Islamic terrorism

{{Short description|Terrorist acts by groups individuals who profess Islamic motivations or goals}}
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{{Terrorism |expanded=by ideology}}
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'''Islamic terrorism''' (also known as '''Islamist terrorism''' or '''radical Islamic terrorism''') refers to [[Terrorism|terrorist acts]] with [[religious terrorism|religious motivations]] carried out by [[Islamic fundamentalism|fundamentalist]] [[militant]] [[Islamism|Islamists]] and [[Islamic extremism|Islamic extremists]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |author1-last=Norton |author1-first=Richard A. |author1-link=Augustus Richard Norton |author2-last=Kéchichian |author2-first=Joseph A. |author2-link=Joseph A. Kéchichian |title=Terrorism |encyclopedia=The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World |editor-last=Esposito |editor-first=John L. |editor-link=John Esposito |location=[[Oxford]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2009 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195305135.001.0001/acref-9780195305135-e-0796 |isbn=978-0-19-530513-5}}{{subscription required}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |author=Thomas Hegghammer |title=Terrorism |editor1-last=Böwering |editor1-first=Gerhard |editor1-link=Gerhard Böwering |editor2-last=Crone |editor2-first=Patricia |editor2-link=Patricia Crone |encyclopedia=The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2013 |pages=545–547}}</ref><ref name="French 2020">{{cite book |last=French |first=Nathan S. |year=2020 |chapter=A Jihadi-Salafi Legal Tradition? Debating Authority and Martyrdom |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dWHdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA36 |title=And God Knows the Martyrs: Martyrdom and Violence in Jihadi-Salafism |location=[[Oxford]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190092153.003.0002 |pages=36–69 |isbn=978-0-19-009215-3 |lccn=2019042378}}</ref>

Incidents and fatalities from Islamic terrorism have been concentrated in eight [[Muslim-majority countries]] ([[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|Afghanistan]], [[Egypt]], [[Iraq]], [[Libya]], [[Religious violence in Nigeria|Nigeria]], [[Terrorism in Pakistan|Pakistan]], [[Somalia]], and [[Terrorism in Syria|Syria]]),<ref>{{cite web|date=November 2015|title=Global Terrorism Index Report 2015|url=http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151123075703/http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf|archive-date=23 November 2015|access-date=13 January 2022|website=[[Wayback Machine]]|publisher=[[Institute for Economics and Peace]]|page=10}}</ref> while four [[Islamic extremism|Islamic extremist groups]] ([[Islamic State]], [[Boko Haram]], the [[Taliban]], and [[al-Qaeda]]) were responsible for 74% of all deaths from [[terrorism]] in 2015.<ref name="GTI2016-4">{{cite book|url=http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf|title=Global Terrorism Index 2016|date=2016|publisher=Institute for Economics and Peace|page=4|access-date=13 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161117033240/http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf|archive-date=17 November 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Egypt's Counterinsurgency Success in Sinai|url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/egypts-counterinsurgency-success-sinai|access-date=12 February 2022|website=The Washington Institute|language=en}}</ref> The annual number of fatalities from terrorist attacks grew sharply from 2011 to 2014 when it reached a peak of 33,438, before declining to 13,826 in 2019.<ref name="gti-2020-15">{{cite web |title=Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism |url=https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf |website=Vision of Humanity |publisher=Institute for Economics & Peace |access-date=6 May 2021 |page=15}}</ref>

Since at least the 1990s, these terrorist incidents have occurred on a global scale, affecting not only Muslim-majority countries in Africa and Asia, but also [[Terrorism in Russia|Russia]], [[Terrorism in Australia|Australia]], [[Terrorism in Canada|Canada]], [[Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict|Israel]], [[Terrorism in India|India]], the [[Terrorism in the United States|United States]], [[Terrorism in China|China]], the [[Terrorism in the Philippines|Philippines]], [[Terrorism in Thailand|Thailand]], and countries within [[Islamic terrorism in Europe|Europe]]. Such attacks have targeted both [[Muslims]] and non-Muslims,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/24/isis-ideology-islamic-militants-british-appeal-iraq-syria|title=Isis: a contrived ideology justifying barbarism and sexual control|first=Mona|last=Siddiqui|author-link=Mona Siddiqui|work=The Guardian |date=23 August 2014|access-date=7 January 2015 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140824131118/http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/24/isis-ideology-islamic-militants-british-appeal-iraq-syria |archive-date=24 August 2014}}</ref> with one study finding 80% of terrorist victims to be Muslims.<ref>The study was conducted by a French non-governmental organization. {{Cite journal|last1=Ritchie|first1=Hannah|last2=Hasell|first2=Joe|last3=Appel|first3=Cameron|last4=Roser|first4=Max|date=28 July 2013|title=Terrorism|url=https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism|journal=Our World in Data}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Overwhelming majority of terror victims are Muslims|url=https://www.trtworld.com/mea/overwhelming-majority-of-terror-victims-are-muslims-31586|access-date=31 October 2020|website=Overwhelming majority of terror victims are Muslims|language=en}}</ref> In a number of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/01/kurdish-peshmerga-kobani-isis-syria|title=Kurdish peshmerga forces arrive in Kobani to bolster fight against Isis|author=Constanze Letsch|work=The Guardian|date=November 2014|access-date=7 January 2015}}</ref> state actors and their [[proxy war|proxies]], and elsewhere by condemnation by prominent Islamic figures.<ref name=kurzman>{{cite web|url=http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-statements-against-terrorism/|title=Islamic Statements Against Terrorism |author=Charles Kurzman|publisher=UNC.edu|author-link=Charles Kurzman|access-date=31 January 2017}}</ref><ref name="australia.to" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nationalreview.com/article/388593/moderate-muslims-stand-against-isis-christine-sisto|title=Moderate Muslims Stand against ISIS |author=Christine Sisto|work=National Review|access-date=7 January 2015 |date=23 September 2014}}</ref> Journalists have also become targets of Islamic terrorism, particularly for the depiction of the Islamic prophet [[Muhammad]], with the [[Charlie Hebdo shooting]] being protested by millions in [[France]].

Justifications given for attacks on civilians by Islamic extremist groups come from their interpretations of the [[Quran]],<ref name="French 2020" /> the ''[[hadith]]'',<ref name=holbrook1>{{cite journal |last=Holbrook |first=Donald |year=2010 |title=Using the Qur'an to Justify Terrorist Violence |journal=Perspectives on Terrorism |publisher=Terrorism Research Initiative and [[Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence]] |volume=4 |issue=3}}</ref><ref name=holbrook2 /> and [[Sharia|''sharia'' law]].<ref name="French 2020" /> These include retribution by armed ''[[jihad]]'' for the perceived injustices of [[Kafir|unbelievers]] against Muslims;<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003">{{cite journal |last1=Wiktorowicz |first1=Quintan |last2=Kaltner |first2=John |title=Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11 |journal=Middle East Policy |date=Summer 2003 |volume=X |issue=2 |pages=85–90|url=https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001177.pdf |access-date=12 August 2019}}</ref> the belief that the killing of many self-proclaimed Muslims is required because they have violated Islamic law and are disbelievers (''[[takfir]]'');<ref name="Poljarevic 2021">{{cite book |author-last=Poljarevic |author-first=Emin |year=2021 |chapter=Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) |editor1-last=Cusack |editor1-first=Carole M. |editor1-link=Carole M. Cusack |editor2-last=Upal |editor2-first=M. Afzal |editor2-link=Afzal Upal |title=Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements |location=[[Leiden]] and [[Boston]] |publisher=[[Brill Publishers]] |series=Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion |volume=21 |doi=10.1163/9789004435544_026 |doi-access=free |isbn=978-90-04-43554-4 |issn=1874-6691 |pages=485–512}}</ref> the overriding necessity of restoring and purifying Islam by establishing [[Sharia|''sharia'' law]], especially by restoring the [[Caliphate]] as a [[pan-Islamic]] state (especially [[ISIS]]);<ref name="what-isis-really-wants">{{cite magazine |last=Wood |first=Graeme |author-link=Graeme Wood (journalist) |title=What ISIS Really Wants |magazine=[[The Atlantic]] |location=[[Washington, D.C.]] |date=March 2015 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150216095910/https://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ |archive-date=16 February 2015 |url-status=live |access-date=30 October 2020}}</ref> the glory and heavenly rewards of [[Istishhad|martyrdom]];<ref name=holbrook2>{{cite book |last=Holbreook |first=Donald |date=2014 |title=The Al-Qaeda Doctrine |location=London |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Publishing]] |pages=30ff, 61ff, 83ff |isbn= 978-1-62356-314-1}}</ref> the [[Supremacism#Islamic|supremacy of Islam]] over all [[Islam and other religions|other religions]].{{#tag:ref|which is encapsulated in the formula "Islam is exalted and nothing is exalted above it".<ref>{{Cite book|title=Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim tradition |last=Yohanan|first=Friedmann |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2003|isbn=978-0-521-82703-4|editor-last=Morgan|editor-first=David|location=Cambridge|oclc=57256339}}</ref> Also World Assembly of Muslim Youth "which has publicly stated that one of its educational goals is to ''arm the Muslim youth with full confidence in the supremacy of the Islamic system over other systems.''"<ref name="Flow_WAMY_NYT">{{cite news |last1=van Natta Jr. |first1=Don |title=Flow of Saudis' Cash to Hamas Is Scrutinized |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/17/world/flow-of-saudis-cash-to-hamas-is-scrutinized.html |access-date=11 August 2019 |work=The New York Times |date=17 September 2003}}</ref>|group=Note}}

The use of the phrase "Islamic terrorism" is disputed. In Western political speech, it has variously been called "counter-productive", "highly politicized, intellectually contestable" and "damaging to community relations", by those who disapprove of the characterization 'Islamic'.<ref name="Jackson2007">{{cite journal|last=Jackson|first=Richard|year=2007|title=Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse|journal=Government and Opposition|volume=42|issue=3|pages=394–426|doi=10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x|s2cid=143513477|issn=0017-257X}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hoover.org/research/religious-sources-islamic-terrorism|title=The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism|author=Shmuel Bar|publisher=Hoover Institution}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/islam-and-patterns-terrorism-and-violent-extremism|title=Islam and the Patterns in Terrorism and Violent Extremism|author=Anthony H. Cordesman|date=17 October 2017 |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies}}</ref> It has been argued that "Islamic terrorism" is a [[misnomer]] for what should be called "[[Islamist]] terrorism".<ref name="islamism" />

== Terminology ==
[[George W. Bush]] and [[Tony Blair]]  (US president and UK Prime Minister respectively at the time of the [[September 11 attacks]]) repeatedly stated that the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam.<ref name="Bar">{{cite web |last1=Bar |first1=Shmuel |title=The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/religious-sources-islamic-terrorism |website=Hoover Institute |access-date=12 August 2019 |date=1 June 2004}}</ref>  Others inside and out of the Islamic world who oppose its use on the grounds there is no connection between Islam and terrorism include  [[Imran Khan]], the prime minister of Pakistan, and academic [[Bruce Lawrence]].<ref name="IK-6-19">{{cite news |title=Islam has no connection with terrorism: Imran Khan |url=https://www.globalvillagespace.com/islam-has-no-connection-with-terrorism-imran-khan/ |access-date=8 August 2019 |agency=Global Village Space |date=2 June 2019}}</ref><ref name="Siasat">{{cite web |title=Islam has no connection with terrorism: Prof. Bruce Lawrence |url=https://archive.siasat.com/news/islam-has-no-connection-terrorism-prof-bruce-lawrence-404381/ |website=Siasat Daily |access-date=8 August 2019 |date=22 February 2013}}</ref>
Former US president [[Barack Obama]] explained why he used the term "terrorism" rather than "Islamic terrorism" in a 2016 townhall meeting saying, "There is no doubt, ... terrorist organisations like [[Al-Qaeda]] or ISIL – They have perverted and distorted and tried to claim the mantle of Islam for an excuse for basically barbarism and death ... But what I have been careful about when I describe these issues is to make sure that we do not lump these murderers into the billion Muslims that exist around the world ..."<ref name="Diaz_why_CNN_29-9-16">{{cite news |last1=Diaz |first1=Daniella |title=Obama: Why I won't say 'Islamic terrorism' |url=https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/28/politics/obama-radical-islamic-terrorism-cnn-town-hall/index.html |access-date=11 August 2019 |publisher=CNN |date=29 September 2016}}</ref>

It has been argued that "Islamic terrorism" is a [[misnomer]] for what should be called "[[Islamist]] terrorism".<ref name="islamism">{{cite web |last1=Courty |first1=Audrey |last2=Rane |first2=Halim |title=Why the media needs to be more responsible for how it links Islam and Islamist terrorism |url=http://theconversation.com/why-the-media-needs-to-be-more-responsible-for-how-it-links-islam-and-islamist-terrorism-103170 |website=The Conversation |access-date=8 August 2019 |date=1 October 2018}}</ref>

In January 2008, the [[United States Department of Homeland Security|US Department of Homeland Security]] Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued a report titled "Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims",<ref name="DHS-terminology">{{cite web |title=Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims |url=https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_crcl_terminology_08-1-08_accessible.pdf |website=U.S. Department of Homeland Security |access-date=15 July 2021}}</ref> which opened with
{{Blockquote
|text=Words matter. The terminology that senior government officials use must accurately identify the nature of the challenges that face our generation. [...] At the same time, the terminology should also be strategic – it should avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology.
}}
The office "consulted with some of the leading U.S.-based scholars and commentators on Islam to discuss the best terminology to use when describing the terrorist threat." Among the experts they consulted,
{{Blockquote
|text=[t]here was a consensus that the [US Government] should avoid unintentionally portraying terrorists, who lack moral and religious legitimacy, as brave fighters, legitimate soldiers, or spokesmen for ordinary Muslims. Therefore, the experts counseled caution in using terms such as, "jihadist," "Islamic terrorist," "Islamist," and "holy warrior" as grandiose descriptions.
}}

== History ==
=== Pre-20th century ===
Others such as [[Ibn Warraq]] claim that from the beginning of Islam, "violent movements have arisen" such as the [[Khawarij|Kharijites]],<ref name="First Terrorists?">{{cite book |last1=Ibn Warraq |title=The Islam in Islamic Terrorism : the importance of Beliefs, Ideas, and Ideology |date=2017 |publisher=New English Review Press |location=London, UK |isbn=978-1-943003-08-2|chapter=9 The First Terrorists? Kharijites, Violence, and the Demand for the Purification of Islam of Its Unpious Accretions |edition=First}}</ref> Sahl ibn Salama, [[Al-Hasan ibn 'Ali al-Barbahari|Barbahari]], [[Kadizadeli]] movement, [[Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab|Ibn Abd al-Wahhab]], etc., "seeking to revive true Islam, which its members felt had been neglected in Muslim societies, who were not living up to the ideals of the earliest Muslims".<ref name=ibn-warraq-violent>{{cite book |last1=Ibn Warraq |title=The Islam in Islamic Terrorism : the importance of Beliefs, Ideas, and Ideology |date=2017 |publisher=New English Review Press |location=London, UK |isbn=978-1-943003-08-2 |page=18 |edition=First}}</ref>  The 7th century [[Khawarij|Kharijites]], according to some, started from an essentially political position but developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream [[Sunni Islam|Sunni]] and [[Shia Islam|Shi'a]] Muslims. The group was particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to ''[[takfir]]'', whereby they declared Muslim opponents to be unbelievers and therefore worthy of death,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/fruits-of-the-tree-of-extremism|title=Imam Mohamad Jebara: Fruits of the tree of extremism|author=Mohamad Jebara More Mohamad Jebara|work=Ottawa Citizen}}</ref> and also by their strong resemblance to contemporary ISIL.<ref name="SHEEMA KHAN 2014">{{cite news|url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/another-battle-with-islams-true-believers/article20802390/ |title=Another battle with Islam's 'true believers'|work=The Globe and Mail |last1=KHAN |first1=SHEEMA |date=29 September 2014}}</ref>

=== 1960s–1970s ===
During the era of the anti-colonial struggle in [[North Africa]] and the [[Middle East]], and coinciding with the creation of [[Israel]] in 1948, a series of [[Marxist-Leninist]] and [[anti-imperialist]] movements swept throughout the Arab and Islamic world. These movements were nationalist and revolutionary, but not Islamic. However, their view that terrorism could be effective in reaching their political goals generated the first phase of modern international terrorism. In the late 1960s, Palestinian secular movements such as [[Fatah|Al Fatah]] and the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]] (PFLP) began to target civilians outside the immediate arena of conflict. Following Israel's [[Six-Day War|victory over Arab forces]] in 1967, Palestinian leaders began to realize that the [[Arab world]] was unable to defeat Israel in the battlefield. At the same time, lessons drawn from the [[Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine|Jewish struggle against the British in Palestine]] and [[revolutionary movement]]s across Latin America, North Africa and Southeast Asia, motivated the Palestinians to turn away from [[guerrilla warfare]] towards urban terrorism. These movements were secular in nature, though their international reach served to spread terrorist tactics worldwide.<ref name=":4" /> Moreover, the [[Arab Cold War]] between mostly US-aligned conservative Islamic monarchies (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and Soviet-aligned secular national-revolutionary governments (Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq) inspired a growth of religiously motivated Islamic movements in the Middle East, supported by [[Saudi Arabia]], which came into conflict with the predominant secular ([[Nasserist]] and [[Ba'athist]]) nationalist ideologies at the time.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45072440 | jstor=45072440 | title=Nasser's Pan-Arab Radicalism and the Saudi Drive for Islamic Solidarity : A Response for Security | last1=Baba | first1=Noor Ahmad | journal=India Quarterly | date=17 November 1992 | volume=48 | issue=1/2 | pages=1–22 | doi=10.1177/097492849204800101 | s2cid=157470830 }}</ref>

The book ''The Revolt'' by [[Menachem Begin]], leader of the [[Irgun]] militia and future Israeli Prime Minister, influenced both [[Carlos Marighella]]'s urban guerrilla theory and [[Osama bin Laden]]'s Islamist [[al-Qaeda]] organization.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/july-22-a-pivotal-day-in-terrorism-history/ | title=July 22: A Pivotal Day in Terrorism History | date=22 July 2021 }}</ref> Israeli journalist [[Ronen Bergman]] in the book ''[[Rise and Kill First]]'' asserted that [[Hezbollah]]'s 1983 campaign of coordinated terrorist attacks against American, French and Israeli military installations in [[Beirut]] drew inspiration from and directly mirrored the [[Haganah]]'s and [[Irgun]]'s 1946 bombing campaign against the British: both succeeded in creating an atmosphere of widespread fear which eventually forced the enemy to withdraw.<ref>https://theswissbay.ch/pdf/Books/Politics/Rise%20and%20Kill%20First%20The%20Secret%20History%20of%20Israel%E2%80%99s%20Targeted%20Assassinations%20by%20Ronen%20Bergman%20%28z-lib.org%29.pdf</ref> Bergman further asserts that the influence of Israeli-sponsored terrorist operations on the emerging Islamists was also of operational nature: the Israeli proxy [[Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners]] had carried out multiple deadly [[car bomb|truck bombings]] in Lebanon long before the emergence of Hezbollah. An Israeli [[Mossad]] agent told Bergman: "I saw from a distance one of the cars blowing up and demolishing an entire street. We were teaching the Lebanese how effective a car bomb could be. Everything that we saw later with Hezbollah sprang from what they saw had happened after these operations."<ref>{{cite web | url=https://medium.com/@djadan/israeli-journalist-ronen-bergman-reveals-his-countrys-terrorist-bombing-campaign-in-lebanon-8a5d9ff7a2f2 | title=Israeli Journalist Ronen Bergman Reveals Israel's Terrorist Bombing Campaign in Lebanon | date=14 August 2019 }}</ref>

The year 1979 is widely considered a turning point in the rise of religiously motivated radicalism in the Muslim world. Several events (the [[Soviet-Afghan War]] and unprecedented support from Saudi Arabia, [[Pakistan]] and the US for anti-Soviet [[Afghan Mujahideen|jihadists]]; the [[Iranian Revolution]] and subsequent [[Iran-Iraq War]] as well as [[Khomeini]]'s active support for [[Hezbollah|Shia groups]] resisting the [[Israeli occupation of Lebanon]]; the [[Grand Mosque seizure]] in Mecca and subsequent [[Wahhabism|Wahhabization]] of the Saudi government; and the [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty]] that was highly unpopular in some sections of the Muslim world) are thought to be crucial for the proliferation of Islamist terrorism in the next decade.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://apnews.com/article/e6a7f7c8963f4cd1b0e27f1e7d484610 | title=AP Analysis: Climactic events in 1979 shaped modern Mideast | website=[[Associated Press News]] | date=19 January 2019 }}</ref>

According to [[Bruce Hoffman]] of [[RAND Corporation|the RAND Corporation]], in 1980, 2 out of 64 terrorist groups were categorized as having religious motivation while in 1995, almost half (26 out of 56) were religiously motivated with the majority having Islam as their guiding force.<ref name="Hoffman-1999-V">{{cite book |last1=Hoffman |first1=Bruce |title=Countering the New Terrorism |date=1999 |publisher=Rand Corporation |page=V |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/congress/terrorism/phase1/countering.pdf |access-date=12 August 2019 |chapter=Two: Terrorism Trends and Prospects}}</ref><ref name=":4" />

=== 1980s–1990s ===
The [[Soviet–Afghan War]] and the subsequent anti-Soviet mujahedin war, lasting from 1979 to 1989, started the rise and expansion of terrorist groups. Since their beginning in 1994, the Pakistani-supported [[Taliban]] militia in Afghanistan has gained several characteristics traditionally associated with [[state sponsors of terrorism|state-sponsors of terrorism]], providing logistical support, travel documentation, and training facilities. Since 1989 the increasing willingness of religious extremists to strike targets outside immediate country or regional areas highlights the global nature of contemporary terrorism. The [[1993 bombing of the World Trade Center]], and the 11 September 2001 attacks on the [[World Trade Center (1973–2001)|World Trade Center]] and Pentagon, are representative of this trend.<ref name=":4">{{cite web|url=http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html| title=The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: an Overview|author=John Moore|publisher=PBS Frontline}}</ref>

=== 2000s–2010s ===
According to research by the German newspaper ''[[Welt am Sonntag]]'', between 11 September 2001 and 21 April 2019, there were 31,221 Islamist terrorism attacks, in which  at least 146,811 people were killed. Many of the victims were Muslims, including most of the victims who were killed in attacks involving 12 or more deaths.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pasteboard.co/IgC7ac6.jpg|title=18 Jahre Terror|date=28 April 2019|website=Die Welt|access-date=18 June 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://jyllands-posten.dk/international/ECE11350481/naesten-150000-har-mistet-livet-i-islamistiske-angreb/|title=Næsten 150.000 har mistet livet i islamistiske angreb|date=1 May 2019|website=jyllands-posten.dk|access-date=4 May 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/danmark/naesten-150000-har-mistet-livet-i-islamistiske-angreb|title=Næsten 150.000 har mistet livet i islamistiske angreb|date=1 May 2019|website=kristeligt-dagblad.dk|access-date=18 June 2019}}</ref>

=== 2010s ===
According to the Global Terrorism Index, deaths from terrorism peaked in 2014 and have fallen  each year since then until 2019 (the last year the study had numbers for), making a decline of more than half (59% or 13,826 deaths) from their peak. The five countries "hardest hit" by terrorism continue to be Muslims countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Somalia.
{{#tag:ref|An indication that Islamic terrorism has at least paced the general decline in deaths from terror is that  "one of the more worrying trends" in terrorism over the five year period from 2014–2019, is (non-Islamic) far-right terrorism.<ref name="Porterfield-25-11-2020">{{cite news |last1=Porterfield |first1=Carlie |title=Terrorism Deaths Decline Worldwide, But Far-Right Attacks Are On The Rise |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/11/25/terrorism-deaths-decline-worldwide-but-far-right-attacks-are-on-the-rise/ |access-date=5 May 2021 |work=Forbes |date=25 November 2020}}</ref> |group=Note}}

