta barracks mutinied, thus precipitating [[1966 Nigerian counter-coup|a counter-coup]], which had already been in the planning stages. Ironsi was on a visit to [[Ibadan]] during their mutiny and there he was killed (along with his host, [[Adekunle Fajuyi]]). The counter-coup led to the installation of Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Gowon was chosen as a compromise candidate. He was a Northerner, a Christian, from a minority tribe, and had a good reputation within the army.<ref name="Britannica"/> It seems that Gowon immediately faced not only a potential standoff with the East, but secession threats from the Northern and even the Western region.<ref>Stevenson, "Capitol Gains" (2014), pp. 318–319.</ref> The counter-coup plotters had considered using the opportunity to withdraw from the federation themselves. Ambassadors from the United Kingdom and the United States, however, urged Gowon to maintain control over the whole country. Gowon followed this plan, repealing the Unification Decree, announcing a return to the federal system.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), pp. 115–116.</ref> ===Persecution of Igbo=== After the January coup, Igbos in the North were accused of taunting their hosts on the loss of their leaders. A popular example was Celestine Ukwu, a popular Igbo musician, who released a song titled "Ewu Ne Ba Akwa" (Goats Are Crying) apparently mocking the late [[Ahmadu Bello]]. These provocations were so pervasive that they warranted the promulgation of Decree 44 of 1966 banning them by the military government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Uko |first=Ndaeyo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Abm-v6wGWOQC&q=aguiyi+ironsi&pg=PA75 |title=Romancing the Gun: The Press as Promoter of Military Rule |date=2004 |publisher=Africa World Press |isbn=978-1-59221-189-0 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-04-02 |title=DEFAMATORY AND OFFENSIVE PUBLICATIONS ACT 1966 |url=https://lawcarenigeria.com/defamatory-and-offensive-publications-act-1966/ |access-date=2023-10-09 |website=LawCareNigeria |language=en-US}}</ref> The first president of Nigeria [[Nnamdi Azikiwe]] who was away during the first coup noted:<blockquote>Some Ibo elements, who were domiciled in Northern Nigeria taunted northerners by defaming their leaders through means of records or songs or pictures. They also published pamphlets and postcards, which displayed a peculiar representation of certain northerners, living or dead, in a manner likely to provoke disaffection.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Azikiwe |first=Nnamdi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lq4MAQAAIAAJ |title=Origins of the Nigerian Civil War |date=1969 |publisher=Nigerian National Press |language=en}}</ref></blockquote>From June through October 1966, [[1966 anti-Igbo pogrom|pogroms in the North]] killed an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Igbo, half of them children, and caused more than a million to two million to flee to the Eastern Region.<ref>Heerten & Moses, ''The Nigeria–Biafra War'' (2014), p. 173. "Repeated outbursts of violence between June and October 1966 peaked in massacres against Igbos living in the ''Sabon Gari'', the 'foreigners' quarters' of northern Nigerian towns. According to estimates, these riots claimed the lives of tens of thousands. This violence drove a stream of more than a million refugees to the Eastern Region, the 'homeland' of the Igbos' diasporic community."</ref> 29 September 1966 became known as 'Black Thursday', as it was considered the worst day of the massacres.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra Civil War" (2014), p. 266. "Between May and September 1966, northerners murdered between 80,000 and 100,000 Igbos and other easterners resident in the Northern Region. The violence reached a climax with the massacres of 29 September 1966 ('Black Thursday'). Ojukwu had to deal with an influx to the east of between 700,000 and two million refugees. He responded by expelling thousands of non-easterners from the Eastern Region."</ref><ref>Chinua Achebe. ''There Was a Country'' (2012). New York: The Penguin Press. pp. 80–83, 122</ref> Ethnomusicologist Charles Keil, who was visiting Nigeria in 1966, recounted: <blockquote>The pogroms I witnessed in [[Makurdi]], Nigeria (late Sept. 1966) were foreshadowed by months of intensive anti-Igbo and anti-Eastern conversations among Tiv, Idoma, Hausa and other Northerners resident in Makurdi, and, fitting a pattern replicated in city after city, the massacres were led by the Nigerian army. Before, during and after the slaughter, Col. Gowon could be heard over the radio issuing 'guarantees of safety' to all Easterners, all citizens of Nigeria, but the intent of the soldiers, the only power that counts in Nigeria now or then, was painfully clear. After counting the disemboweled bodies along the Makurdi road I was escorted back to the city by soldiers who apologised for the stench and explained politely that they were doing me and the world a great favor by eliminating Igbos.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide: The Nigeria-Biafra War 1967 – 1970|last1=Moses|first1=A. Dirk|last2=Heerten|first2=Lasse|publisher=[[Routledge]]|year=2018|isbn=9780415347587|location=New York|pages=25}}</ref></blockquote>Professor of History [[Murray Last]], who was in Zaria city on the day after the first coup, describes his experience on that day: <blockquote>And the day after the coup – January 16th 1966 – there was initially so much open relief on the ABU campus that it shocked me. It was only later, when I was living within Zaria city (at Babban Dodo), that I encountered the anger at the way Igbo traders (and journalists) were mocking their Hausa fellow traders in Zaria’s Sabon Gari over the death of their ‘father’, and were pushing aside various motorpark workers elsewhere, telling the Hausa that the rules had now all changed and it was the Hausa who were now the underlings in market or motorpark.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Olorunyomi |first=Ladi |date=November 22, 2021 |title=INTERVIEW: Why every Nigerian should be proud of the Sokoto Caliphate — Prof Murray Last |url=https://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/496263-interview-why-every-nigerian-should-be-proud-of-the-sokoto-caliphate-prof-murray-last.html?tztc=1 |access-date=2023-03-31 |website=www.premiumtimesng.com}}</ref></blockquote>The Federal Military Government also laid the groundwork for the economic blockade of the Eastern Region which went into full effect in 1967.<ref name="Stevenson2014pages314to315">Stevenson, ''Capitol Gains'' (2014), pp. 314–315. "In fact, the Federation's first response to Biafran secession was to deepen the blockade to include 'a blockade of the East's air and sea ports, a ban on foreign currency transactions, and a halt to all incoming post and telecommunications.' The Federation implemented its blockade so quickly during the war because it was a continuation of the policy from the year before."</ref> ==Breakaway== [[File:Flag of Biafra.svg|left|thumb|The new republic adopted the [[Flag of Biafra]] which was unveiled on 30 May 1967.]] The deluge of refugees in Eastern Nigeria created a difficult situation. Extensive negotiations took place between Ojukwu, representing Eastern Nigeria, and Gowon, representing the Nigerian Federal military government. In the [[Aburi Accord]], finally signed at Aburi, [[Ghana]], the parties agreed that a looser Nigerian federation would be implemented. Gowon delayed announcement of the agreement and eventually reneged.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ipobinusa.org/restructuring-nigeria|title=WHY RESTRUCTURING NIGERIA WILL NOT WORK|website=Indigenous People of Biafra USA|language=en-US |access-date=2019-04-26}}</ref> [[File:Nigeria states-1967-1976.png|300px|thumb|right|The proposed break-up of the East, West and Northern regions following Gowon's military decree.]] On 27 May 1967, Gowon proclaimed the division of Nigeria into twelve states. This decree carved the Eastern Region in three parts: [[South Eastern State]], [[Rivers State]], and [[East Central State]]. Now the Igbos, concentrated in the East Central State, would lose control over most of the petroleum, located in the other two areas.<ref name="Uche2008page123">Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 123. "The oil revenue issue, however, came to a head when Gowon, on 27 May 1967, divided the country into twelve states. The Eastern Region was split into three states: South Eastern State, Rivers State and East Central State. This effectively excised the main oil-producing areas from the core Ibo state (East Central State). On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu declared independence and renamed the entire Eastern Region 'the Republic of Biafra'. As part of the effort to get the Biafran leadership to change its mind, the Federal government placed a shipping embargo on the territory."</ref><ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 6. "The final high water, and the greatest of flood tides, of this phase of Gowon's leadership came in May 1967 with his Decree – and only a no-nonsense, no-referendum military government could have effected overnight such a fundamental reversal of half a century of Nigeria's political history and administrative thinking – to replace the four Regions by twelve States. Whether Decree No. 14 was designed to forestall secession (would-be Biafra was now to consist of 3 states instead of the Eastern Region, two of them mischievously emphasising the East's long-contained minorities problem of Ibibio/Efik discontent and Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers separatism, and the third a landlocked, oil-less, overpopulated Ibo enclave) or whether it pushed Ojukwu into the final defiance of declaring a secessionist Republic remains a matter of argument. What remains unchallenged is the unequalled point of no return in Nigeria's history that the States Decree constitutes."</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Biafra {{!}} secessionist state, Nigeria |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Biafra|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-05-29}}</ref> The Federal Military Government immediately placed an [[Economic sanctions|embargo]] on all shipping to and from Biafra—but not on oil tankers.<ref name="Stevenson2014pages314to315"/><ref name="Uche2008page123"/> Biafra quickly moved to collect oil royalties from oil companies doing business within its borders.<ref name="Uche2008page123"/> When [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]]-[[BP]] acquiesced to this request at the end of June, the Federal Government extended its blockade to include oil.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> The blockade, which most foreign actors accepted, played a decisive role in putting Biafra at a disadvantage from the beginning of the war.<ref name="HeertenMoses2014page174">Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 174. "The FMG's major strategic advantage was not its military force, but its diplomatic status: internationally recognised statehood. That the FMG could argue that it was a sovereign government facing an 'insurgency' was decisive.{{nbsp}}... Nigeria's secured diplomatic status was also crucial for the most significant development in the war's early stages: the FMG's decision to blockade the secessionist state. To cut off Biafra's lines of communication with the outside world, air and sea ports were blockaded, foreign currency transactions banned, incoming mail and telecommunication blocked and international business obstructed. Even with its limited resources, Nigeria was able to organise a successful blockade without gaping holes or long interruptions{{mdash}}mostly because other governments or companies were ready to acquiesce to Lagos' handling of the matter."</ref> Although the very young nation had a chronic shortage of weapons to go to war, it was determined to defend itself. Although there was much sympathy in Europe and elsewhere, only five countries ([[Tanzania]], [[Gabon]], [[Ivory Coast]], [[Zambia]], and [[Haiti]]) officially recognised the new republic.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ijalaye |first1=David A. |title=Was "Biafra" at Any Time A State in International Law? |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=July 1971 |volume=65 |issue=3 |pages=553–554 |doi=10.1017/S0002930000147311 |jstor=2198977 |s2cid=152122313 |access-date=18 August 2022 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2198977}}</ref><ref name="africamasterweb.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html|title=The Biafran War, Nigerian History, Nigerian Civil War|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080312215245/http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html|archive-date=12 March 2008}}</ref> The United Kingdom supplied heavy weapons and ammunition to the Nigerian side, officially to preserve the multi-ethnic country it had created but also to preserve the supply of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom and to protect the investments of Shell-BP. The Biafra side received arms and ammunition from France, even though the French government denied sponsoring Biafra. An article in ''[[Paris Match]]'' of 20 November 1968 claimed that French arms were reaching Biafra through neighbouring countries such as Gabon.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chibuike |first1=Uche |title=Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War|journal=The Journal of African History |date=2008 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=111–135 |jstor=40206616 |doi=10.1017/s0021853708003393 |s2cid=159874579 }}</ref> The heavy supply of weapons by the United Kingdom was the biggest factor in determining the outcome of the war.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Enuka |first1=C.|last2=Odife |first2=I. |date=2009 |title=The Nigerian Civil War as a Domestic Determinant of Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1967–1975 |url=https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/view/67018 |journal=UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities |language=en |volume=10 |issue=2 |doi=10.4314/ujah.v10i2.67018 |doi-broken-date=31 January 2024 |issn=1595-1413}}</ref> Several peace accords were held, with the most notable one held at [[Aburi]], Ghana (the [[Aburi Accord]]). There were different accounts of what took place in Aburi. Ojukwu accused the federal government of going back on their promises while the federal government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half-truths.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} Ojukwu gained agreement to a [[confederation]] for Nigeria, rather than a federation. He was warned by his advisers that Gowon did not understand the difference and would renege upon the agreement.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Ogungbade|first=Gloria|title=ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT: THE NIGERIAN SITUATION |url=https://www.academia.edu/31635385|language=en}}</ref> When this happened, Ojukwu regarded it as both a failure by Gowon to keep to the spirit of the Aburi agreement and a lack of integrity on the side of the Nigerian Military Government in the negotiations toward a united Nigeria. Gowon's advisers, to the contrary, felt that he had enacted as much as was politically feasible in fulfilment of the spirit of Aburi.<ref name="NUA">Ntieyong U. Akpan, ''The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War''.</ref> The Eastern Region was very ill-equipped for war, outmanned and outgunned by the Nigerians, but had the advantages of fighting in their homeland, support of most Easterners, determination, and use of limited resources.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Biafran Civil War: The Politics of Hunger & Starvation - SlaveRebellion.org|url=http://slaverebellion.info/index.php?page=the-biafran-civil-war-the-politics-of-hunger-starvation |website=slaverebellion.info|access-date=2020-05-28}}</ref> The United Kingdom, which still maintained the highest level of influence over Nigeria's highly valued oil industry through Shell-BP,<ref name="shellbpinflu">{{Cite news |last=Awoyokun |first=Damola |title=BIAFRA: The Untold Story of Nigeria's civil war |publisher=P.M. News |date=19 February 2013}}</ref> and the [[Soviet Union]] supported the Nigerian government, especially by military supplies.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Omaka |first=Arua Oko |date=2019-07-03 |title=The Nigerian Civil War and the 'Italian' Oil Workers |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2019.1617662 |journal=War & Society |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=203–224 |doi=10.1080/07292473.2019.1617662 |s2cid=197787017 |issn=0729-2473}}</ref> The Nigerian Army in 1967 was completely unready for war. The Nigerian Army had no training or experience of war on the [[Operational level of war|operational level]], still being primarily an internal security force.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 20"/> Most Nigerian officers were more concerned with their social lives than military training, spending a disproportionate amount of their time on partying, drinking, hunting and playing games.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 24</ref> Social status in the Army was extremely important and officers devoted an excessive amount of time to ensure their uniforms were always immaculate while there was a competition to own the most expensive automobiles and homes.