Metaphysics Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! {{Short description|Study of fundamental reality}} {{Other uses}} {{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020 }} [[File:Aristotle, Metaphysics, Incunabulum.jpg|thumb|alt=Incunabulum showing the beginning of Aristotle's ''Metaphysics''|The beginning of [[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Aristotle's ''Metaphysics'']], one of the foundational texts of the discipline]] '''Metaphysics''' is the branch of [[philosophy]] that examines the fundamental structure of [[reality]]. It is traditionally seen as the study of mind-independent features of reality but some modern theorists understand it as an inquiry into the [[conceptual scheme]]s that underlie human thought and experience. Many general and abstract topics belong to the purview of metaphysics. It investigates what [[existence]] is, which features all entities have in common, and how they are divided into [[categories of being]]. An influential contrast is between [[particular]]s, which are individual unique entities, like a specific apple, and [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], which are general repeatable entities that characterize particulars, like the color ''red''. Modal metaphysics examines what it means for something to be possible or necessary. The [[Philosophy of space and time|nature of space and time]] is another broad topic, with metaphysicians discussing how to conceive them and how to conceptualize change. A closely related issue concerns the essence of [[causality]] and its relation to the [[Scientific laws|laws of nature]]. Other topics include how [[mind–body problem|mind and matter are related]], whether everything in the world is [[Determinism|predetermined]], and whether there is [[free will]]. Metaphysicians employ [[Philosophical methodology|various methods]] to conduct their inquiry. Traditionally, they rely on rational [[intuition]]s and abstract [[Logical reasoning|reasoning]] but have more recently also included [[Empirical evidence|empirical]] approaches associated with scientific theories. Due to the abstract nature of its topic, metaphysics has received criticisms questioning the reliability of its methods and the meaningfulness of its theories. Metaphysics is relevant to many fields of inquiry that often implicitly rely on metaphysical concepts and assumptions. The [[History of metaphysics|origin of metaphysics]] lies in the [[ancient period]] with speculations about the nature of reality and the universe, like the ones found in the [[Upanishads]] in [[ancient India]], [[Daoism]] in [[ancient China]], and [[pre-Socratic philosophy]] in [[ancient Greece]]. [[Aristotle]] conceived the scope of metaphysics under the title ''first philosophy'' and was influential in shaping the discussion of the [[Problem of universals|nature of universals]] in the subsequent [[medieval period]]. The [[modern period]] saw the emergence of many [[Rationalism|rationalist]] and [[Idealism|idealist]] systems of metaphysics. In the 20th century, various criticisms of earlier theories were voiced and new approaches to metaphysical inquiry were proposed. == Definition<!--'First philosophy' and 'Philosophia prima' redirect here--> == Metaphysics is the study of the most general features of [[reality]], including [[existence]], [[Subject and object (philosophy)|objects]] and their [[Property (philosophy)|properties]], possibility and necessity, [[space]] and [[time]], change, [[Causality|causation]], and the relation between [[matter]] and [[mind]]. It is one of the oldest branches of [[philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ What Is an Introduction?}} }}</ref> The precise nature of metaphysics is disputed and its characterization has changed in the course of history. Some approaches see metaphysics as a unified field and give a wide-sweeping definition by understanding it as the study of "fundamental questions about the nature of reality" or as an inquiry into the [[essence]]s of things. Another approach doubts that the different areas of metaphysics share a set of underlying features and provides instead a fine-grained characterization by listing all the main topics investigated by metaphysicians.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10 What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=9–10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Some definitions are descriptive by providing an account of what metaphysicians actually do while others are normative and prescribe what metaphysicians ought to do.<ref>{{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=2}}</ref> Two historically influential definitions in [[ancient philosophy|ancient]] and [[medieval philosophy]] understand metaphysics as the science of the [[first cause]]s and as the study of being ''qua'' being, that is, the topic of what all beings have in common and to what fundamental categories they belong. In the modern period, the scope of metaphysics was extended to cover topics such as the distinction between mind and body and [[free will]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Some philosophers follow [[Aristotle]] in describing metaphysics as '''first philosophy'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, implying that it is the most basic inquiry while all other branches of philosophy depend on it in some way.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=8–10}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=2–3}} }}</ref>{{efn|For example, the metaphysical problem of causation is relevant both to [[epistemology]], as a factor involved in perceptual knowledge, and [[ethics]], in regard to moral responsibility for the consequences caused by one's [[Action (philosophy)|actions]].<ref>{{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=8–10}}</ref>}} [[File:Kant gemaelde 1.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting of Immanuel Kant|[[Immanuel Kant]] conceived critical metaphysics as the study of the principles underlying all human thought and experience.]] Metaphysics is traditionally understood as a study of mind-independent features of reality. Starting with [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[critical philosophy]], an alternative conception gained prominence that focuses on conceptual schemes rather than external reality. Kant distinguishes transcendent metaphysics, which aims to describe the objective features of reality beyond sense experience, from critical metaphysics, which outlines the aspects and principles underlying all human thought and experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2, 6}} | {{harvnb|Bengtson|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pUHvCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Wood|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 354]}} }}</ref> Metaphysics differs from the individual sciences by studying very general and abstract aspects of reality. The individual sciences, by contrast, examine more specific and concrete features and restrict themselves to certain classes of entities, such as the focus on physical things in [[physics]], living entities in [[biology]], and cultures in [[anthropology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10 What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=xiii}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=206–207}} }}</ref> It is disputed to what extent this contrast is a strict dichotomy rather than a gradual continuum.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=203–205}}</ref> Philosophers engaged in metaphysics are called ''metaphysicians'' or ''metaphysicists''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10 What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=2}} }}</ref> Outside the academic discourse, the term ''metaphysics'' is sometimes used in a different sense for the study of [[occult]] and [[paranormal]] phenomena, like metaphysical healing, [[Aura (paranormal)|auras]], and the [[Pyramid power|power of pyramids]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Turner|1911|loc=[[:s:Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Metaphysics]]}} }}</ref> The word ''metaphysics'' has its origin in the ancient Greek words ''[[Meta (prefix)|metá]]'' (''[[wikt:μετά|μετά]]'', meaning ''after'', ''above'', and ''beyond'') and ''phusiká'' (''[[wikt:φυσικά|φυσικά]]'') as a short form of ''ta metá ta phusiká'', that is, what comes after the physics. This is frequently interpreted in the sense that metaphysics discusses topics that, due to their generality and comprehensiveness, lie beyond the realm of physics and its focus on empirical observation. It is often suggested that metaphysics got its name by a historical accident when [[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Aristotle's book]] on this subject was published. Aristotle did not use the term ''metaphysics'' but his editor may have coined it for its title to indicate that this book came after the book published on physics. The term entered the English language through the Latin word ''[[wikt:metaphysica|metaphysica]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoad|1993|pp=291, 351}} | {{harvnb|Cohen|Reeve|2021|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Veldsman|2017|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Heidegger|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zqXDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 39]}} }}</ref> === Branches <!--'Metametaphysics' and 'Meta-metaphysics' redirect here-->=== The nature of metaphysics can also be characterized in relation to its main branches. An influential division from early [[modern philosophy]] distinguishes between general and special or specific metaphysics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=3–5, 10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Craig|1998}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> General metaphysics, also called ''[[ontology]]'',{{efn|The term ''[[ontology]]'' is sometimes also used as a synonym of metaphysics as a whole.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=166}}</ref>}} takes the widest perspective and studies the most fundamental aspects of being. It investigates the features that all entities have in common and how entities can be divided into different [[categories of being|categories]]. Categories are the most general kinds, such as substance, property, [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]], and [[fact]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–14}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=The Categories Of Being}} }}</ref> Ontologists research which categories there are, how they depend on one another, and how they form a system of categories that provides an encompassing classification of all entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hofweber|2023|loc=§ 3. Ontology}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=The Categories Of Being}} | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Special metaphysics considers being from more narrow perspectives and is divided into subdisciplines based on the perspective they take. [[Metaphysical cosmology]] examines changeable things and investigates how they are connected to form a [[world]] as a totality of entities extending through space and time.