== Attacker profiles and motivations ==
{{See also|Motives for the September 11 attacks}}
The motivation of Islamic terrorists has been disputed. Some (such as [[Maajid Nawaz]], [[Graeme Wood (journalist)|Graeme Wood]], and [[Ibn Warraq]]) attribute it to extremist interpretations of Islam;<ref name="eikmeier" /><ref name="Nawaz-debate">{{cite news|last1=Nawaz|first1=Maajid|last2=Hasan|first2=Mehdi|date=4 July 2012|title=Age of extremes: Mehdi Hasan and Maajid Nawaz debate|work=New Statesman|publisher=[[Wayback Machine]]|location=London|url=http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/07/age-extremes-muslim-mehdi-hasan-maajid-mawaz|url-status=dead|access-date=13 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120714001243/http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/07/age-extremes-muslim-mehdi-hasan-maajid-mawaz|archive-date=14 July 2012}}</ref><ref name=ibn-warraq-violent />  others (Mehdi Hasan) to some combination of political grievance and social-psychological maladjustment;<ref name="Hasan-2017">{{cite web |last1=Hasan |first1=Mehdi |title=You Shouldn't Blame Islam for Terrorism. Religion Isn't a Crucial Factor in Attacks. |url=https://theintercept.com/2017/03/29/you-shouldnt-blame-islam-for-terrorism-religion-isnt-a-crucial-factor-in-attacks/ |website=The Intercept |access-date=12 August 2019 |date=29 March 2017}}</ref>  and still others (such as James L. Payne and  [[Michael Scheuer]]) to a struggle against "U.S./Western/Jewish aggression, oppression, and exploitation of Muslim lands and peoples".<ref name="PAYNE-2008">{{cite web |last1=PAYNE |first1=JAMES L. |title=What Do the Terrorists Want? |url=https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13_01_2_payne.pdf |website=Independent Review |access-date=8 August 2019 |year=2008}}</ref>

=== Religious motivation ===
[[Daniel Benjamin]] and [[Steven Simon]], in their book, ''The Age of Sacred Terror'', argue that Islamic terrorist attacks are motivated by religious fervor. They are seen as "a sacrament ... intended to restore to the universe a moral order that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam." Their attacks are neither political nor strategic but an "act of redemption" meant to "humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God".<ref>{{cite book|title=The Age of Sacred Terror|page=40|author=Daniel Benjamin|author2=Steven Simon|year=2002|isbn=978-0-7567-6751-8|publisher=Random House}}</ref>

According to Indonesian Islamic leader Yahya Cholil Staquf in a 2017 [[Time (magazine)|''Time'']] interview, within the classical Islamic tradition the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is assumed to be one of segregation and enmity. In his view extremism and terrorism are linked with "the basic assumptions of Islamic orthodoxy" and that radical Islamic movements are nothing new. He also added that Western politicians should stop pretending that extremism is not linked to Islam.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=http://time.com/4930742/islam-terrorism-islamophobia-violence/|title=Orthodox Islam and Violence 'Linked' Says Top Muslim Scholar|magazine=Time|access-date=27 December 2017|quote=Western politicians should stop pretending that extremism and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam. There is a clear relationship between fundamentalism, terrorism, and the basic assumptions of Islamic orthodoxy. So long as we lack consensus regarding this matter, we cannot gain victory over fundamentalist violence within Islam. Radical Islamic movements are nothing new. They've appeared again and again throughout our own history in Indonesia. The West must stop ascribing any and all discussion of these issues to "Islamophobia." Or do people want to accuse me—an Islamic scholar—of being an Islamophobe too?}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.faz.net/1.5157757|title=F.A.Z. exklusiv: Terrorismus und Islam hängen zusammen|date=18 August 2017|work=Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung|access-date=27 December 2017|language=de-DE|issn=0174-4909}}</ref>

According to journalist [[Graeme Wood (journalist)|Graeme Wood]] "much of what" one major Islamic terror group -- [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|ISIS]] -- "does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment" of Muhammad and his companions, "and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse" and [[Last Judgment#Islam|Judgement day]]. ISIS group members insist "they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers".<ref name="WOOD-wants-2015">{{cite journal |last1=WOOD |first1=GRAEME |title=What ISIS Really Wants |journal=The Atlantic |date=March 2015 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ |access-date=9 August 2019}}</ref>

Shmuel Bar argues that while the importance of political and socioeconomic factors in Islamist terrorism is not in doubt, "In order to comprehend the motivation for these acts and to draw up an effective strategy for a war against terrorism, it is necessary to understand the religious-ideological factors — which are deeply embedded in Islam."<ref>Bar, Shmuel, "The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism", ''Policy Review'', June/July 2004</ref>

Examining Europe, two studies of the background of Muslim terrorists—one of the UK and one of France—found little connection between terrorist acts performed in the name of Islam and the religious piety of the operatives. A "restricted" 2008 UK report of hundreds of case studies by the domestic counter-intelligence agency [[MI5]] found that there was no "typical profile" of a terrorist, and that

{{blockquote|[f]ar from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.<ref name="Travis-20-8-2008">{{cite news|last1=Travis|first1=Alan|title=MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1|access-date=6 November 2015|work=The Guardian |location=London |date=20 August 2008 }}</ref>}}

However, while the motivation of the individuals directly involved in carrying out the terror attacks are not necessarily religious and may stem from other reasons, religiously motivated organizations and governments are very often behind such attacks. Fundamentalist organizations and governments often encourage, fund, assist, incentivize or reward the actions of individuals they recognize as susceptible to be coerced into committing terror attacks, thus using people who are not always religiously motivated themselves to achieve religious ends. [[Hamas]], for example, is known for [[Palestinian Authority Martyrs Fund#Hamas|paying]] the families of imprisoned terrorists and of [[suicide bomber]]s. The [[Iran|Islamic Republic of Iran]] intends billions of US dollars annually for [[Militia|militia fighters]] and terrorists,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Iran spends $7 billion per year on terror network |url=https://embassies.gov.il/un/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Iran-terror-network-.aspx}}</ref> exploiting the extreme economic difficulties faced by people in countries such as [[Economy of Yemen|Yemen]], [[Economy of Lebanon|Lebanon]] and [[Economy of Syria|Syria]] by offering them cash in exchange for terror activity.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302054479|title=Exclusive: IRGC Officers Pocket Millions Intended As Salaries For Proxies|website=Iran International|date=16 November 2023 }}</ref>

A 2015 "general portrait" of "the conditions and circumstances" under which people living in France become "Islamic radicals" (terrorists or would-be terrorists) by Olivier Roy (see above) found radicalisation was not an "uprising of a Muslim community that is victim to poverty and racism: only young people join, including converts".<ref name="roy-inside">{{cite magazine |last=Roy |first=Olivier |date=18 December 2015 |title=What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism? |url=http://insidestory.org.au/what-is-the-driving-force-behind-jihadist-terrorism |access-date=25 February 2016 |magazine=Inside Story |issn=1837-0497 }}</ref>

Roy believes terrorism/radicalism is "expressed in religious terms" because

# most of the radicals have a Muslim background, which makes them open to a process of re-Islamisation ("almost none of them having been pious before entering the process of radicalisation"), and<ref name=roy-inside />
# jihad is "the only cause on the global market". If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local newspaper; "if you kill yelling 'Allahu Akbar', you are sure to make the national headlines". Other extreme causes—ultra-left or radical ecology are "too bourgeois and intellectual" for the radicals.<ref name=roy-inside />

Somewhat in contradiction to this, a study surveying Muslims in Europe to examine how much Islamist ideology increases support for terrorism, found that "in Western countries affected by homegrown terrorism ... justifying terrorism is strongly associated with an increase in religious practice". (This is not the case in European "countries where Muslims are predominant"—[[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia]], [[Albania]], etc. -- where the opposite seems to be true, i.e. the more importance respondents assigned to religion in their life, the less likely they were to "justifying political violence".)<ref name="Egger-2021">{{cite journal |last1=Egger |first1=Clara |last2=Magni-Berton |first2=Raul |title=The Role of Islamist Ideology in Shaping Muslims Believers' Attitudes toward Terrorism: Evidence from Europe |journal=Studies in Conflict & Terrorism |year=2021 |volume=44 |issue=7 |pages=581–604 |doi=10.1080/1057610X.2019.1571696 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

==== Denominations/Ideologies ====
Most strains of thought/schools/sects/movements/[[religious denominations|denominations]]/traditions of Islam do not support or otherwise associate themselves with terrorism.{{#tag:ref| Shia Muslims have been involved in violence primarily at the state level<ref name="Jacobsen-12-3-19" /> ([[Hezbollah]] attacks on Israeli targets and Iran's use of [[Iran–Iraq War#Differences from other conflicts|shaheeds]] against [[Saddam Hussien]]'s [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraq]] for example). The small [[Quranism|Quranist]] (Muslims who follow only Quran) and [[Ahmadi]] groups (who believe jihad should be peaceful) have "zero history of violence".|group=Note}}
According to Mir Faizal, only three sects or movements of Islam—the Sunni sects of [[Salafi]], [[Deobandi]], and [[Barelvi]].{{#tag:ref|Faizal calls these groups "sects", Wikipedia calls them "movements".  |group=Note}}—have been associated with violence against civilians.<ref name="Jacobsen-12-3-19">{{cite news |last1=Jacobsen |first1=Scott Douglas |title=Is There a Link between Islam and Terrorism? |url=https://goodmenproject.com/featured-content/islam-terrorism-sjbn/ |website=good men project |access-date=9 August 2019 |date=12 March 2019}}</ref> Of the three, only Salafi Islam—specifically [[Salafi jihadism]] Islam—can be called involved in global terrorism, as it is connected with [[Al-Qaeda]], [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|ISIS]], [[Boko Haram]] and other groups. (Terrorism among some members of the  [[Barelvi]] sect is limited to attacks on alleged blasphemers in Pakistan, and the terrorism among [[Deobandi]] groups has "almost no" influence beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indian.)<ref name="Jacobsen-12-3-19" /> Another sect/movement known as [[Wahhabism]] (intertwined with ''non''-jihadist [[Salafism]]) has been accused of being the ideology behind Islamic terrorist groups,<ref name="worldaffairsjournal.org">{{cite journal|date=May–June 2015|title=The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad|url=http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/saudi-connection-wahhabism-and-global-jihad|journal=[[World Affairs]]|first1=Carol E. B.|last1=Choksy|author2=Jamsheed K. Choksy|url-status=usurped|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150509000307/http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/saudi-connection-wahhabism-and-global-jihad|archive-date=9 May 2015}}</ref>  but [[Al-Qaeda|Al Qaeda]] and other terrorists are more commonly  described as  following a ''fusion'' of [[Qutbism]] and [[Wahhabism]].<ref name=ayoob-many-58>{{cite book |last1=Ayoob |first1=Muhammad |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.189346
|title=The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World |page=58 |date=2008 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |doi=10.3998/mpub.189346 |jstor=10.3998/mpub.189346 |hdl=10356/90575 |isbn=978-0-472-09971-9 |access-date=31 May 2021}}.</ref><ref>Moussalli, Ahmad. "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the Enemy?" ''A Conflict Forum Monograph'' (January 2009).  10.</ref><ref>International Crisis Group. "Understanding Islamism." Middle East Report, no. 37 (2 March 2005).  2.</ref>

Outside of these sects or religious movements, the religious ideology of [[Qutbism]] has influenced Islamic terrorism, along with religious themes and trends including  [[Takfir]], [[suicide attacks]], and the belief that Jews and Christians are not [[People of the Book]] but infidels/kafir waging "[[war on Islam]]". (These ideas are often related and overlapping.)

===== Qutbism =====
Qutbism is named after Egyptian [[Islamism|Islamist]] theoretician [[Sayyid Qutb]], who wrote a manifesto (known as ''[[Milestones (book)|Milestones]]''), while in prison. Qutb is said to have laid out
the ideological foundation of [[Salafi jihadism]]  (according to Bruce Livesey);<ref>{{Cite web|last=Livesey|first=Bruce|date=25 January 2005|title=The Salafist Movement|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628202818/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html|archive-date=28 June 2011|publisher=PBS}}</ref>  his ideas are said to have formed "the modern Islamist movement" (according to Gilles Kepel);{{#tag:ref|Kepel wrote that "the modern Islamist movement"<ref name=KepelJihad-32 /> was "rebuilt" around "the ideas" of Qutb, rebuilt because the [[History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1954–present)#The Brotherhood under Nasser, 1954–1970|Muslim Brotherhood was crushed after 1954]] by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser.  In 1954 another a second unsuccessful assassination was attempted against Egypt's prime minister (Gamal Abdel Nasser), and blamed on the "secret apparatus" of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was again banned and this time thousands of its members were imprisoned.|group=Note}}
which along with other "violent Islamic thought", became the  ideology known as "[[Qutbism]] that is the "center of gravity" of al-Qaeda and related groups  (according to [[U.S. Army]] Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier).<ref name="eikmeier" />
Qutb is thought to be a major influence on Al-Qaeda #2 leader, [[Ayman al-Zawahiri]].<ref>Lawrence Wright (2006). ''The Looming Tower''. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-41486-X. p.37</ref>{{#tag:ref|[[Qutbism]] has been used as a close relative,<ref name="Manne-2017-17-22">{{cite book |last1=Manne |first1=Robert |title=The Mind of the Islamic State |date=2017 |publisher=Prometheist Books |location=NY |pages=17–22 |isbn=978-1-63388-371-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Es41DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 |access-date=9 March 2021}}</ref><ref name="Shultz-2008">{{cite book |last1=Shultz |first1=Richard |title=Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement. |date=2008 |publisher=USAF Institute for National Security Studies |location=Colorado |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0s0gAQAAIAAJ |access-date=9 March 2021}}</ref> or variety of Salafi jihadism.|group=Note}}

In his manifesto (called "one of the most influential works in Arabic of the last half century"),<ref>''The Age of Sacred Terror'' by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, New York : Random House, c2002, p.63</ref> Qutb preached:
*the absolute necessity of enforcement of [[sharia]] law ("even more necessary than the establishment of the Islamic belief", without which Islam does not exist);<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.89, 9</ref>
*the need for violent jihad as well as preaching to bring back sharia law and spread Islam, (a vanguard "movement" will use "physical power and Jihad",<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.55</ref> to remove "material obstacles");<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.59</ref>
*that offensive jihad—attacking non-Muslim territory—ought not neglected by true Muslims in favor of defensive jihad, (this "diminish[s] the greatness of the Islamic way of life",<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.71</ref> and is the work of those who have been "defeated by the attacks of the treacherous Orientalists!"<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.69</ref>  Muslims should not let lack of non-Muslim aggression stop them from waging Jihad to spread sharia law because ''"truth and falsehood cannot coexist on earth"'' in peace.<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.65</ref>
*a loathing of "the West" (a "rubbish heap ... filth ... hollow and worthless");<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.139, 136</ref>
*... which is deliberately undermining Islam (pursuing a "well-thought-out scheme" to "demolish the structure of Muslim society");<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.116</ref>
*... despite the fact it "knows" it is inferior to Islam (It "knows that it does not possess anything which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence", so that when confronted with the "logic, beauty, humanity and happiness" of Islam, "the American people blush");<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.7, 139</ref>
*and a loathing and hatred of Jews ("world Jewry, whose purpose is to eliminate ... the limitations imposed by faith and religion, so that Jews may penetrate into body politics of the whole world and then may be free to perpetuate their evil designs [such as] usury, the aim of which is that all the wealth of mankind end up in the hands of Jewish financial institutions ...").<ref>Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.110-111</ref>

Eikmeier summarizes the tenets of Qutbism as being:
* A belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to "pure Islam" as originally practiced during the time of [[Muhammad]].
* The path to that "pure Islam" is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the [[Quran]] and [[Hadith]], along with implementation of Muhammad's commands.
* Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars.
* Any interpretation of the Quran from a historical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the [[Fiqh|classical jurisprudential tradition]] is mere sophistry.<ref name="eikmeier" />

While [[Sayyid Qutb]] preached that ''all'' of the Muslim world had become [[Apostasy in Islam|apostate]] or ''[[jahiliyah]]'', he did not specifically takfir or call for the execution of any apostates, even those governing non-sharia governments {{#tag:ref|(Qutb wrote ''Milestones'' in prison and "died before he could fully explain his theories" and clear up "his use of the term jahiliyya and its dire consequence, ''takfir''")<ref name=KepelJihad-31 />|group=Note}}      Qutb did however emphasize that "the organizations and authorities" of the putatively Muslim countries were irredeemably corrupt and evil<ref name="Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, p.55">Sayyid Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.55</ref> and would have to be abolished by "physical power and Jihad",<ref name="Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, p.55" /> by a "vanguard"<ref>Sayyid Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.12</ref> movement of true Muslims.<ref>Sayyid Qutb, ''Milestones'', p.101-103</ref>

One who did argue this was [[Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj]], the main theoretician of [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad|the Islamist group]] that [[Assassination of Anwar Sadat|assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat]].  who in his book  ''Al-Farida al-gha'iba'' (The Neglected Duty), cited a fatwa issued in 1303 CE by the celebrated strict medieval jurist [[Ibn Taymiyyah]]. He had ruled that fighting and killing of the Mongol invaders who were invading Syria was not only permitted but obligatory according to Sharia. This was because the Mongols did not follow sharia law, and so even though they had converted to Islam (Ibn Taymiyyah argued) they were not really Muslims.<ref>Kepel, Gilles, ''The Prophet and the Pharaoh'', (2003), p.194-197</ref> Faraj preached that rulers such as Anwar Sadat were "rebels against the Laws of God [the shari'ah]",<ref name=Faraj-Duty>Faraj, ''al-Farida al-gha'iba'', (Amman, n.d.), p.28, 26; trans. Johannes Jansen, ''The Neglected Duty'', (New York, 1986)</ref><ref name=Cook-understanding-192>Cook, David, ''Understanding Jihad'' by David Cook, University of California Press, 2005  p.192, 190</ref> and "apostates from Islam" who have preserved nothing of Islam except its name.<ref>Kepel, Gilles, ''The Prophet and the Pharaoh'', (2003), p.197</ref>

===== Wahabism/Salafism =====
Another Islamic movement accused of being involved in terrorism is known as [[Wahabism]].<ref name="School2015">{{cite book|author=Naval Postgraduate Naval Postgraduate School|title=Wahhabism: Is It a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=25JPrgEACAAJ|date=19 March 2015|publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform|isbn=978-1-5089-3613-8}}</ref><ref name="Allen2009">{{cite book|author=Charles Allen|author-link = Charles Allen (writer)|title=God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dKK0_bM-4n8C|date=1 March 2009|publisher=Da Capo Press, Incorporated|isbn=978-0-7867-3300-2}}</ref><ref name="DeLong-Bas2007">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nwX_UJ-p2rsC&pg=PA4|title=Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad|publisher=I.B.Tauris|year=2007|isbn=978-1-84511-322-3|pages=4–|author=Natana J. DeLong-Bas}}</ref><ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-terrorism_b_6501916.html?ir=India&adsSiteOverride=in | work=HuffPost | title=How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism | date=20 January 2015}}</ref><ref name="worldaffairsjournal.org" />

Sponsored by [[International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism|oil exporting power]] [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Wahabism]] is deeply conservative and anti-revolutionary (its founder taught that Muslims are obliged to give unquestioned allegiance  to their ruler, however imperfect,  so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God),<ref name="LofC">{{cite web|year=1992|title=Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+sa0044%29|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041107123733/http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd%2Fcstdy%3A%40field%28DOCID+sa0044%29|archive-date=7 November 2004|access-date=13 January 2022|work=[[Wayback Machine]]|publisher=Library of Congress Country Studies}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future|publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=27|quote=Not only is the Saudi monarch effectively the religious primate, but the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Islam that he represents instructs Muslims to be obedient and submissive to their ruler, however imperfect, in pursuit of a perfect life in paradise. Only if a ruler directly countermands the commandments of Allah should devout Muslims even consider disobeying. 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. [surah 4:59]'}}</ref>
Nonetheless, this ideology and its sponsors have been accused of assisting terrorism both
*indirectly—by "creating" an environment from late 1970s to 2010 that "supported the spread of extremist ideologies";<ref name="Dillon-Factor-2009-72">{{cite book |last1=Dillon |first1=Michael R. |title=Wahhabism: Is It a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism? |date=September 2009 |publisher=Naval Post Graduate School |page=72 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA509109.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210518221709/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA509109.pdf |url-status=live |archive-date=18 May 2021 |access-date=18 May 2021}}</ref> despite its conservatism, Wahhabism shares important doctrinal points with forms of Islamism—a strong "revulsion" against [[Westernization|Western influences]],<ref name=Commins-141>{{cite book|last=Commins |first=David |title=The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia |publisher=I.B.Tauris |year=2009 |url=http://ebooks.rahnuma.org/religion/Muslim_Sects/The-Wahhabi-Mission-and-Saudi-Arabia.pdf |page=141|quote=[MB founder Hasan al-Banna] shared with the Wahhabis a strong revulsion against western influences and unwavering confidence that Islam is both the true religion and a sufficient foundation for conducting worldly affairs ... More generally, Banna's [had a] keen desire for Muslim unity to ward off western imperialism led him to espouse an inclusive definition of the community of believers. ... he would urge his followers, 'Let us cooperate in those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those on which we cannot.' ... A salient element in Banna's notion of Islam as a total way of life came from the idea that the Muslim world was backward and the corollary that the state is responsible for guaranteeing decent living conditions for its citizens.}}</ref> a belief in strict implementation of injunctions and prohibitions of [[Sharia|''sharia'' law]],<ref name=Kepel51>{{cite book|last=Kepel|first=Gilles|title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam|date=2006|publisher=I.B. Tauris|page=51|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OLvTNk75hUoC&pg=PA61|quote=Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed '[[petro-Islam]]' included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.|isbn=978-1-84511-257-8}}</ref> an opposition to both [[Shia Islam]] and popular Islamic religious practices (the [[Veneration#Islam|veneration]] of [[Wali|Muslim saints]]),<ref name=roy-117>{{cite book |last=Roy |first=Olivier |author-link=Olivier Roy (political scientist) |year=1994 |title=The Failure of Political Islam |location=[[Cambridge, Massachusetts]] |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |page=[https://archive.org/details/failureofpolitic00royo/page/117 117] |isbn=978-0-674-29141-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/failureofpolitic00royo |url-access=registration |access-date=2 April 2015 |via=[[Internet Archive]] |quote=The Muslim Brothers agreed not to operate in Saudi Arabia itself, but served as a relay for contacts with foreign Islamist movements. The MBs also used as a relay in South Asia movements long established on an indigenous basis (Jamaat-i Islami). Thus the MB played an essential role in the choice of organisations and individuals likely to receive Saudi subsidies. On a doctrinal level, the differences are certainly significant between the MBs and the Wahhabis, but their common references to Hanbalism ... their rejection of the division into juridical schools, and their virulent opposition to Shiism and popular religious practices (the cult of 'saints') furnished them with the common themes of a reformist and puritanical preaching. This alliance carried in its wake older fundamentalist movements, non-Wahhabi but with strong local roots, such as the Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith or the Ikhwan of continental China.}}</ref> and a belief in the importance of armed [[jihad]].<ref name=Kepel2004-156>{{cite book|last1=Kepel|first1=Gilles|title=The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West|date=2004|publisher=Harvard University Press|page=[https://archive.org/details/warformuslimmind00kepe/page/156 156]|url=https://archive.org/details/warformuslimmind00kepe |url-access=registration|access-date=4 April 2015|quote=In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslims Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria and Iraq ... The phenomenon of Osama bin Laden and his associates cannot be understood outside this hybrid tradition.|isbn=978-0-674-01575-3}}</ref>
*and directly—through [[International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism#Other jihads|inadvertent and intentional funding of terrorist groups]]<ref>{{cite book |title=A History of Saudi Arabia |last=Al-Rasheed |first=Madawi|author-link=Madawi al-Rasheed |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-521-74754-7 |page=233|publisher=Cambridge University Press }}</ref><ref name=Cordesman-2002-6>{{cite book|last1=Cordesman|first1=Anthony H.|title=Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century: IV. Opposition and Islamic Extremism Final Review|date=31 December 2002|publisher=CSIS|pages=6–7|url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_04.pdf|access-date=26 November 2015|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304110757/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_04.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> and through its influence on at least two major terrorist groups<ref>The Taliban were responsible for 4,990 terrorist deaths in 2019, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2020, an 18 per cent decrease from 2018. {{cite web |title=Global Terrorism Index 2020 |url=https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf |website=Vision of Humanity |publisher=Institute for Economics & Peace |access-date=18 May 2021 |page=15}}</ref> --  [[International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism#Afghanistan Taliban|the Taliban]]<ref name=LICHTBLAU>{{cite news|last1=LICHTBLAU|first1=ERIC|title=Documents Back Saudi Link to Extremists |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html|access-date=17 August 2014|work=The New York Times|date=23 June 2009|quote=The new documents, provided to The New York Times by the lawyers, are among several hundred thousand pages of investigative material obtained by the Sept. 11 families and their insurers as part of a long-running civil lawsuit seeking to hold Saudi Arabia and its royal family liable for financing Al Qaeda.}}</ref> and the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|Islamic State]].