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> The killings and purges perpetuated during the two coups of 1966 had killed most of the Sandhurst graduates. By July 1966, all of the officers holding the rank above colonel had been either killed or discharged while only 5 officers holding the rank of lieutenant colonel were still alive and on duty.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> Almost all of the junior officers had received their commissions after 1960 and most were heavily dependent on the more experienced NCOs to provide the necessary leadership.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> The same problems that afflicted the Federal Army also affected the Biafran Army even more whose officer corps was based around former Federal Igbo officers.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 17</ref> The shortage of experienced officers was a major problem for the [[Biafran Armed Forces|Biafran Army]], made worse by a climate of paranoia and suspicion within Biafra as Ojukwu believed that other former Federal officers were plotting against him.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17"/> ==War== Shortly after extending its blockade to include oil, the Nigerian government launched a "[[police action]]" to retake the secessionist territory.<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), pp. 6–7.</ref> The war began on the early hours of 6 July 1967 when Nigerian Federal troops [[Operation UNICORD|advanced]] in two columns into Biafra. The Biafra strategy had succeeded: the federal government had started the war, and the East was defending itself.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Akpan|first1=Ntieyoung U.|title=The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. |publisher=Routledge |location=online |isbn=9781317792314 |pages=89–106 |edition=2nd |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9ISrAgAAQBAJ&q=Ntieyong+U.+Akpan%2C+The+Struggle+for+Secession%2C+1966%E2%80%931970%3A+A+Personal+Account+of+the+Nigerian+Civil+War.&pg=PR1 |access-date=16 November 2016 |date=2014-01-14}}</ref> The [[Nigerian Army]] offensive was through the north of Biafra led by Colonel [[Mohammed Shuwa]] and the local military units were formed as the [[1st Division (Nigeria)|1st Infantry Division]]. The division was led mostly by northern officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance and high casualties, the western Nigerian column advanced on the town of [[Nsukka]], which fell on 14 July, while the eastern column made for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}} ===Biafran offensive=== The Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own. On 9 August, Biafran forces crossed their western border and the Niger river into the Mid{{nbh}}Western state of Nigeria. Passing through the state capital of [[Benin City]], the Biafrans advanced west until 21 August, when they were stopped at Ore in present-day [[Ondo State]], {{convert|130|mi|4=-1|order=flip}} east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos. The Biafran attack was led by Lt. Col. Banjo, Yoruba man, with the Biafran rank of brigadier. The attack met little resistance and the Mid{{nbh}}Western state was easily taken over. This was due to the pre-secession arrangement that all soldiers should return to their regions to stop the spate of killings, in which Igbo soldiers had been major victims.<ref name="ReferenceA"/><ref>''Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria'', by Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nova Publishers, 2001.{{ISBN|1560729678}}</ref> The Nigerian soldiers who were supposed to defend the Mid{{nbh}}Western state were mostly Igbo from that state and, while some were in touch with their Biafran counterparts, others resisted the invasion. General Gowon responded by asking Colonel [[Murtala Mohammed]] (who later became head of state in 1975) to form another division (the 2nd Infantry Division) to expel the Biafrans from the Mid{{nbh}}Western state, to defend the border of the Western state and to attack Biafra. At the same time, Gowon declared "total war" and announced the Federal government would mobilise the entire population of Nigeria for the war effort.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=78}} From the summer of 1967 to the spring of 1969, the Federal Army grew from a force of 7,000 to a force of 200,000 men organised in three divisions.<ref>Barua, Deprave ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) pp. 10–11</ref> Biafra began the war with only 230 soldiers at [[Enugu]], which grew to two battalions by August 1967, which soon were expanded into two brigades, the 51st and 52nd which became the core of the Biafran Army.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p.11">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 11</ref> By 1969, the Biafrans were to field 90,000 soldiers formed into five undermanned divisions together with a number of independent units.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p.11"/> [[File:Flag of the Republic of Benin.svg|thumb|left|Flag of the [[Republic of Benin (Nigeria)|Republic of Benin]]]] As Nigerian forces retook the Mid{{nbh}}Western state, the Biafran military administrator declared it to be the [[Republic of Benin (1967)|Republic of Benin]] on 19 September, though it ceased to exist the next day. The present country of [[Benin]], west of Nigeria, was still named [[Republic of Dahomey|Dahomey]] at that time.<ref>{{Cite web|title=WOMEN AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL CONFLICT|url=https://hyattractions.wordpress.com/2014/12/02/women-and-the-nigerian-civil-conflict/|date=2014-12-02|website=HYATTRACTIONS|language=en|access-date=2020-05-29}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |title=Law, Order, and the Biafran National Imagination |date=2020 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-the-republic-of-biafra/law-order-and-the-biafran-national-imagination/64C63FCC3FAE3D59FB2FFCA69BCE534A |work=A History of the Republic of Biafra: Law, Crime, and the Nigerian Civil War |pages=35–77 |editor-last=Daly |editor-first=Samuel Fury Childs |place=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781108887748.002 |isbn=978-1-108-74391-4 |s2cid=236791532 |access-date=2022-07-09}}</ref> Although Benin City was retaken by the Nigerians on 22 September, the Biafrans succeeded in their primary objective by tying down as many Nigerian Federal troops as they could. Gen. Gowon also launched an [[Offensive (military)|offensive]] into Biafra south from the [[Niger Delta]] to the riverine area, using the bulk of the Lagos Garrison command under Colonel [[Benjamin Adekunle]] (called the Black Scorpion) to form the 3rd Infantry Division (which was later renamed as the 3rd Marine Commando). As the war continued, the Nigerian Army recruited amongst a wider area, including the [[Yoruba people|Yoruba]], Itshekiri, Urhobo, Edo, Ijaw, etc.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Refugees |first=United Nations High Commissioner for |title=Refworld {{!}} Nigeria: The Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in Delta State, including time period, causes, whether the authorities intervened, whether the police support the Ijaw or Itsekiri and the current situation |url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abe720.html |access-date=2022-07-07 |website=Refworld |language=en}}</ref> ===Nigerian offensive=== The command was divided into two brigades with three battalions each. The 1st Brigade advanced on the axis of the Ogugu–Ogunga–Nsukka road while the 2nd Brigade advanced on the axis of the Gakem–Obudu–Ogoja road. By 10 July 1967, the 1st Brigade had conquered all its assigned territories. By 12 July the 2nd brigade had captured Gakem, Ogudu, and Ogoja. To assist Nigeria, Egypt sent six [[Ilyushin Il-28]] bombers flown by Egyptian air crews.<ref>Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 12</ref><ref name="litencyc.com">{{Cite web|url=http://www.litencyc.com/theliterarymagazine/biafra.php|title=The Literary Magazine – the Biafra War and the Age of Pestilence by Herbert Ekwe Ekwe|access-date=16 June 2010|archive-date=20 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180820081648/https://www.litencyc.com/theliterarymagazine/biafra.php|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>''Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967–1970'', by Michael I. Draper ({{ISBN|1-902109-63-5}})</ref> The habit of the Egyptians to bomb Red Cross hospitals together with schools, hospitals, and marketplaces did much to earn Biafra international sympathy.<ref>{{cite book |last=Venter |first=A.J. |title=Biafra's War 1967–1970: A Tribal Conflict in Nigeria That Left a Million Dead |year=2016 |page=139}}</ref> [[File:Lynn Garrison in cockpit 1966.jpg|thumb|[[Lynn Garrison]] in cockpit of his F4U-7 Corsair 1966]] Enugu became the hub of secession and rebellion, and the Nigerian government believed that once Enugu was captured, the drive for secession would end. The plans to conquer Enugu began on 12 September 1967.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} On 4 October, the Nigerian 1st Division [[Fall of Enugu|captured Enugu]].{{sfn|Jowett|2016|p=6}} Ojukwu was asleep in the Biafran State House when the federal troops attacked and narrowly escaped by disguising himself as a servant.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=23}} Many Nigerians hoped that Enugu's capture would convince the Igbos' traditional elite to end their support for secession, even if Ojukwu did not follow them. This did not occur. Ojukwu relocated his government without difficulty to [[Umuahia]], a city positioned deep within traditional Igbo territory.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=97–98}} The fall of Enugu contributed to a brief destabilisation of Biafran propaganda efforts, as the forced relocation of personnel left the Ministry of Information disorganised and the federal force's success undermined previous Biafran assertions that the Nigerian state could not withstand a protracted war.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=111}} On 23 October the Biafran official radio declared in a broadcast that Ojukwu promised to continue resisting the federal government, and that he attributed the loss of Enugu to subversive actions.<ref name= NYT1>{{cite news |title=Nigerian Civil War Makes Enugu a Ghost Town |newspaper=The New York Times |page=A20 |date=24 October 1967}}</ref> Nigerian soldiers under Murtala Mohammed carried out [[Asaba massacre|a mass killing]] of 700 civilians when they captured [[Asaba, Nigeria|Asaba]] on the [[River Niger]]. The Nigerians were repulsed three times as they attempted to cross the River Niger during October, resulting in the loss of thousands of troops, dozens of tanks and equipment. The first attempt by the 2nd Infantry Division on 12 October to cross the Niger from the town of Asaba to the Biafran city of Onitsha cost the Nigerian Federal Army over 5,000 soldiers killed, wounded, captured or missing. [[Operation Tiger Claw]] (17–20 October 1967) was a military conflict between Nigerian and Biafran military forces. On 17 October 1967 Nigerians invaded [[Calabar]] led by the "Black Scorpion", Benjamin Adekunle, while the Biafrans were led by Col. Ogbu Ogi, who was responsible for controlling the area between Calabar and Opobo, and Lynn Garrison, a foreign mercenary. The Biafrans came under immediate fire from the water and the air. For the next two days Biafran stations and military supplies were bombarded by the Nigerian air force. That same day Lynn Garrison reached Calabar but came under immediate fire by federal troops. By 20 October, Garrison's forces withdrew from the battle while Col. Ogi officially surrendered to Gen. Adekunle. On 19 May 1968 Port Harcourt was captured. With the capture of Enugu, Bonny, Calabar and Port Harcourt, the outside world was left in no doubt of the Federal supremacy in the war.<ref>Al J. Vetner. “Biafra’s War 1967-1970: A Tribal Conflict That Left a Million Dead.” Warwick, UK, Helion & Company, 2015. {{ISBN|978-1-910294-69-7}}. pp. 197–210.</ref> Biafran propaganda always blamed military defeats on "saboteurs" within the ranks of the Biafran officer, and both officers and the other ranks were encouraged to denounce suspected "saboteurs".<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17"/> Throughout the war, Biafran officers were far more likely to be executed by their own side than by the Federal Army as Ojukwu conducted purges and had officers who were merely accused of being "saboteurs" taken out and shot.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17-18">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) pp. 17–18</ref> Ojukwu did not trust the majority of the former Federal Igbo officers who had rallied to Biafra and saw them as potential rivals, thus leading to murderous purges that led to most of them being executed.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17-18"/> Furthermore, Ojukwu needed scapegoats for Biafra's defeats and death was the usual punishment for Biafran officers who lost a battle.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 18</ref> Out of a fear of a coup, Ojukwu created several units such as the S Brigade commanded by himself and the 4th Commando Brigade commanded by the German mercenary [[Rolf Steiner]] that existed outside of the regular chain of command.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/> Barua wrote that Ojukwu's leadership, especially his frequent executions of his own officers had a "disastrous impact" on the morale of the Biafran officer corps.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/> The executions of officers also made it difficult for the Biafran officers to acquire the necessary experience to conduct military operations successfully as Barua noted the Biafran Army lacked both the "continuity and cohesion" to learn from the war.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/> ===Control over oil production=== [[File:Nigerdelta NASA.jpg|200px|thumb|Control over petroleum in the [[Niger Delta]] was a paramount military objective during the war.]] Oil exploration in Nigeria was pioneered by the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company in 1937. In a bid to control the oil in the eastern region, the Federal government placed a shipping embargo on the territory. This embargo did not include oil tankers. The leadership of Biafra wrote to Shell-BP demanding royalties for the oil that was being explored in their region. After much deliberation, Shell-BP decided to pay Biafra the sum of 250,000 pounds. The news of this payment reached the Federal government, which immediately extended the shipping embargo to oil tankers. The Nigerian government also made it clear to Shell-BP that it expected the company to pay all outstanding oil royalties immediately. With the stalling on the payment for Biafra, the government instructed Shell-BP to stop operations in Biafra and took over from the company.<ref name="auto">{{cite journal |last1=Chibuike |first1=Uche |year=2008 |title=Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War |journal=The Journal of African History |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=111–135 |doi=10.1017/S0021853708003393 |jstor=40206616 |s2cid=159874579 }}</ref> Towards the end of July 1967, Nigerian federal troops and marines captured [[Bonny Island]] in the Niger Delta, thereby taking control of vital Shell-BP facilities.<ref>Uche, ''Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War'' (2008), p. 131. "Within a month of full military conflict, the Nigerian government captured the important Island of Bonny from the Biafrans. The British High Commissioner articulated the importance of this capture at the time: 'This not only tightens the grip on the blockade and gives the Federal Government a first footing in the Rivers Province; it places in their hands the most valuable part of Shell-BP installations, for the storage tanks, the pumping station and the tanker terminal are all at Bonny.' At the time of the capture, the Nigerian government claimed that the Island was taken 'without any damage' to Shell-BP's installations there."</ref> Operations began again in May 1968, when Nigeria captured [[Port Harcourt]]. Its facilities had been damaged and needed repair.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 132. "Despite the return of Gray, and the interest of Shell-BP and the British government in getting the oil machines pumping again, the state of war and its attendant hazards ensured that this could not happen immediately. It was not until May 1968, when Nigerian marines captured Port Harcourt, that it was adjudged safe by Shell-BP to send an advance team to both Bonny and Port Harcourt to assess the state of their production facilities."</ref> Oil production and export continued, but at a lower level. The completion in 1969 of a new terminal at [[Forçados]] brought production up from 142,000 barrels/day in 1958 to 540,000 barrels/day in 1969. In 1970, this figure doubled to 1.08 million barrels/day. The royalties enabled Nigeria to buy more weapons, hire mercenaries, etc. Biafra proved unable to compete on this economic level.