<ref name="Loux 2017 3–5, 10">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=3–5, 10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Rational psychology restricts itself to exploring metaphysical foundations and problems concerning the mind, such as its relation to matter and the freedom of the will. Natural theology studies the divine and its role as the first cause.<ref name="Loux 2017 3–5, 10"/> The scope of special metaphysics overlaps with other philosophical disciplines and it is often not clear whether a topic belongs to it rather than to disciplines like [[philosophy of mind]] and [[theology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–11}} | {{harvnb|Craig|1998|loc=§ 2. Specific Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Applied metaphysics is a young subdiscipline. It belongs to [[applied philosophy]] and studies the applications of metaphysics, both within philosophy and other fields of inquiry. In [[ethics]] and [[philosophy of religion]], it concerns topics like the ontological foundation of moral claims and religious doctrines.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=165–168}} | {{harvnb|Brumbaugh|1966|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20124133 647–648]}} }}</ref> Applications outside philosophy include the use of ontologies in [[artificial intelligence]], [[economics]], and [[sociology]] to classify entities<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–169, 171–172}}</ref> as well as questions in [[psychiatry]] and [[medicine]] about the metaphysical status of [[disease]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=174}}</ref> '''Meta-metaphysics'''{{efn|Some philosophers use the term ''[[metaontology]]'' as a synonym while others characterize metaontology as a subfield of meta-metaphysics.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2018|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} is the [[metatheory]] of metaphysics and investigates the nature and methods of metaphysics. It also examines how metaphysics differs from other philosophical and scientific disciplines and how it is relevant to them. While the discussions of its topics have a long history in metaphysics, it has only recently developed into a systematic field of inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 7 Meta-metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2018|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> == Topics == === Existence and categories of being === {{main|Existence|Theory of categories}} Metaphysicians often see existence or being as one of the most basic and general concepts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} | {{harvnb|White|2019|pp=135, 200}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA47 47–48]}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=16}} }}</ref> To exist means to form part of [[reality]] and existence marks the difference between real entities and imaginary ones.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} }}</ref> According to the orthodox view, existence is a second-order property or a property of properties: if an entity exists then its properties are instantiated.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522;jsessionid=AEB41DBFF0B3EBCDCCB8A1E0DAFD4EB0 existence]}} }}</ref> A different position states that existence is a first-order property, meaning that it is similar to other properties of entities, such as shape or size.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522;jsessionid=AEB41DBFF0B3EBCDCCB8A1E0DAFD4EB0 existence]}} }}</ref> It is controversial whether all entities have this property. According to [[Alexius Meinong]], there are some objects that do not exist, including merely possible objects like [[Santa Claus]] and [[Pegasus]].<ref name="auto">{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49]}} }}</ref>{{efn|According to Meinong, existence is not a synonym of being: all entities have being but not all entities have existence.<ref name="auto"/>}} A related question is whether existence is the same for all entities or whether there are different modes or degrees of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT89 77]}} }}</ref> For instance, Plato held that [[Platonic forms]], which are perfect and immutable ideas, have a higher degree of existence than matter, which is only able to imperfectly mirror Platonic forms.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Poidevin|Peter|Andrew|Cameron|2009|pp=227–228}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} }}</ref> Another key concern in metaphysics is the division of entities into different groups based on underlying features they have in common. Theories of categories provide a system of the most fundamental kinds or the highest genera of being by establishing a comprehensive inventory of everything.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> One of the earliest theories of categories was provided by Aristotle, who proposed a [[Categories_(Aristotle)#The_praedicamenta|system of 10 categories]]. [[Substance theory|Substances]] (e.g. man and horse), are the most important category since all other categories like [[quantity]] (e.g. four), [[Quality (philosophy)|quality]] (e.g. white), and place (e.g. in Athens) are said of substances and depend on them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.1 Aristotelian Realism}} | {{harvnb|Studtmann|2024|loc=§ 2. The Ten-Fold Division}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=§ 1. Categories in Aristotle}} }}</ref> Kant understood categories as fundamental principles underlying human understanding and developed a [[Category (Kant)|system of 12 categories]], which are divided into the four classes quantity, quality, relation, and modality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.2 Kantian Conceptualism}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=§ 1. Categories in Kant}} }}</ref> More recent theories of categories were proposed by [[Edmund Husserl]], [[Samuel Alexander]], [[Roderick Chisholm]], and [[E. J. Lowe (philosopher)|E. J. Lowe]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.3 Husserlian Descriptivism, § 1.4 Contemporary Category Systems}} | {{harvnb|Grim|Rescher|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KgPPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39]}} }}</ref> Many philosophers rely on the contrast between [[Abstract and concrete|concrete and abstract objects]]. According to a common view, concrete objects, like rocks, trees, and human beings, exist in space and time, undergo changes, and impact each other as cause and effect, while abstract objects, like [[number]]s and [[Set (mathematics)|sets]], exist outside space and time, are immutable, and do not enter into causal relations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Falguera|Martínez-Vidal|Rosen|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction, § 3.5 The Ways of Negation}} | {{harvnb|Erasmus|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ze5FDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93]}} | {{harvnb|Macnamara|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pvKD5fvyLXIC&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref> === Particulars === [[Particular]]s are individual entities and include both concrete objects, like Aristotle, the Eiffel Tower, or a specific apple, and abstract objects, like the number 2 or a specific set in mathematics. Also called ''individuals'',{{efn|Some philosophers use the two terms in slightly different ways.<ref>{{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} they are unique, non-repeatable entities and contrast with [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], like the color red, which can at the same time exist in several places and characterize several particulars.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. The Nature of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> A widely held view is that particulars instantiate universals but are not themselves instantiated by something else, meaning that they exist in themselves while universals exist in something else. Substratum theory analyzes particulars as a substratum, also called ''bare particular'', together with various properties. The substratum confers individuality to the particular while the properties express its qualitative features or what it is like. This approach is rejected by [[Bundle theory|bundle theorists]], who state that particulars are only bundles of properties without an underlying substratum. Some bundle theorists include in the bundle an individual essence, called ''[[haecceity]]'', to ensure that each bundle is unique. Another proposal for concrete particulars is that they are individuated by their space-time location.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Bundles of Properties}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} }}</ref> Concrete particulars encountered in everyday life, like rocks, tables, and organisms, are complex entities [[Composition (objects)|composed]] of various parts. For example, a table is made up of a tabletop and legs, each of which is itself made up of countless particles. The relation between parts and wholes is studied by [[mereology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=250–251}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=Lead Section, § 1. 'Part' and Parthood}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21}} }}</ref> The problem of the many is about which groups of entities form mereological wholes, for instance, whether a dust particle on the tabletop forms part of the table. According to mereological universalists, every collection of entities forms a whole, meaning that the parts of the table without the dust particle form one whole while they together with it form a second whole. Mereological moderatists hold that certain conditions have to be fulfilled for a group of entities to compose a whole, for example, that the entities touch one another. [[Mereological nihilism|Mereological nihilists]] reject the idea that there are any wholes. They deny that, strictly speaking, there is a table and talk instead of particles that are arranged table-wise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|p=1295}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21, 23–24, 32–33}} }}</ref> A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as [[Atomism|atomists]] claim, or not, as continuum theorists contend.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berryman|2022|loc=§ 2.6 Atomism and Particle Theories in Ancient Greek Sciences}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=§ 3.4 Atomism, Gunk, and Other Options}} }}</ref> === Universals === {{main|Universal (metaphysics)}} Universals are general entities, encompassing both [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] and [[Relations (philosophy)|relations]], that express what particulars are like and how they resemble one another. They are repeatable, meaning that they are not limited to a unique existent but can be instantiated by different particulars at the same time. For example, the particulars [[Nelson Mandela]] and [[Mahatma Gandhi]] instantiate the universal ''humanity'', similar to how a strawberry and a ruby instantiate the universal ''red''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998a|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Cowling|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19}} }}</ref> A topic discussed since ancient philosophy, the [[problem of universals]] consists in the challenge of characterizing the ontological status of universals.