Up until at least 2017 or so (when [[Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia|Saudi Crown Prince]] [[Muhammad bin Salman]] declared Saudi Arabia was returning to "moderate Islam"),<ref name="bbc-moderate-2017">{{cite news |title=Crown prince says Saudis want return to moderate Islam |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476 |access-date=18 May 2021 |publisher=BBC |date=25 October 2017}}</ref>
Saudi Arabia  [[International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism|spent]]  many billions, not only through the Saudi government but through Islamic organizations,  religious charities, and private sources,<ref name=house-groups>{{cite book |last=House |first=Karen Elliott |author-link=Karen Elliott House |title=[[On Saudi Arabia|On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future]] |publisher=[[Alfred A. Knopf|Knopf]] |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-307-47328-8 |page=234 |quote=To this day, the regime funds numerous international organizations to spread fundamentalist Islam, including the [[Muslim World League]], the [[World Assembly of Muslim Youth]], the [[International Islamic Relief Organization]], and various royal charities such as the Popular Committee for Assisting the Palestinian Muhahedeen, led by Prince [[Salman bin Abdul-Aziz]], now minister of defense, who often is touted as a potential future king [and who became king in 2015]. Supporting da'wah, which literally means 'making an invitation' to Islam, is a religious requirement that Saudi rulers feel they cannot abandon without losing their domestic legitimacy as protectors and propagators of Islam. Yet in the wake of [[September 11 attacks|9/11]], American anger at the kingdom led the U.S. government to demand controls on Saudi largesse to Islamic groups that funded terrorism.}}</ref>
on ''dawah wahhabiya'', i.e. spreading the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam,<ref name=lacey-95-embassies>{{cite book|last=Lacey|first=Robert|title=Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia|url=https://archive.org/details/insidekingdomkin00lace_0|url-access=registration|date=2009|publisher=Viking
|page=[https://archive.org/details/insidekingdomkin00lace_0/page/95 95]|isbn=978-0-670-02118-5|quote=The Kingdom's 70 or so embassies around the world already featured cultural, educational, and military attaches, along with consular officers who organized visas for the hajj. Now they were joined by religious attaches, whose job was to get new mosques built in their countries and to persuade existing mosques to propagate the ''dawah wahhabiya''.}}</ref>
This funding incentivized Muslim "schools, book publishers, magazines, newspapers, or even governments" around the world to "shape their behavior, speech, and thought in such a way as to incur and benefit from Saudi largesse," and so propagate Wahhabi doctrines;<ref>{{cite book|last= Abou El Fadl |first=Khaled|title=The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists|url= https://archive.org/details/greattheftwrestl00abou  |url-access= registration |publisher= Harper San Francisco |year=2005 |page=[https://archive.org/details/greattheftwrestl00abou/page/74 74] |isbn=978-0-06-056339-4|quote=A wide range of institutions, whether schools, book publishers, magazines, newspapers, or even governments, as well as individuals, such as imams, teachers, or writers, learned to shape their behavior, speech, and thought in such a way as to incur and benefit from Saudi largesse. In many parts of the Muslim world, the wrong type of speech or conduct (such as failing to veil or advocate the veil) meant the denial of Saudi largesse or the denial of the possibility of attaining Saudi largesse, and in numerous contexts this meant the difference between enjoying a decent standard of living or living in abject poverty.}}</ref>

The hundreds of Islamic colleges and Islamic centers, over a thousand  mosques and schools for Muslim children, it financed {{#tag:ref|One estimate is that during the reign of [[Fahd of Saudi Arabia|King Fahd]] (1982 to 2005), over $75 billion was spent in efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. The money was used to establish 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, and 2,000 schools for Muslim children in Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries.<ref name=threat-alliance>{{cite news|last=Ibrahim|first=Youssef Michel|title=The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=11 August 2002|url=http://www.cfr.org/religion/mideast-threat-s-hard-define/p4702|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140904022847/http://www.cfr.org/religion/mideast-threat-s-hard-define/p4702|url-status=dead|archive-date=4 September 2014|access-date=21 August 2014|quote=... money that brought Wahabis power throughout the Arab world and financed networks of fundamentalist schools from Sudan to northern Pakistan.}}</ref> According to diplomat and political scientist [[Dore Gold]], this funding was for non-Muslim countries alone.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gold |first1=Dore |title=Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism |date=2003 |publisher=Regnery |page=126}}</ref>|group=Note}}
often featured Wahhabi-friendly curriculum and religious materials<ref name=lynch-schools>{{cite web|last1=Lynch III|first1=Thomas F.|title=Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism Differences that Matter|url=http://gsmcneal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/sunni-and-shia-terrorism-differences-that-matter.pdf|website=gsmcneal.com|publisher=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|access-date=31 October 2014|page=30|date=29 December 2008|quote=Although Sunni‐extremist fervor dissipates the further one travels from the wellsprings of Cairo and Riyadh, Salafist (and very similar Wahhabi) teaching is prominently featured at thousands of worldwide schools funded by fundamentalist Sunni Muslim charities, especially those from Saudi Arabia and across the Arabian Peninsula.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Focus on Islamic issues |last=Malbouisson |first=Cofie D. |year=2007 |isbn=978-1-60021-204-8 |page=26|publisher=Nova Publishers }}</ref><ref name=Cordesman-17-18>{{cite book|last1=Cordesman|first1=Anthony H.|title=Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century: IV. Opposition and Islamic Extremism Final Review|date=2002|publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies|pages=17–18|url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_04.pdf|access-date=31 October 2015|quote=Many aspects of the Saudi curriculum were not fully modernized after the 1960s. Some Saudi textbooks taught Islamic tolerance while others condemned Jews and Christians. Anti-Christian and anti-Jewish passages remained in grade school textbooks that use rhetoric that were little more than hate literature. The same was true of more sophisticated books issued by the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Practices. Even the English-language Korans available in the hotels in the Kingdom added parenthetical passages condemning Christians and Jews that were not in any English language editions of the Koran outside Saudi Arabia.|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304110757/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_04.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>
such as textbooks explaining that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation,<ref name=Husain-wahhab>{{cite book|author=Husain, Ed|title=The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left|publisher=Penguin|date=2007|page=250|quote=My Saudi students gave me some of their core texts from university classes. They complained that regardless of their subject of study, they were compelled to study 'Thaqafah Islamiyyah' (Islamic Culture) ... These books were published in 2003 (after a Saudi promise in a post-9/11 world to alter their textbooks) and were used in classrooms across the country in 2005. I read these texts very closely: entire pages were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation. There were prolonged denunciations of nationalism, communism, the West, free mixing of the sexes, observing birthdays, even Mother's Day }}</ref> or the twelfth grade Saudi text that "instructs students that it is a religious obligation to do 'battle' against infidels in order to spread the faith".<ref name=SACoI-9>{{cite book|title=Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance|date=2006|publisher=Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House with the Institute for Gulf Affairs|page=9|url=https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/CurriculumOfIntolerance.pdf|access-date=10 November 2015}}</ref>

Wahhabi-friendly works distributed for free "financed by petroleum royalties" included those of [[Ibn Taymiyyah]]<ref name=kepel-158-taymiyyah>{{cite book|last=Kepel |first=Gilles |title=The War for Muslim Minds|url=https://archive.org/details/warformuslimmind00kepe |url-access=registration |publisher=Belknap Press of Harvard University Press |year=2004 |page=[https://archive.org/details/warformuslimmind00kepe/page/158 158]|isbn=978-0-674-01575-3 |quote=Starting in the 1950s, religious institutions in Saudi Arabia published and disseminated new editions of Ibn Taymiyya's works for free throughout the world, financed by petroleum royalties. These works have been cited widely: by Abd al-Salam Faraj, the spokesperson for the group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981; in GIA tracts calling for the massacre of 'infidels'during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s; and today on Internet sites exhorting Muslim women in the west to wear veils as a religious obligation.}}</ref> (author of the fatwa mentioned above against rulers who do not rule by sharia law).<ref name=Faraj-Duty /><ref name=Cook-understanding-192 />

Not least, the successful 1980–1990 jihad against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—that inspired non-Afghan jihad veterans to continue jihad in their own country or other—benefited from  billions of dollars in Saudi financing, as well as "weaponry and intelligence".
<ref name=Rashid-taliban-1308>{{cite book
 | last = Rashid
 | first = Ahmed
 | author-link = Ahmed Rashid
 | title = Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
 | publisher = I.B. Tauris
 | year = 2000
 | location = London
 | page = 130}}</ref>

==== Religious interpretations ====
The "root cause" of Muslim terrorism is extremist ideology, according to Pakistani theologian [[Javed Ahmad Ghamidi]], specifically the teachings that:
*"Only Muslims have the right to rule, non-Muslims are meant to be subjugated";
*"Modern nation states are unIslamic and constitute [[Kafir|kufr]] (disbelief)";
*the only truly Islamic form of state is a unified Muslim Caliphate;
*"when Muslims obtain power they will overthrow non-Muslim governments and rule";
*"The punishment of kufr (disbelief) and [[irtidad]] (apostasy) is death and must be implemented".<ref>{{cite web
 | url =http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/junaid-jahangir/freedom-of-speech_b_9004740.html
 | title =Freedom Of Speech Does Not Mean Freedom To Hate
 | last =Jahangir
 | first =Junaid
 | date =18 January 2017
| website =HuffPost
 | access-date =6 April 2017
| quote =Islamic grand teacher, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, who is in self-imposed exile due to death threats, has clearly stated that the root cause of Muslim terrorism is religious ideology. }}</ref>
Other authors have noted other elements of extremist Islamic ideology.

=====Martyrdom/Istishhad=====
{{Main|Istishhad}}
Terror attacks requiring the death of the attacker are generally referred to as [[Suicide attack|suicide attacks/bombings]] by the media, but when done by Islamists their perpetrators generally call such an attack ''Istishhad'' (or in English "[[martyrdom operation]]"),<ref name=":32">{{Cite book |last=Romero |first=Juan |title=Terrorism: the Power and Weakness of Fear |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-032-19806-4 |series=Routledge Studies in Modern History |location=Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY |pages=145-146 |chapter=Rules of jihad}}</ref> and the suicide attacker ''[[shahid]]'' (pl. ''shuhada'', literally 'witness' and usually translated as 'martyr'). The idea being that the attacker died in order to testify his faith in God, for example while waging ''[[jihad|jihad bis saif]]'' ([[jihad]] by the sword). The term "suicide" is never used because Islam has [[Islamic views on suicide|strong strictures]] against taking one's own life.

According to author Sadakat Kadri, "the very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield." After 1983 the process was limited among Muslims to Hezbollah and other Lebanese Shi'a factions for more than a decade.<ref name=kadri-168>{{cite book|last1=Kadri|first1=Sadakat|title=Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ...|date=2012|publisher=macmillan|isbn=978-0-09-952327-7|page=168|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC&q=Heaven+on+Earth:+A+Journey+Through+Shari%27a+Law}}</ref>

Since then, the "vocabulary of martyrdom and sacrifice", videotaped pre-confession of faith by attackers have become part of "Islamic cultural consciousness", "instantly recognizable" to Muslims (according to [[Noah Feldman]]),{{Citation needed|date=October 2021}} while the tactic has spread through the Muslim world "with astonishing speed and on a surprising course".{{Citation needed|date=October 2021}}

{{blockquote|First the targets were American soldiers, then mostly Israelis, including women and children. From [[Lebanon]] and Israel, the technique of suicide bombing moved to Iraq, where the targets have included mosques and shrines, and the intended victims have mostly been [[Shia|Shiite]] [[Iraqi people|Iraqis]]. ... [In] [[Afghanistan]], ... both the perpetrators and the targets are orthodox [[Sunni]] Muslims. Not long ago, a bombing in Lashkar Gah, the capital of [[Helmand Province]], killed Muslims, including women, who were applying to go on [[Hajj|pilgrimage]] to [[Mecca]]. Overall, the trend is definitively in the direction of Muslim-on-Muslim violence. By a conservative accounting, more than three times as many Iraqis have been killed by suicide bombings in just three year (2003–6) as have Israelis in ten (from 1996–2006). Suicide bombing has become the archetype of Muslim violence&nbsp;– not just to Westerners but also to Muslims themselves.<ref name="nytimes.com">[[Noah Feldman]], [https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html "Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age"], ''The New York Times'', October 29, 2006</ref>}}

;Jihadist comparisons of life and death

Below are jihadist statements comparing life and death:
*"We love death like our enemies love life" ([[Hamas]] leader [[Ismail Haniyeh]] on [[Al-Aqsa TV]] in 2014)<ref>{{cite book |last1=Weber |first1=Joseph |title=Divided Loyalties: Young Somali Americans and the Lure of Extremism |publisher=MSU Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XzLwDwAAQBAJ&q=%E2%80%9CWe+love+death+like+our+enemies+love+life%E2%80%9D+haniyeh&pg=PT133 |chapter= 13. The Glory of the Shahid |date=September 2020 |isbn=978-1-62895-407-4 |access-date=15 July 2021}}</ref>
*"The Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love death." (Afghan jihadist Maulana Inyadullah addressing a British reporter in 2001)<ref name="Blair-2001">{{cite news |last1=Blair |first1=David |title=The Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love death. |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1341470/The-Americans-love-Pepsi-Cola-but-we-love-death.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220111/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1341470/The-Americans-love-Pepsi-Cola-but-we-love-death.html |archive-date=11 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=15 July 2021 |work=The Telegraph |date=24 September 2001}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
*"The world is but a passage ... what is called life in this world is not life but death" ([[Ruhollah Khomeini|Ayatollah Khomeini]] in 1977, commemorating his son's death)<ref>{{cite book |last1=Figueira |first1=Daurius |title=The Al Qaeda Discourse of the Greater Kufr |date=November 2004 |publisher=iUniverse |isbn=978-0-595-33613-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YCDMiksuRdYC&q=%22what+is+called+life+in+this+world+is+not+life+but+death%22+khomeini&pg=RA1-PT21 |access-date=15 July 2021}}</ref>
*"...The sons of the land of the two holiest sites [<nowiki/>[[Mecca]] and [[Medina]]] ... I say this to you, These youths love death as you love life" (Osama bin Laden addressing U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1996 fatwa)<ref name="Declaration of Jihad ObL">{{cite web |last1=bin Laden |first1=Osama |title=Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites. (Expel the infidels from the Arab Peninsula). A message from Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin |url=https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Americans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf |website=Combating Terrorism Center |access-date=15 July 2021 |page=(Document page 3) |archive-date=7 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210807052959/https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Americans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

=====Justification for killing noncombatants =====
Al-Qaeda justification for the killing of civilian bystanders following its first attack (see above) based on a [[Ibn Taymiyyah]]'s fatwa was described by author Lawrence Wright,
{{blockquote| Ibn Taymiyyah had issued a historic fatwa: Anyone who aided the Mongols, who bought goods from them or sold to them or was merely standing near them, might be killed as well. If he is a good Muslim, he will go to Paradise; if he is bad, he will go to hell, and good riddance. Thus the dead tourist and the hotel worker [killed by Al-Qaeda] would find their proper reward.<ref name="auto1">[source: testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, et.al., quoted in ''Looming Tower'', by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, 174-5</ref>}}

An influential tract ''[[Management of Savagery]]'' (''Idarat at-Tawahhush''), explains away mass killing in part by the fact that even "if the whole umma [community of Muslims] perishes they would all be martyrs".<ref name="auto2">Najji, ''Management of Savagery'', p.76; quoted in ...</ref><ref name="Gerges-18-3-19">{{cite journal |last1=Gerges |first1=Fawaz A. |title=The World According to ISIS |journal=Foreign Policy Journal |date=18 March 2016 |url=https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/03/18/the-world-according-to-isis/ |access-date=17 August 2019}}</ref> Similarly, author [[Ali A. Rizvi]] has described the chat room reaction of a Taliban supporter to his (Rizvi's) condemnation of the [[2014 Peshawar school massacre]]—that the 132 school children the Taliban slaughtered were "not dead" because they had been killed "in the way of God ... Don't call them dead. They are alive, but we don't perceive it" (citing, {{qref|3|169|b=y}} Never think of those martyred in the cause of Allah as dead. In fact, they are alive with their Lord, well provided for—), and maintaining that those whose Islamic faith is "pure" would not be upset with the Taliban's murder of children either.<ref name="interview">{{cite web |last1=POWELL |first1=CALEB |title=Leaving The Faith, THE SUN INTERVIEW, Ali Rizvi. |url=https://www.thesunmagazine.org/issues/504/leaving-the-faith |website=The Sun Magazine |access-date=26 August 2019 |date=December 2017}}</ref>

===== "War against Islam" =====

A tenant of Qutbism and other militant Islamists is that Western policies and society are not just un-Islamic or exploitive, but actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a "[[war against Islam]]". Islamists (such as Qutb) often identify what they see as a historical struggle between [[Christianity]] and [[Islam]], dating back as far as the [[Crusades]],<ref name="Qut-Decieve-1982-159">{{cite book |last1=Qutb |first1=Sayyid |title=Milestones |date=1982 |publisher=Mother Mosque Foundation |location=Iowa |isbn=0-911119-42-6 |pages=159–160 |quote=Enemies of the Believers may wish to change this struggle into an economic or political ... struggle so that the Believers become confused concerning the true nature of the struggle and the flame of belief in their hearts becomes extinguished ... We see an example of this today in the attempts of Christendom to try to deceive us by distorting history and saying that the Crusades were a form of imperialism. The truth of the matter is that the latter-day imperialism is but a mask for the crusading spirit, since it is not possible for it to appear in its true form, as it was possible in the Middle Ages.}}</ref> among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions.

In 2006, Britain's then head of [[MI5]] [[Eliza Manningham-Buller]] said of Al-Qaeda that it "has developed an ideology which claims that Islam is under attack, and needs to be defended". "This," she said "is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide."<ref name="EM-B">{{cite web|first=Eliza|last=Manningham-Buller|author-link=Eliza Manningham-Buller|url=http://www.icjs-online.org/index.php?article=1121|title=Transcript of speech: The International Terrorist Threat to the UK|publisher=ICJS Research|date=10 November 2006|access-date=4 August 2016|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304185657/http://www.icjs-online.org/index.php?article=1121|url-status=dead}}</ref> She said that the video wills of [[United Kingdom|British]] suicide bombers made it clear that they were motivated by perceived worldwide and long-standing injustices against Muslims; an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam promoted by some preachers and people of influence; their interpretation as anti-Muslim of UK foreign policy, in particular the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan."<ref name="EM-B" />

In his call for jihad, [[Osama bin Laden]] almost invariably described his enemies as aggressive and his action against them as defensive.<ref name="KNAPP-90">{{cite journal|last1=KNAPP|first1=MICHAEL G.|date=Spring 2003|title=The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam|url=https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/03spring/knapp.pdf|url-status=dead|journal=Parameters|publisher=[[Wayback Machine]]|page=90|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170517024926/https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/03spring/knapp.pdf|archive-date=17 May 2017|access-date=14 January 2022}}</ref>

===== Enmity towards non-Muslims, Western society and LGBT+ =====
The enmity towards non-Muslims among Islamist militants, leaders and scholars is driven by theological beliefs that deem Christians and Jews as "[[Infidels in Islam|infidels]]". This hostility is further extended to [[Western world|Western society]] due to its secular values and practices, which are viewed as contrary to Islamic principles. These include issues such as the proliferation of [[pornography]], perceived [[immorality]], and the acceptance of [[homosexuality]] and [[feminism]].

An example of this ideological stance in practice was provided by Karam Kuhdi, an Islamist arrested in Egypt in 1981 for his involvement in a series of robberies and murders targeting Christian goldsmiths. In this period, tourists, often non-Muslim, were also frequently targeted by Islamic terrorists in Egypt. During police interrogation, Kuhdi surprised authorities with his unconventional beliefs. He rejected the traditional Islamic doctrine that Christians were "[[People of the Book]]" entitled to protection as [[Dhimmi|''dhimmis'']], instead considering them infidels subject to violent jihad. Kuhdi supported his stance by citing Quranic verses such as 'Those who say that God is Jesus, son of Mary, are infidels' and 'combat those of the people of the book who are infidels', explaining the Islamists view that the infidels are "the People of the Book, since they have not believed in this book".<ref>Kepel, Gilles, The Prophet and the Pharaoh, (2003), p.208-209</ref>

According to a doctrine known as ''al-wala' wa al-bara{{'}}'' (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Wahhabi founder Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".<ref>{{cite book|last= Abou El Fadl  |first= Khaled |title= The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists |publisher= Harper San Francisco  |year=2005 |pages=49, 50 |quote=Significantly, Abd al-Wahhab also insisted that it was a sign of spiritual weakness for Muslims to care for or be interested in non-Muslim beliefs or practices. Pursuant to a doctrine known as ''al-wala' wa al-bara{{'}}'' (literally, the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal. For example, by not being  the first to greet a non-Muslim, orby ever  wishing a non-Muslim peace.}}</ref>

Although bin Laden almost always emphasized the alleged oppression of Muslims by America and Jews when talking about the need for jihad in his messages, in his "[[Letter to the American People|Letter to America]]", he answered the question, "What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?" with:

{{blockquote|We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, and trading with interest (...) You separate religion from your policies, (...) You are the nation that permits Usury, which has been forbidden by all the religions (...) You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants (...) You are a nation that permits acts of immorality (...) You are a nation that permits gambling in its all forms. (...) You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women.<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America'] accessed 24 May 2007</ref>}}

This principle has been emphasized by [[Ayman al-Zawahiri]] (leader of al-Qaeda since June 2011),  [[Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi]] (Jihadi theorist), [[Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shu'aybi]] (conservative Sudi scholar who supported the 9/11 attacks), and a number of Salafi preachers, [[Ahmad Musa Jibril]], [[Abdullah el-Faisal]].<ref name="Gilliam-2018">{{cite journal |last1=Gilliam |first1=Joshua |title=Why They Hate Us An Examination of al-wala' wa-l-bara' in Salafi-Jihadist Ideology |journal=Military Review |date=15 February 2018 |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Feb/They-Hate/ |access-date=1 June 2021}}</ref>

Following the 2016 [[Pulse nightclub shooting|Orlando nightclub shooting]], described as a "hate crime" due to the victims being customers of an LGBT nightclub,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Blinder |first1=Alan |last2=Robles |first2=Frances |last3=Pèrez-Peña |first3=Richard |date=16 June 2016 |title=Omar Mateen Posted to Facebook Amid Orlando Attack, Lawmaker Says |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/us/orlando-shooting.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160618111744/http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/us/orlando-shooting.html |archive-date=18 June 2016 |access-date=18 June 2016 |work=The New York Times}}</ref> allegedly targeted in retaliation for American airstrikes against ISIS, the official ISIS magazine [[Dabiq (magazine)|Dabiq]] responded: "A hate crime? Yes. Muslims undoubtedly hate liberalist sodomites. An act of terrorism? Most definitely. Muslims have been commanded to terrorize the disbelieving enemies of Allah."<ref>{{cite magazine |date=July 2016 |title=Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You |url=http://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-cross.pdf |access-date=2 February 2018 |journal=Dabiq |page=30 |issue=15}}</ref><ref name="Gilliam-2018" />

===== Takfir =====

According to traditional Islamic law, the blood of someone who leaves Islam is "forfeit"—i.e. they are condemned to death.<ref name=KepelJihad-31 />  This applies not only to self-proclaimed ex-Muslims, but to those who still believe themselves to be Muslims but who  (in the eyes of their accusers) have deviated too far from orthodoxy.  {{#tag:ref|(The punishment is agreed on by all the [[madhhab|schools of fiqh]] (Islamic jurisprudence) both [[Madhhab#Sunni|Sunni]] and [[Madhhab#Shia|Shia]],<ref name="punishment">{{cite book |last1=Abul Ala Mawdudi |title=The Punishment of the Apostate According to Islamic Law |date=1 January 1994 |publisher=The Voice of the Martyrs |chapter=Chapter one. The Problem of the Apostate's Execution from a Legal Perspective }}</ref> and has traditionally been undisputed.)<ref name="Schirrmacher-2020-85">{{cite book |last1=Schirrmacher |first1=Christine |editor1-last=Enstedt |editor1-first=Daniel |editor2-last=Larsson |editor2-first=Göran |editor3-last=Mantsinen |editor3-first=Teemu T. |title=Handbook of Leaving Religion |date=2020 |publisher=Brill |page=85  |url=https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/43466/external_content.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y |access-date=6 January 2021 |chapter=Leaving Islam}}</ref>|group=Note}}

Many contemporary liberal/modernist/reformist Muslims believe [[Apostasy in Islam#Supporters and opponents of death penalty|killing appostates]] to be in violation of the Quranic injunction 'There is no compulsion in religion....' (Q.2:256), but even earlier generations of  Islamic scholars warned against making such accusations (known as ''[[takfir]]''), without great care and usually reserved the punishment of death for "extreme, persistent and aggressive" proponents of religious innovation (''[[bidʻah]]'').<ref name="Lewis-229">{{cite book|last1=Lewis|first1=Bernard|title=The Middle East: a Brief History of the Last 2000 Years|date=1995|publisher=Touchstone|isbn=978-0-684-83280-7|page=229}}</ref> The danger, according to some (such as [[Gilles Kepel]]), was that "used wrongly or unrestrainedly,  ... Muslims might resort to mutually excommunicating one another and thus propel the [[Ummah]] to complete disaster."<ref name=KepelJihad-31>Kepel, Gilles; ''Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam'', London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, page 31</ref>

Kepel noted that some of Qutb's early followers believed that his declaration that the Muslim world has reverted to pre-Islamic ignorance ([[Jahiliyyah]]), should be taken literally and everyone outside of their movement takfired;<ref name=KepelJihad-32>Kepel,  ''Jihad'', 2002, p. 32</ref> and Wahhabis has been known for their  willingness to takfir non-Wahhabi Muslims.<ref name="TCSI2010: 48">{{cite book|last=Halverson|first=Jeffry R.|year=2010|title=Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash'arism, and Political Sunnism |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-230-10658-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IYzGAAAAQBAJ |pages=48–49}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Islam and power in Saudi Arabia|editor-first=John L.|editor-last=Esposito|editor2=Emad El-Din Shahin|encyclopedia=The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|year=2013 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Hc7iAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA412|pages=412–413|isbn=978-0-19-539589-1}}</ref>

Since the last half of the 20th century, a "central ideology"<ref name="OISO" /> of insurgent [[Wahhabi movement|Wahhabist]]/[[Salafi jihadism|Salafi jihadist]] groups<ref>Oliveti, Vincenzo; ''Terror's Source: the Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences,'' Birmingham: Amadeus Books, 2002</ref> has been the "sanctioning" of "violence against leaders" of Muslim majority states<ref name="OISO" /> who do not enforce [[sharia]] (Islamic law) or are otherwise "deemed insufficiently religious".<ref name="OISO">{{cite web |title=Takfiri |url=http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130117234531/http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319 |url-status=dead |archive-date=17 January 2013 |website=Oxford Islamic Studies Online |access-date=18 December 2020}}</ref>
Some  insurgent groups -- [[Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya]] of Egypt, and later [[Armed Islamic Group of Algeria#Antar Zouabri and takfir|GIA]], the [[Taliban's rise to power#Ethnic massacres and persecution|Taliban]],  and [[Ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant#Takfir|ISIL]]) -- are thought to have gone even further,  applying takfir and its capital punishment against not only to Sunni government authorities and Shia Muslims, but to ordinary Sunni civilians who disagree with/disobeyed insurgent policies such as reinstituting slavery.