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 133–134. "The problem was that the oil had to be shipped through Bonny, which at the time was not safe. Furthermore, silting of the approaches to the Bonny terminal during the early parts of the war reduced its unit tanker capacity from 70,000 tons to about 40,000 tons. Even with the use of smaller tankers, the short haul from Nigeria to the United Kingdom was still more profitable than the Cape route used for Gulf oil. Despite the prospects for Eastern Region oil, the civil war made the source unreliable. Luckily for Shell-BP, prior to the war, it had planned a second terminal off Forcados, which was in Federal territory. Construction of the terminal and the pipelines, which started during the war, took 18 months and was completed in the middle of 1969."</ref> ==International involvement== === United Kingdom === The United Kingdom had planned to maintain and expand its supply of cheap high-quality oil from Nigeria. Therefore, it placed a high priority on maintenance of [[Extraction of petroleum|oil extraction]] and refining operations. The war broke out just a week before the [[Six-Day War]] in the Middle East, forcing oil tankers from the Middle East to use the long route around the Cape of Good Hope, thereby increasing the cost of Middle Eastern oil. In turn, this increased the importance of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom, because Nigerian oil was cheaper than Persian Gulf oil.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=65}} Initially, when it was unclear which side would prevail, the United Kingdom took a "wait and see" approach before opting decisively for Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=65–66}} Nigeria had a navy of only six vessels, the largest of which was a frigate; an air force of 76 planes, none of which were fighters or bombers; and an army of 7,000 men with no tanks and a shortage of officers with command experience. Though Biafra was likewise similarly weak, the two sides appeared evenly matched at the beginning of the war, and Nigerian victory was by no means considered preordained.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=72–73}} The United Kingdom backed the Federal Government but, when the war broke out, cautioned them not to damage British oil installations in the East. These oilworks, under the control of the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company (jointly owned by [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]] and [[British Petroleum]]), controlled 84 per cent of Nigeria's 580,000 barrels per day. Two-thirds of this oil came from the Eastern region, and another third from the newly created Mid-West region. Two-fifths of all Nigerian oil ended up in the United Kingdom.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124">Uche, ''Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War'' (2008), pp. 120–124.</ref> In 1967, 30 per cent of the oil being imported into the United Kingdom came from Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=66}} Shell-BP therefore considered carefully a request by the Federal Government that it refuse to pay the royalties demanded by Biafra. Its lawyers advised that payment to Biafra would be appropriate if this government did in fact maintain law and order in the region in question. The British government advised that paying Biafra could undermine the goodwill of the Federal Government. Shell-BP made the payment, and the government established a blockade on oil exports.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> Forced to choose a side, Shell-BP and the British government threw in their lot with the Federal Government in Lagos, apparently calculating that this side would be more likely to win the war.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127">Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 125–127. "The Nigerian government subsequently made it explicit to Shell-BP that it expected the company to pay the outstanding oil royalty immediately. Once the oil flow stopped, sitting on a fence ceased to be an option for the British government. The United Kingdom subsequently decided to back Nigeria, partly because it was advised that, in the event of war, the odds were 'slightly in favour of the Federal Military Government'. Perhaps more importantly, the British government calculated that supporting Nigeria was its safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country, largely because the Cold War and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers would wade into the conflict."</ref> As the British High Commissioner in Lagos wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27 July 1967: <blockquote>Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which has [[Subsidy|subsidised]] a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to the lengths of cancelling the Company's concessions and nationalising their installations. I conclude, therefore, if the company does change its mind and asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the ready."<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/></blockquote> Shell-BP took this advice.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/> It continued to quietly support Nigeria through the rest of the war, in one case advancing a royalty of £5.5 million to fund the purchase of more British weapons.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 132. "Given Shell-BP's interest in Nigeria taking over the major oilfields still in Biafran hands, it was not surprising that they overtly supported the Nigerian military cause.99 A case in point was in December 1967 when the Nigerian government, frustrated by the slow pace of progress in the war, requested that Shell-BP pay its royalty of £5.5 million in advance, in order to enable it to purchase arms from the United Kingdom. Shell-BP promptly complied."</ref> It was not until Federal forces captured the ocean oil terminal at Bonny on 25 July 1967 that the British Prime Minister [[Harold Wilson]] decided to back Nigeria with military aid. After the Federal victory at Bonny, Wilson summoned [[David Hunt (diplomat)|David Hunt]], the British high commissioner to Nigeria, for a meeting at 10 Downing Street in early August 1967 for his assessment of the situation.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=76}} Hunt's view that the Federal forces were the better organised and would win because they could draw upon a greater population led Wilson to side with Nigeria. During the war, the United Kingdom covertly supplied Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence and may have also helped it to hire mercenaries.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 130. "In reality, however, the British government supplied many more arms than it was publicly prepared to admit. Apart from direct arms supplies, it provided military intelligence to the Nigerian government and may have helped it to access sophisticated arms and mercenaries through third parties."</ref> After the decision was made to back Nigeria, the BBC oriented its reporting to favour this side.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 131. "Furthermore, once the war broke out and the British government decided to back the Nigerian side, the BBC swiftly shifted its reporting on the conflict, in Nigeria's favour. This was noticed and thankfully acknowledged by the Nigerian government."</ref> Supplies provided to the Federal Military Government included two vessels and 60 vehicles.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 274.</ref> In the United Kingdom, the humanitarian campaign around Biafra began on 12 June 1968, with media coverage on ITV and in ''The Sun''. The charities [[Oxfam]] and [[Save the Children Fund]] were soon deployed, with large sums of money at their disposal.<ref name="OSullivan2014page302">O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), p. 302. "It took time, however, for popular attention to focus on the crisis. In the United Kingdom that occurred only after 12 June 1968, when a film broadcast on ITV and a press campaign led by the ''Sun'' newspaper sparked the humanitarian response into life."</ref> ===France=== France provided weapons, mercenary fighters, and other assistance to Biafra and promoted its cause internationally, describing the situation as a [[genocide]]. President [[Charles de Gaulle]] referred to "Biafra's just and noble cause".<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 137–139.</ref> However, France did not recognise Biafra diplomatically.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 114–115. "France, however, categorically refused to officially recognise Biafra, a possibility President Charles de Gaulle ruled out as early as 14 December 1967. At the same time it was well known that France was supporting Biafran leader General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu with covert military aid throughout the war, including mercenaries and weapons."</ref> Through [[Pierre Laureys]], France had apparently provided two [[Douglas A-26 Invader|B-26]]s, [[Aérospatiale Alouette II|Alouette]] helicopters, and pilots.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119. Foccart says de Gaulle's decision to send military assistance to Biafra was made on 27 September 1967, when the General met personally with Houphouët-Boigny, who was Biafra's most important African ally throughout the war. On 26 September, the Biafran capital, Enugu, was shelled for the first time by Federal Nigerian forces. The problem with this date is that it appears that France had already supplied Biafra with two B-26 aircraft, Alouette helicopters and pilots in summer 1967 via the French arms dealer [[Pierre Laureys]]. In 1971, however, Ralph Uwechue, Biafra's envoy to France, wrote that "the helicopters had been purchases made by the Eastern Nigerian Regional Government from France for civilian purposes well before the war."</ref> France supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from [[World War II]], sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to [[Ivory Coast]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "De Gaulle made the decision to begin regular French arms shipments to Biafra on 17 or 18 October 1967. De Gaulle was very reluctant to send weapons from French stocks, and only agreed when Foccart suggested sending captured German and Italian weapons from World War II with the serial number scratched off. The weapons would not be sent directly to Ojukwu, but would go through Houphouët-Boigny, so that it looked like France was replenishing the Ivory Coast's stocks as stipulated in the normal bilateral military assistance agreements."</ref> France also sold [[Panhard]] armoured vehicles to the Nigerian federal government.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 179. "France, too, pursued contradictory policies, selling Nigeria Panhard light armoured cars and halting all arms transfers to Lagos only later that year, by which time it was supplying the Biafrans via the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Clapham notes that France's military aid to Biafra prolonged the war for about eighteen months."</ref> French involvement in the war can be viewed in the context of its geopolitical strategy (''[[Françafrique]]'') and competition with the British in [[West Africa]]. Nigeria represented a base of British influence in the predominantly French-aligned area. France and Portugal used nearby countries in their sphere of influence, especially Ivory Coast under President [[Félix Houphouët-Boigny]], as waystations for shipments to Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139"/><ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015)</ref> To some extent, also, France repeated its earlier policy from the [[Congo Crisis]], when it supported the secession of the southern mining province [[State of Katanga|Katanga]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 116–117. "The Katanga secession (1960–1963) was in many ways a precursor to the Biafran War for France. French mercenaries went to Katanga to support the Belgian intervention. The Belgians were helping Tshombé fight Congolese forces loyal to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was supported by the Soviet Union.{{nbsp}}... The Katangan secession was ultimately unsuccessful, and thus it is a surprise that de Gaulle's government would support another secession in Biafra four years later. A number of other countries also drew a link between the two conflicts, and Ojukwu released a statement on 11 January 1969 called 'Biafra: the antithesis of Katanga', to reassure foreign powers.{{nbsp}}... Katanga gave France experience in using mercenaries to fight a war in which the consequences of failure were minimal."</ref> Economically, France gained incentives through oil drilling contracts for the ''Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Pétrolières'' (SAFRAP), apparently arranged with Eastern Nigeria in advance of its secession from the Nigerian Federation.<ref>Griffin, ''French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War'' (2015), p. 118. "Nigeria, however, was very important for France due to its size as well as the oil in the Niger River Delta. France had no diplomatic relations with Nigeria after 1960, as Nigeria expelled the French ambassador, Raymond Offroy, following the third French nuclear test in Algeria on 27 December. The severing of diplomatic relations did not halt commercial relations between the two countries, and in 1964, the French national oil company, SAFRAP, was given the rights to search for oil in parts of Eastern Nigeria that would later declare independence under the name of Biafra."</ref><ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 135–136. "The French policy may be described as anti-British, anti-Nigerian and pr-Biafra. SAFRAP (a French oil company) is exploring for oil in Biafra as well as in Nigeria. Although France has leaned toward Biafra, SAFRAP has vast exploration rights in the Northern Region; this might have prevented France giving Biafra political recognition.{{nbsp}}... The highlight of increasing world sympathy for Ojukwu was also motivated by the declaration by the French government that it endorsed the principle of Biafra's right to self-determination. Before the start of the Civil War, France had strengthened her economic ties with Biafra. On August 8th, F.G. showed some documents (photostat copies) to the foreign press showing that Biafra had sold oil concessions to France."</ref> SAFRAP laid claim to 7% of the Nigerian petroleum supply.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> In the assessment of a CIA analyst in 1970, France's "support was actually given to a handful of Biafran bourgeoisie in return for the oil. "<ref>"[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d160 Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room]," CIA, 20262, TDCS DB – 315/00173-70 (ADVANCE), 14 January 1970, in FRUS, Vol. E-5, 2005 (160); as cited in Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 120.</ref> Biafra, for its part, openly appreciated its relationship with France. Ojukwu suggested on 10 August 1967, that Biafra introduce compulsory French classes in secondary, technical and teacher training schools, in order to "benefit from the rich culture of the French-speaking world".<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119.</ref> France led the way, internationally, for political support of Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136"/> [[Portugal]] also sent weapons. These transactions were arranged through the "Biafran Historical Research Centre" in Paris.<ref name="griffin">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "The most important dimension of French military assistance was the shipment of weapons to Biafra, which had severe shortages of not only heavy weapons, but also small arms and ammunition. Portugal also provided weapons to Biafra, as did Czechoslovakia, until the Soviet invasion in 1968. The Biafrans set up an office in Paris called the 'Biafran Historical Research Centre', which was Ojukwu's contact point with Mauricheau-Beupré, Falques and Denard. The Centre allowed Ojukwu to purchase arms directly from European arms dealers. Denard would purchase arms from Czechoslovakia and ship them by sea to Biafra via Libreville. Starting in October 1967, there were also direct Czech arms flights, by a network of pilots led by Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian in contact with Houphouët-Boigny and Mauricheau-Beupré."</ref> French-aligned [[Gabon]] and Ivory Coast recognised Biafra in May 1968.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 123.</ref> On 8 May 1968, De Gaulle personally contributed 30,000 francs to medicine purchases for the [[French Red Cross]] mission. [[May 1968 events in France|Fairly widespread student-worker unrest]] diverted the government's attention only temporarily. The government declared an arms embargo but maintained arms shipments to Biafra under cover of humanitarian aid.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "In May and early June 1968, protests and general strikes in France prevented de Gaulle, Foccart or any other French official from following the situation in Biafra. On 12 June, after the riots had subsided, a French ministerial council decided to impose an official arms embargo on both Nigeria and Biafra, and to start providing direct humanitarian aid to Ojukwu. Robert explains that the humanitarian aid provided a very effective cover for the secret French arms shipments, which began to increase."</ref> In July the government redoubled its efforts to involve the public in a humanitarian approach to the conflict. Images of starving children and accusations of genocide filled French newspapers and television programs. Amidst this press blitz, on 31 July 1968, De Gaulle made an official statement in support of Biafra.