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1c. The Problem of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Rodriguez-Pereyra|2000|pp=255–256}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19}} }}</ref> Realists argue that universals are real, mind-independent entities that exist in addition to particulars. According to [[Theory of forms|Platonic realists]], universals exist also independently of particulars, which implies that the universal ''red'' would continue to exist even if there were no red things. A more [[Aristotelianism#Problem of universals|moderate form of realism]], inspired by Aristotle, states that universals depend on particulars, meaning that they are only real if they are instantiated. [[Nominalism|Nominalists]] reject the idea that universals exist in either form. For them, the world is composed exclusively of particulars. The position of [[Conceptualism|conceptualists]] constitutes a middle ground: they state that universals exist, but only as [[concept]]s in the mind used to order experience by classifying entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Versions of Realism, § 3. Versions of Anti-Realism}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998a|loc=§ 4. Nominalism and Realism}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19, 45}} }}</ref> [[Natural kind|Natural]] and social kinds are often understood as special types of universals. Entities belonging to the same natural kind share certain fundamental features characteristic of the structure of the natural world. In this regard, natural kinds are not an artificially made-up classification but are discovered,{{efn|The classified entities do not have to occur naturally and can encompass man-made products, such as synthetic chemical substances.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brzović|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>}} usually by the natural sciences, and include kinds like [[electrons]], [[H2O|{{chem2|H2O}}]], and tigers. [[Scientific realism|Scientific realists]] and anti-realists are in disagreement about whether natural kinds exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brzović|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Metaphysics of Natural Kinds}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=Lead Section, § 1.2 Natural Kind Realism}} | {{harvnb|Liston|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Social kinds are basic concepts used in the social sciences, such as [[Race (human categorization)|race]], [[gender]], [[money]], and [[disability]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ásta|2017|pp=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315768571-27/social-kinds-%C3%A1sta 290–291]}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=§ 2.4 Natural Kinds and Social Science}} }}</ref> They are studied by [[Social metaphysics|social metaphysics]] and group entities based on similarities they share from the perspective of certain practices, conventions, and institutions. They are often characterized as useful social constructions that, while not purely fictional, fail to reflect the fundamental structure of mind-independent reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=259–263}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=185–186}} }}</ref> === Possibility and necessity === The concepts of possibility and necessity convey what can or must be the case, expressed in statements like "it is possible to find a cure for cancer" and "it is necessary that two plus two equals four". They belong to modal metaphysics, which investigates the metaphysical principles underlying them, in particular, why it is the case that some modal statements are true while others are false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=149–150}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=154–155}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 8. What Is Possible?}} }}</ref>{{efn|A further topic concerns different types of modality, such as the contrast between physical, metaphysical, and logical necessity based on whether the necessity has its source in the [[Scientific law|laws of nature]], the essences of things, or the laws of logic.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hanna|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ka9BhOL1ev8C&pg=PA196 196]}} | {{harvnb|Hale|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OSvsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142]}} }}</ref>}} Some metaphysicians hold that modality is a fundamental aspect of reality, meaning that besides facts about what is the case, there are additional facts about what could or must be the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goswick|2018|pp=97–98}} | {{harvnb|Wilsch|2017|pp=428–429, 446}} }}</ref> A different view argues that modal truths are not about an independent aspect of reality but can be reduced to non-modal characteristics, for example, to facts about what properties or linguistic descriptions are compatible with each other or to [[Fictionalism|fictional statements]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goswick|2018|pp=97–98}} | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=§ 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism}} | {{harvnb|Wilsch|2017|pp=428–429}} }}</ref> Following [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], many metaphysicians use the concept of [[possible world]]s to analyze the meaning and ontological ramifications of modal statements. A possible world is a complete and consistent way of how things could have been.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} | {{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Pavel|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 50]}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Possible Worlds}} }}</ref> For example, the [[dinosaurs]] were [[Cretaceous–Paleogene extinction event|wiped out]] in the actual world but there are possible worlds in which they are still alive.<ref>{{harvnb|Nuttall|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=luc-Hf_bEOIC&pg=PT135 135]}}</ref> According to possible world semantics, a statement is possibly true if it is true in at least one possible world while it is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} | {{harvnb|Kuhn|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c_eYe6NVaDMC&pg=PA13 13]}} }}</ref> [[Modal realism|Modal realists]] argue that possible worlds exist as concrete entities in the same sense as the actual world, with the main difference being that the actual world is the world we live in while other possible worlds are inhabited by [[Counterpart theory|counterparts]]. This view is controversial and various alternatives have been suggested, for example, that possible worlds only exist as abstract objects or that they are similar to stories told in works of [[fiction]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Lewis' Realism, § 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism}} | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Three Philosophical Conceptions of Possible Worlds}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Modal Realism}} }}</ref> === Space, time, and change === {{main|Philosophy of space and time}} [[Space]] and [[time]] are dimensions that entities occupy. Spacetime realists state that space and time are fundamental aspects of reality and exist independently of the human mind. This view is rejected by spacetime idealists, who hold that space and time are constructions of the human mind in its attempt to organize and make sense of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dainton|2010|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/time-and-space/spatial-antirealism/CE284C8D3088AF598998951618D4867D 245–246]}} | {{harvnb|Janiak|2022|loc=§ 4.2 Absolute/Relational Vs. Real/Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Pelczar|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tkjTBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA115 115]}} }}</ref> Spacetime absolutism or substantivalism understands spacetime as a distinct object, with some metaphysicians conceptualizing it as a box that contains all other entities within it. [[Relationalism#Relationalism (theory of space and time)|Spacetime relationism]], by contrast, sees spacetime not as an object but as relations between objects, such as the spatial relation of ''being next to'' and the temporal relation of ''coming before''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoefer|Huggett|Read|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Benovsky|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4KHWCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19–20]}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref> In the metaphysics of time, an important contrast is between the [[A series and B series|A-series and the B-series]]. According to the A-series theory, the [[flow of time]] is real, meaning that events are categorized into the past, present, and future. The present keeps moving forward in time and events that are in the present now will change their status and lie in the past later. From the perspective of the B-series theory, time is static and events are ordered by the temporal relations earlier-than and later-than without any essential difference between past, present, and future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dyke|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IxIlqbSWg4gC&pg=PA138 138]}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=182–185}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=160–161}} }}</ref> [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)|Eternalism]] holds that past, present, and future are equally real while according to [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|presentists]], only entities in the present exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=179–181}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=206, 214–215}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref> Material objects persist through time and undergo changes in the process, like a tree that grows or loses leaves.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref> The main ways of conceptualizing persistence through time are [[endurantism]] and [[perdurantism]]. According to endurantism, material objects are three-dimensional entities that are wholly present at each moment. As they undergo changes, they gain or lose properties but remain the same otherwise. Perdurantists see material objects as four-dimensional entities that extend through time and are made up of different [[Temporal parts|temporal parts]]. At each moment, only one part of the object is present but not the object as a whole. Change means that an earlier part is qualitatively different from a later part. For example, if a banana ripens then there is an unripe part followed by a ripe part.