In 1977, the group ''[[Jama'at al-Muslimin]]'' (known to the public as ''[[Takfir wal-Hijra]]''), kidnapped and later killed an  Islamic scholar and former Egyptian government minister Muhammad al-Dhahabi.  The founder of ''Jama'at al-Muslimin'', Shukri Mustaf  had been imprisoned with [[Sayyid Qutb]], and had become one of Qutb's "most radical" disciples.<ref name=pbs>{{Cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/script.html|title=Transcript &#124; Al Qaeda's New Front &#124; FRONTLINE |publisher=PBS}}</ref> He believed that not only was the Egyptian government [[Apostasy in Islam|apostate]], but so was "Egyptian society as a whole" because it was "not fighting the Egyptian government and had thus accepted rule by non-Muslims".<ref name=Mili-29-6-2006>{{cite journal|last1=Mili|first1=Hayder|title=Jihad Without Rules: The Evolution of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra|journal=Terrorism Monitor|date=29 June 2006|volume=4|issue=13|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=822&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1|access-date=18 December 2015}}</ref>  While police broke up the group, it  reorganized with thousands of members,<ref>Wright, Robin ''Sacred Rage'', 1985, p.181</ref> some of whom went on to help assassinate the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat,<ref name="Rabasa">{{Cite book|first=Angel|last=Rabasa|title=Radical Islam in East Africa|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x96UabsFz4AC&pg=PA70|year=2009|publisher=Rand Corporation|page=70|isbn=978-0-8330-4679-6}}</ref> and join the [[Algerian Civil War]] and Al-Qaeda.<ref name="Dalacoura">[https://archive.org/details/islamistterroris0000dala/page/113 ''Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East''] By Katerina Dalacoura, p.113</ref>  During the 1990s, a violent Islamic insurgency in Egypt, primarily perpetrated by [[Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya]], targeted not only police and government officials but also civilians, killing or wounding 1106 persons in one particularly bloody year (1993).<ref>Murphy, Caryle ''Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience'', Scribner, 2002, pp. 82-3</ref>

In the brutal 1991–2002 [[Algerian Civil War]], takfir of the general Algerian public was known to have been declared by the hardline Islamist [[Armed Islamic Group of Algeria]] (GIA). The GIA amir, Antar Zouabri claimed credit for two massacres of civilians ([[Rais massacre|Rais]] and [[Bentalha massacre]]s), calling the killings an "offering to God" and declaring impious the victims and all Algerians who had not joined its ranks.<ref name=GKJTPI2002:272-3>[[#GKJTPI2002|Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002]]: p.272-3</ref> He declared that "except for those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserving of death,"<ref>''[[El Watan]]'', 21 January (quoted in Willis 1996)</ref> (Tens, and sometimes hundreds, of civilians were killed in each of a series of massacres that started in April 1998.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Nesroullah Yous |author2=Salima Mellah |title=Qui a tué a Bentalha?|publisher=La Découverte, Paris|year=2000|isbn=978-2-7071-3332-8}}</ref> However, how many murders were the doing of GIA and how many of the security forces—who had infiltrated the insurgents and were not known for their probity—is not known.)<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20050401070834/http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1543&l=2 Entre menace, censure et liberté: La presse privé algérienne se bat pour survivre], 31 March 1998</ref><ref name=Ajami-2010>{{cite magazine|last1=Ajami|first1=Fouad|title=The Furrows of Algeria|magazine=New Republic|date=27 January 2010|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/the-furrows-algeria|access-date=4 June 2015}}</ref>

In August 1998 the Taliban insurgents slaughtered 8000 mostly Shia [[Hazaras|Hazara]] non-combatants in [[Mazar-i-Sharif]], Afghanistan. Comments by Mullah Niazi, the Taliban commander of the attack and newly installed governor,  declared in a number of post-slaughter speeches from Mosques in Mazar-i-Sharif: "Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shi'a. They are kofr [infidels]. The Hazaras killed our force here, and now we have to kill Hazaras. ... You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. ...",<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/report/1998/11/01/afghanistan-massacre-mazar-i-sharif|title=THE MASSACRE IN MAZAR-I SHARIF|publisher=Human Rights Watch|date=1 November 1998 |access-date=25 December 2020}}</ref>  indicated that along with revenge, and/or ethnic hatred, [[takfir]]  was a motive for the slaughter.

From its inception in 2013 to 2020, directly or through affiliated groups,  [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|Daesh]]), "has been responsible for 27,947 terrorist deaths", the majority of these have been Muslims,{{#tag:ref|according to Jamileh Kadivar based on estimates from Global Terrorism Database, 2020; Herrera, 2019; Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights & United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Office, 2014; Ibrahim, 2017; Obeidallah, 2014; 2015<ref name="Kadivar-2020" />|group=Note}} "because it has regarded them as kafir".<ref name="Kadivar-2020">{{cite journal |last1=Kadivar |first1=Jamileh |title=Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh's Media |journal=Contemporary Review of the Middle East |date=18 May 2020 |volume=7 |issue=3 |pages=259–285 |doi=10.1177/2347798920921706 |s2cid=219460446 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

One example of Daesh takfir is found in the 13th issue of its magazine ''Dabiq'', which  dedicated "dozens of pages ... to attacking and explaining the necessity of killing Shia", who the group refers to by the label ''Rafidah''
{{blockquote|Initiated by a sly Jew, [the Shia] are an apostate sect drowning in worship of the dead, cursing the best companions and wives of the Prophet, spreading doubt on the very basis of the religion (the Qur'ān and the Sunnah), defaming the very honor of the Prophet, and preferring their "twelve" imāms to the prophets and even to Allah! ...Thus, the Rāfidah are mushrik [polytheist] apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found, until no Rāfidī walks on the face of earth, even if the jihād claimants despise such...<ref name="Pillalamarri-why-hate-29-1-2016">{{cite news |last1=Pillalamarri |first1=Akhilesh |title=Revealed: Why ISIS Hates the Taliban |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/revealed-why-isis-hates-the-taliban/ |access-date=26 December 2020 |agency=The Diplomat |date=29 January 2016}}</ref>}}

Daesh not only called for the revival of slavery of non-Muslims (specifically of the [[Yazidi]] minority group), but declared takfir on any Muslim who disagreed with their policy.
{{blockquote|Yazidi women and children [are to be] divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the [[Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014)|Sinjar operations]]  ... Enslaving the families of the [[kuffar]] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Koran and the narrations of the Prophet ... and thereby apostatizing from Islam.<ref name="what-isis-really-wants" />}}

Starting in 2013, Daesh began "encouraging takfir of Muslims deemed insufficiently pure in regard of ''tawhid'' (monotheism)". The Taliban were found "to be "a 'nationalist' movement, all too tolerant" of Shia.<ref name=infighting-2019 /> In 2015 ISIL "pronounced [[Jabhat al-Nusrat]] -- then al-Qaida's affiliate in Syria -- an apostate group."<ref name=infighting-2019>{{cite journal|journal=Perspectives on Terrorism |volume=13 |issue=1 |last1=Bunzel |first1=Cole |title=Ideological Infighting in the Islamic State |date=February 2019 |pages=12–21 |jstor=26590504 |access-date=17 December 2020 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26590504}}</ref>

===== Interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith =====
{{See also|Quran and violence}}

Donald Holbrook, a Research Fellow at the [[Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence]], analyzes a sample of 30 works by jihadist propagandists for references to Islamic scripture that justifies the objectives of violent jihad.<ref name=holbrook1 /> [[An-Nisa]] (4:74–75) is quoted most frequently; other popular passages are [[At-Taubah]] (9:13–15, 38–39, 111), [[Al-Baqarah]] (2:190–191, 216), and [[Sword Verse|Surah 9:5]]:

{{blockquote|But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.}}

Holbrook notes that the first part "slay the idolaters ..." is oft quoted but not the limiting factors at the end of the [[ayat]].<ref name=holbrook1 />

==== Jihad and Islamic jurisprudence ====
{{Main|Jihad}}

[[Islamic military jurisprudence|Techniques of war]] are restricted by classical Islamic jurisprudence, but its scope is not. [[Bernard Lewis]] states that ultimately Jihad ends when  the entire world is brought under Islamic rule and law.<ref>Lewis, Bernard, ''The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years'', pp. 233–34</ref> [[Fiqh#Diagram of early scholars|Classical Islamic jurisprudence]] imposes, without limit of time or space, the duty to subjugate non-Muslims, (according to Lewis).<ref>Lewis, Bernard, ''The Political Language of Islam'', p. 73</ref> [[Wael Hallaq]] writes that some radical Islamists go beyond the classical theory to insist that the purpose of jihad is to overthrow regimes oppressing Muslims and bring non-Muslims to convert to Islam. In contrast, [[Islamic modernism|Islamic modernists]]–who Islamists despise–view jihad as defensive and compatible with modern standards of warfare.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IbOtAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA338|title=Sharī'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|pages=338–39|author=Wael B. Hallaq|isbn=978-1-107-39412-4}}</ref> To justify their acts of [[Islam and violence|religious violence]], jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (''[[fatwa]]'') developed by [[Salafi jihadism|jihadi-Salafist]] legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the [[Internet]].<ref name="French 2020" />

;Al-Qaeda
While Islamic opponents of attacks on civilians have quoted numerous prophetic hadith and hadith by Muhammad's first successor [[Abu Bakr]],<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003-86">{{cite journal |last1=Wiktorowicz |first1=Quintan |last2=Kaltner |first2=John |title=Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11 |journal=Middle East Policy |date=Summer 2003 |volume=X |issue=2 |pages=86|url=https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001177.pdf |access-date=12 August 2019}}</ref> Al-Qaeda believes its attacks are religiously justified.
After its first attack on a US target that killed civilians instead (a [[1992 Yemen hotel bombings|1992 bombing of a hotel in Aden Yemen]]), Al Qaeda justified the killing of civilian bystanders through an interpretation (by one Abu Hajer) based on medieval jurist [[Ibn Taymiyyah]] (see above).

In a post-9/11 work, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington", Al-Qaeda provided a more systematic justification—one that provided "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003" />  Among these justifications are that America is leading the countries of the West in waging war on Islam, which (al-Qaeda alleges) targets "Muslim women, children and elderly". This means any attacks on America are a defense of Islam, and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. Other justifications for killing and situations where killings is allowed based on precedents in early Islamic history include:  killing non-combatants  when it is too difficult to distinguish between them and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (''hist''), and/or non-combatants remain in enemy territory; killing those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind", this includes civilians since they can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power; necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims; when the prophet was asked whether Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village of Taif, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a  civilian population, he indicated in the affirmative; killing women, children and other protected groups is allowed when they serve as human shields for the enemy; killing of civilians is permitted if the enemy has broken a treaty.
<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003" />

Supporters of bin Laden have pointed to reports according to which the Islamic prophet Muhammad attacked towns at night or with catapults, and argued that he must have condoned incidental harm to noncombatants, since it would have been impossible to distinguish them from combatants during such attacks.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wiktorowicz |first1=Quintan |last2=Kaltner |first2=John |title=Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11 |journal=Middle East Policy |date=Summer 2003 |volume=X |issue=2 |pages=85–90 |url=https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001177.pdf |access-date=12 August 2019}}</ref><ref name="peters-cook">{{cite encyclopedia |year=2014 |title=Jihād |encyclopedia=The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |url=http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref:oiso/9780199739356.001.0001/acref-9780199739356-e-0263 |last1=Peters |first1=Rudolph |first2=David|last2=Cook |url-access=subscription |isbn=978-0-19-973935-6}}</ref> These arguments were not widely accepted by Muslims.<ref name=peters-cook />

;''Management of Savagery''
Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors, [[Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad]] and the [[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]], are thought to have been heavily influenced<ref name=McCoy-12-8-2004 /><ref name=Crooke-30-8-2014>{{cite web|last1=Crooke|first1=Alastair|title=The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq|url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/iraq-isis-alqaeda_b_5542575.html|website=The World Post|access-date=2 December 2015|date=30 August 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Hassan |first=Hassan |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/isis-islamic-state-ideology-sharia-syria-iraq-jordan-pilot |title=Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it |work=The Guardian |date=8 February 2015 |access-date=10 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=McCoy |first=Terrence |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/12/the-calculated-madness-of-the-islamic-states-horrifying-brutality/ |title=The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=12 August 2014 |access-date=1 September 2014}}<br />{{bullet}}{{cite news |first=Alastair |last=Crooke |url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/iraq-isis-alqaeda_b_5542575.html |title=The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq |work=HuffPost |date=30 June 2014}}<br />{{bullet}}{{cite news |last=Hassan |first=Hassan |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/isis-islamic-state-ideology-sharia-syria-iraq-jordan-pilot |title=Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it |work=The Guardian |date=8 February 2015}}</ref><ref name="Ajjoub 2021">{{cite book |last=Ajjoub |first=Orwa |year=2021 |title=The Development of the Theological and Political Aspects of Jihadi-Salafism |url=https://www.cmes.lu.se/sites/cmes.lu.se/files/2021-02/orwa_ajjoub_rapport_a4_0203_interaktiv.pdf |url-status=live |location=[[Lund]] |publisher=Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) at the [[Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University]] |pages=1–28 |isbn=978-91-7895-772-9 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210210042321/https://www.cmes.lu.se/sites/cmes.lu.se/files/2021-02/orwa_ajjoub_rapport_a4_0203_interaktiv.pdf |archive-date=10 February 2021 |access-date=6 July 2021}}</ref> by a 2004 work on jihad entitled ''[[Management of Savagery]]'' (''Idarat at-Tawahhush''), written by Abu Bakr Naji<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /> and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamic [[caliphate]] by first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.<ref name="nyJune14">{{cite magazine |last=Wright |first=Lawrence |title=ISIS's Savage Strategy in Iraq |url=http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/isiss-savage-strategy-in-iraq |magazine=The New Yorker |date=16 June 2014 |access-date=1 September 2014}}</ref>

The tract asserts that "one who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, deterrence and massacring,"<ref name=NEGUS-1-4-2015>{{cite news|last1=NEGUS|first1=STEVE|title='ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror,' and More|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/books/review/isis-inside-the-army-of-terror-and-more.html|access-date=3 December 2015|work=The New York Times|date=1 April 2015}}</ref>  and  that even "the most abominable of the levels of savagery" of jihad are better "than stability under the order of unbelief"—those orders being any regime other than ISIL.<ref name=McCoy-12-8-2004>{{cite news|last1=McCoy|first1=Terrence|title=The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/12/the-calculated-madness-of-the-islamic-states-horrifying-brutality/|access-date=2 December 2015|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=12 August 2014}}</ref><ref name=Atran-nybooks-11-16-15>{{cite news |last1=Atran |first1=Scott |last2=Hamid |first2=Nafees |title=Paris: The War ISIS Wants |url=http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/nov/16/paris-attacks-isis-strategy-chaos |work=[[The New York Review of Books]] |access-date=20 November 2015 |date=16 November 2015}}</ref>
Victims should not only be beheaded, shot, burn alive in cages or gradually submerged until drowned, but these events should be publicized with videos and photographs.<ref name=cnn-12-8-15>{{cite news |last1=Lee |first1=Ian |last2=Hanna |first2=Jason |title=Croatian ISIS captive reportedly beheaded |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/12/middleeast/isis-croatian-hostage/ |access-date=12 August 2015 |publisher=CNN |date=12 August 2015}}</ref>

;''The Jurisprudence of Blood''
[[File:Slogan of the Houthi Movement.svg|150px|thumb|right|The [[Houthi]] flag, with the top saying "''[[Takbir|God is the greatest]]''", the next line saying "''[[Death to America]]''", followed by "''Death to Israel''", followed by "''[[Antisemitism in Islam|A curse upon the Jews]]''", and the bottom saying "''Victory to Islam''".]]

Some observers<ref name="Poljarevic 2021" /><ref name="1Kadri-2012">{{cite book |last=Kadri |first=Sadakat |year=2012 |title=Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia |publisher=[[Macmillan Publishers]] |location=[[London]] |isbn=978-0-09-952327-7 |pages=172–175 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC}}</ref><ref name="Gorka-2009">{{cite web|title=Understanding History's Seven Stages of Jihad|url=https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/understanding-history%E2%80%99s-seven-stages-of-jihad|last=Gorka|first=Sebastian|date=3 October 2009|website=Combating Terrorism Center|access-date=1 November 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304082911/https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/understanding-history%E2%80%99s-seven-stages-of-jihad|archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref> have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-century [[Salafi jihadism]].<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /> According to the [[legal historian]] Sadarat Kadri,<ref name="1Kadri-2012" /> during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any ''[[bid'ah]]'' (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".<ref name="1Kadri-2012" /> "The very idea that [[Muslims]] might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."<ref name="1Kadri-2012" />

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (''jihad bil-saif'') rather than the "jihad of the heart",<ref>{{cite book |last=Lewis |first=Bernard |author-link=Bernard Lewis |year=1988 |title=[[The Political Language of Islam]] |page=[https://archive.org/details/politicallanguag00lewi_680/page/n80 72] |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |location=[[Chicago]] |isbn=0-226-47693-6 |via=[[Internet Archive]]}}</ref> but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the [[Quran]] and the [[Hadith]], such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the [[Ummah|Muslim community]], jihad was not a "personal obligation" (''fard 'ayn''); instead it was a "collective one" (''[[fard al-kifaya]]''),<ref name="Khadduri-1955-60">{{cite book |last=Khadduri |first=Majid |author-link=Majid Khadduri |title=War and Peace in the Law of Islam |year=1955 |publisher=[[Johns Hopkins University Press]] |location=[[Baltimore]] |page=60 |chapter-url=https://actforamericaeducation.com/downloads/All_Files_by_Type/khadduri.pdf |access-date=26 October 2015 |chapter=5. Doctrine of Jihad |quote=[Unlike the five pillars of Islam, jihad was to be enforced by the state.] ... 'unless the Muslim community is subjected to a sudden attack and therefore all believers, including women and children are under the obligation to fight—[jihad of the sword] is regarded by all jurists, with almost no exception, as a collective obligation of the whole Muslim community,' meaning that 'if the duty is fulfilled by a part of the community it ceases to be obligatory on others'.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151128192525/http://www.actforamericaeducation.com/downloads/All_Files_by_Type/khadduri.pdf|archive-date=28 November 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (''fi sabil Allah''),<ref name="2Kadri-2012">{{cite book |last=Kadri |first=Sadakat |year=2012 |title=Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia |publisher=[[Macmillan Publishers]] |location=[[London]] |isbn=978-0-09-952327-7 |pages=150–151 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC}}</ref> and it could only be directed by the [[caliph]], "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."<ref name="2Kadri-2012" /> (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the [[Khawarij|Kharijia]]'s jihad against and killing of [[Ali as Caliph|Caliph Ali]], since [[Takfir|they deemed]] that [[Apostasy in Islam|he was no longer a Muslim]]).<ref name="Poljarevic 2021" /> [[Shahid|Martyrdom]] resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in [[Jahannam|Hell]].<ref name="ARSI-BL-xii">{{cite book|last1=Lewis|first1=Bernard|title=The Assassins, a radical sect in Islam|orig-year=1967|year=2003|publisher=Basic Books|page=xi–xii |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sRVmL_h_PcsC&q=suicide |access-date=13 October 2015|isbn=978-0-7867-2455-0}}</ref> The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Edwards |first1=Richard |last2=Zuhur|first2=Sherifa |title=The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and|page=553|publisher=ABC-CLIO|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YAd8efHdVzIC&pg=PA553|isbn=978-1-85109-842-2 |date=12 May 2008}}</ref>

Based on the 20th-century interpretations of [[Sayyid Qutb]], [[Abdullah Azzam]], [[Ruhollah Khomeini]], [[al-Qaeda]] and others, many if not all of those self-proclaimed jihad fighters believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act of martyrdom and it brings you a special place in [[Jannah|Heaven]], not a special place in Hell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermind Non-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analyst [[Sebastian Gorka]] described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."<ref name=Gorka-2009 />

[[Islamic theology|Islamic theologian]] Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists and [[ideologue]]s behind modern jihadist violence.<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /><ref name="CP265">{{cite journal |last=Bunzel |first=Cole |date=18 February 2016 |title=The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_265_Bunzel_Islamic_States_Final.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Carnegie Papers |volume=265 |pages=1–43 |publisher=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |location=[[Washington, D.C.]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160328062426/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_265_Bunzel_Islamic_States_Final.pdf |archive-date=28 March 2016 |access-date=5 July 2021}}</ref><ref name="Atlantic 2016">{{cite magazine |last1=al-Saud |first1=Abdullah K. |last2=Winter |first2=Charlie |title=Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir: The Obscure Theologian Who Shaped ISIS |magazine=[[The Atlantic]] |location=[[Washington, D.C.]] |date=4 December 2016 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/isis-muhajir-syria/509399/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612140424/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/isis-muhajir-syria/509399/ |archive-date=12 June 2018 |url-status=live  |access-date=28 September 2020}}</ref><ref name="Guardian">{{cite news |last=Townsend |first=Mark |date=13 May 2018 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/isis-jihadist-manual-analysed-rebutted-by-islamic-scholar |title=The core Isis manual that twisted Islam to legitimise barbarity |work=[[The Guardian]] |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180609090007/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/isis-jihadist-manual-analysed-rebutted-by-islamic-scholar |archive-date=9 June 2018 |url-status=live |access-date=5 July 2021 }}</ref> His theological and legal justifications influenced [[Abu Musab al-Zarqawi]], al-Qaeda member and former leader of [[al-Qaeda in Iraq]], as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIL and Boko Haram.<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /><ref name="CP265" /><ref name="Atlantic 2016" /><ref name="Guardian" /> Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic as ''Fiqh al-Dima'' and referred to in English as ''The Jurisprudence of Jihad'' or ''The Jurisprudence of Blood''.<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /><ref name="CP265" /><ref name="Atlantic 2016" /><ref name="Guardian" /><ref name="ChrisStout">{{cite book |last=Stout |first=Chris E. |author-link=Chris Stout (psychologist) |year=2018 |orig-year=2017 |title=Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism: New Psychology to Understand, Face, and Defuse the Threat |location=[[Santa Barbara, California]] |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group]] |pages=5–6 |chapter=The Psychology of Terrorism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QvHeDgAAQBAJ&q=jurisprudence+of+blood+ISIS&pg=PA5 |isbn=978-1-4408-5192-6 |oclc=994829038}}</ref> The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and  non-combatants".<ref name="Ajjoub 2021" /> ''[[The Guardian]]''{{'}}s journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of [[Quilliam (think tank)|Quilliam]], notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [''The Jurisprudence of Blood''] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".<ref name="Guardian" /> Charlie Winter of ''[[The Atlantic]]'' describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".<ref name="Atlantic 2016" /> He states:

{{Blockquote|Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the [[Ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|literary corpus of ISIS]]—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir, [[Suicide attack#Islam|committing suicide to kill people]] is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.<ref name="Atlantic 2016" />}}

Clinical psychologist [[Chris Stout (psychologist)|Chris E. Stout]] also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay, ''Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism'' (2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders Islamic terrorism a valid means of solution.<ref name="ChrisStout" />

=== Economic motivation ===
[[File:Osama bin Laden (cropped).jpg|alt=Osama in November 2001|thumb|Osama Bin Laden, the founder of multinational terrorist group [[Al-Qaeda]], in November 2001.]]
Following the 9/11 attack, commentators noted the poverty of Afghanistan, and speculated that blame might partly fall on a lack of a "higher priority to health, education, and economic development" funding by richer countries,<ref name="Stern-2001">{{cite journal |last1=Stern |first1=Jessica |title=John Harvard's Journal: Talking about Terrorism |journal=Harvard Magazine |date=November 2001 |issue=November–December 2001 |url=https://harvardmagazine.com/2001/11/talking-about-terrorism.html |access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref> and "stagnant economies and a paucity of jobs" in poorer countries.<ref name="Sachs">{{cite news |last1=Sachs |first1=Susan |title=A NATION CHALLENGED: WHO SEETHES, AND WHY; Despair Beneath the Arab World's Rage |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/14/world/a-nation-challenged-who-seethes-and-why-despair-beneath-the-arab-world-s-rage.html |access-date=31 August 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=14 October 2001}}</ref>

Among the acts of oppression against Muslims by the United States and its allies alleged by the head of Al-Qaeda, are economic exploitation. In a 6 October 2002 message by Osama bin Laden 'Letter to America', he alleges
{{blockquote|You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of your international influence and military threats. This theft is indeed the biggest theft ever witnessed by mankind in the history of the world. ... If people steal our wealth, then we have the right to destroy their economy.<ref>{{cite news |last1=bin Laden |first1=Osama |title=Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver |access-date=31 August 2019 |work=The Guardian}}</ref><ref name="Swanson-stealing">{{cite web |last1=Swanson |first1=Elmer |title=Muslims are starving to death and the United States is stealing their oil |url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/us_stealing_muslim_oil.html |website=Gems of Islamism |access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref>}}
In a 1997 interview, he claimed that "since 1973, the price of petrol has increased only $8/barrel while the prices of other items have gone up three times. The oil prices should also have gone up three times but this did not happen",<ref>bin Laden in an interview with Hamid Mir, Pakistan, 18 March 1997. Quoted on p.230 of ''The New Jackals : Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism'' by Simon Reeve, 1999.</ref>{{#tag:ref|(This claim seems to be based on incorrect facts — the price of wheat did not increase three fold from 1973–1997 — and the questionable assumption that the demand and price for oil would continue to rise at a steady rate after the [[1973 oil crisis|Arab Oil Embargo]] raised it by four fold in a short period.)<ref name="Swanson-stealing" /><ref name="Macrotrends">{{cite web |title=Wheat Prices – 40 Year Historical Chart |url=https://www.macrotrends.net/2534/wheat-prices-historical-chart-data |website=Macrotrends |access-date=3 June 2021}}</ref>|group=Note}} (On the other hand, in an interview five weeks after the destruction the [[World Trade Center (1973–2001)|World Trade Center]] towers his operation was responsible for, bin Laden described the towers as standing for—or "preaching"—not exploitation or capitalism, but "freedom human Rights, and equality".)<ref>Osama bin Laden interviewed by Tayser Allouni, Al Jazeera, 21 October 2001, in ''Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden'', ed. Bruce Lawrence, translated by James Howarth (London, Verso, 2005), 112</ref>

In 2002, academics Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova found "a careful review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would by themselves, meaningfully reduce international terrorism."<ref>{{cite magazine |last1=Krueger |first1=Alan B. |last2=Maleckova |first2=Jitka |title=Does Poverty Cause Terrorism |magazine=The New Republic |date=24 June 2002 |url=http://www.nber.org/ens/feldstein/Krueger/LC514_Week_02_Does_Poverty_Cause_Terrorism.pdf |access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref>  Alberto Abadie found "the risk of terrorism is not significantly higher for poorer countries, once other country-specific characteristics are considered", but instead seems to correlate with a country's "level of political freedom".<ref name="Abadie-2005">{{cite journal |last1=Abadie |first1=Alberto |title=Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism |journal=American Economic Review |date=September 2005 |volume=95 |issue=4 |pages=50–56 |url=https://www.nber.org/digest/may05/w10859.html |access-date=31 August 2019 |series=(NBER Working Paper No. 10859}}</ref>

Martin Kramer has argued that while terrorist organizers are seldom poor, their "foot-soldiers" often are.<ref name="kramer-2004">{{cite book |last1=Lieber |first1=Robert James |title=The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century |date=2005 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=118 |isbn=978-0-521-85737-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4kH7I9f6o64C&q=martin+kramer+the+vehicle+of+counter-elites%2C+people+who%2C+by+virtue+of+education+and%2For+income%2C+are+potential+members+of+the+elite&pg=PA118 |access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref> Andrew Whitehead states that "poverty creates opportunity" for terrorists, who have hired desperate poor children to do grunt work in Iraq and won the loyalty of poor in Lebanon by providing social services.<ref>Andrew Whitehead, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?", Homeland Security Policy Institute, 21 August 2007</ref>

=== Western foreign policy ===
Many believe that groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS which are reacting to aggression by non-Muslim (especially US) powers, and that religious beliefs are overstated if not irrelevant in their motivation.
According to a graph by U.S. State Department, terrorist attacks escalated worldwide following the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan|United States' 2001 invasion of Afghanistan]] and [[2003 invasion of Iraq]].<ref name="stopwar.org.uk">{{cite web|last=Rees|first=John|author-link=John Rees (activist)|date=7 January 2015|title=What you need to know about terrorism and its causes: a graphic account|url=http://stopwar.org.uk/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-terrorism-and-its-causes-a-graphic-account|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150111021852/http://stopwar.org.uk/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-terrorism-and-its-causes-a-graphic-account|archive-date=11 January 2015|access-date=14 January 2022|website=[[Wayback Machine]]|publisher=stopwar.org.uk}}</ref>{{unreliable source?|date=July 2016}} [[Eliza Manningham-Buller, Baroness Manningham-Buller|Dame Eliza Manningham Buller]], the former head of [[MI5]], told the Iraq inquiry, the security services warned Tony Blair launching the [[War on Terror]] would increase the threat of terrorism.<ref name="stopwar.org.uk" />{{Better source needed|reason=This source is the website of an advocacy group with a very clear POV.|date=January 2015}} [[Robert Pape]] has argued that at least terrorists utilizing suicide attacks—a particularly effective<ref>For example, according to Pape, from 1980 to 2003 suicide attacks amounted to only 3% of all terrorist attacks, but accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism—this excluding 9/11 attacks, from Pape, ''Dying to Win'', (2005), p. 28</ref> form of terrorist attack—are driven not by Islamism but by "a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland".<ref>{{cite web|last=McConnell |first=Scott |year=2005 |url=http://www.amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html |title=The Logic of Suicide Terrorism |work=The American Conservative magazine |publisher=The American Conservative |access-date=25 June 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060622024516/http://www.amconmag.com/2005_07_18/article.html |archive-date=22 June 2006 }}</ref> However, [[Martin Kramer]], who debated Pape on origins of suicide bombing, stated that the motivation for suicide attacks is not just strategic logic but also an interpretation of Islam to provide a moral logic. For example, [[Hezbollah]] initiated suicide bombings after a complex reworking of the [[martyrdom in Islam|concept of martyrdom]]. Kramer explains that the [[South Lebanon conflict (1982–2000)|Israeli occupation of the South Lebanon Security Zone]] raised the temperature necessary for this reinterpretation of Islam, but occupation alone would not have been sufficient for suicide terrorism.<ref name=kramer2010>{{cite web|url=http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2401 |title=Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response |publisher=Washingtoninstitute.org |access-date=25 April 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090112232504/http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2401 |archive-date=12 January 2009 }}</ref> "The only way to apply a brake to suicide terrorism," Kramer argues, "is to undermine its moral logic, by encouraging Muslims to see its incompatibility with their own values."<ref name=kramer2010 />

Breaking down the content  of Osama bin Laden's statements and interviews collected in [[Bruce Lawrence]]'s ''[[Messages to the World]]'' (Lawrence shares Payne's belief in US imperialism and aggression as the cause of Islamic terrorism), James L. Payne found that 72% of the content was on the theme of "criticism of U.S./Western/Jewish aggression, oppression, and exploitation of Muslim lands and peoples" while only 1% of bin Laden's statements focused on criticizing "American society and culture".<ref name="PAYNE-2008" />

Former [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] analyst [[Michael Scheuer]] argues that terrorist attacks (specifically [[al-Qaeda]] attacks on targets in the United States) are ''not'' motivated by a religiously inspired hatred of [[Culture of the United States|American culture]] or religion, but by the belief that [[Foreign policy of the United States|U.S. foreign policy]] has oppressed, killed, or otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East,<ref name="Scheuer 2004 9">Scheuer (2004), p. 9<br />
"The focused and lethal threat posed to U.S. national security arises not from Muslims being offended by what America is, but rather from their plausible perception that the things they most love and value—God, Islam, their brethren, and Muslim lands—are being attacked by America."</ref> condensed in the phrase "They hate us for what we do, not who we are." U.S. foreign policy actions Scheuer believes are fueling Islamic terror include: the US–led intervention in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq; [[Israel–United States relations]], namely, financial, military, and political support for [[Israel]];<ref>{{cite news|date=14 September 2009|title=US Support for Israel prompted 9/11|newspaper=The Australian|publisher=[[Wayback Machine]]|agency=Agence France-Presse|url=http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-support-for-israel-prompted-911-osama-bin-laden/story-e6frg6so-1225772727712|access-date=14 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140411152607/http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-support-for-israel-prompted-911-osama-bin-laden/story-e6frg6so-1225772727712|archive-date=11 April 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=[[John Mearsheimer|Mearsheimer, John J.]] |author2=[[Stephen Walt|Walt, Stephen]] |title=The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |location=New York |year=2007 |pages= |isbn=978-0-374-17772-0 |oclc= |doi= |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780374177720 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|date=27 July 2006|title=Six shot, one killed at Seattle Jewish federation|work=Seattle Post-Intelligencer|publisher=[[Wayback Machine]]|url=http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Six-shot-one-killed-at-Seattle-Jewish-federation-1210235.php#ixzz1hCIBKtsf.|url-status=dead|access-date=14 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120308170723/http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Six-shot-one-killed-at-Seattle-Jewish-federation-1210235.php|archive-date=8 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/25/nyregion/the-gunman-premeditated-the-attack-officials-say.html|title= The Gunman Premeditated The Attack, Officials Say|access-date= | work=The New York Times|first=Matthew|last=Purdy|date=25 February 1997}}</ref> U.S. support for "[[Apostasy in Islam|apostate]]" [[police state]]s in Muslim nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait;<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/interviews/scheuer.html|title= Frontline: Al Qaeda's New Front: Interviews: Michael Scheuer|access-date=8 March 2008 |publisher= [[PBS]]|date= 25 January 2005|quote= Bin Laden has had success because he's focused on a limited number of U.S. foreign policies in the Muslim world, policies that are visible and are experienced by Muslims on a daily basis: our unqualified support for Israel; our ability to keep oil prices at a level that is more or less acceptable to Western consumers. Probably the most damaging of all is our 30-year support for police states across the Islamic world: the Al Sauds and the Egyptians under [Hosni] Mubarak and his predecessors; the Algerians; the Moroccans; the Kuwaitis. They're all police states.}}</ref> U.S. support for the [[United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor|creation]] of an independent [[East Timor]] from territory previously held by Muslim Indonesia; perceived U.S. approval or support of actions against Muslim insurgents in India, the Philippines, [[Chechnya]], and [[State of Palestine|Palestine]].<ref>Scheuer (2004), pp. 11–13</ref>

[[Maajid Nawaz]] and [[Sam Harris]] argue that in many cases there is simply no connection between acts of Islamic extremism and Western intervention in Muslim lands.

{{blockquote|Nawaz: ... What does [[Sinjar massacre|killing the Yazidi population]] on Mount Sinjar have to do with US foreign policy? What does enforcing [[Taliban treatment of women|headscarves]] (tents in fact) on women in [[Waziristan]] and Afghanistan, and lashing them, forcing men to grow beards under threat of a whip, chopping off hands, and so forth, have to do with US foreign policy? <br />
Harris: This catalogue of irrelevancy could be extended indefinitely. What does the [[Anti-Shi'ism#Pakistan|Sunni bombing of Shia]] and [[Persecution of Ahmadis|Ahmadi mosques]] in Pakistan have to with Israel or US foreign policy?<ref name="tolerance-2015-57">{{cite book |last1=Harris |first1=Sam |last2=Nawaz |first2=Maajid |title=Islam and the Future of Tolerance: A Dialogue |date=2015 |publisher=Harvard University Press |page=57 |isbn=978-0-674-08870-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3I7JCgAAQBAJ&q=What+does+killing+the+Yazidi+population+on+Mount+Sinjar+have+to+do+with+US+foreign+policy%3F+nawaz&pg=PA57 |access-date=8 August 2019}}</ref>}}
Nawaz also argues that suicide bombers in non-Muslim majority countries such as the [[7 July 2005 London bombings|7 July 2005 bombers]] can be said to motivated by ideology not by any desire to compel UK military to withdraw from "their homeland", as they were born and raised in Yorkshire. They had never set foot in Iraq and do not speak its language.<ref name="Nawaz-debate" />

=== Socio-psychological motivations ===

==== Socio-psychological development ====
A motivator of violent radicalism (not just found in Al-Qaeda and ISIS) is psychological development during adolescence.<ref name="Rizvi-2016-88">{{cite book |last1=Rizvi |first1=Ali A. |title=The Atheist Muslim |date=2016 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |location=NY |isbn=978-1-250-09444-5 |pages=88–93}}</ref>
Cally O'Brien found many terrorists were "not exposed to the West in a positive context, whether by simple isolation or conservative family influence, until well after they had established a personal and social identity." Looking at theories of psychological [[Identity (social science)|personal identity]] Seth Schwartz, Curitis Dunkel and Alan Waterman found two types of "personal identities" susceptible to radicalization leading to terrorism:
# "Foreclosed and authoritarian" — Principally conservative Muslims who are often taught by their family and communities from early childhood to not deviate from a strict path and to either consider inferior or hate outside groups. When exposed to (alien) western culture, they are likely to judge it relative to their perception of the correct order of society, as well as perceive their own identities and mental health to be at risk.<ref>Cally O'Brien, "[https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1003&context=jss Eriksonian Identity Theory in Counterterrorism]" ''Journal of Strategic Security'', v.3, n.3 (2010): 29</ref><ref name="Identity Theory 2009">Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and S. Waterman, "[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225029149_Terrorism_An_Identity_Theory_Perspective Terrorism: an Identity Theory Perspective]", ''Studies in Conflict and Terrorism'', v.32, n.6 (2009): 537-59</ref><ref name="Rizvi-2016-88" />
# "Diffuse and aimless" — Principally converts whose lives are characterized by "aimlessness, uncertainty and indecisiveness" and who have neither explored different identities nor committed to a personal identity. Such people are "willing to go to their deaths for ideas [such as jihadism] that they have appropriated from others" and that give their lives purpose and certainty.<ref name="Identity Theory 2009" /><ref name="Rizvi-2016-88" />

=== Characteristics of terrorists ===

In 2004, a forensic psychiatrist and former foreign service officer, [[Marc Sageman]], made an "intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad" in his book ''Understanding Terror Networks''.<ref>Sageman (2004)</ref> He concluded [[social network]]s, the "tight bonds of family and friendship", rather than [[emotional and behavioral disorders]] of "poverty, trauma, madness, [or] ignorance", inspired [[Social alienation|alienated]] young Muslims to join the jihad and kill.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14036.html |title=Understanding Terror Networks|author= [[Marc Sageman]]|publisher=Upenn.edu |date=11 September 2001 |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref>

According to anthropologist [[Scott Atran]], a [[NATO]] researcher studying suicide terrorism, as of 2005, the available evidence contradicts a number of simplistic explanations for the motivations of terrorists, including mental instability, poverty, and feelings of humiliation.<ref name="burke" /> The greatest predictors of [[Suicide attack#Post-1980 attacks|suicide bombings]]—one common type of terror tactic used by Islamic terrorists—turns out to be not religion but group dynamics.
While personal humiliation does not turn out to be a motivation for those attempting to kill civilians, the perception that others with whom one feels a common bond are being humiliated can be a powerful driver for action. "Small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the [[diaspora]] cell of [[fraternity|brotherhood]] and [[camaraderie]] on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based".<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000676/document |title=The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism |last1=Atran |first1=Scott |pages=138, 144 |journal=The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies, MIT |year= 2006 |volume= 29 |access-date=26 August 2019 }}</ref> Terrorists, according to Atran, are social beings influenced by social connections and values. Rather than dying "for a cause", they might be said to have died "for each other".<ref name="burke">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/oct/24/scott-atran-talking-to-the-enemy-review|title=Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – [book] review|date=23 October 2010|work=The Observer|last1=Burke|first1=Jason|access-date=19 October 2014}}</ref>

In a 2011 doctoral thesis, anthropologist Kyle R. Gibson reviewed three studies documenting 1,208 suicide attacks from 1981 to 2007 and found that countries with higher [[polygyny]] rates correlated with greater production of [[Suicide attack#Suicide terrorism|suicide terrorists]].<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Harmon|first1=Vanessa|first2=Edin|last2=Mujkic|first3=Catherine|last3=Kaukinen|first4=Henriikka|last4=Weir|title=Causes & Explanations of Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Review|year=2018|journal=Homeland Security Affairs|publisher=[[Center for Homeland Defense and Security|NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security]]|volume=25|url=https://www.hsaj.org/articles/14749}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Gibson|first=Kyle R.|title=The Roles of Operational Sex Ratio and Young-Old Ratio in Producing Suicide Attackers|year=2011|publisher=[[University of Utah]]|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260059007}}</ref> Political scientist [[Robert Pape]] has found that among Islamic suicide terrorists, 97 percent were unmarried and 84 percent were male (or if excluding the [[Kurdistan Workers' Party]], 91 percent male),<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pape|first=Robert|author-link=Robert Pape|title=The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism|year=2003|journal=[[American Political Science Review]]|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|volume=97|issue=3|pages=343–361|doi=10.1017/S000305540300073X|hdl=1811/31746|s2cid=1019730|url=http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/stille/Politics%20Fall%202007/readings%20weeks%206-7/Strategic%20Logic%20of%20Suicide%20Missions.pdf|hdl-access=free}}</ref> while a study conducted by the [[United States Armed Forces|U.S. military]] in [[Iraq]] in 2008 found that suicide bombers were almost always single men without children aged 18 to 30 (with a mean age of 22), and were typically students or employed in [[Blue-collar worker|blue-collar occupations]].<ref>{{cite news|title=U.S. study draws portrait of Iraq bombers|date=15 March 2008|work=[[USA Today]]|publisher=[[Gannett]]|url=https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-03-15-iraq-study_N.htm|access-date=27 February 2020}}</ref> In addition to noting that countries where polygyny is widely practiced tend to have higher [[List of countries by intentional homicide rate|homicide rates]] and [[Rape statistics|rates of rape]], political scientists [[Valerie M. Hudson]] and Bradley Thayer have argued that because [[Polygyny in Islam|Islam is the only major religious tradition where polygyny is still largely condoned]], the higher degrees of marital inequality in [[Muslim world|Islamic countries]] than most of the world causes them to have larger populations susceptible to suicide terrorism, and that [[Houri|promises of harems of virgins]] for [[Shahid|martyrdom]] serves as a mechanism to mitigate [[In-group and out-group|in-group]] conflict within Islamic countries between alpha and non-alpha males by bringing esteem to the latter's families and redirecting their violence towards out-groups.<ref name="Hudson & Thayer 2010">{{cite journal|last1=Hudson|first1=Valerie M.|author-link1=Valerie M. Hudson|last2=Thayer|first2=Bradley|title=Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism|year=2010|journal=[[International Security (journal)|International Security]]|publisher=[[MIT Press]]|volume=34|issue=4|pages=48–53|jstor=40784561}}</ref>

Along with his research on the [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam|Tamil Tigers]], Scott Atran found that [[State of Palestine|Palestinian]] terrorist groups (such as [[Hamas]]) provide monthly [[stipend]]s, [[Lump sum|lump-sum payments]], and massive prestige to the families of suicide terrorists.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Atran|first=Scott|author-link=Scott Atran|year=2003|title=Genesis of Suicide Terrorism|journal=[[Science (journal)|Science]]|publisher=[[American Association for the Advancement of Science]]|volume=299|issue=5612|pages=1534–1539|doi=10.1126/science.1078854|pmid=12624256 |bibcode=2003Sci...299.1534A |s2cid=12114032 |url=https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00509568/file/genesis_of_Suicide_terrorism.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Atran|first=Scott|year=2006|title=The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism|journal=[[The Washington Quarterly]]|publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]]|volume=29|issue=2|pages=127–147|doi=10.1162/wash.2006.29.2.127|s2cid=154382700 |url=https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000676/file/TWQ06spring_atran.pdf }}</ref> Citing Atran and other anthropological research showing that 99 percent of Palestinian suicide terrorists are male, that 86 percent are unmarried, and that 81 percent have at least six siblings (larger than the average Palestinian family size), cognitive scientist [[Steven Pinker]] argues in ''[[The Better Angels of Our Nature]]'' (2011) that because the families of men in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip|Gaza]] often cannot afford [[bride price]]s and that many potential brides end up in polygynous marriages, the financial compensation of an act of suicide terrorism can buy enough brides for a man's brothers to have children to make the [[Altruism (biology)|self-sacrifice]] pay off in terms of [[kin selection]] and [[Fitness (biology)|biological fitness]] (with Pinker also citing a famous quotation attributed to evolutionary biologist [[J. B. S. Haldane]] when Haldane quipped that he would not sacrifice his life for his brother but would for "two brothers or eight cousins").<ref>{{cite book|last=Pinker|first=Steven|author-link=Steven Pinker|year=2011|title=The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined|title-link=The Better Angels of Our Nature|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|place=New York|pages=353–358|isbn=978-0143122012}}</ref>

In 2007, scholar [[Olivier Roy (professor)|Olivier Roy]] described the background of the hundreds of ''global'' (as opposed to local) terrorists who were incarcerated or killed and for whom authorities have records, as being surprising in a number of ways: The subjects frequently had a Westernized background; there were few [[Palestinians]], [[Iraqis]], or [[Afghanistan|Afghans]] "coming to avenge what is going on in their country"; there was a lack of religiosity before radicalization through being "born again" in a foreign country; a high percentage of subjects had converted to Islam; their backgrounds were "de-territorialized "—meaning, for example, they were "born in a country, then educated in another country, then go to fight in a third country and take refuge in a fourth country"; and their beliefs about jihad differed from  traditional ones—i.e. they believed jihad to be permanent, global, and "not linked with a specific territory."<ref>{{cite web |title=Olivier Roy Interview (2007): Conversations with History |url=http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people7/Roy/roy07-con5.html |publisher=Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley |date=3 May 2007 |access-date=25 April 2010 |archive-date=15 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100715230422/http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people7/Roy/roy07-con5.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Roy believes terrorism/radicalism is "expressed in religious terms" among the terrorists studied because