<ref name="Griffin2015page124">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 124–125. "The 31 July 1938 statement in favour of Biafra was preceded by a concerted campaign in the French press during the month of July to inform the French public about events in Biafra.{{nbsp}}... The French government's next step after the 31 July statement was to launch a major campaign to gain public funding for humanitarian operations in Biafra. The campaign was coordinated at the highest levels of government, and the French Foreign Ministry files make it clear that the French television service and the French Red Cross were required to get governmental approval to ask for funds. The French public eventually contributed 12,600,000 francs. The French press continued a concerted campaign throughout August 1968 to alert the public to the humanitarian situation."</ref> Maurice Robert, head of ''[[Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage]]'' (SDECE, the French foreign intelligence service) African operations, wrote in 2004 that his agency supplied the press with details about the war and told them to use the word "genocide" in their reporting.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "Robert, in a surprising admission, stated that it was the SDECE that instructed the media to use the term 'genocide' in 1968. He says that the SDECE gave the French press precise information about Biafran casualties and civilian losses, and that ''Le Monde'' was the first to pick up the story. Rony Braumann wrote in 2006 that the SDECE paid the Biafran press service Markpress, located in Geneva, to introduce the theme of genocide to the general public."</ref> France declared "Biafra Week" on 11–17 March 1969, centred on a 2-franc raffle held by the French Red Cross. Soon after, de Gaulle terminated arms shipments, then resigned on 27 April 1969. Interim president [[Alain Poher]] fired General [[Jacques Foccart]], the lead coordinator of France's Africa policy. [[Georges Pompidou]] re-hired Foccart and resumed support for Biafra, including cooperation with the South African secret service to import more weapons.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 127–128.</ref> ===Soviet Union=== The [[Soviet Union]] strongly backed the Nigerian government, emphasising the similarity with the Congo situation. Nigeria's need for more aircraft, which the United Kingdom and the United States refused to sell, led Gowon to accept a Soviet offer in the summer of 1967 to sell a squadron of 17 [[MiG-17]] fighters.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=79}} The British-trained Nigerian military tended to be distrustful of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet ambassador in Lagos, Alexander Romanov, a gregarious and friendly man as well as a shrewd diplomat, established an excellent rapport with Gowon and persuaded him that accepting Soviet weapons would not mean subjection to the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=79–80}} The first MiG-17s arrived in Nigeria in August 1967 together with some about 200 Soviet technicians to train the Nigerians in their use. Though the MiG-17s turned out to be too sophisticated for the Nigerians to use properly, requiring Egyptian Air Force pilots to fly them, the Soviet-Nigerian arms deal turned out to be one of the turning points of the war. Besides establishing an arms pipeline from the Soviet Union to Nigeria, the possibility that the Soviet Union would gain greater influence in Nigeria led the United Kingdom to increase its supply of arms to maintain its influence in Lagos while ruling out the possibility of either the United States or Britain recognising Biafra.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=80}} The Soviet Union consistently supplied Nigeria with weapons, with the diplomatic disclaimer that these were "strictly for cash on a commercial basis". In 1968, the USSR agreed to finance the [[Kainji Dam]] on the Niger (somewhat upriver from the Delta). Soviet media outlets initially accused the British of cynically supporting the Biafran secession, then had to adjust these claims later when it turned out that the United Kingdom was, in fact, supporting the Federal Government.<ref name="Stent1973">[[Angela Stent]], "The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism", ''Issue: A Journal of Opinion'' 3.2, Summer 1973.</ref> One explanation for Soviet sympathy with the Federal Military Government was a shared opposition to internal secessionist movements. Before the war, the Soviets had seemed sympathetic to the Igbos. But Soviet Prime Minister [[Alexei Kosygin]] stated to their chagrin in October 1967 that "the Soviet people fully understand" Nigeria's motives and its need "to prevent the country from being dismembered."<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 273. "From 1967 to 1970, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland sold Nigeria twelve L-29 Delfin training aircraft, forty-seven MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter jets, and five Ilyushin-28 bombers, two of which Egypt transferred to Lagos. This constituted a virtual about-face in Soviet policy, because, until the secession, Moscow had evinced both admiration of the Igbos and sympathy for their plight. The Soviet Union chose pragmatism, in the form of alignment with federal Nigeria, over the ideological (if not idealist) alternative of support for Biafra."</ref> Reportedly, the war substantially improved Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic and trade relations, and [[Moskvitch]] cars began to make appearances around Lagos. The USSR became a competitive importer of Nigerian [[Cocoa bean|cacao]].<ref name="Stent1973"/> ===China=== Because the Soviet Union was one of Nigeria's leading supporters, supplying arms on a generous scale, China, having recently become rivals with the Soviets in the [[Sino-Soviet split]], declared its support for Biafra.<ref name="whokilledbiafra">{{Cite journal|last=Diamond|first=Stanley|date=2007|title=Who Killed Biafra?|journal=[[Dialectical Anthropology]]|volume=31|issue=1/3|pages=339–362|jstor=29790795|doi=10.1007/s10624-007-9014-9|s2cid=144828601}}</ref> In its first major statement on the war in September 1968, the [[Xinhua News Agency|Xinhua Press Agency]] stated the People's Republic of China fully supported the justified struggle for liberation of the people of Biafra against the Nigerian government supported by "Anglo-American imperialism and Soviet revisionism". China supported arms to Biafra via [[Tanzania]], supplying arms worth some $2 million in 1968–1969.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=237}} ===Israel=== From early on, Israel perceived that Nigeria would be an important player in West African politics and saw good relations with Lagos as an important foreign policy objective. Nigeria and Israel established a linkage in 1957. In 1960, the United Kingdom allowed the creation of an Israeli diplomatic mission in Lagos, and Israel made a $10 million loan to the Nigerian government.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265341363|title=Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra Civil War, 1967–1970}}</ref> Israel also developed a cultural relation with the Igbos based on possible shared traditions. These moves represented a significant diplomatic success given the Muslim orientation of the northern-dominated government. Some northern leaders disapproved of contact with Israel and banned Israelis from [[Maiduguri]] and [[Sokoto]].<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 264–265. "Israel was certain that Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent (fifty- five million in 1960) and rich in oil, would have a great influence on African politics. The Israeli foreign ministry was determined to establish full diplomatic relations upon that colony's receipt of independence (1 October 1960). Ehud Avriel, ambassador to Ghana and a close confidant of both Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Golda Meir, cautioned that were Israel to fail to establish ties with Nigeria, 'all of our work in West Africa will have come to naught'."</ref> Israel did not begin arms sales to Nigeria until after Aguyi-Ironsi came to power on 17 January 1966. This was considered an opportune time to develop this relationship with the federal government. Ram Nirgad became Israeli ambassador to Nigeria in January. Thirty tons of mortar rounds were delivered in April.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 266.</ref> The Eastern Region began seeking assistance from Israel in September 1966. Israel apparently turned down their requests repeatedly, although they may have put the Biafran representatives in contact with another arms dealer.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 267. "By September 1966, an open arms race had developed between the East and the Federal Government. In mid August, Ojukwu sent two representatives from the Eastern Region on a clandestine visit to Israel in a bid to purchase military hardware. Biafran attention to Israel was a highly astute move, primarily because the secessionists knew well what associations the massacres evoked for the Israelis."</ref> In 1968, Israel began supplying the Federal Military Government with arms—about $500,000 worth, according to the US State Department.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 280.</ref> Meanwhile, as elsewhere, the situation in Biafra became publicised as a genocide. The [[Knesset]] publicly debated this issue on 17 and 22 July 1968, winning applause from the press for its sensitivity. Right-wing and left-wing political groups, and student activists, spoke for Biafra.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 270–271. "Uri Avneri of ''HaOlam HaZeh—Koach Hadash'' ('This World—New Force', a far left-wing faction) called for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Biafra, while Aryeh Ben-Eliezer, of the right-wing herut party, lambasted Egyptian and Soviet support of Nigeria. The Israeli press praised the Knesset's attention to Biafra, pointing out that Israel's parliament was the first in the world both to devote a session to the issue and to declare its intention to help the victims."</ref> In August 1968, the [[Israeli Air Force]] overtly sent twelve tons of food aid to a nearby site outside of Nigerian (Biafran) airspace. Covertly, Mossad provided Biafra with $100,000 (through Zurich) and attempted an arms shipment. Soon after, Israel arranged to make clandestine weapons shipments to Biafra using Ivory Coast transport planes.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 271–272.</ref><ref>[https://unitedwithisrael.org/biafran-airlift-israels-secret-mission-to-save-lives/ "Biafran Airlift: Israel's Secret Mission to Save Lives"]. Eitan Press. ''United With Israel. www.unitedwithisrael.org''. 13 October 2013. Accessed 13 January 2017.</ref> The nations of sub-Saharan Africa tended to support the Arabs in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute by voting for resolutions sponsored by Arab states at the United Nations. A [[Alliance of the periphery|major goal]] of Israeli diplomacy was to wean the African states away from the Arab states and given the way that the majority of African nations supported Nigeria, Israel was loath to antagonise them by supporting Biafra too overtly.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=236}} ===Egypt=== President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] dispatched pilots of the [[Egyptian Air Force]] to fight for Nigeria in August 1967, flying the recently arrived MiG-17s. The tendency of Egyptian pilots to indiscriminately bomb Biafran civilians proved counterproductive in the propaganda war as the Biafrans did their best to publicise cases of civilians killed by the Egyptians.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=333}} In the spring of 1969, the Nigerians replaced the Egyptian pilots with European pilots who proved to be considerably more competent.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=333–334}} ===United States=== The civil war began while the United States was under the presidency of [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], who was officially neutral in regard to the civil war,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/c15646.htm|title=Nigerian Civil War|first=Bureau of Public Affairs|last=[[United States Department of State]]: The Office of Electronic Information|date=25 October 2005|website=2001-2009.state.gov}}</ref> with U.S. Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] stating that "America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area under British influence".<ref name="shellbpinflu"/> Strategically, U.S. interests aligned with the Federal Military Government, although there was considerable popular public sentiment in support of Biafra. The U.S. also saw value in its alliance with Lagos, and sought to protect $800 million (in the assessment of the State Department) worth of private investment.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), pp. 105–106.</ref> The neutrality was not universally popular, and a pro-Biafra lobby emerged within the United States to pressure the U.S. government to take a more active role in assisting Biafra.<ref name="lefever"/> The American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive was an organization founded by American activists to inform the American public of the war and sway popular opinion towards Biafra.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McNeil |first1=Brian |title='And starvation is the grim reaper': the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive and the genocide question during the Nigerian civil war, 1968–70 |journal=Journal of Genocide Research |date=3 July 2014 |volume=16 |issue=2–3 |pages=317–336 |doi=10.1080/14623528.2014.936723 |s2cid=70911056 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2014.936723 |issn=1462-3528}}</ref> Biafra became a topic in the [[1968 United States presidential election]] and on 9 September 1968, future Republican president [[Richard Nixon]] called for Lyndon B. Johnson to take action in helping Biafra, stating: <blockquote>Until now, efforts to relieve the Biafran people have been thwarted by the desire of central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide. But genocide is what is taking place right now—and starvation is the grim reaper.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139"/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/54841.htm |title=Technical Difficulties }}</ref></blockquote> Both Biafran officials and the U.S. pro-Biafra lobby hoped the election of Richard Nixon would change U.S. foreign policy regarding the war. However, when Nixon became president in 1969, he found there was little he could do to change the established stance aside from calling for another round of peace talks. According to American political theorist [[Ernest W. Lefever]], the U.S. providing official support to Biafra would have resulted in hostility from not only Nigeria, but also other African nations who supported Nigeria in the war, who had successfully argued to the [[United Nations]] that the war was an internal affair that the U.N. should not be involved with.<ref name="lefever">{{cite journal |last1=Lefever |first1=Ernest W. |title=The "Biafra Lobby" and U.S. Foreign Policy |journal=Worldview |date=February 1969 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=6–7 |doi=10.1017/S0084255900013395 |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S0084255900013395 |language=en |issn=0084-2559}}</ref> The [[Vietnam War]] served as another obstacle to a possible U.S. intervention in Biafra. Despite this, Nixon continued to personally support Biafra.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://notevenpast.org/foreign-policy-from-candidate-to-president-richard-nixon-and-the-lesson-of-biafra/|title=Foreign Policy from Candidate to President: Richard Nixon and the Lesson of Biafra – Not Even Past|date=5 December 2016|website=notevenpast.org}}</ref> Himself a Jew who escaped persecution from [[Nazi Germany]], U.S. Secretary of State [[Henry Kissinger]] compared the Igbo people to Jews in a memoriam written to U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]], stating: {{blockquote|The Ibos are the wandering Jews of West Africa – gifted, aggressive, Westernized; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by the mass of their neighbors in the Federation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chiluwa |first1=Innocent |last2=Chiluwa |first2=Isioma M. |title=Separatists or terrorists? Jews or Nigerians?: Media and cyber discourses on the complex identity of the "Biafrans" |journal=Journal of Language and Politics |date=8 June 2020 |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=583–603 |doi=10.1075/jlp.19041.chi |s2cid=214072392 |url=https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/jlp.19041.chi |language=en |issn=1569-2159}}</ref>}} [[Gulf Oil]] Nigeria, the third major player in Nigerian oil, was producing 9% of the oil coming out of Nigeria before the war began.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> Its operations were all located offshore of the federally controlled Mid-Western territory; therefore it continued to pay royalties to the federal government and its operations were mostly undisrupted.