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Theories of Persistence}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2023|loc=3. Change and Temporal Parts}} }}</ref> === Causality === {{main|Causality}} Causality is the relation between cause and effect whereby one entity produces or affects another entity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=20–22}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=218–219}} }}</ref> For instance, if a person bumps a glass and spills its contents then the bump is the cause and the spill is the effect.<ref>{{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=20}}</ref> Besides the single-case causation between particulars in this example, there is also general-case causation expressed in general statements such as "smoking causes cancer".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 186]}} }}</ref> The term [[agent causation]] is used if people and their actions cause something.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=219, 252–253}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=233–234}} }}</ref> Causation is usually interpreted deterministically, meaning that a cause always brings about its effect. This view is rejected by [[Probabilistic causation|probabilistic theories]], which claim that the cause merely increases the probability that the effect occurs. This view can be used to explain that smoking causes cancer even though this is not true in every single case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=228–231}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA185 185–186]}} }}</ref> The [[Humeanism#Causality and necessity|regularity theory of causation]], inspired by [[David Hume]]'s philosophy, states that causation is nothing but a [[constant conjunction]] in which the mind apprehends that one phenomenon, like putting one's hand in a fire, is always followed by another phenomenon, like a feeling of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lorkowski|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Necessary Connections and Hume’s Two Definitions, § 4. Causal Reductionism}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=24–25}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=220–221}} }}</ref> According to nomic regularity theories, the regularities take the forms of [[Scientific law|laws of nature]] studied by science.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=223–224}}</ref> [[Counterfactual conditional|Counterfactual]] theories focus not on regularities but on how effects depend on their causes. They state that effects owe their existence to the cause and would not be present without them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=26}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=221–222}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=224–225}} }}</ref> According to primitivism, causation is a basic concept that cannot be analyzed in terms of non-causal concepts, such as regularities or dependence relations. One form of primitivism identifies causal powers inherent in entities as the underlying mechanism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=231–232}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2009|pp=94–95}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|Anjum|2013}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=63–64}} }}</ref> Eliminativists reject the above theories by holding that there is no causation.<ref>{{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=231–232}}</ref> === Mind and free will === {{main|Mind|Free will}} [[File:Dualism-vs-Monism.png|thumb|right|upright=1.3|alt=Diagram of approaches to the mind–body problem|Different approaches toward resolving the mind–body problem]] Mind encompasses phenomena like [[thinking]], [[perceiving]], [[feeling]], and [[desiring]] as well as the underlying faculties responsible for these phenomena.<ref>{{harvnb|Morton|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1608?rskey=jqUtkA&result=1601 603]}}</ref> The [[mind–body problem]] is the challenge of clarifying the relation between physical and mental phenomena. According to [[Cartesian dualism]], minds and bodies are distinct substances. They causally interact with each other in various ways but can, at least in principle, exist on their own.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McLaughlin|1999|pp=684–685}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} }}</ref> This view is rejected by [[Monism|monists]], who argue that reality is made up of only one kind. According to [[idealism]], everything is mental, including physical objects, which may be understood as ideas or perceptions of conscious minds. Materialists, by contrast, state that all reality is at its core material. Some deny that mind exists but the more common approach is to explain mind in terms of certain aspects of matter, such as brain states, behavioral [[disposition]]s, or functional roles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McLaughlin|1999|pp=685–691}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Ramsey|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> [[Neutral monism|Neutral monists]] argue that reality is fundamentally neither material nor mental and suggest that matter and mind are both derivative phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stubenberg|Wishon|2023|loc=Lead Section; § 1.3 Mind and Matter Revisited}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998}} }}</ref> A key aspect of the mind–body problem is the [[hard problem of consciousness]], which concerns the question of how physical systems like brains can produce phenomenal consciousness.<ref>{{harvnb|Weisberg|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem}}</ref> The status of free will as the ability of a person to choose their [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] is a central aspect of the mind–body problem.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Timpe|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2001|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mind-body-problem Mind–Body Problem]}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uf7EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref> Metaphysicians are interested in the relation between free will and [[causal determinism]], the view that everything in the universe, including human behavior, is determined by preceding events and laws of nature. It is controversial whether causal determinism is true, and, if so, whether this would imply that there is no free will. According to [[incompatibilism]], free will cannot exist in a deterministic world since there is no true choice or control if everything is determined. [[Hard determinists]] infer from this observation that there is no free will while [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarians]] conclude that determinism must be false. [[Compatibilists]] take a third approach by arguing that determinism and free will do not exclude each other, for instance, because a person can still act in tune with their motivation and choices even if they are determined by other forces. Free will plays a key role in ethics in regard to the [[moral responsibility]] people have for what they do.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|O’Connor|Franklin|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Nature of Free Will}} | {{harvnb|Timpe|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Free Will, Free Action and Moral Responsibility, § 3. Free Will and Determinism}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uf7EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref> === Others === [[Identity (philosophy)|Identity]] is a relation that every entity has to itself as a form of sameness. It refers to numerical identity when the very same entity is involved, as in the statement "the [[morning star]] is the evening star". In a slightly different sense, it encompasses qualitative identity, also called ''exact similarity'' and ''indiscernibility'', which is the case when two distinct entities are exactly alike, such as perfect identical twins.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is widely accepted and holds that numerically identical entities exactly resemble one another. The converse principle, known as [[identity of indiscernibles]], is more controversial and states that two entities are numerically identical if they exactly resemble one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sleigh|2005|p=418}} | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=§ 2. The Logic of Identity}} }}</ref> Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time while diachronic identity is about the same entity at different times, as in statements like "the table I bought last year is the same as the table in my dining room now".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gallois|2016|loc=§ 2.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Identity}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 5. Identity Over Time}} }}</ref> [[Personal identity]] is a related topic in metaphysics that uses the term ''identity'' in a slightly different sense and concerns questions like what [[personhood]] is or what makes someone a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Problems of Personal Identity}} | {{harvnb|Korfmacher}} }}</ref> Various contemporary metaphysicians rely on the concepts of [[truth]] and [[Truthmaker theory|truthmakers]] to conduct their inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} }}</ref> Truth is a property of linguistic statements or mental representations that are in accord with reality. A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=926}} | {{harvnb|Imaguire|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=X4dnDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA34 34]}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} | {{harvnb|Asay|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nRXeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} }}</ref> For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because there exists a red tomato as its truthmaker.<ref>{{harvnb|Tallant|2017|p=1}}</ref> Based on this observation, it is possible to pursue metaphysical research by asking what the truthmakers of statements are, with different areas of metaphysics being dedicated to different types of statements. According to this view, modal metaphysics asks what makes statements about what is possible and necessary true while the metaphysics of time is interested in the truthmakers of temporal statements about the past, present, and future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4, 163–165}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17, 154}} }}</ref> == Methodology == Metaphysicians employ a variety of [[Philosophical methodology|methods]] to arrive at metaphysical theories and formulate arguments for and against them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=xi, 2}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref> Traditionally, ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' methods are the dominant approach. They rely on rational [[intuition]] and abstract reasoning from general principles rather than sensory [[experience]]. ''A posteriori'' approaches, by contrast, ground metaphysical theories in [[empirical observation]]s and scientific theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> Some metaphysicians use perspectives from fields such as [[physics]], [[psychology]], [[linguistics]], and [[history]] to conduct their inquiry.<ref>{{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}}</ref> The two approaches are not exclusive and it is possible to combine elements from both.