# most of the radicals have a Muslim background, which makes them open to a process of re-Islamisation ("almost none of them having been pious before entering the process of radicalisation"), and<ref name=roy-inside />
# jihad is "the only cause on the global market". If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local newspaper; "if you kill yelling 'Allahu Akbar', you are sure to make the national headlines". Other extreme causes—ultra-left or radical ecology are "too bourgeois and intellectual" for the radicals.<ref name=roy-inside />

Author [[Lawrence Wright]] described the characteristic of "[[displacement (psychology)|displacement]]" of members of the most famous Islamic terrorist group, al-Qaeda:

{{blockquote|What the recruits tended to have in common—besides their urbanity, their [[cosmopolitanism|cosmopolitan]] backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills—was displacement. Most who joined the jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They were Algerians living in [[expatriate]] enclaves in France, [[Moroccans]] in Spain, or [[Yemen]]is in Saudi Arabia. Despite their accomplishments, they had little standing in the host societies where they lived.<ref>Wright, ''Loming Tower'' (2006), p. 304</ref>}}

This profile of global Jihadists differs from that found among more recent local Islamist suicide bombers in Afghanistan. According to a 2007 study of 110 suicide bombers by Afghan pathologist Dr. Yusef Yadgari, 80% of the attackers studied had some kind of physical or mental disability. The bombers were also "not celebrated like their counterparts in other Muslim nations. Afghan bombers are not featured on posters or in videos as martyrs."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15276485 |title=Disabled Often Carry Out Afghan Suicide Missions |website=NPR.org |publisher=NPR |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref> Daniel Byman, a Middle East expert at the [[Brookings Institution]], and Christine Fair, an assistant professor in peace and security studies at [[Georgetown University]], argue that many of the Islamic terrorists are foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable, with one in two [[Taliban]] suicide bombers killing only themselves.<ref name="Byman">{{cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-case-for-calling-them-nitwits/8130/|title=The Case for Calling Them Nitwits|author-link2=C. Christine Fair|date=July–August 2010|work=Atlantic Magazine|first1=Daniel|last1=Byman|author-link1=Daniel Byman|author2=Christine Fair|access-date=8 July 2010|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100610213739/http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-case-for-calling-them-nitwits/8130|archive-date=10 June 2010}}</ref>

Studying 300 cases of people charged with jihadist terrorism in the United States since 11 September 2001, author [[Peter Bergen]] found the perpetrators were "generally motivated by a mix of factors", including "militant Islamist ideology;" opposition to "American foreign policy in the Muslim world; a need to attach themselves to an ideology or organization that gave them a sense of purpose"; and a "cognitive opening" to militant Islam that often was "precipitated by personal disappointment, like the death of a parent".<ref name="Bergen-15-6-2016">{{cite news|last1=Bergen|first1=Peter|title=Why Do Terrorists Commit Terrorism?|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/why-do-terrorists-commit-terrorism.html|access-date=16 June 2016|work=The New York Times|date=15 June 2016}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=May 2023}}

However, two studies of the background of Muslim terrorists in Europe—one of the UK and one of France—found little connection between religious piety and terrorism among the terrorist rank and file. A "restricted" report of hundreds of case studies by the UK domestic counter-intelligence agency [[MI5]] found that

{{blockquote|[f]ar from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.<ref name="Travis-20-8-2008" />}}

A 2015 "general portrait" of "the conditions and circumstances" under which people living in France become "Islamic radicals" (terrorists or would-be terrorists) by Olivier Roy (see above) found radicalisation was not an "uprising of a Muslim community that is victim to poverty and racism: only young people join, including converts".<ref name="roy-inside" />

== Refutations, criticisms and explanations for decline ==
=== Refuting Islamic terrorism ===

Along with explaining Islamic terrorism, many observers have attempted to point out their inconsistencies and the flaws in their arguments, often suggesting means of de-motivating potential terrorists.

[[Princeton University]] Middle Eastern scholar [[Bernard Lewis]] argues that although bin Laden and other radical Islamists claim they are fighting to restore [[shariah]] law to the Muslim world, their attacks on civilians violate the classical form of that [[Islamic jurisprudence]]. The "classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered [jihad] the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations".<ref>Lewis, Bernard, 'Islam: The Religion and the People' (2009). pp. 53, 145–50</ref> In regard to the [[September 11 attacks]] Lewis noted,

{{blockquote|Being a religious obligation, jihad is elaborately regulated in sharia law, which discusses in minute detail such matters as the opening, conduct, interruption and cessation of hostilities, the treatment of prisoners and noncombatants, the use of weapons, etc.<ref>Bukhari 50:891</ref> Similarly, the laws of Jihad categorically preclude wanton and indiscriminate slaughter.<ref>Quran (8:12)</ref> The warriors in the holy war are urged not to harm non-combatants, women and children, "unless they attack you first". ... A point on which they insist is the need for a clear declaration of war before beginning hostilities, and for proper warning before resuming hostilities after a truce. What the classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered is the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations that we saw in New York two weeks ago. For this there is no precedent and no authority in Islam.<ref>{{cite web|author=Bernard Lewis |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1001547201928681240 |title=Jihad vs. Crusade |publisher=Opinionjournal.com |date=September 27, 2001 |access-date=August 4, 2016}}</ref>}}

Similarly, [[Timothy Winter]] writes that the proclamations of bin Laden and [[Ayman al-Zawahiri]] "ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship", and that if they "followed the norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of mainstream Islam allows the targeting of civilians."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.islamfortoday.com/murad04.htm|title=Abdal-Hakim Murad, Bin Laden's Violence is a Heresy Against Islam|publisher=Islamfortoday.com|access-date=25 April 2010|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100103130922/http://islamfortoday.com/murad04.htm|archive-date=3 January 2010}}</ref>

Researcher Donald Holbrook notes that while many jihadists quote the beginning of the famous sword verse (or [[ayah]]):
*But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. ...
... they fail to quote and discuss limiting factors that follow,
*".... But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind."
showing how they are (Holbrook argues) "shamelessly selective in order to serve their propaganda objectives."<ref name=holbrook1 />

The scholarly credentials of the ideologues of extremism are also "questionable".<ref name="eikmeier" /> Dale C. Eikmeier notes

{{blockquote|With the exception of [[Abul Ala Maududi]] and [[Abdullah Yusuf Azzam]], none of Qutbism's main theoreticians trained at Islam's recognized centers of learning. Although a devout Muslim, [[Hassan al-Banna]] was a teacher and community activist. [[Sayyid Qutb]] was a literary critic. [[Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag]] was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman.<ref name="eikmeier">{{cite journal|last=Eikmeier|first=Dale C.|date=Spring 2007|title=Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism|url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm|journal=[[Parameters (journal)|Parameters]]|volume=XXXVII|issue=1|pages=85–98|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609120804/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm|archive-date=June 9, 2007}}</ref>}}

[[Michael Sells]] and Jane I. Smith (a professor of Islamic Studies) write that barring some extremists like [[al-Qaeda]], most Muslims do not interpret Qur'anic verses as promoting warfare today but rather as reflecting historical contexts.<ref name="Sells">{{cite news|author=Sells|first=Michael|date=8 August 2002|title=Understanding, Not Indoctrination|newspaper=The Washington Post|publisher=[[Internet Archive]]|url=https://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/msells.htm|access-date=21 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20021027032139/https://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/msells.htm|archive-date=27 October 2002}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia | author=Jane I. Smith | title=Islam and Christianity | encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Christianity | publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2005 | isbn=978-0-19-522393-4}}</ref> According to Sells, most Muslims "no more expect to apply" the verses at issue "to their contemporary non-Muslim friends and neighbors than most Christians and Jews consider themselves commanded by God, like the Biblical [[Joshua]], to exterminate the [[infidel]]s."<ref name="Sells" />

In his book ''[[No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam]]'', [[Iranian-American]] academic [[Reza Aslan]] argues that there is an internal battle currently taking place within Islam between [[individualism|individualistic]] reform ideals and the [[ulama|traditional authority of Muslim clerics]].<ref name="david">{{cite journal|last=Shasha|first=David|date=January 2002|title=No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam|url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0SBL/is_1-2_19/ai_n15340018/|url-status=dead|journal=International Journal of Kurdish Studies|publisher=[[Internet Archive]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090611021728/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0SBL/is_1-2_19/ai_n15340018/|archive-date=11 June 2009|access-date=21 January 2022}}</ref>  The struggle is similar to that of the 16th-century [[Protestant Reformation|reformation]] in [[Christianity]], and in fact is happening when the religion of Islam is as "old" as Christianity was at the time of its reformation.<ref name=stan>[http://news-service.stanford.edu/pr/2006/pr-aslan-102506.html Author of No god but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam to speak on campus] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070724073511/http://news-service.stanford.edu/pr/2006/pr-aslan-102506.html |date=24 July 2007 }}. [[Stanford University|Stanford University press release]]. Published 20 October 2006. Retrieved 7 May 2009.</ref> Aslan argues that "the notion that historical context should play no role in the interpretation of the Koran—that what applied to Muhammad's community applies to all Muslim communities for all time—is simply an untenable position in every sense."<ref name=times>[https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/books/review/29RODENBE.html 'No god but God': The War Within Islam (Book Review)] |By Max Rodenbeck| nytimes.com| 29 May 2005</ref>
<!--Beginning with the 7th-century AD [[Arab]] [[Muslim conquests|era of Muslim conquests]], and continuing on until the 21st-century resurgence of Muslim violence on non-Muslims in the name of "[[Jihad]]", many have debated whether Islam was fundamentally a religion of peace,<ref>{{cite web|author=President and Founder of the Christian Apologetic and Research Ministry, Matt Slick |url=http://carm.org/religious-movements/islam/islam-religion-peace-and-terrorism |title=Islam, the religion of peace, and terrorism|work=carm.org}}</ref> of violence, or perhaps of some combination of the two.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Political Language of Islam |last=Lewis |first=Bernard |author-link=Bernard Lewis |year=1988 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=0-226-47692-8 |page=72}} Cf. {{cite book |last1=Watt |first1=William M. |editor1-first=Thomas P. |editor1-last=Murphy |title=The Holy War |year=1976 |publisher=Ohio State University Press |isbn=978-0-8142-0245-6 |page=143 |chapter=Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War}}</ref>-->

Despite their proclaimed devotion to the virtue of Sharia law, Jihadists have not always avoided association with the pornography of the despised West. ''[[The Times]]'' (London) newspaper has pointed out that  Jihadists were discovered by one source to have sought anonymity through some of the same dark networks used to distribute [[child pornography]]—quite ironic given their proclaimed [[piety]].<ref name="Times">{{Cite web|date=2 June 2010|title=Dangerous and depraved: paedophiles unite with terrorists online – Times Online|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4958674.ece|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100602180448/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4958674.ece|url-status=dead|archive-date=2 June 2010|access-date=21 January 2022}}</ref> Similarly, [[Reuters]] news agency reported that pornography was found among the materials seized from [[Death of Osama bin Laden|Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound that was raided by U.S. Navy SEALs]].<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-binladen-porn-idUSTRE74C4RK20110513 Exclusive: Pornography found in bin Laden hideout: officials] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151127161638/http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/13/us-binladen-porn-idUSTRE74C4RK20110513 |date=27 November 2015 }}, "Reuters",  13 May 2011</ref>

;Takfir
Despite the fact that a founding principle of modern violent jihad is the defense of Islam and Muslims, most victims of attacks by Islamic terrorism ("the vast majority" according to one source—J.J. Goldberg)<ref name="Goldberg-9-11-2017">{{cite news |last1=Goldberg |first1=J.J. |title=The Islam-Terrorism Connection — It's Not What You Think |url=https://forward.com/opinion/387326/the-islam-terrorism-connection-its-not-what-you-think/ |access-date=17 August 2019 |agency=Forward |date=9 November 2017}}</ref> are self-proclaimed Muslims.  Many if not all Salafi-Jihadi groups practice [[takfir]]—i.e. proclaim that some self-proclaimed Muslims (especially government officials and security personnel) are actually apostates deserving of death.

Furthermore, the more learned salafi-jihadi thinkers and leaders are (and were), the more reluctance they are/were to embrace [[takfir]] (according to a study by Shane Drennan).<ref name="DRENNAN-2008" /> The late [[Abdullah Yusuf Azzam]], "the godfather of the Afghan jihad", for example, was an Islamic scholar and university professor who avoided takfir and preached unity in the [[ummah]] (Muslim community). The Islamic education of Al-Qaeda's number two leader, [[Ayman al-Zawahiri]], was early and much more informal—he was not a trained scholar—and al-Zawahiri expanded the definition of kafir to include many self-proclaimed Muslims. He has maintained that civilian government employees of Muslim states, security forces and any persons collaborating or engaging with these groups are apostates, for example.<ref name="DRENNAN-2008" />

Two extreme takfiris -- [[Abu Musab al-Zarqawi]], a Sunni jihadist leader in Iraq, and [[Djamel Zitouni]], leader of the Algerian [[Armed Islamic Group of Algeria]] (GIA) during the Algerian civil war—had even broader definitions of apostasy and less religious knowledge. Al-Zarqawi was a petty criminal who had no religious training until he was 22 and limited training thereafter. Famous for bombing targets other jihadis thought off limits,<ref name="Cambanis-3-10-15">{{cite news|last1=Cambanis|first1=Thanassis|title=Book Review. 'Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS' by Joby Warrick|url=https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/books/2015/10/03/book-review-black-flags-the-rise-isis-joby-warrick/PkvOQIXpSqCssZ5tdqH5pJ/story.html|access-date=29 October 2015|work=[[The Boston Globe]]|date=3 October 2015}}</ref> his definition of apostates included all Shia Muslims and "anyone violating his organization's interpretation of Shari'a".<ref name="DRENNAN-2008" /> [[Djamel Zitouni]] was the son of a chicken farmer with little Islamic education. He famously expanded the GIA's definition of apostate until he concluded the whole of Algerian society outside of the GIA "had left Islam".  His attacks led to the deaths of thousands of Algerian civilians.<ref name="DRENNAN-2008">{{cite journal |last1=DRENNAN |first1=SHANE |title=Constructing Takfir |journal=Combating Terrorism Center |date=June 2008 |volume=1 |issue=7 |url=https://ctc.usma.edu/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni/ |access-date=13 August 2019 |archive-date=12 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812175049/https://ctc.usma.edu/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

;De-radicalization
Evidence that more religious training may lead to less extremism has been found in Egypt. That country's largest radical Islamic group, [[al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya]] — which killed at least 796 Egyptian policemen and soldiers from 1992 to 1998 — renounced bloodshed in 2003 in a deal with the Egyptian government where  a series of high-ranking members were released (as of 2009 "the group has perpetrated no new terrorist acts").  A second group [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad]] made a similar agreement in 2007. Preceding the agreements was program where Muslim scholars debated with imprisoned group leaders arguing that true Islam did not support terrorism.<ref name="DeAngelis-2009">{{cite journal |last1=DeAngelis |first1=Tori |title=Understanding terrorism |journal=Monitor on Psychology |date=November 2009 |volume=40 |issue=10 |url=https://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism |access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref>

== Muslim attitudes toward terrorism ==
{{Main|Muslim attitudes towards terrorism}}

The opinions of Muslims on the subject of attacks on civilians by Islamist groups vary. [[Fred Halliday]], a British academic specialist on the Middle East, argues that most Muslims consider these acts to be egregious violations of Islam's laws.<ref>Halliday, Fred: ''Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East'' (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 107</ref> Muslims living in the West denounce the 11 September attacks against United States, while Hezbollah contends that their rocket attacks against Israeli targets are [[defensive jihad]] by a legitimate [[resistance movement]] rather than terrorism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html |title=Statement of purpose |publisher=Almashriq.hiof.no |date=20 March 1998 |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-background.html |title=Hizbullah: Views and Concepts |publisher=Almashriq.hiof.no |date=20 June 1997 |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref>

=== Views of modern Islamic scholars ===

In reference to suicide attacks, Hannah Stuart notes there is a "significant debate among contemporary clerics over which circumstance permit such attacks."  Qatar-based theologian, [[Yusuf al-Qaradawi]], criticized the 9/11 attacks but previously justified suicide bombings in Israel on the grounds of necessity and justified such attacks in 2004 against American military and civilian personnel in Iraq. According to Stuart, 61 contemporary Islamic leaders have issued fatawa permitting suicide attacks, 32 with respect to Israel. Stuart points out that all of these contemporary rulings are contrary to classical [[Islamic jurisprudence]].<ref name="Stuart1">{{cite book|title=Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism|publisher=IOS Press|year=2014|isbn=978-1-61499-469-5|pages=74–76|author=Hannah Stuart|editor=Marco Lombardi}}</ref>

[[Charles Kurzman]] and other authors have collected statements by prominent Muslim figures and organizations condemning terrorism.<ref name=kurzman />
In September 2014, an open letter to ISIS by "over 120 prominent Muslim scholars" denounced that group for "numerous religious transgressions and abominable crimes".<ref name="css">{{cite web|title=The Danger of Takfir (Excommunication): Exposing IS' Takfiri Ideology|url=https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/316b8048-d26a-44cb-b4ce-48d8167f1c7c/pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826180152/https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/316b8048-d26a-44cb-b4ce-48d8167f1c7c/pdf|archive-date=26 August 2019|url-status=dead|access-date=26 August 2019|website=css.ethz.ch|publisher=Center for Security Studies}}</ref><ref name="letter">{{cite web |title=Open Letter to AL-Baghdadi |url=http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/ |website=lettertobaghdadi |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-date=8 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150208110812/http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

[[Huston Smith]], an author on comparative religion, argued that extremists have hijacked Islam, just as has occurred periodically in Christianity, [[Hinduism]] and other religions throughout history. He added that the real problem is that extremists do not know their own faith.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/38467/man-of-faiths-preeminent-religion-scholar-huston-smith-reflects-on-judaism- |title=Man of faiths: Preeminent religion scholar Huston Smith reflects on Judaism and Chasing the Divine |work= Jewish News Weekly of Northern California |publisher=Jweekly.com |date=25 June 2009 |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref>

[[Ali Gomaa]], former [[Grand Mufti]] of Egypt, stated not only for Islam but in general: "Terrorism cannot be born of religion. Terrorism is the product of corrupt minds, hardened hearts, and arrogant egos, and corruption, destruction, and arrogance are unknown to the heart attached to the divine."<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.themuslimtimes.org/2013/07/religion/terrorism-has-no-religion|title= Terrorism has no religion|date= 8 July 2013|access-date=25 August 2013}}</ref>

A [[Fatwa on Terrorism|600-page legal opinion]] (''fatwa'') by [[Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri]] condemned suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism as ''[[kufr]]'' (unbelief),<ref>{{cite news|title=Sheikh issues fatwa against all terrorists|work=[[The Independent]]|author=Jerome Taylor|date=3 March 2010|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sheikh-issues-fatwa-against-all-terrorists-1915000.html|access-date=9 April 2010 | location=London}}</ref> stating that it "has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2634649 |title=Top Islamic scholar issues 'absolute' fatwa against terror |work=National Post |date=3 March 2010 |access-date=25 April 2010 }}{{dead link|date=September 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> Iranian Ayatollah [[Yousef Sanei|Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei]] has preached against suicide attacks and stated in an interview: "Terror in Islam, and especially Shiite, is forbidden."<ref>{{cite news|year = 2012|url = http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/leading-iranian-cleric-calls-on-regime-to-avoid-war-with-israel-1.459775|title = Leading Iranian Cleric Calls on Regime to Avoid War With Israel|newspaper = Haaretz |access-date = 3 August 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url = https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/interviews/saanei.html|title = Interview Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei |date = 2 May 2002 |publisher = PBS/Frontline|access-date = 3 August 2016}}</ref>

A group of Pakistani clerics of [[Jamaat Ahle Sunnat|Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnah]] ([[Barelvi]] movement) who were gathered for a convention denounced suicide attacks and beheadings as un-Islamic in a unanimous resolution.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Top-Pak-clerics-declare-suicide-attacks-un-Islamic/articleshow/4543693.cms|title=Top Pak clerics declare suicide attacks un-Islamic|newspaper=The Times of India|date=17 May 2009|access-date=3 August 2016}}</ref> On 2 July 2013 in [[Lahore]], 50 Muslim scholars of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) issued a collective fatwa against suicide bombings, the killing of innocent people, bomb attacks, and targeted killings. It considers them to be forbidden.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1022298 |title=Fatwa issued against suicide bombings, targeted killings and terrorism |date=2 July 2013 |location=Lahore}}</ref>

=== Opinion surveys ===
* [[The Gallup Organization|Gallup]] conducted tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of more than 35 predominantly Muslim countries between 2001 and 2007. It found that more than 90% of respondents condemned the killing of non-combatants on religious and humanitarian grounds.<ref name="australia.to">{{cite web |url=https://www.ispu.org/al-qaida-today-a-movement-at-a-crossroads/ |title=Al-Qaida today: a movement at the crossroads |date=14 May 2009 |author=Fawaz A. Gerges |author-link=Fawaz Gerges|access-date=7 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141025152045/https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/al-qaida-today-the-fate-of-a-movement|archive-date=25 October 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> [[John Esposito]], using poll data from [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]], wrote in 2008 that Muslims and Americans were equally likely to reject violence against civilians. He also found that those Muslims who support violence against civilians are no more religious than Muslims who do not.<ref>{{cite web |title=Excerpt: 'Who Speaks for Islam?' |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=87860378 |publisher=[[NPR]] |date=4 March 2008}}</ref>
* An earlier poll, conducted in 2005 by the [[Fafo Foundation]] in the Palestinian Authority, found that 65% of respondents supported the 9/11 attacks.<ref>[http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/95535 65% of Palestinians Applaud Terror Attacks on US and Europe] Arutz Sheva</ref>
* A subsequent Gallup poll released in 2011 suggested "that one's religious identity and level of devotion have little to do with one's views about targeting civilians... it is human development and governance—not piety or culture—that are the strongest factors in explaining differences in how the public perceives this type of violence." The same poll concluded that populations of countries in the [[Organisation of the Islamic Conference]] were slightly more likely to reject attacks on civilians in all cases, both military and individual, than those in non-member countries.<ref name="views">{{cite web|title=Views of Violence|date=8 September 2011|url=http://www.gallup.com/poll/157067/views-violence.aspx|publisher=Gallup|access-date=31 January 2016}}</ref>
* Pew Research surveys in 2008, show that in a range of countries—Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh—there have been substantial declines in the percentages saying suicide-bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets can be justified to defend Islam against its enemies. Wide majorities say such attacks are, at most, rarely acceptable. The shift of attitudes against terror has been especially dramatic in Jordan, where 29% of Jordanians were recorded as viewing suicide-attacks as often or sometimes justified (down from 57% in May 2005). In the largest majority-Muslim nation, Indonesia, 74% of respondents agree that terrorist attacks are "never justified" (a substantial increase from the 41% level to which support had risen in March 2004); in Pakistan, that figure is 86%; in Bangladesh, 81%; and in Iran, 80%.<ref name="australia.to" />
* In Pakistan, despite the recent rise in the Taliban's influence, a poll conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow in Pakistan in January 2008 tested support for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, other militant Islamist groups and Osama bin Laden himself, and found a recent drop by half. In August 2007, 33% of Pakistanis expressed support for al-Qaeda; 38% supported the Taliban. By January 2008, al-Qaeda's support had dropped to 18%, the Taliban's to 19%. When asked if they would vote for al-Qaeda, just 1% of Pakistanis polled answered in the affirmative. The Taliban had the support of 3% of those polled.<ref name="australia.to" />
* A December 2008 poll conducted in Osama bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia showed that his compatriots have dramatically turned against him, his organisation, Saudi volunteers in Iraq, and terrorism in general. Indeed, confidence in bin Laden has fallen in most Muslim countries in recent years.<ref name="australia.to" />
* A poll conducted among Palestinians following the [[2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel|Hamas October 7]] attacks, show that a 70% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza supported the attacks.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Joffre |first=Tzvi |date=2023-12-13 |title=Palestinians largely support October 7 massacre, deny atrocities - poll |work=[[The Jerusalem Post]] |url=https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-777918 |access-date=2023-12-13}}</ref>

== Tactics ==
{{Main|Tactics of terrorism}}

=== Suicide attacks ===
{{See also|Suicide attack}}

[[Hezbollah]] were the first to use suicide bombers in the Middle East.<ref name=":4" /> An increasingly popular tactic used by terrorists is suicide bombing.<ref>{{cite web|title= The_MIPT_Terrorism_Annual|url=http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf|publisher=tkb.org|access-date=6 February 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071129192403/http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf |archive-date = 29 November 2007}}</ref> This tactic is used against civilians, soldiers, and government officials of the regimes the terrorists oppose. A recent clerical ruling declares terrorism and suicide bombing as forbidden by Islam.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8544531.stm | work=BBC News | first=Dominic | last=Casciani | title=Muslim scholar condemns terrorism | date=2 March 2010}}</ref> However, groups who support its use often refer to such attacks as "[[Istishhad|martyrdom operations]]" and the suicide-bombers who commit them as "[[martyr]]s" (Arabic: shuhada, plural of "shahid"). The bombers, and their sympathizers often believe that suicide bombers, as martyrs ([[Shahid|shaheed]]) to the cause of jihad against the enemy, will receive the rewards of [[Jannah|paradise]] for their actions.