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/> ===Canada=== At the request of the Nigerian government, Canada sent three observers to investigate allegations of genocide and war crimes against the Nigerian military. Major General W.A. Milroy was joined by two other Canadian officers in 1968, and the Canadian contingent remained until February 1970.<ref>Department of National Defense{{cite web |title=Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation Observer Team Nigeria |url=http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=131&CdnOpId=155 |website=Operations Database Details/Information |date=9 November 2004 |access-date=6 March 2019 |archive-date=4 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200804120959/http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=131&CdnOpId=155 |url-status=dead }}</ref> ===Rest of Africa=== Biafra appealed unsuccessfully for support from the [[Organisation of African Unity]] (OAU), the precursor to the [[African Union]]. The OAU, bound by its charter to oppose any secession from a member state, denounced Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria. Equally bound by its charter to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of its member states, the OAU took no further action.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kamanu |first1=Onyeonoro S. |title=Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: an O.A.U. Dilemma |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |date=September 1974 |volume=12 |issue=3 |page=373 |quote=The obligation to 'defend' the territorial status quo theoretically precludes the participation of the O.A.U. in any settlement of an internal conflict whose terms might favor the break-up of a member state. The dilemma this creates for the Organization was made startlingly and embarassingly apparent by the Nigerian-Biafran war. While one of the costliest wars in African history was raging out of control and hundreds of thousands of African lives were being lost, all the O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government could do was to reiterate its 'condemnation of secession in any Member State' and to 'send a consultative mission of 6 Heads of State...to the Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria'. |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00009678 |s2cid=153949636 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/secession-and-the-right-of-selfdetermination-an-oau-dilemma/F3F8BC828CE731E8FE48703ED5A8E9E5 |language=en |issn=1469-7777}}</ref> Countries such as Ethiopia<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sadleman |first1=Stephen |title=The Ties That Divide |date=2000 |page=86 |publisher=Columbia University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_8UzCgAAQBAJ&q=ethiopia+support&pg=PA87 |access-date=8 June 2018|isbn=9780231122290 }}</ref> and Egypt vocally supported the Nigerian government's policies in order to prevent inspiring revolts within their own borders.<ref name="HeertenMoses2014page175">Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 174–175. "Realising their slim chances on the battlefield, the Biafran leadership moved the conflict into the propaganda domain. The situation did not look promising for Biafra's propagandists in the international sphere, either. Governments of the global south were particularly hesitant. As many of them faced separatist movements at home, they were adamantly opposed to what they understood as illegitimate secession rather than the legitimate exercise of the Biafran's right to self-determination."</ref> However, Biafra received the support of African countries such as Tanzania,<ref>Malcolm MacDonald: ''Bringing an End to Empire'', 1995, p. 416.</ref><ref>''Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria'', 2001, p. 54.{{full citation needed|date=October 2022}}</ref><ref>''Africa 1960–1970: Chronicle and Analysis'', 2009, p. 423.{{full citation needed|date=October 2022}}</ref> Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast.<ref name="africamasterweb.com"/> [[Rhodesia]]n pilots smuggled weapons and money into Biafra, which Rhodesian intelligence chief [[Ken Flower]] claimed was part of the operations of Rhodesia's [[Central Intelligence Organisation]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=White |first1=Luise |title=Unpopular sovereignty: Rhodesian independence and African decolonization |date=2015 |publisher=The University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago (Ill.) |isbn=9780226235226}}</ref> ===Foreign mercenaries=== Outmatched by Nigeria's superior firepower, Biafra hired foreign mercenaries for extra support.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,900387,00.html|title = Biafra: The Mercenaries|magazine = Time|date = 25 October 1968}}</ref> Mercenaries with prior experience fighting in the [[Congo Crisis]] were eagerly drawn to Biafra. German mercenary [[Rolf Steiner]] was placed in charge of the 4th Commando Brigade of the Biafran Armed Forces and commanded 3,000 men. Welsh mercenary [[Taffy Williams]], one of Steiner's subordinates, was in command of one hundred Biafran fighters. Steiner's other subordinates were a mixture of adventurers consisting of the Italian Giorgio Norbiato; the Rhodesian explosive expert Johnny Erasmus; the Scotsman Alexander "Alec" Gay; the Irishman Louis "Paddy" Malrooney; the Corsican Armand Iaranelli who had been able to enlist in the Foreign Legion by pretending to be Italian; and a Jamaican bartender turned mercenary who called himself "Johnny Korea".{{sfn|Jowett|2016|p=15}} Polish-Swiss pilot [[Jan Zumbach]] formed and commanded a ragtag air force for Biafra. Canadian pilot [[Lynn Garrison]], Swedish pilot [[Carl Gustaf von Rosen]], and Rhodesian pilot [[Jack Malloch]] served as leaders of Biafran air operations, attacking Nigerian forces and also supplying weapons and food aid. Portuguese pilots also served in the Biafran Air Force, transporting weapons from Portugal to Biafra. Steiner established a [[brown water navy]] by converting some [[Chris-Craft Boats]] into gun boats, which turned out to be successful in launching surprise raids for weapons and supplies.{{sfn|Venter|2016|p=95}} It was hoped that employing mercenaries in Nigeria would have similar impact to the Congo, but the mercenaries proved largely ineffective since the Nigerian military received much more professional and adequate training compared to the Congolese militias.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=49}} Despite some initial early successes (such as [[Operation OAU]]), over half of the 4th Commando Brigade was wiped out by Nigerian forces during the disastrous [[Operation Hiroshima]] of 15–29 November 1968, resulting in Steiner experiencing depression and a nervous breakdown, leading to his eventual expulsion and replacement by Taffy Williams. Although Nigeria appeared to be a tougher opponent, commentators observing the war noted that the remaining mercenaries appeared to have developed a personal or ideological commitment to Biafra's cause, which is a rare trait for mercenaries.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}} Belgian mercenary [[Marc Goosens]], who was killed by defensive Nigerian forces in a [[suicide mission]] during Operation Hiroshima, was reportedly motivated to return to Africa after a dispute with his girlfriend.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}} Goosens was photographed in the moments before and after his death.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.jeremy-duns.com/blog/2014/5/30/the-real-dogs-of-war |title=The real dogs of war — JEREMY DUNS |website=www.jeremy-duns.com |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160323040031/http://www.jeremy-duns.com/blog/2014/5/30/the-real-dogs-of-war |archive-date=2016-03-23}}</ref> Steiner claimed to have fought for Biafra for idealistic reasons, saying the Igbo people were the victims of genocide, but the American journalist [[Edward P. Morgan|Ted Morgan]] mocked his claims, describing Steiner as a militarist who simply craved war because killing was the only thing he knew how to do well.<ref name="Morgan">{{cite news |last1=Morgan |first1=Ted |title=War Is Heaven |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1978/07/09/archives/war-is-heaven.html |access-date=11 April 2020 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=9 July 1978}}</ref> Journalist [[Frederick Forsyth]] quotes Taffy Williams speaking of his Biafran subordinates, "I've seen a lot of Africans at war. But there's nobody to touch these people. Give me 10,000 Biafrans for six months, and we'll build an army that would be invincible on this continent. I've seen men die in this war who would have won the [[Victoria Cross]] in another context".{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}} After the war, [[Philip Effiong]], the chief of the Biafran general staff was asked by a journalist about the impact of the mercenaries on the war, his reply was: "They had not helped. It would had made no difference if not a single one of them came to work for the secessionist forces. Rolf Steiner stayed the longest. He was more of a bad influence than anything else. We were happy to get rid of him."<ref name="Oyewole">{{cite journal |last1=Oyewole |first1=Fola |title=Scientists and Mercenaries |journal=Transition |year=1975 |volume=48 | pages=64–65}}</ref> ==Biafra surrounded== [[File:Makeshift airport in Calabar, Nigeria, probably 1968.png|thumb|A makeshift airport in Calabar, Nigeria, where relief efforts to aid famine victims were deployed by helicopter teams.]] From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate, with Nigerian forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas under Biafran control due to stiff resistance and major defeats in [[Abagana]], [[Arochukwu]], [[Oguta]], [[Umuahia]] ([[Operation OAU]]), [[Onne]], [[Ikot Ekpene]], etc.<ref name="NCWF">{{cite web|work=Dawodu|title= Nigerian Civil War File |author=Nowa Omoigui|date=3 October 2007|access-date=27 October 2007|url=http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui24.htm}}</ref> But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two northern fronts and the capture of [[Port Harcourt]] on 19 May 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 175–176. "In early May 1968, Biafra's principal port town and remaining access to the sea, Port Harcourt, fell to federal forces. The secessionist state was turned into a landlocked enclave. With federal forces tightening the noose around the secessionist territory, the shrinking Biafran enclave soon encompassed only the heart of Igboland. At the same time, this territory had to absorb increasing numbers of people fleeing federal offensives. After a year of fighting, the rump state was overpopulated, its people impoverished, lacking supplies, food and medicine."</ref> The Biafran government reported that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war, and sought aid from the outside world. Private groups in the US, led by Senator [[Ted Kennedy]], responded. No one was ever held responsible for these killings. In September 1968, the federal army planned what Gowon described as the "final offensive." Initially the final offensive was neutralised by Biafran troops by the end of the year after several Nigerian troops were routed in Biafran ambushes. In the latter stages, a Southern Federal Military Government offensive managed to break through. However, in 1969, the Biafrans launched several offensives against the Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance starting in March when the 14th Division of the Biafran army recaptured [[Owerri]] and moved towards Port Harcourt, but were halted just north of the city. In May 1969, Biafran commandos recaptured oil wells in Kwale. In July 1969, Biafran forces launched a major land offensive supported by foreign [[mercenary]] pilots continuing to fly in food, medical supplies and weapons. Most notable of the mercenaries was Swedish Count [[Carl Gustav von Rosen]] who led air attacks with five [[Malmö MFI-9]] MiniCOIN small piston-engined aircraft, armed with rocket pods and machine guns. His Biafran Air Force consisted of three Swedes: von Rosen, Gunnar Haglund and Martin Lang. The other two pilots were Biafrans: Willy Murray-Bruce and Augustus Opke. From 22 May to 8 July 1969 von Rosen's small force attacked Nigerian military airfields in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Benin City and Ughelli, destroying or damaging a number of Nigerian Air Force jets used to attack relief flights, including a few MiG-17's and three of Nigeria's six Ilyushin Il-28 bombers that were used to bomb Biafran villages and farms on a daily basis. Although the Biafran offensives of 1969 were a tactical success, the Nigerians soon recovered. The Biafran air attacks did disrupt the combat operations of the Nigerian Air Force, but only for a few months.[[File:Malmö MFI-9 Biafra Baby two-view silhouette.svg|thumb|Malmö MFI-9 Biafra Baby two-view silhouette]] In response to the Nigerian government using foreigners to lead some advances, the Biafran government also began hiring foreign [[mercenary|mercenaries]] to extend the war.<ref name="Mercs">{{cite web|url=http://www.mercenary-wars.net/biafra/|title=The Biafran conflict in 1966.|access-date=12 January 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140112190931/http://www.mercenary-wars.net/biafra/|archive-date=12 January 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> Only German-born [[Rolf Steiner]], a lieutenant colonel with the 4th Commandos, and Major [[Taffy Williams]], a Welshman, would remain for the duration.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Last Adventurer |first=Rolf |last=Steiner |location=Boston |publisher=Little & Brown |year=1978 |isbn=978-0-316-81239-9 }}</ref> Nigeria deployed foreign aircraft, in the form of Soviet MiG{{nbh}}17 and Il{{nbh}}28 bombers.<ref name="Shadows"/> ===Humanitarian crisis=== {{Further|Blockade of Biafra|Biafran airlift}} [[File:Starved girl.jpg|200px|left|thumb|A child suffering the effects of [[kwashiorkor]], a disease brought on due to a severe dietary protein deficiency. Pictures of the famine caused by the Nigerian blockade garnered worldwide sympathy for the Biafrans. It was regarded in the Western press as the genocide of two million people, half of them children.]] The September massacres and subsequent Igbo withdrawal from northern Nigeria was the basis for the initial human rights petition to the UN to end genocide and provided a historical link to Biafran claims of genocide during the Nigerian civil war.<ref name="auto2">{{cite journal|last1=McNeil|first1=Brian|title='And starvation is the grim reaper': the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive and the genocide question during the Nigerian civil war, 1968–70|journal=Journal of Genocide Research|date=July 2014|volume=16|issue=2–3|pages=317–336|doi=10.1080/14623528.2014.936723|s2cid=70911056}}</ref> Awareness of a mounting crisis rose in 1968. Information spread especially through religious networks, beginning with alerts from missionaries. It did not escape the notice of worldwide Christian organisations that the Biafrans were Christian and the northern Nigerians controlling the federal government were Muslim.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 175. "In the first half of 1968, ever more religious groups and humanitarian organisations were alerted to the event, due in large measure to the presence of western missionaries. These religious ties were conduits for the transnational networks through which the conflict would be turned into an object of international humanitarian concern. For many Christian clerics and laypeople, the war seemed to be a cosmic drama fought between a vulnerable Christian Biafra and a northern Muslim-dominated federal Nigeria."</ref> Among these Christian efforts were the organisation Joint Church Aid and [[Caritas Internationalis|Caritas]], the latter aligned with various international Catholic aid groups.<ref>{{cite report|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/54647.htm|title=The Biafran Relief Problem|publisher=[[Central Intelligence Agency]]|date=29 January 1969|access-date=1 March 2021|location=[[Langley, Virginia|Langley, VA]]}}</ref> The famine was a result of the blockade that the Nigerian government had imposed on the Eastern region in the months leading up to secession.<ref name="auto2"/> [[Frederick Forsyth]], then a journalist in Nigeria and later a successful novelist, observed that the main problem was [[kwashiorkor]], a protein deficiency. Prior to the civil war, the main source of dietary protein was [[stockfish|dried fish]] imported from [[Norway]], which was supplemented by local hogs, chicken and eggs. The blockade prevented imports, and local protein supplies were quickly depleted: "The national diet was now almost 100% [[starch]]."<ref>Forsyth, Frederick. The Outsider: My Life in Intrigue. NY: Putnam, p. 176</ref> Many volunteer bodies organised the [[Biafran airlift]] which provided blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons.<ref name="Shadows">''Shadows : Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967–1970'', by Michael I. Draper ({{ISBN|1-902109-63-5}})</ref> More common was the claim that the arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more difficult to distinguish between aid aircraft and military supply aircraft.