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152, 172–173}}</ref> Which method a metaphysician employs often depends on their conception of the nature of metaphysics, for example, whether they see it as an inquiry into the mind-independent structure of reality, as [[Metaphysical realism|metaphysical realists]] claim, or the principles underlying thought and experience, as some [[Metaphysical anti-realism|metaphysical anti-realists]] contend.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Effingham|Beebee|Goff|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BBKsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 123]}} | {{harvnb|Khlentzos|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Anti-Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Realism}} }}</ref> ''A priori'' approaches often rely on intuitions, that is, non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 11–12]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} | {{harvnb|Duignan|2009a}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–180}}}}</ref> For example, arguments for the [[A-theory of time]], which states that time flows from the past through the present and into the future, often rely on pre-theoretical intuitions associated with the sense of the passage of time.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=188–190}}</ref> Some approaches use intuitions to establish a small set of [[self-evident]] fundamental principles, known as [[axiom]]s, and employ [[deductive reasoning]] to build complex metaphysical systems by drawing conclusions from these axioms.<ref>{{harvnb|Goldenbaum|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Geometrical Method}}</ref> Intuition-based approaches can be combined with [[thought experiments]], which help evoke and clarify intuitions by linking them to imagined situations while using [[counterfactual thinking]] to assess the possible consequences of these situations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–178}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Goffi|Roux|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV 165, 168–169]}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|pp=915–916}} }}</ref> To explore the relation between matter and consciousness, some theorists compare humans to [[philosophical zombies]], that is, hypothetical creatures identical to humans but without [[Consciousness|conscious experience]].<ref>{{harvnb|Kirk|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Zombies and Physicalism}}</ref> A related method relies on commonly accepted beliefs instead of intuitions to formulate arguments and theories. The [[Common sense|common-sense]] approach is often used to criticize metaphysical theories that deviate a lot from how the average person thinks about an issue. For example, common-sense philosophers have argued that [[mereological nihilism]] is false since it implies that commonly accepted things, like tables, do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lawson|2020|pp=185–186}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> [[Conceptual analysis]], a method particularly prominent in [[analytic philosophy]], aims to decompose metaphysical concepts into component parts in order to clarify their meaning and identify essential relations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jackson|1998|pp=28–30}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|p=915}} | {{harvnb|Shaffer|2015|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 555–556]}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2006|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy § Philosophical Methods]}} }}</ref> In [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], the method of [[eidetic variation]] is used to investigate essential structures underlying [[Phenomenon|phenomena]]. To study the essential features of any kind of object, it proceeds by imagining this object and varying its features to identify which ones are essential and cannot be changed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Drummond|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VQ9hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} | {{harvnb|Ryckman|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–144]}} }}</ref> The [[Transcendental arguments|transcendental]] method is a further approach and examines the metaphysical structure of reality by observing what entities there are and studying the [[Condition of possibility|conditions of possibility]] without which these entities could not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coelho|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=P518M0X_zakC&pg=PA128 128]}} | {{harvnb|Körner|1984|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eAA4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA183 183–184]}} | {{harvnb|Pihlström|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=srGLpb7pWdkC&pg=PA60 60–61]}} | {{harvnb|Stern|Cheng|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Some approaches give less importance to ''a priori'' reasoning and see metaphysics instead as a practice continuous with the empirical sciences that generalizes their insights while making their underlying assumptions explicit. This approach is known as ''naturalized metaphysics'' and is closely associated with the work of [[Willard Van Orman Quine]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=30–31}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> He relies on the idea that true sentences from the sciences and other fields have [[ontological commitments]], that is, they imply that certain entities exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=37–38, 40}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> For example, if the sentence "some electrons are bonded to protons" is true then it can be used to justify that electrons and protons exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=41}}</ref> Quine used this insight to argue that one can learn about metaphysics by closely analyzing{{efn|Quine's method of analysis relies on [[logic translation]] to [[first-order logic]] in order to express claims as precisely as possible while relying [[existential quantifier]]s to identify their ontological commitments.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–41}}</ref>}} scientific claims to understand what kind of metaphysical picture of the world they presuppose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–43}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> In addition to methods of conducting metaphysical inquiry, there are various methodological principles used to decide between competing theories by comparing their theoretical virtues. [[Ockham's Razor]] is a well-known principle that gives preference to simple theories, in particular, to theories that assume that few entities exist. Other principles consider [[explanatory power]], theoretical usefulness, and proximity to established beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217 217–221]}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=48–49}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref> == Criticism <!--'Metaphysical deflationism', 'Ontological deflationism', 'Antimetaphysicalism', and 'Anti-metaphysicalism' redirect here-->== [[File:Allan Ramsay - David Hume, 1711 - 1776. Historian and philosopher - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting of David Hume|[[David Hume]] criticized metaphysicians for trying to arrive at knowledge outside the field of sensory experience.]] Despite its status as one of the main branches of philosophy, metaphysics has received numerous criticisms putting into question its status as a legitimate field of inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> One type of criticism states that metaphysical inquiry is impossible because humans do not have the cognitive capacities needed to access the ultimate nature of reality.<ref>{{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}}</ref> This line of thought leads to a form of [[skepticism]] about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. It is often followed by empiricists like Hume, who argue that there is no good [[Knowledge#Sources|source of metaphysical knowledge]] since metaphysics lies outside the field of [[Empirical evidence|empirical knowledge]] and relies on dubious intuitions about the realm beyond sensory experience. A closely related concern about the unreliability of metaphysical theorizing is that there a deep and lasting [[Disagreements (epistemology)|disagreements]] about metaphysical issues, indicating a lack of overall progress.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=211–212}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=16–17}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=4–5}} }}</ref> Another criticism holds that the problem lies not with human cognitive abilities but with metaphysical statements themselves, which are claimed to be neither true nor false but [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaningless]]. According to [[Logical positivism|logical positivists]], for instance, the meaning of a statement is given by the procedure used to [[Verificationism|verify]] it, usually in terms of the [[observations]] that would confirm it. Based on this controversial assumption, they argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless since they do not make predictions about experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|p=4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=212–215}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} }}</ref> A slightly weaker position allows that metaphysical statements have meaning while holding that metaphysical disagreements are merely verbal disputes about different ways to describe the world. According to this view, the disagreement in the metaphysics of composition about whether there are tables or only particles arranged table-wise is a trivial debate about linguistic preferences without any substantive consequences for the nature of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=213–215}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=71–72}} }}</ref> The position that metaphysical disputes have no meaning or no significant point is called '''''metaphysical''''' or '''''ontological deflationism'''''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=4, 15, 32}} | {{harvnb|Sider|2009|pp=386–387}} }}</ref> This view is opposed by serious metaphysicians, who contend that metaphysical disputes are about substantial features of the underlying structure of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=28, 36}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2016|pp=272–273}} }}</ref> A closely related debate between ontological [[Philosophical realism|realists]] and anti-realists concerns the question of whether there are any objective facts that determine which metaphysical theories are true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chalmers|2009|pp=77–78}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=304–305}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=65–66, 68}} }}</ref> A different criticism, formulated by [[Pragmatism|pragmatists]], sees the fault of metaphysics not in its cognitive ambitions or the meaninglessness of its statements, but in its practical irrelevance and lack of usefulness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} | {{harvnb|Macarthur|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ra7QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref> It is questionable to what extent the criticisms of metaphysics affect the discipline as a whole or only certain issues or approaches in it. For example, it could be the case that certain metaphysical disputes are merely verbal while others are substantive.