=== Hijackings ===
Islamic terrorism sometimes employs the hijacking of passenger vehicles. The most infamous were the [[September 11 attacks|"9/11"]] attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on a single day in 2001, effectively ending the era of [[aircraft hijacking]].

=== Hostage taking, kidnappings and executions ===
{{Main|Beheading in Islamism}}
{{See also|Beheading video|ISIL beheading incidents}}

Along with bombings and hijackings, Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of highly publicised kidnappings and executions (i.e. ritualized murders), often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. A frequent form of execution by these groups is [[decapitation]], another is shooting. In the 1980s, a [[Lebanon hostage crisis|series of abductions of American citizens]] by Hezbollah during the [[Lebanese Civil War]] resulted in the 1986 [[Iran–Contra affair]]. During the chaos of the [[Iraq War]], more than 200 kidnappings [[Foreign hostages in Iraq|foreign hostages]] (for various reasons and by various groups, including purely criminal) gained great international notoriety, even as the great majority (thousands) of victims were Iraqis. In 2007, the [[kidnapping of Alan Johnston]] by [[Army of Islam (Gaza Strip)|Army of Islam]] resulted in the British government meeting a Hamas member for the first time.
;Motivations
[[Islamism|Islamist]] militants, including [[Boko Haram]], [[Hamas]], [[al-Qaeda]] and the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|ISIS]], have used [[kidnapping]] as a method of fundraising, as a means of bargaining for political concessions, and as a way of intimidating potential opponents.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Shay|first1=Shaul|title=Global Jihad and the Tactic of Terror Abduction: A Comprehensive Review of Islamic Terrorist Organizations|date=December 2013|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=978-1-84519-611-0}}</ref>

==== As political tactic ====
An example of political kidnapping occurred in September 2014, in the Philippines. The German Foreign Ministry reported that the Islamist militant group [[Abu Sayyaf]] had kidnapped two German nationals and was threatening to kill them unless the German government withdraw its support for the war against [[ISIS]] and also pay a large ransom.<ref>{{cite news|last=Thomas|first=Andrea|title=Germany Confirms Kidnapping of Two Citizens by Islamist Group in Philippines|url=https://online.wsj.com/articles/germany-confirms-kidnapping-of-two-citizens-by-islamist-terror-group-1411564496|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|date=24 September 2014|access-date=7 October 2014|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In September 2014 an Islamist militant group kidnapped a French national in Algeria and threatened to kill the hostage unless the government of France withdrew its support for the war against ISIS.<ref>{{cite news|last=Willsher|first=Kim|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/22/algerian-islamists-threaten-to-execute-french-hostage-unless-france-halts-isis-attacks|title=Algerian Islamists threaten to execute hostage unless France halts Isis attacks|newspaper=The Guardian|date=23 September 2014|access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref>

===== Islamist self-justifications =====
According to the [[International Business Times]], in October 2014 the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)]] released a five-point justification of its right to take non-Muslims hostage, and decapitate, ransom or enslave them.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Johnlee|first1=Varghese|title=ISIS Lists Out 5 Islamic Reasons to Justify Beheading Alan Henning and other Captives|url=http://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-lists-out-5-islamic-reasons-justify-beheading-alan-henning-other-captives-610585|access-date=13 October 2014|newspaper=International Business Times|date=6 October 2014}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=June 2022}} British Muslim cleric [[Anjem Choudary]] told [[The Clarion Project]] that kidnapping and even [[Beheading in Islamism|beheading]] hostages is justified by Islam.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Mauro|first1=Ryan|title=UK's Anjem Choudary Justifies Beheading of James Foley|url=http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/uks-anjem-choudary-justifies-beheading-james-foley|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903003801/http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/uks-anjem-choudary-justifies-beheading-james-foley|archive-date=3 September 2014|access-date=4 February 2022|website=[[Internet Archive]]}}</ref>

ISIL also published an article entitled, 'The revival (of) slavery before the Hour (of Judgement Day)', in its online magazine, "Dabiq", justifying its kidnapping of  [[Yazidi]] women and forcing them to become sex slaves or concubines:  "One should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffar—the infidels—and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah, or Islamic law."<ref>{{cite news|last1=Abdelaziz|first1=Salma|title=ISIS states its justification for the enslavement of women|url=http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/world/meast/isis-justification-slavery/|access-date=13 October 2014|publisher=CNN|date=13 October 2014}}</ref>

[[Abubakar Shekau]], the leader of the Nigerian extremist group [[Boko Haram]], said in a 2014 interview claiming responsibility for the [[2014 Chibok kidnapping]] of 270+ schoolgirls, "Slavery is allowed in my religion, and I shall capture people and make them slaves".<ref name=CNNEssenceTerror>{{cite news| url=http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-analysis/ |publisher=CNN |title=Boko Haram: The essence of terror |last=Lister |first=Tim |date=5 June 2015 |access-date=13 May 2014}}</ref>

==== Kidnapping as revenue ====
[[Nasir al-Wuhayshi]] leader of the [[Islamist]] militant group [[Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula]] describes kidnapped hostages as "an easy spoil... which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure."<ref name="nytimes1">{{cite news|last1=Callimachi|first1=Rukmini Maria|title=Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html|access-date=4 September 2014|newspaper=The New York Times|date=29 July 2014}}</ref>

A 2014 investigation, by journalist [[Rukmini Maria Callimachi]] published in ''[[The New York Times]]'' demonstrated that between 2008 and 2014, Al Qaeda and groups directly affiliated with al-Qaeda took in over US$125 million from kidnapping, with $66 million of that total paid in 2013 alone. The article showed that from a somewhat haphazard beginning in 2003, kidnapping grew into the group's main fundraising strategy, with targeted, professional kidnapping of civilians from wealthy European countries—principally France, Spain and Switzerland—willing to pay huge ransoms. US and UK nationals are less commonly targeted since these governments have shown an unwillingness to pay ransom.<ref name="nytimes1" />

[[Boko Haram]] kidnapped Europeans for the Ransom their governments would pay in the early 2010s.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-the-chibok-abductions-and-nigerias-counterterrorism-strategy|title=Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy|website=Combating Terrorism Center|publisher=West Point Military Academy|last1=Hill|first1=J.N.C.|date=30 July 2014|access-date=4 September 2014|archive-date=4 September 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140904160609/https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-the-chibok-abductions-and-nigerias-counterterrorism-strategy|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Kington|first=Tom|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/11/nigerian-kidnappers-paid-part-of-ransom|title=Nigerian kidnappers 'received ransom downpayment'|newspaper=The Guardian|date=10 March 2012|access-date=4 September 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140905003658/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/11/nigerian-kidnappers-paid-part-of-ransom|archive-date=5 September 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=BBCnigeria|title=Italian Abducted in Nigeria Freed|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18305746|access-date=4 September 2014|publisher=BBC|date=1 June 2012}}</ref> For example, in the spring of 2013, Boko Haram kidnapped and within 2 months released a French family of 7 and 9 other hostages in exchange for a payment by the French government of $3.15 million.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Caulderwood|first1=Kathleen|title=Fake Charities, Drug Cartels, Ransom and Extortion: Where Islamist Group Boko Haram Gets Its Cash|url=http://www.ibtimes.com/fake-charities-drug-cartels-ransom-extortion-where-islamist-group-boko-haram-gets-its-cash-1585743|access-date=29 September 2014|newspaper=International Business Times|date=16 May 2014}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=June 2022}}

According to [[Yochi Dreazen]] writing in ''[[Foreign Policy]]'', although ISIS received funding from Qatar, Kuwait and other Gulf oil states, "traditional criminal techniques like kidnapping", are a key funding source for ISIS.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Dreazen|first=Yochi|author-link=Yochi Dreazen|url=http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/16/isis_uses_mafia_tactics_to_fund_its_own_operations_without_help_from_persian_gulf_d|title=ISIS Uses Mafia Tactics to Fund Its Own Operations Without Help From Persian Gulf Donors|magazine=Foreign Policy|access-date=4 September 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140617074156/http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/16/isis_uses_mafia_tactics_to_fund_its_own_operations_without_help_from_persian_gulf_d|archive-date=17 June 2014}}</ref> [[Armin Rosen]] writing in [[Business Insider]], kidnapping was a "crucial early source" of funds as ISIS expanded rapidly in 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.businessinsider.com/isiss-history-of-hostage-taking-2014-8|title=ISIS Has Been Taking Foreign Hostages Since The Very Beginning – And Getting Paid For Them|date=20 August 2014|website=Business Insider|last1=Rosen|first1=Armin|access-date=4 September 2014}}</ref>  In March, upon receiving payment from the government of Spain, ISIS released 2 Spanish hostages working for the newspaper [[El Mundo (Spain)|El Mundo]], correspondent Javier Espinosa and photographer [[Ricardo Garcia Vilanova]], who had been held since September 2013.<ref>{{cite news|last1=BBCMarch|title=Syria crisis: Spanish journalists freed after ISIS kidnapping|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26807207|access-date=4 September 2014|publisher=BC|date=30 March 2014}}</ref> [[Philip Balboni]], CEO of [[GlobalPost]] told the press that he had spent "millions" in efforts to ransom journalist [[James Foley (journalist)|James Foley]], and an American official told the [[Associated Press]] that demand from ISIS was for 100 million ($132.5).<ref>{{cite news|last1=CBSNews|title=Multiple kidnappings for ransom funding ISIS, source says|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/news/multiple-kidnappings-for-ransom-funding-isis-source-says/|access-date=4 September 2014|publisher=CBS News|date=21 August 2014}}</ref>  In September 2014, following the release of ISIS [[Beheading video]]s of journalists James Foley and [[Steven Sotloff]], British Prime Minister [[David Cameron]] appealed to members of the [[G7]] to abide by their pledges not to pay ransom "in the case of terrorist kidnap".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Elliott |first1=Francis |title=European allies shamed over ransom payments |url=https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/european-allies-shamed-over-ransom-payments-d66g7qg0rds |access-date=7 May 2021 |work=The Times |date=5 September 2014}}</ref>

Holding foreign journalists as hostages is so valuable to ISIS that Rami Jarrah, a Syrian who has acted as go-between in efforts to ransom foreign hostages, told the ''[[Wall Street Journal]]'' that ISIS had "made it known" to other militant groups that they "would pay" for kidnapped journalists.<ref name="autogenerated5">{{cite news|last1=Malas|first1=Nour|title=Hostage-Taking Central to Islamic State Strategy in Syria|url=https://online.wsj.com/articles/hostage-taking-central-to-islamic-state-strategy-in-syria-1408711183|access-date=4 September 2014|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|date=22 August 2014}}</ref> ISIS has also kidnapped foreign-aid workers and Syrians who work for foreign-funded groups and reconstruction projects in Syria.<ref name="autogenerated5" />  By mid-2014, ISIS was holding assets valued at US$2 billion.<ref>{{cite news|last=Chulov|first=Martin|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power|title=Iraq arrest that exposed wealth and power of Isis jihadists|newspaper=The Guardian|date=16 June 2014|access-date=17 June 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140616091317/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power|archive-date=16 June 2014}}</ref>

===== Kidnapping as psychological warfare =====
Boko Haram has been described as using kidnapping as a means of intimidating the civilian population into non-resistance.<ref name="ctc.usma.edu">{{cite journal|date=30 July 2014|title=Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy|url=https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-the-chibok-abductions-and-nigerias-counterterrorism-strategy|journal=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|last1=Hill|first1=Jonathan N.C.|access-date=4 September 2014|archive-date=4 September 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140904160609/https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-the-chibok-abductions-and-nigerias-counterterrorism-strategy|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Marina Lazreg 2009 p. 47">Marina Lazreg, "Consequences of Political Liberalisation and Sociocultural Mobilisation for Women in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan", in Anne-Marie Goetz, Governing Women: Women's Political Effectiveness in Contexts of Democratisation and Governance Reform (New York: Routledge/UNRISD, 2009), p. 47.</ref>

According to psychologist [[Irwin Mansdorf]], Hamas demonstrated effectiveness of kidnapping as a form of [[psychological warfare]] in the [[2006 Gaza cross-border raid|2006 capture]] of the Israeli soldier [[Gilad Shalit]] when public pressure forced the government of Israel to release 1027 prisoners, including 280 convicted of terrorism by Israel, in exchange for his release.<ref>{{cite news|first=Andreas|last=Gorzewski|url=http://www.dw.com/en/hamas-uses-kidnapping-as-a-strategic-tool/a-17799249|title=Hamas uses kidnapping as a strategic tool|publisher=Deutsche Welle|date=22 July 2014|access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref> According to ''[[The New York Times]]'', "Hamas has recognized the pull such incidents have over the Israeli psyche and clearly has moved to grab hostages in incidents such as the [[death and ransoming of Oron Shaul]]."<ref>{{cite news|last1=Kershner|first1=Isabel|author-link1=Isabel Kershner|author2=Jodi Rudoren|title=A Blast, a Fire and an Israeli Soldier Goes Missing |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html |work=The New York Times|date=22 July 2014|access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref>

=== Internet recruiting ===
{{Main|Terrorism and social media}}
In the beginning of the 21st century, emerged a worldwide network of hundreds of web sites that inspire, train, educate and recruit young Muslims to engage in jihad against the United States and other Western countries, taking less prominent roles in mosques and community centers that are under scrutiny.

== Examples of organizations and acts ==
{{Further|List of designated terrorist groups}}
{{See also|United States Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations}}[[File:Flag of Jihad.svg|thumb|The "black flag of [[Jihad]]", used by various Islamist organisations since the late 1990s, consists of a white-on-black [[shahada]].]]

Some prominent Islamic terror groups and incidents include the following:

=== Africa ===
In the 1990s, a distinct pattern of jihadist attacks in East Africa emerged. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated [[Somali warlords]] which resulted in an armed jihadist movement controlling a territory of their own. The ICU was later militarily defeated and al-Shabaab was formed from its remnants. Al-Shabaab would later ally itself with al-Qaeda. In 2017, the [[European Union Institute for Security Studies|EUISS]] noted an increased frequency of jihadist violence in an arc extending across borders from the [[Red Sea]] to the [[Gulf of Guinea]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=African futures: Horizon 2025|last=Arnould, Valérie|others=Strazzari, Francesco,, Institute for Security Studies (Paris, France)|year=2017|isbn=9789291986316|location=Paris|pages=47|oclc=1006747525}}</ref>

==== Algeria ====
{{main|Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present)}}
The [[Armed Islamic Group]], active in Algeria between 1992 and 1998, was one of the most violent Islamic terrorist groups, and is thought to have [[takfir]]ed the Muslim population of Algeria. Its campaign to overthrow the Algerian government included [[List of Algerian massacres of the 1990s|civilian massacres]], sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. It also targeted foreigners living in Algeria, killing more than 100 expatriates in the country. In recent years it has been eclipsed by a splinter group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now called [[Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb]].<ref>Kepel, Gilles, ''Jihad'', (2003)</ref>

==== Burkina Faso ====
In January 2016, terrorists from [[Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]] (AQIM) [[2016 Ouagadougou attacks|shot and killed 30 people at the Splendid Hotel]] in Ouagadougou.<ref name="Welle www.dw.com">{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/de/burkina-faso-islamistische-gefahr-aus-dem-innern/a-41056722|title=Burkina Faso: Islamistische Gefahr aus dem Innern |date=20 October 2017 |publisher=Deutsche Welle |language=de-DE|access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref>

In an August [[2017 Ouagadougou attack]], 19 people were killed, and 25 others were injured when [[al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb|al-Qaeda's Maghreb jihadists affiliates]] opened fire on a Turkish restaurant and hotel.

During the March [[2018 Ouagadougou attacks]], terrorists affiliated with [[Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]] killed 8 people and injured more than 85.

The terrorist organization [[Ansar ul Islam (Western Africa)|Ansar ul Islam]] is active in Burkina Faso and has conducted assassinations, looting, attacks on police and has closed hundreds of schools.<ref name="Welle www.dw.com" />

==== Egypt ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Egypt}}
Egypt has faced Islamist violence in repeated attacks since the 2011 Arab Spring uprising.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/egypt-kills-40-suspected-militants-after-tourist-bus-attack/a-46893439 |title=Egypt kills 40 suspected militants after tourist bus attack {{!}} DW {{!}} 29 December 2018 |last=Welle (www.dw.com)|first=Deutsche |publisher=Deutsche Welle |language=en-GB  |access-date=20 March 2019}}</ref>

On 17 November 1997, a splinter group of the [[al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya]], an Egyptian [[Islamist]] organization, carried out the [[Luxor massacre]] where 62 people were killed. Most of the killed were tourists.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/741/eg1.htm|title=Fearing the worst|date=5 May 2005|access-date=2 May 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130924131816/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/741/eg1.htm|archive-date=24 September 2013|url-status=dead|work=Al-Ahram Weekly}}</ref>

On 29 December 2017 in Cairo, [[Attack on Saint Menas church|a gunman opened fire at the Coptic Orthodox Church of Saint Menas]] and a nearby shop owned by a Coptic man. Ten citizens and a police officer were killed around ten people were injured in the attack which was claimed by the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|Islamic state]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.masrawy.com/news/news_egypt/details/2017/12/29/1230869/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%83%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-|title=رسميًا.. داعش يُعلن مسؤوليته عن هجوم كنيسة مارمينا بحلوان|access-date=30 December 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.egyptindependent.com/mass-funeral-held-helwan-church-victims-coptic-orthodox-church/|title=Mass funeral to be held for Helwan church victims: Coptic Orthodox Church – Egypt Independent|date=29 December 2017|access-date=30 December 2017}}</ref>

==== Kenya ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Kenya}}
During the 1990s, Muslims in Kenya received religious radical instruction from [[Al-Qaeda]] and Somali group l-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI). AIAI sought to create an Islamic government over Somalia and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. In Kenya, it recruited among [[Somalis in Kenya]] living in the [[North Eastern Province (Kenya)|North Eastern Province]] and the [[Eastleigh, Nairobi|Eastleigh district in Nairobi]].<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-attacks-in-kenya-reveal-domestic-radicalization/|title=Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Reveal Domestic Radicalization|date=29 October 2012|website=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|language=en-US|access-date=18 March 2019|archive-date=1 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801212030/https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-attacks-in-kenya-reveal-domestic-radicalization/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

On 7 August 1998, [[1998 United States embassy bombings|Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi]] in an attack that claimed 213 lives.<ref name=":6" />

On 28 November 2002, Al-Qaeda militants [[2002 Mombasa attacks|attacked an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa]] where 15 were killed. Militants also fired [[Man-portable air-defense system|shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles]] at an airliner which escaped unharmed.<ref name=":6" />

On Saturday 21 September 2013, [[Westgate shopping mall attack|four Al-Shabaab militants attacked a shopping mall in Nairobi]], shooting and throwing grenades at shoppers. The civilian death toll was 61, along with six soldiers and five of the attackers.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nairobi-attack-and-al-shababs-media-strategy/|title=The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy|date=24 October 2013|website=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|language=en-US|access-date=18 March 2019|archive-date=23 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180923063727/https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nairobi-attack-and-al-shababs-media-strategy/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In 2015, 147 people were killed by Al-Shabaab militants during the [[Garissa University College attack]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080|title=Kenya university attack kills 147|date=3 April 2015|access-date=18 March 2019|language=en-GB}}</ref>

After Al-Shabaab abducted foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya, Kenyan troops were sent to Somalia in October 2011 to pursue al-Shabab militants. In the wake of the intervention, Kenya has suffered a number of attacks carried out both by al-Shabaab militants as well as Kenyan Muslim recruited by radical clerics in [[Provinces of Kenya|North-Eastern and Coast provinces]].<ref name=":6" />

==== Mali ====
{{Main|Category:Islamic terrorism in Mali}}

==== Mauritius ====
In 2011, Mauritian shop-keeper Reaz Lauthan travelled to Syria to join Islamic State and participate in the war. In Mauritius Reaz Lauthan had established Al Muhajiroun, an organisation which promoted the relinquishment of Islamic traditions that originated from India. However Lauthan's group disintegrated and he made his way to Syria. He returned to Mauritius in 2012 and befriended members of a new  Islamic group called Hizb ul Tahrir. He died in 2013 in Syria soon after returning there to participate in Islamic State's activities. 4 other Mauritians had attempted to join Reaz Lauthan in Syria but were refused entry at the Turkish border.<ref>{{cite web |title=Avant Yogen Sundrun: Reaz Lauthan, un Mauricien en Syrie… |date=12 December 2015 |url=https://www.lexpress.mu/article/272823/avant-yogen-sundrun-reaz-lauthan-un-mauricien-en-syrie |publisher=L'Express |access-date=2015-12-12}}</ref>

In August 2014, Mauritians Mohammed Iqbal Golamaully, aged 48, and his wife, Nazimabee Golamaully, aged 45, provided financial support to their nephew Zafirr Golamaully who had left Mauritius in March 2014 to fight for Islamic State in Syria after travelling via Dubai and Turkey. The couple was eventually jailed in 2016. Zafirr Golamaully's sister Lubnaa also left Mauritius to join him in Syria. Hospital director Mohammed Iqbal Golamaully had also encouraged Lubnaa to become familiar with the new gun that Zafirr had purchased for her. Mohammed Iqbal Golamaully also instructed Lubnaa to "revolutionise the Islamic Concept amongst our close relatives". Using a pseudonym "Abu Hud" Zafirr Golamaully posted hate messages on Twitter following the terrorist attack against magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015. On other social media sites Zafirr Golamaully used pseudonym "Paladin of Jihad" to provide advice to would-be jihadists on how to avoid deportation by Turkish immigration officials.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Press Association |title=South London couple plead guilty to funding nephew fighting for Isis |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/03/south-london-couple-plead-guilty-to-funding-nephew-fighting-for-isis |work=The Guardian |date=3 October 2016 |access-date=4 October 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Swann |first1=Steve |title=Couple jailed for funding Islamic State fighter nephew |work=BBC News |date=22 November 2016 |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38056207 |access-date=22 November 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Djihadistes mauriciens: des amis de Zafirr et Lubnaa Golamaully racontent |date=8 October 2016 |url=https://www.lexpress.mu/article/291164/djihadistes-mauriciens-amis-zafirr-et-lubnaa-golamaully-racontent |publisher=L'Express |access-date=8 October 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Abel |first1=Vinesen |title=Zafirr et Lubnaa Golamaully, deux ex-élèves de collèges d'élite devenus terroristes |date=5 October 2016 |url=https://www.lexpress.mu/article/290933/zafirr-et-lubnaa-golamaully-deux-ex-eleves-colleges-delite-devenus-terroristes |publisher=L'Express |access-date=5 October 2016}}</ref>

In December 2015, Islamic State issued a video on social media which showed Mauritian citizen Yogen Sundrun who used his pseudonym Abu Shuaib Al Afriqi to claim that IS fighters will liberate Mauritius soon. The video prominently featured a flag of Daesh. Yogen Sundrun also urged other Mauritians, especially nurses and doctors, to travel to the lands of Islamic State. In 2014, Yogen Sundrun had released an earlier video, intended for South Africans at the time of Eid, and encouraging them to join the "Caliphate of Daesh". In that video he held his daughter in his arms and stated "This is my fifth daughter in the Khilafah, praise be God. Brothers and sisters, I don't have the words to express myself about the happiness to be here…". Around him children held fire-arms.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Arouff |first1=Jean Paul |last2=Harelle |first2=Audrey |title=Dans une vidéo de propagande: un Mauricien appelle à rejoindre Daech |date=9 December 2015 |url=https://www.lexpress.mu/video/272693/dans-une-video-propagande-un-mauricien-appelle-rejoindre-daech |publisher=L'Express |access-date=9 December 2015}}</ref>