<ref name="Shadows"/> The American Community to Keep Biafra Alive stood apart from other organisations by quickly creating a broad strategy for pressuring the American government into taking a more active role in facilitating relief. Former [[Peace Corps]] volunteers who had recently returned from Nigeria and college students founded the American Committee in July 1968. The Peace Corps volunteers stationed in the Eastern Region developed strong friendships and identified as Igbo which prompted them to help the Eastern Region.<ref name="auto2"/> One of the characters assisting Count Carl Gustav von Rosen was [[Lynn Garrison]], an ex-[[RCAF]] fighter pilot. He introduced the Count to a Canadian method of dropping bagged supplies to remote areas in Canada without losing the contents. He showed how one sack of food could be placed inside a larger sack before the supply drop. When the package hit the ground the inner sack would rupture while the outer one kept the contents intact. With this method many tons of food were dropped to many Biafrans who would otherwise have died of starvation.<ref>Farran, Roy. "Calgarian active in Biafran conflict." ''North Hill News,'' 19 October 1968.</ref> [[Bernard Kouchner]] was one of a number of French doctors who volunteered with the [[French Red Cross]] to work in hospitals and feeding centres in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being similar to a [[gag order]], that was designed to maintain the organisation's neutrality, whatever the circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.<ref>{{Cite web|title=July 6: Nightfall at dawn New Telegraph Online New Telegraph|url=https://www.newtelegraphng.com/july-6-nightfall-dawn/|last=Correspondents|website=New Telegraph|language=en-US|access-date=2020-05-29}}{{Dead link|date=October 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} After entering the country, the volunteers, in addition to Biafran health workers and hospitals, were subjected to attacks by the Nigerian army, and witnessed civilians being murdered and starved by the blockading forces. Kouchner also witnessed these events, particularly the huge number of starving children, and when he returned to France, he publicly criticised the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit behaviour. With the help of other French doctors, Kouchner put Biafra in the media spotlight and called for an international response to the situation. These doctors, led by Kouchner, concluded that a new aid organisation was needed that would ignore political / religious boundaries and prioritise the welfare of victims. They formed the ''Comité de Lutte contre le Génocide au Biafra'', which in 1971 became ''[[Médecins Sans Frontières]]'' (Doctors Without Borders).<ref name="hih">Bortolotti, Dan (2004). ''Hope in Hell: Inside the World of Doctors Without Borders'', Firefly Books. {{ISBN|1-55297-865-6}}.</ref><ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 177.</ref> The crisis brought about a large increase in prominence and funding of [[non-governmental organisations]] (NGOs).<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 177. "The Biafran crisis was also connected to wider changes in the relief sector. In particular, it resulted in a massive spending increase through state funds and public donations, leading to the growth and proliferation of NGOs."</ref><ref>O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), p. 299. "The Biafran humanitarian crisis holds a critical place in the history of non-government organisations (NGOs). It prompted the creation of new agencies, like Africa Concern, and thrust existing ones, like Oxfam, into a spotlight they have left only rarely since. As part of a wider 'NGO moment', it focused public and official attention on the role of non-state actors and accelerated the emergency of an internationalised, professionalised aid industry that took centre stage in the mid 1980s."</ref> ===Media and public opinion=== Media and public relations played a central role in the war, due to their influence on morale at home and the dynamics of international involvement. Both sides relied heavily on external support.<ref name="HeertenMoses2014page174"/><ref name="HeertenMoses2014page175"/> Biafra hired the New York public relations firm of Ruder and Finn to lobby American public opinion.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=68}} However, it was not until Biafra hired the Geneva public relations Markpress in January 1968 that significant international sympathy was won.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=116}} Markpress was headed by an American public relations executive, William Bernhardt, who was paid 12,000 Swiss francs per month for his services, and who expected a share of Biafra's oil revenues after the war.<ref>Omaka, Arua Oko ''The Biafran Humanitarian Crisis, 1967–1970:'' (2016) p. 68.</ref> Markpress's portrayal of the war as a struggle for freedom by the [[Catholic Church|Catholic]] Igbos against the Muslim-dominated north won the support of Catholic opinion all over the world, especially in the United States.<ref>Omaka, Arua Oko ''The Biafran Humanitarian Crisis, 1967–1970:'' (2016) pp. 69–70.</ref> Besides portraying the war as a Christian-Muslim conflict, Markpress accused the Federal government of waging genocide against the Igbos, a campaign that was extremely effective as pictures of starving Igbos won the sympathy of the world.<ref>Omaka, Arua Oko ''The Biafran Humanitarian Crisis, 1967–1970:'' (2016) p. 70.</ref> [[File:Ongeveer_10.000_kinderen_van_scholen_uit_het_gehele_land_demonstreerden_in_Den_H%2C_Bestanddeelnr_922-9928.jpg|thumb|Student protesters in [[The Hague]], 20 November 1969.]] Media campaigns focused on the plight of the Biafrans intensified internationally in the summer of 1968.<ref name="OSullivan2014page302"/><ref name="Griffin2015page124"/> By the Biafran leadership and then around the world, the pogroms and famine were classified as [[genocide]] and compared to [[The Holocaust]]; [[Igbo Jews|hypothetical Judaic origins of the Igbos]] were used to bolster comparisons with Jews in Germany. In the international press, Igbo refugee camps were compared to Nazi extermination camps.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 178–179. "Further elevating the genocide reproaches, the eastern (later the Biafran) leadership frequently made comparisons to the Holocaust to draw attention to their cause. This analogy originated in ethnological genealogies that cast the Igbos as the 'Jews of Africa', even as one of Israel's 'lost tribes'. The Biafran leadership drew on this representation that many eastern Nigerians had adopted as their self-perception. This analogy, combined with the genocide charge, was used by the leadership to secure the support of the population, and to build loyalty to Biafra by emphasising the threat from a common enemy. The 'Jews of Africa' envisioned their state like an 'African Israel', a new nation born of genocidal violence. / Soon, the growing cast of Biafra's supporters around the globe adopted this rhetoric, further elaborating it in the process. After the publication of images of starving Biafran children in the western media, analogies and comparisons with the Holocaust abounded internationally."</ref> Humanitarian appeals differed somewhat from place to place. In the United Kingdom, humanitarian aid used familiar discourses of imperial responsibility; in Ireland, advertisements appealed to shared Catholicism and experiences of civil war.<ref>O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), pp. 304–305. "In Britain humanitarianism became a vessel through which society could construct a new sense of national purpose; it amounted, in essence, to a benign re-imagining of imperial compassion for a postcolonial world. When the Biafran crisis erupted, it offered an opportunity to renew this emphasis on the country's responsibilities{{nbsp}}... On the surface, the Irish response to Biafra was built on something very different to the British: a shared religion (Catholicism), a common colonial experience and a narrative of humanitarian disaster. At the launch of the JBFA in June 1968, one speaker reminded the assembled that Ireland and Nigeria were united in their knowledge of 'the horror of famine and civil war'."</ref> Both of these appeals channelled older cultural values into support for the new model of international NGOs.<ref>O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), p. 305. "Yet the dominance of the decolonisation paradigm suggests that the experiences of the British and Irish NGOs were much closer than they might at first appear. From different starting points, and with differing goals, NGOs in both states assumed the mantel of organised reactions and re-imaginings of their countries' roles for the postcolonial era. Where the British public used humanitarianism to negotiate the shift from formal empire to responsible power, the changing role of Irish Catholic missionaries reflected the need to re-articulate the Irish 'spiritual empire' for this new world."</ref> In Ireland, public opinion identified intensely with Biafra as most of the Catholic priests working in Biafra were Irish who naturally sympathised with the Biafrans, who they saw as fellow Catholics struggling for independence.<ref name="Hogan">{{cite news |last1=Hogan |first1=John |title=How Ireland got involved in a Nigerian civil war |url=https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/how-ireland-got-involved-in-a-nigerian-civil-war-1.3089229 |access-date=7 April 2020 |newspaper=The Irish Times|date=20 May 2017}}</ref> The Irish journalist John Hogan who covered the war noted: "The threat of famine, combined with an independence struggle, had an almost irresistible political and emotional impact on Irish public opinion, which became hugely supportive of the regular airlifts, via the off-shore Portuguese island of São Tomé, of food and medical supplies to the beleaguered infant republic".<ref name="Hogan"/> The use of famine as a conscious tactic by the Federal government who wanted to starve Biafra into submission provoked parallels with the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine of Ireland]] of the 1840s while many Irish people saw a parallel with Igbo struggle for independence with their own independence struggle.<ref name="Hogan"/> The pro-Biafra British journalist [[Frederick Forsyth]] started covering the war in the summer of 1967 for the BBC, became angry at the pro-Nigeria stance of the British government and resigned in protest in September 1967.<ref name="Heerten, Lasse 2017 p.98">Heerten, Lasse, ''The Biafran War and Postcolonial Humanitarianism: Spectacles of Suffering'' (2017) p. 98</ref> Returning as a freelance journalist in 1968, Forysth worked closely with the Irish Holy Ghost Fathers to collect information about the famine, and whose dispatches from Biafra had an immense impact on British public opinion.<ref name="Heerten, Lasse 2017 p.98"/> In Israel, the Holocaust comparison was promoted, as was the theme of threat from hostile Muslim neighbours.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 270. "Michal Givoni points out that after June 1967, Israelis viewed the Biafrans as a people threatened in a manner similar to Israel during the crisis period that preceded the war.60 She also notes that Israel's daily newspapers reported frequently and prominently on what they termed the 'genocide' taking place in Nigeria. The general public in Israel, in the wake of that intense press coverage, expressed revulsion at the world's feckless response and the helplessness of the Biafran victims, which, for Israelis, recalled their own catastrophe."</ref> The Biafran war presented Westerners with the notion of starving African children. The Biafran famine was one of the first African disasters to receive widespread media coverage, enabled by the proliferation of television sets.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 176.</ref> The televised disaster and the rising NGOs mutually enhanced each other; NGOs maintained their own communications networks and played a significant role in shaping news coverage.<ref>O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), pp. 303–304. "As NGOs moved to centre stage in translating humanitarian concern into humanitarian action, they took on an equally important role in mediating between the lives of donors and life 'on the ground' in the Third World. Their advertisements, images and stories dominated the public narrative. In some cases, they did so in quite a direct fashion—Africa Concern, for example, established its own telex service to send up-to-date reports to the major Irish media outlets straight from west Africa, and in so doing had a considerable influence on the news agenda."</ref> Biafran elites studied Western [[propaganda]] techniques and released carefully constructed public communications in an intentional fashion. Biafran propagandists had the dual task of appealing to international public opinion, and maintaining morale and nationalist spirit domestically. [[Political cartoon]]s were a preferred medium for publicising simple interpretations of the war. Biafra also used [[push poll]]ing to insinuate messages about Nigeria's inherent bloodthirstiness.<ref>Roy Doron, "Marketing genocide: Biafran propaganda strategies during the Nigerian civil war, 1967–70", ''Journal of Genocide Research'' 16.2–3, August 2014. "In order to organise a coherent policy, and to create a strategy to circumvent the obstacles of creating effective propaganda during wartime, the Biafrans created a series of plans, of which only one, 'Guide lines [sic] for effective propaganda' (also called Plan #4), remains. The plan's first part details the general purpose, aims, techniques, and strategies of the campaign. The second part explains how the Biafran 'propaganda man' was to deal with the unique challenges of operating in a war so close to home and a home front that was increasingly under siege, blockaded and teeming with refugees. / The authors of the guidelines studied propaganda techniques very carefully, and incorporated the lessons of Allied and Axis propaganda during World War II with strategies used in the advertising world. Thus, when the Biafrans discussed hate appeals as an effective propaganda tactic, they invoked Josef Goebbels' words, 'we are enemies of the Jews, because we are fighting for the freedom of the German' alongside catchy advertising slogans such as 'Fresh up with Seven-up!'"</ref> Novelist [[Chinua Achebe]] became a committed propagandist for Biafra, and one of its leading international advocates.<ref name="Jeyifo2013">{{cite journal | last1 = Jeyifo | first1 = Biodun | title = First, There Was A Country; Then There Wasn't: Reflections on Achebe's New Book | journal = Journal of Asian and African Studies | volume = 48 | issue = 6| pages = 683–697 | year = 2013 | doi = 10.1177/0021909613506483 | s2cid = 147590538 }}</ref> On 29 May 1969, Bruce Mayrock, a student at Columbia University, set himself ablaze at the premises of the [[United Nations Headquarters]] in New York, to protest what he viewed as a [[genocide]] against the people of Biafra.<ref name="El Paso Herald Post-1969">{{cite news|title=Student Dies Following Self Burning|url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/69591865/|access-date=19 June 2014|agency=El Paso Herald-Post|date=30 May 1969}}</ref><ref name="Achebe-2012">{{cite book|last1=Achebe|first1=Chinua|title=There was a country : a personal history of Biafra|date=2012|publisher=Allen Lane|location=London|isbn=978-1-84614-576-6|chapter=Blood, Blood Everywhere}}</ref><ref name="Columbia Spectator 1969">{{cite news|title=GS Student, 20, Immolates Himself in Front of U.N.|url=http://spectatorarchive.library.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/columbia?a=d&d=cs19690603-01.2.8&e=-------en-20--1--txt-txIN------|access-date=2 June 2014|date=3 June 1969}}</ref><ref name="Ebiem-2014">{{cite news|last1=Ebiem|first1=Osita|title=30 May Biafra Independence & Bruce Mayrock Story|url=http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2014/05/30-may-biafra-independence-bruce.html|access-date=2 June 2014|date=26 May 1914}}</ref> He died of his injuries the following day.<ref name="Achebe-2012"/> On 25 November 1969, musician [[John Lennon]] returned the MBE he had awarded by Queen Elizabeth II in 1964 in protest against British support for Nigeria.<ref name="Lennon-MBE">{{cite news |title=Valued exposure: MBE |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/8378080.stm |access-date=6 April 2020 |publisher=BBC |date=25 November 2019}}</ref> In his letter to the Queen returning the MBE, Lennon wrote: "Your Majesty, I am returning this in protest against Britain's involvement in the Nigeria-Biafra thing, against our support of America in Vietnam, and against Cold Turkey slipping down the charts. With love. John Lennon.".<ref name="Lennon-MBE"/> ==Kwale oilfield incident== In May 1969 a company of Biafran commandos raided an oil field in [[Kwale (Nigeria)|Kwale]] and killed 11 [[Saipem]] workers and [[Agip]] technicians. They captured three Europeans unhurt and then at a nearby [[Okpai]] Field Development Biafran commandos surrounded and captured 15 more expatriate personnel. The captives included 14 [[Italy|Italians]], 3 [[West Germany|West Germans]] and one [[Lebanon|Lebanese]]. It was claimed that the foreigners were captured fighting alongside Nigerians against Biafran troops and that they assisted Nigerians in constructing roads to aid them in their operations against Biafra. They were tried by a Biafran court and sentenced to death.