<ref>{{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=215–216, 223–224}}</ref> == Relation to other disciplines == Metaphysics is related to many fields of inquiry by investigating their basic concepts and relation to the fundamental structure of reality. For example, scientists often rely on concepts such as [[Scientific law|law of nature]], causation, necessity, and spacetime to formulate their theories and predict or explain the outcomes of experiments.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Göhner|Schrenk|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is Metaphysics of Science?}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|Tugby|2013|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=187–188}} }}</ref> While the main focus of scientists is on the application of these concepts to specific situations, metaphysics examines their general nature and how they depend on each other. Physicists formulate specific laws of nature, like [[Newton's law of universal gravitation|laws of gravitation]] and [[Laws of thermodynamics|thermodynamics]], to describe how physical systems behave under various conditions. Metaphysicians, by contrast, ask what all laws of nature have in common, for example, whether they merely describe contingent regularities or express necessary relations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Göhner|Schrenk|loc=§ 3. Why Do We Need Metaphysics of Science?, § 4c. Laws of Nature}} | {{harvnb|Roberts|2016|pp=337–338}} }}</ref> At the same time, new scientific findings have also influenced existing and inspired new metaphysical theories. Einstein's [[theory of relativity]], for instance, prompted various metaphysicians to conceive space and time as a unified dimension rather than as independent dimensions.<ref>{{harvnb|Healey|2016|pp=356–357}}</ref> Empirically focused metaphysicians often rely on scientific theories to ground their theories about the nature of reality in empirical observations.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=187–188}}</ref> Similar issues pertain to the [[social sciences]] where metaphysicians investigate their basic concepts and analyze their metaphysical implications. This includes questions like whether social facts arise from non-social facts, whether social groups and institutions have mind-independent existence, and how they persist through time.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=188–189}}</ref> Metaphysical assumptions and topics in [[psychology]] and [[psychiatry]] include the questions about the relation between body and mind, whether the nature of the human mind is historically fixed, and what the metaphysical status of diseases is.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dafermos|2021|pp=1–2, 6–7}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=174}} }}</ref> Metaphysics is similar to both [[physical cosmology]] and [[theology]] in its interest in the first causes and the universe as a whole. Key differences are that metaphysics relies on rational inquiry while physical cosmology gives more weight to empirical observations and theology is additionally based on divine [[revelation]] and faith-based doctrines.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2024|pp=6–8}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=10}} }}</ref> Historically, cosmology and theology were considered subfields of metaphysics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dryer|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=S8weDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA490 490]}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=10}} }}</ref> {{cladogram |title=Suggested Upper Merged Ontology |caption=Fundamental categories in the [[Suggested Upper Merged Ontology]]<ref>{{harvnb|Heckmann|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=e5adLEi4gYgC&pg=PA42 42]}}</ref> |cladogram={{clade |label1=Entity{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}} |1={{clade |label1={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Physical{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}} |1={{clade |label1={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Object |1={{nbsp}} |label2={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Process |2={{nbsp}} }} |label2={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Abstract{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}{{nbsp}} |2={{clade |label1={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Quantity |1={{nbsp}} |label2={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Proposition |2={{nbsp}} |label3={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Attribute |3={{nbsp}} |label4={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Relation |4={{nbsp}} |label5={{nbsp}}{{nbsp}}Set or Class |5={{nbsp}} }} }} }} }} Metaphysics in the form of ontology plays a central role in [[computer science]] to classify objects and formally represent information about them. Unlike metaphysicians, computer scientists are usually not interested in providing a single all-encompassing characterization of reality as a whole but instead employ many different ontologies, each one concerned only with a limited domain of entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7456 7456–7457]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–170}} }}</ref> For example, a college [[database]] may use an ontology with categories such as ''person'', ''teacher'', ''student'', and ''exam'' to represent information about academic activities.<ref>{{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7457 7457]}}</ref> Ontologies provide standards or conceptualizations for encoding and storing information in a structured way, which makes it possible to use and transform the information by computational processes for a variety of purposes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7456 7456–7457]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–169}} }}</ref> Some [[knowledge base]]s integrate information belonging to various domains, which brings with it the problem of handling data that was formulated using different ontologies. They do so by providing an [[upper ontology]] that defines concepts on a higher level of abstraction to apply to all domains. Influential upper ontologies include [[Suggested Upper Merged Ontology]] and [[Basic Formal Ontology]].<ref>{{harvnb|Gopalakrishnan Nair|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4594 4594]}}</ref> [[Logic]] as the study of [[Logical reasoning|correct reasoning]]<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|MacFarlane|2017}} |2={{harvnb|Corkum|2015|pp=753–767}} |3={{harvnb|Blair|Johnson|2000|pp=93–95}} |4={{harvnb|Magnus|2005|loc=1.6 Formal Languages|pp=12–14}} }}</ref> is often used by metaphysicians as a tool to engage in their inquiry and express insights using precise [[logical formula]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=1–2, 18–20}}</ref> Another relation between the two fields concerns the metaphysical assumptions associated with [[logical system]]s. Many logical systems like [[first-order logic]] rely on [[existential quantifier]]s to express existential statements. For instance, in the logical formula <math>\exists x \text{Horse}(x)</math> the existential quantifier <math>\exists</math> is applied to the [[Predicate (logic)|predicate]] <math>\text{Horse}</math> to express that there are horses. Following Quine, various metaphysicians assume that existential quantifiers carry [[ontological commitment]]s, meaning that existential statements imply that the entities over which one quantifies form part of reality.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Shapiro|Kouri Kissel|2022|loc=§2.1 Building Blocks}} |2={{harvnb|Cook|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JfaqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA111 111]}} |3={{harvnb|Kind|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oDhjDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT236 236]}} |4={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }}</ref> == History == {{main|History of metaphysics}} [[File:Yin yang.svg|thumb|right|upright=0.8|alt=Symbol of yin and yang|The [[taijitu]] symbol shows [[yin and yang]], which are concepts of two correlated forces used in Chinese metaphysics to explore the nature and patterns of existence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perkins|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 5. Fundamental Concepts in the Daodejing}} }}</ref>]] The history of metaphysics examines how the inquiry into the basic structure of reality has evolved in the course of history. Metaphysics has its origin in speculations about the nature and origin of the cosmos that go back to ancient civilizations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=183}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}} }}</ref> In [[ancient India]] starting in the 7th century BCE, the [[Upanishads]] were written as religious and philosophical texts that examine how [[Brahman|ultimate reality]] constitutes the ground of all being. They further explore the nature of the [[Ātman (Hinduism)|self]] and how it can reach [[moksha|liberation]] by understanding ultimate reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7–10]}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Andrea|Overfield|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x5-aBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70–71]}} }}</ref> This period also saw the emergence of [[Buddhism]] in the 6th century BCE,{{efn|The precise date is disputed.<ref>{{harvnb|Velez|loc=§ 1a. Dates}}</ref>}} which denies the existence of an independent self and understands the world as a [[Saṃsāra|cyclic process]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7–10]}} | {{harvnb|Velez|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Buddha's Cosmology and Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} }}</ref> At about the same time{{efn|According to traditional accounts, [[Laozi]] as the founder of Daoism lived in the 6th century BCE but other accounts state that he may have lived in the 4th or 3rd centuries BCE.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dynes|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2. Classical Sources for Our Understanding of Daoism}} }}</ref>}} in [[ancient China]], the school of [[Daoism]] was formed and explored the natural order of the universe, known as [[Dao]], and how it is characterized by the interplay of [[yin and yang]] as two correlated forces.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 5. Fundamental Concepts in the Daodejing}} | {{harvnb|Dynes|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–61]}} }}</ref> In [[ancient Greece]], metaphysics emerged in the 6th century BCE with the [[pre-Socratic]] philosophers, who gave rational explanations of the whole cosmos by examining the [[first principle]]s from which everything arises.