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-01-15 |title=Remembering Nigeria's Biafra war that many prefer to forget |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093 |access-date=2022-10-26}}</ref> This incident caused an international uproar. In the month that followed [[Pope Paul VI]], the governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America mounted concerted pressure on Biafra. On 4 June 1969, after receiving a personal direct mail from the Pope, Ojukwu pardoned the foreigners. They were released to the special envoys sent by the governments of [[Ivory Coast]] and [[Gabon]] and left Biafra.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/the-kwale-oilfi-eld-incident-nigeria-biafra-war-2/|title=The Kwale oilfield incident: Nigeria –Biafra War (2)|url-status=usurped|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160423060946/http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/the-kwale-oilfi-eld-incident-nigeria-biafra-war-2/|archive-date=23 April 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.segun.bizland.com/ojukwu.htm|title=Ojukwu on the Kwale Incident|website=segun.bizland.com}}</ref> ==End of the war== [[File:ASC Leiden - Rietveld Collection - Nigeria 1970 - 1973 - 01 - 093 New Nigerian newspaper page 7 January 1970. End of the Nigerian civil war with Biafra.jpg|thumb|New Nigerian newspaper page 7 January 1970. End of the Nigerian civil war with Biafra. "Owerri is now captured. Ojukwu flees his enclave." Photographs of the military Obasanjo, Jallo, Bissalo, Gowon.]] With increased British support, the Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans once again on 23 December 1969, with a major thrust by the ''3rd Marine Commando Division''. The division was commanded by Col. [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] (who later became president twice), which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind", was launched on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran towns of [[Owerri]] fell on 9 January, and Uli on 11 January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by plane to the [[Ivory Coast]], leaving his deputy [[Philip Effiong]] to handle the details of the surrender to General [[Yakubu Gowon]] of the Federal Army on 13 January 1970. The surrender paper was signed on 14 January 1970 in Lagos and thus came the end of the civil war and renunciation of secession.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} Fighting ended a few days later, with the Nigerian forces advancing into the remaining Biafran-held territories, which was met with little resistance. After the war, Gowon said, "The tragic chapter of violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again we have an opportunity to build a new nation. My dear compatriots, we must pay homage to the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme sacrifice that we may be able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and industry."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of-1970/Apollo-13/|title=Apollo 13 - 1970 Year in Review - Audio - UPI.com|website=UPI}}</ref> ==Legacy== ===Atrocities against the Igbos=== [[File:Starving woman africa biafra nigeria conflict famine (cropped).jpg|thumb|A severely malnourished woman during the war.]] The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to one million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease caused by Nigerian forces.<ref>{{cite web|title=Nigerian Civil War|url=http://www.war-memorial.net/Nigerian-Civil-War--3.140|work=Polynational War Memorial|access-date=2 January 2024 |quote=It has been estimated that up to a million people may have died due to the conflict, hunger and disease.}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Biafra: Thirty years on|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm|work=Africa|publisher=BBC News|access-date=4 January 2014|quote=Ethnic split: At independence, Nigeria had a federal constitution comprising three regions defined by the principal ethnic groups in the country – the Hausa and Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the south-west, and Ibo in the south-east. Crowd The fighting led to famine and chaos but as the military took over in the mid-1960s, and the economic situation worsened, ethnic tensions broke out. Up to 30,000 Ibos were killed in fighting with Hausas, and around 1 million refugees fled to their Ibo homeland in the east}}</ref> More than half a million people died from the famine imposed deliberately through blockade throughout the war. Lack of medicine also contributed. Thousands of people starved to death every day as the war progressed.<ref name="Block">Stevenson, "Capitol Gains" (2014), p. 314.</ref> The International Committee of the Red Cross in September 1968 estimated 8,000 to 10,000 deaths from starvation each day.{{sfn|Korieh|2013|p=737}} The leader of a Nigerian peace conference delegation said in 1968 that "starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels". This stance is generally considered to reflect the policy of the Nigerian government.<ref name="Njoku2013"/><ref>Colin Campbell, "[https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/29/books/starvation-was-the-policy.html Starvation Was The Policy]", ''New York Times'', 29 March 1987.</ref> The federal Nigerian army is accused of further atrocities including deliberate bombing of civilians, mass slaughter with machine guns, and rape.<ref name="Njoku2013">{{cite journal | last1 = Ijeoma Njoku | first1 = Carol | title = A Paradox of International Criminal Justice: The Biafra Genocide | journal = Journal of Asian and African Studies | volume = 48 | issue = 6| year = 2013 }}</ref> ===Igbo nationalism=== The first generation of [[Igbo nationalism]] began to develop in the immediate aftermath of the war.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Onuoha |first1=C |last2=Nwangwu |first2=FC |date=November 2020|title=The political economy of Biafra separatism and post-war Igbo nationalism in Nigeria |journal=African Affairs |volume=119 |issue=477 |pages=526–551 |doi=10.1093/afraf/adaa025 |quote="The first generation of Igbo nationalism started immediately after the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, and it is championed and dominated by the conservative Igbo petty bourgeoisie."}}</ref> ===Ethnic minorities in Biafra=== Ethnic minorities (Ibibio, Ijaw, Ikwerre, Etche, Ogoni and others) made up approximately 40% of the Biafran population in 1966.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Omaka|first=Arua|date=2014-02-17|title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970|url=https://encompass.eku.edu/jora/vol1/iss1/2|journal=Journal of Retracing Africa (JORA)|volume=1|issue=1|pages=25–40|issn=2168-0531}}</ref> The attitude of ethnic minorities in Biafra towards the conflict were initially divided early in the war, having suffered the same fate as Igbos in the North held the same fear and dread as Igbos.<ref>Akpan, Ntieyong U. The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. (2nd ed.). online: Routledge. p. 152, {{ISBN|0714629499}}.</ref> However, actions by Biafra authorities suggesting they favoured the Igbo majority turned these attitudes negative.<ref>Akpan, Ntieyong U. The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. (2nd ed.). online: Routledge. p. 152, "The first evidence came when the East started to recruit young men into the army. Thousands from all over the Region turned up daily for recruitment. While the Ibo candidates were regularly selected, scarcely any from non-Ibo areas were recruited." {{ISBN|0714629499}}.</ref> Great suspicion was directed towards ethnic minorities and opponents of Biafra, with 'combing' exercises conducted to sift these communities for saboteurs, or 'sabo,' as they were commonly branded.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Omaka |first=Arua Oko |title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970 |journal=Journal of Retracing Africa |volume=1 |issue=1 |year=2014 |pages=25–40 |url=http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/vol1/iss1/2 }}</ref> This brand was widely feared, as it generally resulted in death by the Biafran forces or even mobs.<ref>"William Norris of the ''London Times'' who visited Biafra, also reported an eyewitness account in which some of the great men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at Umuahia on April 2, 1968. These Ibibios who included old men and young men were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people attacked them with sticks and clubs."</ref> The accusations subjected entire communities to violence in the form of killings, rapes, kidnapping and internments in camps by Biafran forces.<ref>Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu's Rebellion, p. 17. "Some six thousand Rivers people were sent to different refugee camps in the Igbo hinterland."</ref> The Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighter (BOFF) was a paramilitary organisation set up by the civil defence group with instructions to suppress the enemy, and engaged in "combing" exercises in minority communities.<ref>{{cite journal | title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970 | publisher=African Tree Press | isbn=978-1592320134 | url=http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora | first=Arua Oko | last=Omaka | journal=Journal of Retracing Africa | volume=1 | issue=1 | date=February 2014 | access-date=25 October 2020 | pages=25–40 }}</ref><ref>The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970, http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora "The sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suffered the same intimidation and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha and Enugu"</ref> Minorities in Biafra suffered atrocities at the hands of those fighting for both sides of the conflict. The pogroms in the north in 1966 were indiscriminately directed against people from Eastern Nigeria.<ref name="ReferenceB">Elechi Amadi, author of ''The Concubine'' and ''The Great Ponds'', recalls in his memoir ''Sunset in Biafra'' his time in a Biafran detention camp. He and other ethnic minorities were imprisoned and tortured for their real or perceived support for the Federal Side.</ref> Despite a seemingly natural alliance between these victims of the pogroms in the north, tensions rose as minorities, who had always harboured an interest in having their own state within the Nigerian federation, were suspected of collaborating with Federal troops to undermine Biafra.<ref name="Saro-Wiwa, Ken 1992">Saro-Wiwa, Ken, ''Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy'', Saros International Publishers, Port Harcourt, 1992, {{ISBN|1-870716-22-1}}, "Port Harcourt was the last place whose fall led the inhabitants being treated as saboteurs, and so cruelly treated. I went to Igrita shortly after the fall of Port Harcourt and was terribly shocked by the number of bodies being carted into mass graves—bodies of person killed not by bullets but by cruel handling, and not by soldier but by frenzied and ill-motivated civilians," quoting ''The Struggle for Succession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War,'' Routledge (14 January 2014).</ref> The Federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In the Rivers area, ethnic minorities sympathetic to Biafra were killed in the hundreds by federal troops. In Calabar, some 2000 Efiks were also killed by Federal troops.<ref name="encompass.eku.edu">''The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970'', African Tree Press (18 February 2007) 978-1592320134 http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora "The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities' areas. They were accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of the ''London Sunday Times'' in an article titled, "Nightmare in Biafra," reported how the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centers in Biafra. He stated that, 'Slowly, but effectively, a reign of terror has been created'."</ref> Outside of the Biafra, atrocities were recorded against the residents of Asaba in present-day Delta State by both sides of the conflict.<ref name="jstor.org">{{cite journal|jstor=722748|quote=Similarly, on 20 September 1967, 'there was a mass killing of non-Ibo MidWesterners at Boji-Boji Agbor', and on 23 September, 'non-Ibo speaking MidWesterners were apprehended by rebel soldiers at Asaba, Ibusa and Agbor and taken [in two lorries] to a rubber plantation along Uromi-Agbor road and massacred|title=The Biafran Crisis and the Midwest|journal=African Affairs|volume=86|issue=344|pages=367–383|last1=Orobator|first1=S. E.|year=1987|doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a097919}}</ref><ref name="vanguardngr.com">{{cite web|url=https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/revisiting-1967-asaba-massacre/|title=Revisiting The 1967 Asaba Massacre|first=Emmanuel|last=Okogba|date=29 October 2016}}</ref> ===Genocide question=== Legal scholar Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe and other academics argued that the Biafran war was a [[genocide]], for which no perpetrators have been held accountable.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 187. "The prolific independent scholar Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe is perhaps the most outspoken articulator of this paradigm, which also depicts the Nigerian state as a prison house of nations, especially for the Igbo."</ref> Critics of this position acknowledge that starvation policies were pursued deliberately and that accountability has not been sought for the 1966 pogroms, but suggest that claims of genocide are incongruous with the fact that the Igbo were not exterminated after the war ended, alongside other arguments such as a lack of clarity surrounding Nigerian intentions and that Nigeria was fighting to retain control of Biafra and its people rather than to expel or exterminate them.<ref name="Njoku2013"/><ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 188.</ref> Biafra made a formal complaint of genocide against Igbos to the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, a Paris-based [[NGO]] of international lawyers, which concluded that the actions undertaken by the Nigerian government against the Igbo amounted to a genocide.<ref>{{harvnb|Korieh|2013|p=731}}: "The International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide found evidence of genocide and intent to commit genocide by northern Nigerians against the Igbo, and accused federal Nigeria of genocide in its report."</ref> With special reference to the Asaba Massacre, jurist Emma Okocha described the killings as "the first black-on-black genocide".{{sfn|Korieh|2013|p=737}} Ekwe-Ekwe places significant blame on the British government for their support of the Nigerian government, which he argued allowed for their depredations against the Igbo to continue.<ref>Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, "The Achebean Restoration", ''Journal of Asian and African Studies'' 48.6, 2013. "Britain was a central operative, along with the Nigerian state, in the planning and execution of the Igbo genocide right from its outset in 1966 to its concluding phases in 1969/1970. It was Britain's 'punishment' of the Igbo for its audacious lead of the struggle for the freeing of Nigeria from British occupation that began in the 1930s. Twice during that struggle, the occupation regime had casually watched two organised pogroms against the Igbo in north Nigeria—in 1945 and 1953. These murders, which also included the looting and destruction of tens of thousands of pounds' worth of Igbo property and businesses, were carried out by pro-British political forces in the region who were opposed to the restoration of African independence but who Britain would hand over supreme political power of the country to on the eve of its so-called departure from Nigeria in 1960. The pogroms were clearly dress rehearsals for subsequent genocide. / Without British complicity, it was highly unlikely that the Igbo genocide would have been embarked on in its initial phase by the Nigerian state with such unrelenting stretch and consequences between May and October 1966. Without the massive arms support that Nigeria received from Britain especially, it was highly improbably the Nigeria would have been in the military position to pursue its second phase of the genocide—namely, the invasion of Igboland—between July 1967 and January 1970. Harold Wilson, the British prime minister at the time, was adamant, as the slaughtering worsened, that he 'would accept' the death of 'a half a million' Igbo 'if that was what it took' the Nigerian genocidists on the ground to accomplish their ghastly mission (Morris, 1977:122)." See also: Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, "[http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/comment/88468 Britain and the Igbo genocide: Now for the pertinent questions]", ''Pambazuka News'', 30 July 2013.</ref> ===Reconstruction=== [[File:Disabled Biafran war veterans.jpg|left|thumb|Disabled Biafran war veterans in 2017.]] Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues.<ref>With reason. The pre-1966 tax-sharing agreements on mineral wealth were changed to okay favour the Federal government at the expense of the state. This agreement has, in the 1980s, been modified to further favour the Federal government.</ref> Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it has been hard to make this work in practice. Igbos who ran for their lives during the pogroms and war returned to find their positions had been taken over; and when the war was over the government did not feel any need to re-instate them, preferring to regard them as having resigned. This reasoning was also extended to Igbo-owned properties and houses. People from other regions were quick to take over any house owned by an Igbo, especially in the Port Harcourt area. The Nigerian Government justified this by terming such properties abandoned.<ref>{{Cite web|author=Shayera Dark, for|title=A Nigerian town relives the brutal civil war, 50 years after it ended|url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/15/africa/biafra-nigeria-civil-war/index.html|access-date=2021-04-17|website=CNN|date=15 January 2020 }}</ref> This, however, has led to a feeling of an injustice as the Nigerian government policies were seen as further economically disabling the Igbos even long after the war. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria changing its currency, so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honoured. At the end of the war, only N£20 was given to any easterner regardless of the amount of money he or she had had in the bank. This was applied irrespective of their banking in pre-war Nigerian currency or Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.<ref>[[Ken Saro-Wiwa]], ''On a darkling plain''</ref> ===Fall of Biafra and restoration attempts=== {{further|Orlu Crisis}} On 29 May 2000, ''[[The Guardian (Nigeria)|The Guardian]]'' reported that President [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2 June 2000 |title=WEST AFRICA IRIN-WA Weekly Round-up 22 |url=http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/wafrica/00a/0021.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090418012151/http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/wafrica/00a/0021.html |archive-date=18 April 2009 |access-date=28 March 2022 |website=iys.cidi.org}}</ref> Biafra was more or less wiped off the map until its resurrection by the contemporary [[Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra]].<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 189–190. "By contrast, 'Biafra' as an Igbo project of collective assertion and liberation was destroyed in 1970 and has been a taboo subject ever sense—at least until MASSOB placed it back on the agenda."</ref> Chinua Achebe's last book, ''There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra'', has also rekindled discussion of the war.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2012-10-05 |title=There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra by Chinua Achebe – review |url=http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/oct/05/chinua-achebe-there-was-a-country-review |access-date=2022-07-19 |website=the Guardian |language=en}}</ref> In 2012, the [[Indigenous People of Biafra]] (IPOB) separatist movement was founded, led by [[Nnamdi Kanu]]. In 2021, tensions between IPOB and the Nigerian government escalated into the violent [[Orlu Crisis]], with IPOB declaring that the "second Nigeria/Biafra war" had begun. The separatists vowed that this time, Biafra would win.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://saharareporters.com/2021/02/19/second-nigeriabiafra-war-has-just-started-we-will-defend-our-land-%E2%80%94-ipob | title=Second Nigeria/Biafra War Has Just Started But We Will Defend Our Land – IPOB | publisher=Sahara Reporters | date=19 February 2021 | access-date=17 June 2021}}</ref> === South East Freedom Fight === Nnamdi Kanu's ascent to prominence and the meteoric rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a complex narrative deeply intertwined with the socio-political fabric of Nigeria. Kanu, a charismatic and outspoken leader, gained attention through his vocal advocacy for the rights of the Igbo people and the call for an independent state of Biafra in southeastern Nigeria. His platform, IPOB, emerged as a formidable force, rallying support both within Nigeria and among the Igbo diaspora globally. The movement tapped into deep-seated grievances stemming from historical injustices, marginalization, and perceived neglect of the Igbo ethnic group within the Nigerian state. Kanu's ability to leverage social media and online platforms amplified his message, resonating with a significant segment of the Igbo population disillusioned with the Nigerian government. Despite facing legal challenges and government crackdowns, Kanu's influence continued to grow, symbolizing a resurgence of Biafran identity and aspirations for self-determination within Nigeria's complex political landscape.<ref>{{Cite web|last=UNIPROJECTS|first=Project Topics and Materials for Students {{!}} Download Complete Projects from|title=South East Freedom Fight|url=https://uniprojects.net/|access-date=2021-05-19|website=www.uniprojects.net}}</ref> === Intergenerational impacts === According to a 2021 study, "War exposure among women [in the Biafran war] results in reduced adult stature, an increased likelihood of being overweight, earlier age at first birth, and lower educational attainment. War exposure of mothers has adverse impacts on next-generation child survival, growth, and education. Impacts vary with age of exposure."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Akresh|first1=Richard|last2=Bhalotra|first2=Sonia|last3=Leone|first3=Marinella|last4=Osili|first4=Una|date=2021-03-09|title=First and Second Generation Impacts of the Biafran War|url=http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2021/03/02/jhr.58.4.0118-9272R1|journal=Journal of Human Resources|volume=58 |issue=2 |pages=0118–9272R1|language=en|doi=10.3368/jhr.58.4.0118-9272R1|s2cid=233738166|issn=0022-166X|hdl=10419/170922|hdl-access=free}}</ref> ==See also== {{Portal|Nigeria}} * [[List of civil wars]] ==Notes== {{Notelist}} ==References== ===Citations=== {{Reflist}} ===Sources=== {{refbegin}} * {{cite book| last = Baxter| first = Peter| title = Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970| publisher = Helion and Company| date = 2015| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=bFfdCQAAQBAJ| isbn = 9781910777473}} * [[Chinua Achebe|Achebe, Chinua]]. ''There Was a Country'', Penguin Press, 2012. ({{ISBN|978-1-59420-482-1}}) * Chuku, Gloria. "Women and the Nigeria-Biafra war." in ''Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide'' (Routledge, 2017) pp. 329–359. * Daly, Samuel Fury Childs. ''A History of the Republic of Biafra: Law, Crime, and the Nigerian Civil War,'' (Cambridge University Press, 2020) [http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55906 online review] * [[Larry Diamond|Diamond, Larry]]. ''Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic''. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1988. {{ISBN|0-333-39435-6}} * Draper, Michael I. ''Shadows : Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967–1970''. {{ISBN|1-902109-63-5}} * [[Billy Dudley|Dudley, Billy]]. ''Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria'' * Ejibunu, Hassan Tai: ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20071129053950/http://www.aspr.ac.at/epu/research/rp_0707.pdf Nigeria's Delta Crisis: Root Causes and Peacelessness]'' – [[European University Centre for Peace Studies|EPU]] Research Papers: Issue 07/07, Stadtschlaining 2007 * Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. ''The Biafra War: Nigeria and the Aftermath''. African Studies, Volume 17. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990. {{ISBN|0-88946-235-6}} * {{cite journal | last1 = Griffin | first1 = Christopher | title = French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970 | journal = Small Wars & Insurgencies | volume = 26 | issue = 1| pages = 114–135 | year = 2015 | doi = 10.1080/09592318.2014.959766 | s2cid = 143967690 }} * {{cite journal | last1 = Heerten | first1 = Lasse | last2 = Moses | first2 = A. Dirk | title = The Nigeria–Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide | journal = Journal of Genocide Research | volume = 16 | issue = 2–3| pages = 169–203 | year = 2014 | doi=10.1080/14623528.2014.936700| doi-access = free }} * {{cite book| last = Jowett| first = Philip S.| title = Modern African Wars (5). The Nigerian-Biafran War 1967–70| publisher = Osprey Publishing| date = 2016| location = Oxford| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=QEfVDAAAQBAJ| isbn = 9781472816092}} * [[Kirk-Greene, A.H.M.]] ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20160107111556/http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/97133/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/54783669-d417-44cf-802b-5b055acc89ad/en/27.pdf The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War and the Theory of Fear]''. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Research Report No. 27. Uppsala Offset Centre AB, 1975. {{ISBN|91-7106-085-5}} * {{cite journal |last1=Korieh |first1=Chima J. |title=Biafra and the discourse on the Igbo Genocide |journal=Journal of Asian and African Studies |date=December 2013 |volume=48 |issue=6 |pages=727–740 |doi=10.1177/0021909613506455 |s2cid=145067114 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909613506455 |language=en |issn=0021-9096}} * Levey, Zach. "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70". ''Journal of Genocide Research'' 2–3, 2014. * Madiebo, Alexander A. ''The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War''. Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980. * Njoku, H. M. ''A Tragedy Without Heroes: The Nigeria—Biafra War''. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd., 1987. {{ISBN|978-156-238-2}} * Obe, Peter ''Nigeria – A decade of crisis in pictures''. Peter Obe Photo Agency, Lagos, 1971. * Ojiaku, Chief Uche Jim. ''Surviving the Iron Curtain: A Microscopic View of What Life Was Like, Inside a War-Torn Region''. 2007. {{ISBN|1-4241-7070-2}}; {{ISBN|978-1-4241-7070-8}} * Omaka, Arua Oko. "Conquering the Home Front: Radio Biafra in the Nigeria–Biafra War, 1967–1970." ''War in History'' 25.4 (2018): 555–575. * {{cite journal | last1 = Pierri | first1 = Bruno | title = A New Entry into the World Oil Market: Nigeria and Its Relations with the Atlantic Powers, 1967–1973 | url = http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/eunomia/article/view/12737 | journal = Eunomia. Rivista Semestrale di Storia e Politica Internazionali | volume = 1 | issue = 2| year = 2013 }} * [https://web.archive.org/web/20170214103207/http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/biafra.htm Case Study] * {{cite book| last = Stremlau| first = John J.| title = The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970| publisher = Princeton University Press| date = 2015| location = Princeton| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=wqN9BgAAQBAJ| isbn = 9781400871285}} * {{cite thesis |last1=Stevenson |first1=John A. |title=Capitol gains: How foreign military intervention and the elite quest for international recognition cause mass killing in new states |date=2014 |s2cid=155490944 | degree= PhD| institution= University of Chicago }} * Uche, Chibuike. "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War". ''Journal of African History'' 49, 2008. * {{cite journal|first1=João M.|last1=Vidal|title=Texans in Biafra: T-6Gs in Use in the Nigerian Civil War|journal=Air Enthusiast |date=September–October 1996|issue=65|pages=40–47 |issn=0143-5450}} * Ugwueze, Michael I. "Biafra War Documentaries: Explaining Continual Resurgence of Secessionist Agitations in the South-East, Nigeria." ''Civil Wars'' 23.2 (2021): 207–233. * [[Jan Zumbach|Zumbach, Jan]]. ''On Wings of War: My Life as a Pilot Adventurer''. {{refend}} ====Historiography and memory==== {{refbegin}} * Falola, Toyin, and Ogechukwu Ezekwem, eds. ''Writing the Nigeria-Biafra War'' (Boydell & Brewer, 2016). * Nwosu, Maik. "The Muse of History and the Literature of the Nigeria-Biafra War." in ''Routledge Handbook of Minority Discourses in African Literature'' (Routledge, 2020) pp. 276–291. * {{cite journal | last1 = O'Sullivan | first1 = Kevin | title = Humanitarian encounters: Biafra, NGOs and imaginings of the Third World in Britain and Ireland, 1967–70 | journal = Journal of Genocide Research | volume = 16 | issue = 2–3| pages = 299–315 | year = 2014 | doi=10.1080/14623528.2014.936706| hdl = 10379/6616 | s2cid = 71299457 | hdl-access = free }} * Ojaide, Tanure, and Enajite Eseoghene Ojaruega, eds. ''The Literature and Arts of the Niger Delta'' (Taylor & Francis, 2021) [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Senayon-Olaoluwa/publication/349638658_Cosmopolitans_at_one_with_homeland/links/60d1e3b5a6fdcce58ba727df/Cosmopolitans-at-one-with-homeland.pdf online]. * Ojaruega, Enajite Eseoghene. "From the Niger Delta’s viewpoint: The Nigerian Civil War literature." in ''The Literature and Arts of the Niger Delta'' (Routledge, 2021) pp. 206–217. * Ojaruega, Enajite E. "Beyond Victimhood: Female Agency in Nigerian Civil War Novels." ''CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture'' 23.4 (2022): 2+ [https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3619&context=clcweb online]. * Roy-Omoni, Alex. "Sleeping Crocodiles are not Dead: Echoes of The Civil War in Contemporary Niger Delta Poetry." ''African Journal of Rhetoric'' 13.1 (2021): 261–281. {{refend}} ==External links== * [https://www.govt.africa Government of Biafra] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230908170105/https://www.govt.africa/ |date=8 September 2023 }} ===Images=== * [http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/biafra.htm Map of Nigerian Civil War] * [http://www.africafederation.net/Biafra_War.htm Photos from Civil War and related events] hosted by Federation of the Free States of Africa * [https://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/biafra/ "Biafra"], ''Iconic Photos'' blog, 3 December 2010 ===Video=== * [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL4v1l0k2vZT_48EArNzPROr3-j2mcnQ9Q Nigerian-Biafran War Full Video (Raw War Footage)] by Initiative Reports * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OiWw-yYzarM Daily Life in Biafra] (& [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N4id1lXVdqk part 2]), Nigerian History Channel * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwIAIO3Lqls BBC documentary] on Nigerian Civil War * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8zXftCUlYk Biafra documentary on YouTube, part 1] and [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeI86Q4gMuU part 2]. * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n50-qZAxFSM Speech] by President Ojukwu * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGSRa6KE_rg Surrender ceremony], 15 January 1970 * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFfAVrh06fA Major General Gowon comments] after the war has concluded ===Writing=== * {{cite book|author=Samuel Fury Childs Daly|title=A History of the Republic of Biafra: Law, Crime, and the Nigerian Civil War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UY_dzQEACAAJ|year=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-74391-4}} * {{cite book|author=Chinua Achebe|title=There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dGiLDQAAQBAJ|year=2012|publisher=Penguin Press|isbn=978-1-59420-482-1}} * [http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/27th-december-1968/10/britain-and-biafra-the-case-for-genocide-examined "Britain and Biafra: the Case for Genocide Examined"] – by [[Auberon Waugh]] in the ''Spectator'' (UK), 26 December 1968 * [http://journeytoforever.org/rrlib/biafra.html "Biafra: A People Betrayed"] – by [[Kurt Vonnegut]] in ''[[Wampeters, Foma and Granfalloons]]'', 1974 * [http://www.philip-effiong.com/ Philip Effiong II Website] – Writings and links from son of Major General Philip Effiong ===Military aspects=== * [https://web.archive.org/web/20120419174113/http://www.brushfirewars.org/aircraft/mfi_9b_biafran/mfi_9b_biafran_1.htm Short history and assessment of the MFI-9B "MiniCOIN" in Biafran air force service] * [http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui34.htm Nicknames, Slogans, Local and Operational Names Associated with the Nigerian Civil War] * [http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui24.htm A view of blunders in the Nigerian strategy] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20130326163056/http://www.worldhistoryblog.com/2006/07/nigerian-civil-war-causes-strategies.html The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt] * [https://www.webguinee.net/blogguinee/2016/11/nigeria-soldiers-as-policymakers-1960s-1970s/ Nigeria. Soldiers As Policymakers (1960s–1970s)] * [http://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20170525-how-france-armed-biafras-bid-break-nigeria How France armed Biafra's bid to break from Nigeria] by Michel Arseneault {{Biafra topics}} {{Nigeria topics}} {{Cold War}} {{Authority control}} [[Category:Nigerian Civil War| ]] [[Category:Biafra]] [[Category:History of Nigeria]] [[Category:History of West Africa]] [[Category:Civil wars in Nigeria]] [[Category:Civil wars of the 20th century]] [[Category:Coup-based civil wars]] [[Category:Ethnicity-based civil wars]] [[Category:Separatist rebellion-based civil wars]] [[Category:Wars involving Igboland]] [[Category:Wars involving Nigeria]] [[Category:Wars involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo]] [[Category:1960s in Nigeria]] [[Category:1960s conflicts]] [[Category:1970 in Nigeria]] [[Category:Conflicts in 1970]] [[Category:Proxy wars]] [[Category:Attacks on hospitals in Nigeria]] [[Category:Cold War military history of France]] [[Category:Wars of independence]] Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. 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