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=183}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}} | {{harvnb|Kirk|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uewoLyIw_DQC&pg=PA308 308–310]}} }}</ref> Following them, [[Plato]] (427–347 BCE) formulated his [[theory of forms]], which states that eternal forms or ideas possess the highest kind of reality while the material world is only an imperfect reflection of them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=184–185}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}} | {{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 3b. Metaphysics}} }}</ref> [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE) accepted Plato's idea that there are universal forms but held that they cannot exist on their own but depend on matter. He also proposed a system of categories and developed a comprehensive framework of the natural world through his theory of the [[four causes]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=185–187}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}} | {{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 4a. Terminology, § 4f. Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Starting in the 4th century BCE, [[Hellenistic philosophy]] explored the [[Logos|rational order]] underlying the cosmos and the idea that it is made up of [[Atomism|indivisible atoms]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}} | {{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 5a. Epicureanism, § 5c. The Stoics}} }}</ref> [[Neoplatonism]] emerged towards the end of the ancient period in the 3rd century CE and introduced the idea of "the One" as a transcendent and ineffable entity that is the source of all of creation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=187–188}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|pp=590–591}} | {{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 5. Post-Hellenistic Thought}} }}</ref> Meanwhile in [[Indian Buddhism]], the [[Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka school]] developed the idea that all phenomena are [[Sunyata|inherently empty]] without a permanent essence while the consciousness-only doctrine of the [[Yogācāra|Yogācāra school]] stated that experienced objects are mere transformations of consciousness that do not reflect external reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Depraz|Varela|Vermersch|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iYJy_2909NAC&pg=PA212 212]}} | {{harvnb|Shun'ei|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1C4qAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}} }}</ref> The [[Āstika and nāstika|Hindu school]] of [[Samkhya]] philosophy{{efn|The ideas underlying Samkhya philosophy arose as early as the 7th and 6th centuries BCE but it's classical and systematic formulation is dated 350 CE.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ruzsa|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} }}</ref>}} introduced a metaphysical dualism with [[Purusha|pure consciousness]] and [[Prakṛti|matter]] as its fundamental categories.<ref name="auto1"/> In China, the school of [[Xuanxue]] explored metaphysical problems such as the contrast between being and non-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chai|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LSAAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19]}} | {{harvnb|Robinet|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R3Sp6TfzhpIC&pg=PA274 Chongxuan]}} }}</ref> [[File:Boethius.jpeg|thumb|alt=Illustration of Boethius|[[Boethius]]'s theory of universals influenced many subsequent metaphysicians.]] Medieval Western philosophy was strongly influenced by ancient Greek philosophy. [[Boethius]] (477–524 CE) attempted to harmonize Plato's and Aristotle's theories of universals by stating that universals can exist both in matter and in the mind. His theory inspired the philosophies of nominalism and conceptualism, as in the thought of [[Peter Abelard]] (1079–1142 CE).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=188–189}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Boethius, § Abelard}} | {{harvnb|Marenbon|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DYSVbvnDL8IC&pg=PA6 6]}} | {{harvnb|Sweeney|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=orIYDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10–11]}} }}</ref> [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1224–1274 CE) understood metaphysics as the discipline that investigates the different meanings of ''being'', such as the contrast between substance and [[Accident (philosophy)|accident]], and principles applying to all beings, such as the [[principle of identity]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|loc=§ 5. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=189}} }}</ref> [[William of Ockham]] (1285–1347 CE) proposed the methodological principles of [[Ockham's razor]] as a tool to decide between competing metaphysical theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=190}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Ockham}} }}</ref> Arabic–Persian philosophy, which had [[Islamic Golden Age|its prime period]] from the early 9th century CE to the late 12th century CE, employed many ideas of the ancient Greek philosophers to interpret and clarify the teachings of the [[Quran]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=Arabic–Persian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Adamson|Taylor|2004|pp=1–3}} }}</ref> [[Avicenna]] (980–1037 CE) developed a comprehensive philosophical system that examined the contrast between existence and essence and distinguished between contingent and necessary existence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Ibn Sina (Avicenna)}} | {{harvnb|Lizzini|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Essence and Existence, § 4. Modality and Existence}} }}</ref> [[Medieval India]] saw the emergence of the [[Monism|monist]] school of [[Advaita Vedanta]] in the 8th century CE, which holds that everything is one and that the idea of many entities existing independently is an [[Maya (religion)|illusion]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Medieval Period of Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 2.3 Two-Tiered Reality}} }}</ref> In China, [[Neo-Confucianism]] arose in the 9th century CE and explored the [[Li (neo-Confucianism)|concept of li]] as the rational principle that is the ground of being and reflects the order of the universe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berthrong|loc=Lead Section, § 4. Traits, Themes and Motifs}} | {{harvnb|Wu|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zRVmEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA56 56]}} | {{harvnb|Smart|2008|p=99}}}}</ref> In the early modern period, [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) developed a substance dualism according to which body and mind exist as independent entities that causally interact.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} | {{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA51 51]}} }}</ref> This idea was rejected by [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677), who formulated a monist philosophy according to which there is only one substance that has both physical and mental attributes developing side-by-side without interacting.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=190}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} }}</ref> [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] (1646–1716) introduced the concept of possible worlds and articulated a metaphysical system, known as [[monadology]], that understands the universe as a collection of [[Monad (philosophy)|simple substances]] that are synchronized without causally interacting with one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=190–191}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} | {{harvnb|Look|2020|loc=§ 4. Metaphysics: A Primer on Substance}} | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} }}</ref> [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] (1679–1754), conceptualized the scope of metaphysics by introducing the distinction between general and special metaphysics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Svare|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=60MsUE3K2ekC&pg=PA15 15]}} | {{harvnb|Hettche|Dyck|2019|loc=§ 5. Metaphysics}} }}</ref> According to the [[idealism]] of [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753), everything is mental, including material objects, which are [[Esse est percipi|ideas perceived by the mind]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=192}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} }}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776) made various contributions to metaphysics, including the [[Humeanism#Causality and necessity|regularity theory of causation]] and the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct entities. At the same time, his [[Empiricism|empiricist]] outlook led him to formulate a stark criticism of metaphysical theories that aim to arrive at ultimate principles inaccessible to sensory experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morris|Brown|2023|loc=§ 3. Philosophical Project, § 5. Causation, § 6. The Idea of Necessary Connection}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|pp=591–592}} }}</ref> This skeptical outlook was embraced by [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804). He tried to reconceptualize metaphysics as a [[Critical philosophy|critical inquiry]] into the basic principles and categories of thought and understanding rather than seeing it as an attempt to comprehend mind-independent reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=192–193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Wood|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 354]}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2, 6}} }}</ref> Many developments in the later modern period were shaped by Kant's philosophy. [[German idealism|German idealists]] employed his idealistic outlook in their attempt to find a unifying principle as the foundation of all reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Critchley|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=syhsLJ1eMOEC&pg=PA31 31]}} }}</ref> [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) developed a comprehensive system of philosophy that examines how absolute spirit manifests itself.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Green|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Gu6YVfL58OQC&pg=PA172 172]}} }}</ref> He inspired the [[British idealism]] of [[Francis Herbert Bradley]] (1846–1924), who interpreted absolute spirit as the all-inclusive totality of being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Idealism}} }}</ref> [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) was a strong critic of German idealism and articulated a different [[The World as Will and Representation|metaphysical vision]] that takes a [[Voluntarism (philosophy)#Metaphysical voluntarism|blind and irrational will as the underlying principle of reality]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Schopenhauer}} | {{harvnb|Janaway|1999|pp=[https://academic.oup.com/book/2954/chapter-abstract/143638920?redirectedFrom=fulltext 248–249]}} }}</ref> Pragmatists like [[C. S. Peirce]] (1839–1914) and [[John Dewey]] (1859–1952) conceived metaphysics as an observational science of the most general features of reality and experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=194}} | {{harvnb|Misak|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p30osmyc2xoC&pg=PA406 Scientific Realism, Anti-Realism, and Empiricism]}} }}</ref> [[File:ANWhitehead.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Alfred North Whitehead|[[Alfred North Whitehead]] articulated the foundations of [[process philosophy]] in his work ''[[Process and Reality]]''.]] In the 20th century, [[Rudolf Carnap]] (1891–1970) and other [[Logical positivism|logical positivists]] formulated a wide-ranging criticism of metaphysical statements by holding that they are meaningless since there is no way to [[Verificationism|verify them]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Another criticism of traditional metaphysics was articulated by [[Ordinary language philosophy|ordinary language philosophers]] who identified misunderstandings of ordinary language as the source of many traditional metaphysical problems.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=194–195}} | {{harvnb|Morris|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfElDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA15 15]}} }}</ref> [[Alfred North Whitehead]] (1861–1947) developed [[process philosophy|process metaphysics]] as an attempt to provide a holistic description of both the objective and the subjective worlds.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Desmet|Irvine|2022|loc=§ 6. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Palmer|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZT2pI9IMiYUC&pg=PA175 175]}} }}</ref> [[Logical atomism|Logical atomists]], like [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) and the early [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] (1889–1951), conceived the world as a multitude of atomic facts, which inspired later metaphysicians such as [[D. M. Armstrong]] (1926–2014).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Proops|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Klement|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kGGmBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100 100]}} }}</ref> [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000) tried to naturalize metaphysics by connecting it to the empirical sciences. His student [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] (1941–2001) employed the concept of possible worlds to formulate his [[modal realism]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hylton|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=n5XX3CwWh2MC&pg=PT348 348]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2006|p=170}} | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=§ 2. Lewis' Realism}} }}</ref> In [[continental philosophy]], [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) engaged in ontology through a phenomenological description of experience while his student [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) developed [[fundamental ontology]] as an attempt to clarify the meaning of being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ryckman|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–144]}} | {{harvnb|McLean|2003|p=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/metaphysics 550]}} | {{harvnb|Taminiaux|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kcJzeXpHctYC&pg=PA154 154]}} }}</ref> Heidegger's philosophy inspired general criticisms of metaphysics by [[Postmodernism|postmodern]] thinkers like [[Jacques Derrida]] (1930–2004).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|loc=Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty - Deconstruction and Critique}} | {{harvnb|Reynolds|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> ==See also== * [[Computational metaphysics]] * [[Doctor of Metaphysics]] * [[Enrico Berti#Thought|Enrico Berti's classification of metaphysics]] * [[Feminist metaphysics]] * [[Fundamental question of metaphysics]] * [[List of metaphysicians]] * [[Grounding (metaphysics)|Metaphysical grounding]] ==References== ===Notes=== {{notelist}} ===Citations=== {{reflist}} ===Sources=== {{Refbegin|30em}} * {{cite book |last1=Adamson |first1=Peter |last2=Taylor |first2=Richard C. |title=The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy |date=2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-49469-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iFMiAwAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=7 June 2023 |archive-date=7 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230607072853/https://books.google.com/books?id=iFMiAwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |author1=AHD staff |title=The American Heritage Dictionary Entry: Existence |url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |website=American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=10 August 2023 |date=2022 |archive-date=11 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230811074250/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Andrea |first1=Alfred J. |last2=Overfield |first2=James H. |title=The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume I: To 1500 |publisher=Cengage Learning |isbn=978-1-305-53746-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x5-aBAAAQBAJ |language=en |date=2015 |access-date=4 April 2024 |archive-date=22 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230622154153/https://books.google.com/books?id=x5-aBAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Armstrong |first1=D. 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|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 March 2024 |date=2022 |archive-date=14 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014093655/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Rea |first1=Michael C. |title=Metaphysics: The Basics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-367-13607-9 |edition=2 |date=2021 }} * {{cite web |last1=Reynolds |first1=Jack |title=Derrida, Jacques |url=https://iep.utm.edu/jacques-derrida/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2024 |archive-date=13 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240313234622/https://iep.utm.edu/jacques-derrida/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Roberts |first1=John T. |editor-last1=Humphreys |editor-first1=Paul |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-063070-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p__mDAAAQBAJ |language=en 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Ontological Realism |date=2009 }} * {{cite book |last1=Simons |first1=Peter |editor1-last=Kanzian |editor1-first=Christian |title=Persistence |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-032705-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 |language=en |chapter=The Thread of Persistence |date=2013 |access-date=29 March 2024 |archive-date=29 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240329053018/https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Sleigh |first1=R. 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Lille: Words in the Absence of Things |date=2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-137-06373-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=orIYDAAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=17 June 2023 |archive-date=22 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230622154205/https://books.google.com/books?id=orIYDAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Tahko |first1=Tuomas E. |title=An Introduction to Metametaphysics |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-07729-4}} * {{cite book |last1=Tahko |first1=Tuomas |chapter=Meta-metaphysics |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/meta-metaphysics/v-1 |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=20 March 2024 |language=en |date=2018 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N127-1 |hdl=1983/9dafefd5-5280-49b5-9085-de78b6ebb656 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |archive-date=20 March 2024 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|date=2019 |archive-date=28 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200928232840/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Veldsman |first1=Daniël P. |title=The Place of Metaphysics in the Science-religion Debate |journal=HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies |volume=73 |issue=3 |doi=10.4102/hts.v73i3.4655 |date=2017 }} * {{cite web |last1=Velez |first1=Abraham |title=Buddha |url=https://iep.utm.edu/buddha/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=30 March 2024 |archive-date=4 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240204123126/https://iep.utm.edu/buddha/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Wardy |first1=Robert |chapter=Categories |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/categories/v-1 |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=22 March 2024 |language=en |date=1998 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N005-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 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|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 |language=en |chapter=Probabilistic Theories |date=2012 |access-date=29 March 2024 |archive-date=27 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240327133855/https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 |url-status=live }} * {{cite journal |last1=Wilsch |first1=Tobias |title=Sophisticated Modal Primitivism |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=2017 |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=428–448 |doi=10.1111/phis.12100}} * {{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Allen W. |editor1-last=Kim |editor1-first=Jaekwon |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |editor3-last=Rosenkrantz |editor3-first=Gary S. |title=A Companion to Metaphysics |date=2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-4443-0853-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 |language=en |chapter=Kantianism |access-date=21 March 2024 |archive-date=20 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320180208/https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Guo |title=An Anthropological Inquiry Into Confucianism: Ritual, Emotion, and Rational Principle |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-7936-5432-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zRVmEAAAQBAJ |language=en |date=2022 |access-date=4 April 2024 |archive-date=4 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240404092849/https://books.google.com/books?id=zRVmEAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }} {{Refend}} ==External links== {{Library resources box}} * {{PhilPapers|category|metaphysics}} * {{InPho|taxonomy|2350}} * {{cite IEP |url-id=category/m-and-e/metaphysics/ |title=Metaphysics}} * [https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/377923/metaphysics Metaphysics] at [[Encyclopædia Britannica]] * {{librivox book |title=Metaphysics}} {{Metaphysics}} {{Navboxes |title=Articles related to metaphysics |list= {{Philosophy 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