During the night of Sunday 29 May 2016 and the following morning, several gunshots were fired at the French Embassy located in the capital city [[Port Louis]]. Graffiti was also painted by the attackers on the front fence of the compound which referred to Islamic State and claims that their prophet Abu Bakr Baghdadi had been insulted.<ref>{{cite web |title=Gunshots fired at French Embassy in Mauritius |url=https://www.africanews.com/2016/05/30/gunshots-fired-near-french-embassy-in-mauritius-police-on-alert// |website=Africa News |date=30 May 2016 |access-date=30 May 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Descours |first1=Guillaume |title=Île Maurice: des coups de feu tirés contre l'ambassade de France |url=https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/05/30/01016-20160530ARTFIG00227-le-maurice-des-coups-de-feu-tires-contre-l-ambassade-de-france.php |website=Le Figaro |date=30 May 2016 |access-date=30 May 2016}}</ref>

Following the murder of Manan Fakhoo in January 2021, who was shot dead in [[Beau Bassin-Rose Hill|Beau-Bassin]] by hitmen riding a motorbike, Javed Meetoo, a resident of Vallee Pitôt and member of Daesh ([[Islamic State]]), was arrested and charged with "harbouring terrorist" on 14 March 2022.<ref>{{cite web |title=Meurtre de Manan Fakoo: Le prédicateur islamiste Javed Meetoo |url=https://www.zinfos-moris.com/Meurtre-de-Manan-Fakoo-le-predicateur-islamiste-Javed-Meetoo-serait-l-un-des-cinq-suspects_a20729.html |publisher=Zinfos |access-date=15 February 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Lovina Sophie |first1=Lovina Sophie |title=Assassinat de Manan Fakhoo: Javed Meetoo inculpé sous le "Prevention of Terrorism Act" |url=https://www.lexpress.mu/article/406104/assassinat-manan-fakhoo-javed-meetoo-inculpe-sous-prevention-terrorism-act |work=L'Express |date=15 March 2022 |access-date=15 March 2022}}</ref> In March 2021, Yassiin Meetou had confessed that he had assisted shooter Ajmal Aumeeruddy and Ajam Beeharry of Camp Yoloff by transporting them and their motorbike to shoot Manan Fakhoo.<ref>{{cite web |title=Manan Fakhoo assassination: an investigator offers the status of "star witness" to Yassiin Meetou |url=https://mauritiushindinews.com/hindi-newspaper-in-mauritius/manan-fakhoo-assassination-an-investigator-offers-the-status-of-star-witness-to-yassiin-meetou/ |publisher=Mauritius News & L'Express |access-date=27 March 2021}}</ref>

==== Morocco ====
{{See also|Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group|Salafia Jihadia|Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present)}}

The majority of the perpetrators directly and indirectly involved in the [[2004 Madrid train bombings]] were Moroccans. In the aftermath of that attack, Morocco became a focus of attention for anti-terrorist authorities in [[#Spain|Spain]].<ref name="ispi2018" />

While Morocco is generally seen as a secure destination for tourists as the last terrorist attack happened in [[2011 Marrakesh bombing|2011 where 17 people were killed by bomb at a restaurant in Marrakesh]], over 1600 people have travelled from Morocco to join the Islamic State in the [[Syrian Civil War]]. Moroccan authorities initially ignored the people who joined ISIS but later on realised they could return to commit terrorist offences in Morocco. As a result, the ''Bureau Central d'Investigations Judiciaires'' (BCIJ) was formed.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web|url=https://jyllands-posten.dk/premium/indblik/Indland/ECE11086519/mindst-1600-marokkanere-sluttede-sig-til-is-nu-har-marokko-et-problem-med-hellige-krigere/|title=Hundreder af tikkende bomber i landet, som Islamisk Stat styrede udenom i syv år|date=20 December 2018|website=jyllands-posten.dk|access-date=23 December 2018}}</ref>

In the 2013–2017 period, anti-terrorist authorities in Morocco, in cooperation with their counterparts in Spain, conducted up to eleven joint operations against jihadist cells and networks.<ref name="ispi2018" />

In 2016, the government developed a strategy to further adherence to the [[Maliki]] Islamic school of thought. The authorities removed Quranic passages that were deemed too violent from religious education textbooks. As a result, the textbooks were reduced to 24 lessons from the 50 lessons they had before.<ref name="ispi2018" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.france24.com/en/20161213-focus-morocco-school-reform-religious-education-islam-fight-extremism|title=FOCUS – Morocco reforms religious education to fight extremism|date=13 December 2016|publisher=France 24|language=en|access-date=27 December 2018}}</ref>

In 2017, it was estimated that {{Val|1623}} Moroccans and 2000 Moroccan-Europeans had travelled to join the Islamic State caliphate in the [[Syrian Civil War]], which along with other fighters from MENA countries contributed a significant force to ISIS.<ref name="ispi2018" />

According to a researcher at the [[Danish Institute for International Studies]], Moroccan authorities appear to have a good grip on the jihadist situation and cooperates with European and US authorities. Moroccans are overrepresented in "diaspora terrorism", that is terrorism which takes place outside the borders of Morocco. For example, two Moroccans were behind the [[2017 London Bridge attack]] and a Moroccan killed people by driving his van into pedestrians in [[La Rambla, Barcelona|La Rambla]] in the [[2017 Barcelona attacks|2017 Barcelona terrorist attacks]].<ref name=":03" />

==== Mozambique ====

Mozambique has seen an Islamist insurgency and terror attacks, by Ansar al-Sunna and ISIL, starting with October 2017, in the [[Insurgency in Cabo Delgado|Cabo Delgado Province]]. By December 2020, more than [[Insurgency in Cabo Delgado|3,500 people have been killed]] and [[Insurgency in Cabo Delgado|more than 400,000 people have been displaced]].

==== Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon insurgency by Boko Haram ====
{{See also|Boko Haram insurgency}}

[[Boko Haram]] is an Islamic extremist group based in northeastern Nigeria which began violent attacks in 2009, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. In the 2009–2018 period, more than 27,000 people have been killed in the fighting in the countries around [[Lake Chad]].<ref name=":5">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689|title=Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?|date=22 December 2017|work=BBC News|access-date=4 January 2019|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref name="thedefensepost.com">{{Cite web|url=https://thedefensepost.com/2018/09/29/chad-troops-kill-17-boko-haram-6-dead-lake-chad/|title=Chad troops kill 17 Boko Haram militants after 6 killed in Lake Chad attacks|date=29 September 2018|website=The Defense Post|language=en-US|access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref>

A study from June 2021 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that nearly 350,000 have been killed by the [[Boko Haram insurgency]].<ref name="reuters.com">{{Cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/northeast-nigeria-insurgency-has-killed-almost-350000-un-2021-06-24/|title=Northeast Nigeria insurgency has killed almost 350,000 – UN|date=24 June 2021|work=Reuters|language=en-US|access-date=13 February 2022}}</ref>

Boko Haram consists of two factions, one is led by [[Abubakar Shekau]] and it uses suicide bombings and kill civilians indiscriminately. The other is named Islamic State West Africa Province and it generally attacks military and government installations.<ref name="thedefensepost.com" />

==== Somalia and the Horn of Africa ====
[[Al-Shabaab (militant group)|Al-Shabaab]] is a militant jihadist terrorist group based in East Africa, which emerged in 2006 as the youth wing of the [[Islamic Courts Union]]. A number of foreign jihadists{{Who|date=January 2019}} have gone to Somalia to support al-Shabaab. In 2012, it pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda. It is a participant in the Somali Civil War, and is reportedly being used by Egypt to destabilize Ethiopia, and attracting converts from predominantly Christian Kenya.<ref name=":5" />

In 2010, the group [[July 2010 Kampala attacks|killed 76 people watching the 2010 World Cup in Uganda]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24379013|title=In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?|date=5 October 2013|work=BBC News|access-date=4 January 2019|language=en-GB}}</ref>

In 2017, al-Shabaab was estimated to have about 7000–9000 fighters. It has imposed a strict Sharia law in areas it controls, such as stoning adulterers and amputating hands of thieves.<ref name=":5" />

==== Sudan ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Sudan}}
* [[2000 Jarafa mosque massacre]]

==== Tanzania ====
* [[1998 United States embassy bombings]]

==== Tunisia ====
On 11 April 2002, [[Ghriba synagogue bombing|a Tunisian Al-Qaeda operative used a truck bomb to attack]] the [[El Ghriba synagogue]] on [[Djerba]] island. The attack killed 19 people and injured 30 and was planned by [[Khalid Sheikh Mohammed]] and financed by a [[Pakistanis in Spain|Pakistani resident of Spain]].<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IQbRDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT88|title=Al-Qaeda's Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings|last=Reinares|first=Fernando|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2016|isbn=978-0-231-80140-9|page=88}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ctc.usma.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/|title=Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing|date=14 April 2017|website=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|language=en-US|access-date=18 March 2019|archive-date=6 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181206103743/https://ctc.usma.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

On 18 March 2015, [[Bardo National Museum attack|three militants attacked the Bardo National Museum]] in the [[Tunisia]]n capital city of [[Tunis]], and took hostages. Twenty-one people, mostly European tourists, were killed at the scene, and an additional victim died ten days later. Around fifty others were injured.<ref name="nytimes12">{{cite news|date=18 March 2015|title=The Latest: French President Mourns Tunisia Victims|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/18/world/middleeast/ap-ml-tunisia-attack-the-latest.html|url-status=dead|access-date=4 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150320215139/https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/18/world/middleeast/ap-ml-tunisia-attack-the-latest.html|archive-date=20 March 2015}}</ref><ref name="latimes">{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-tunisia-museum-attack-20150318-story.html#page=1|title=Museum attack a 'great calamity' for Tunisia's young democracy|date=18 March 2015|work=Los Angeles Times|access-date=19 March 2015}}</ref><ref name="auto">[https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/tunisia-death-toll-in-museum-attack-rises-to-23/ar-BBiqmqN Death toll rises to 23] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180105123113/http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/tunisia-death-toll-in-museum-attack-rises-to-23/ar-BBiqmqN |date=5 January 2018 }}, MSN. Retrieved 19 March 2015.</ref> Two of the gunmen, Tunisian citizens Yassine Labidi and Saber Khachnaoui were killed by police. Police treated the event as a [[terrorist attack]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/3/18/tourists-killed-in-tunisia-museum-assault.html|title=21 dead in Tunisia attack, Including Gunmen|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=19 March 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/11479898/Gunmen-take-hostages-in-attack-on-Tunisia-parliament.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150318130121/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/11479898/Gunmen-take-hostages-in-attack-on-Tunisia-parliament.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=18 March 2015|title=Gunmen 'take hostages' in attack on Tunisia parliament.|last1=Marszal|first1=Andrew|date=18 March 2015|work=The Telegraph|access-date=18 March 2015}}</ref>

In June 2015, a mass shooting claimed by the Islamic State [[2015 Sousse attacks|was carried out at a hotel by Seifeddine Rezgui]]. Thirty-eight people were killed, the majority of whom were tourists from the United Kingdom.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.france24.com/en/20150626-tunisia-deadly-shooting-beach-resort-gunmen|title=Scores killed in terror attack on Tunisian beach resort|date=26 June 2015|publisher=France 24|language=en|access-date=19 March 2019}}</ref>

==== Uganda ====
* [[2010 Kampala bombings]]. On 11 July 2010, [[Al-Shabaab (militant group)|Al-Shabaab]] carried out suicide bombings at two locations in Kampala, the capital city of [[Uganda]]. The attacks left [[2010 Kampala bombings|74 dead and 85 injured]].
* [[2021 Uganda bombings]]. From late October to mid-November 2021, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Islamic State organization carried out four bombing attacks across [[Uganda]].

=== Central Asia ===

==== Afghanistan ====
According to [[Human Rights Watch]], [[Taliban]] and [[Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin]] forces have "sharply escalated bombing and other attacks" against civilians since 2006. In 2006, "at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally launched at civilians or civilian objects".<ref>[https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/ ''The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan'']. April 2007. Volume 19, No. 6(C). [[Human Rights Watch]]/</ref>

==== Kyrgyzstan ====
[[Kyrgyzstan|Kyrgyz]]-American brothers [[Dzhokhar Tsarnaev]] and [[Tamerlan Tsarnaev]] were responsible for the [[Boston Marathon bombing]].

==== Tajikistan ====
The government blamed the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) for training those responsible for carrying out a suicide car bombing of a police station in [[Khujand]] on 3 September 2010. Two policemen were killed and 25 injured.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://themoscowtimes.com/news/car-bomber-kills-2-in-tajikistan-1143|title=Car Bomber Kills 2 in Tajikistan|newspaper=[[The Moscow Times]]|date=6 September 2010 |access-date=3 August 2016}}</ref>

==== Uzbekistan ====
{{See also|Terrorism in Uzbekistan}}

On 16 February 1999, six car bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing 16 and injuring more than 100, in what may have been an attempt to assassinate President [[Islam Karimov]]. The IMU was blamed.<ref>{{cite web|first1=Abdumannob|last1=Polat|first2=Nickolai|last2=Butkevich|url=http://www.iicas.org/english/Krsten_4_12_00.htm |title=Unraveling the Mystery of the Tashkent Bombings: Theories and Implications|date=28 November 2000 |access-date=9 February 2016 |url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030611072650/http://iicas.org/english/Krsten_4_12_00.htm|archive-date=11 June 2003}}</ref>

The IMU launched a series of attacks in Tashkent and [[Bukhara]] in March and April 2004. Gunmen and [[female suicide bomber]]s took part in the attacks, which mainly targeted police. The violence killed 33 militants, 10 policemen, and four civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rferl.org/reports/centralasia/2004/04/14-070404.asp|title=Central Asia Report: 7 April 2004|work=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty}}</ref> The government blamed [[Hizb ut-Tahrir]],<ref>{{cite web|first=Hooman|last=Peimani|url=http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2299|title=Uzbekistan's reaction to Tashkent bombings generate doubts on efficacy|publisher=cacianalyst.org|date=21 April 2004 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040617000825/http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2299|archive-date=17 June 2004}}</ref> though the [[Islamic Jihad Union]] (IJU) claimed responsibility.<ref name="rferl.org">{{cite web |first=Gulnoza |last=Saidazimova|url=http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/6ec8adad-f98f-413d-95e1-776074d74a24.html|title=Germany: Authorities Say Uzbekistan-Based Group Behind Terrorist Plot|publisher=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty |date=6 September 2007 |url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070911181849/http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/6ec8adad-f98f-413d-95e1-776074d74a24.html|archive-date=11 September 2007}}</ref>

[[Furkat Kasimovich Yusupov]] was arrested in the first half of 2004, and charged as the leader of a group that had carried out the 28 March bombing on behalf of Hizb ut-Tahrir.<ref name=Rfe2004-07-27>{{cite news|first=Bruce|last=Pannier|url=http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1054045.html|title=Uzbekistan: 'Terror' Trial Likely To Hold Few Surprises|publisher=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]]|date=27 July 2004|url-status=unfit|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081213124934/http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1054045.html|archive-date=13 December 2008}}</ref>

On 30 July 2004, suicide bombers struck the entrances of the US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. Two Uzbek security guards were killed in both bombings.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3532518.stm|title=US FBI joins Uzbek blast inquiry|work=BBC News |date=3 August 2004 |access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref> The IJU again claimed responsibility.<ref name="rferl.org" />

Foreign commentators on Uzbek affairs speculated that the 2004 violence could have been the work of the IMU, Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, or some other radical Islamic organization.<ref name="CRISIS">{{cite journal|last=Rotar|first=Igor|author-link=Igor Rotar|date=19 May 2005 |title=Terrorism in Uzbekistan: A self-made crisis|url=http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=400&no_cache=1|journal=Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation|volume=2|issue=8|access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref><ref name=CORNELL>{{cite news|first=Kathleen|last=Knox|url=http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8147-18.cfm|title=Uzbekistan: Who's Behind The Violence?|publisher=[[Johnson's Russia List]]|issue=18 – JRL 8147|year=2004|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040404040430/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8147-18.cfm|archive-date=4 April 2004}}</ref>

=== East Asia ===

==== China ====
{{Main|Terrorism in China}}
* [[1992 Ürümqi bombings]]
* [[1997 Ürümqi bus bombings]]
* [[2010 Aksu bombing]]
* [[2013 Tiananmen Square attack]]
* [[Kunming station massacre]]
* [[April 2014 Ürümqi attack]]
* [[May 2014 Ürümqi attack]]

=== South Asia ===

==== Bangladesh ====
{{See also|Attacks by Islamic extremists in Bangladesh}}
In Bangladesh, the group [[Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh]] was formed sometime in 1998, and gained prominence in 2001.<ref name="satp">[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)], from South Asia Terrorism Portal</ref> The organization was officially banned in February 2005 after attacks on [[Non-governmental organization|NGOs]], but struck back in August when 300 bombs were detonated almost simultaneously throughout Bangladesh, targeting [[Shahjalal International Airport]], government buildings and major hotels.<ref>{{cite news|first=Maneeza|last=Hossain|url=http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm?doc_id=358521|title=The Rising Tide of Islamism in Bangladesh|publisher=defenddemocracy.org|date=16 February 2006|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060405221840/http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm?doc_id=358521|archive-date=5 April 2006}}</ref><ref>''The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism'', Columbia University Press (2007), pp. 69–70</ref>

The [[Ansarullah Bangla Team]] ('''ABT'''), also called '''Ansar Bangla''' is an Islamic extremist organization in Bangladesh, implicated in crimes including some brutal [[Attacks on atheists in Bangladesh|attacks and murders of atheist bloggers]] from 2013 to 2015 and a bank heist in April 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2015/may/25/ansarullah-bangla-team-banned|title=Ansarullah Bangla Team banned|work=dhakatribune.com|date=25 May 2015|url-status=unfit|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150527045656/http://en.prothom-alo.com/bangladesh/news/67459/Ansarullah-Bangla-Team-banned|archive-date=27 May 2015}}</ref>

[[Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami]] ({{lang-ar|حركة الجهاد الإسلامي}}, ''Ḥarkat al-Jihād al-Islāmiyah'', meaning "Islamic Jihad Movement", '''HuJI''') is an [[Islamic fundamentalism|Islamic fundamentalist]] organisation most active in South Asian countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India since the early 1990s. It was banned in Bangladesh in 2005.

==== India ====
{{See also|Terrorism in India|Category:Islamic terrorism in India}}

[[Lashkar-e-Taiba]], [[Jaish-e-Mohammed]], [[Al Badr]] & [[Hizbul Mujahideen]] are militant groups seeking accession of [[Kashmir]] to [[Pakistan]] from [[India]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=Lashkar-e-Toiba|title=Lashkar-e-Toiba |dictionary=dictionary.com |year=2003 |access-date=27 August 2006 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040811141123/http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=lashkar-e-toiba |archive-date=11 August 2004}}</ref> The Lashkar leadership describes Indian and Israel regimes as the main enemies of Islam and Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web|last=Mir|first=Amir|year=2005|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC11Df07.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050311133403/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC11Df07.html|url-status=unfit|archive-date=11 March 2005|title=The jihad lives on|publisher=Asia Times Online Ltd.|access-date=24 June 2006}}</ref> Lashkar-e-Toiba, along with [[Jaish-e-Mohammed]], another militant group active in [[Kashmir]] are on the United States' foreign terrorist organizations list, and are also designated as terrorist groups by the United Kingdom,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.britishhighcommission.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1031627751059 |title=Speech by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP to the Confederation of Indian Industry Bangalore, India 5 January 2002 |publisher=britishhighcommission.gov |date=January 2002 |access-date=24 June 2006 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071123113931/http://www.britishhighcommission.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1031627751059 |archive-date=23 November 2007 }}</ref> India, Australia<ref>{{cite web|last=Thompson|first=Geoff|url=http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1107792.htm|title=Is Lashkar-e-Toiba still operating in Pakistan?|work=PM|publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation|date=13 May 2004|access-date=5 August 2016}}</ref> and Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ppu.org.uk/war/countries/asia/pakistan.html|title=Wars and Armed Conflicts: Current Situation|work=Peace Pledge Union|date=27 July 2002 |access-date=25 June 2006|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051219133310/http://www.ppu.org.uk/war/countries/asia/pakistan.html|archive-date=19 December 2005}}</ref> Jaish-e-Mohammed was formed in 1994 and has carried out a series of attacks all over India.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1804228.stm |title=SOUTH ASIA &#124; Jaish-e-Mohammad: A profile |work=BBC News |date=6 February 2002 |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Attack_May_Spoil_Kashmir_Summit.html |title=Attack May Spoil Kashmir Summit |publisher=Spacewar.com |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref> The group was formed after the supporters of [[Maulana Masood Azhar]] split from another Islamic militant organization, [[Harkat-ul-Mujahideen]]. Jaish-e-Mohammed is viewed by some as the "deadliest" and "the principal terrorist organization in [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]".<ref name="fas">{{cite web|title=Foreign Terrorist Organizations|url=https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf|publisher=fas.org|access-date=6 February 2008}}</ref> The group was also implicated in the kidnapping and murder of American journalist [[Daniel Pearl]].<ref name="fas" /> All these groups coordinate under leadership of Syed Salahuddin's [[United Jihad Council]].

Some major bomb blasts and attacks in India were perpetrated by Islamic militants from Pakistan, e.g., the [[2008 Mumbai attacks]] and [[2001 Indian Parliament attack]].

[[2006 Mumbai train bombings]] killed 209 people and injured 700 more. It was carried out by banned [[Students Islamic Movement of India]] terrorist groups.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/all-you-need-to-know-about-711/article7640887.ece|title=All you need to know about the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts|last=Desk|first=Internet|date=11 September 2015|work=The Hindu|access-date=29 August 2019|language=en-IN|issn=0971-751X}}</ref>

==== Pakistan ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Pakistan}}

==== Sri Lanka ====
The [[2019 Sri Lanka Easter bombings]], orchestrated by the [[National Thowheeth Jama'ath]],<ref>{{Cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/asia/ntj-sri-lanka-national-thowheeth-jamaath.html |title = Local Group is Blamed for Attacks, but Sri Lanka Suspects 'International Network'|newspaper = The New York Times|date = 22 April 2019|last1 = Bradsher|first1 = Keith|last2 = Garcia|first2 = Sandra E.}}</ref> were the deadliest terrorist attack in the country since [[Sri Lankan Civil War|its civil war]] ended on 16 May 2009. The bombings killed 269 people and injured more than 500.

=== Southeast Asia ===

==== Indonesia ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Indonesia}}

==== Philippines ====
{{See also|Terrorism in the Philippines}}

The [[Abu Sayyaf|Abu Sayyaf Group]], also known as al-Harakat al-Islamiyya, is one of several militant Islamic-separatist groups based in and around the southern islands of [[Philippines|the Philippines]], in [[Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao]] ([[Jolo]], [[Basilan]], and [[Mindanao]]) where for almost 30 years various Muslim groups have been engaged in an insurgency for a state, independent of the predominantly [[Christians|Christian]] [[Philippines]]. The name of the group is derived from the Arabic ابو, ''[[ab (Semitic)|abu]]'' ("father of") and ''sayyaf'' ("Swordsmith").<ref name="24threlease">{{cite press release|title=FBI updates most wanted terrorists and seeking information – War on Terrorism Lists|date=24 February 2006|publisher=FBI National Press Office|url=https://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel06/mostwantedterrorists022406.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090805113636/http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel06/mostwantedterrorists022406.htm |archive-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> Since its inception in the early 1990s, the group has carried out bombings, [[assassination]]s, [[kidnapping]]s and [[extortion]] in their fight for an independent [[Islamic state]] in western Mindanao and the [[Sulu Archipelago]] with the stated goal of creating a [[pan-Islamic]] superstate across [[southeast Asia]], spanning from east to west; the island of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, the island of [[Borneo]] (Malaysia, Indonesia), the [[South China Sea]], and the [[Malay Peninsula]] ([[Peninsular Malaysia]], [[Thailand]] and [[Burma|Myanmar]]).<ref name="TKBAbu">{{cite web|url=http://tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=204|title=Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)|publisher=MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base|access-date=20 September 2006|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060827045351/http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=204|archive-date=27 August 2006}}</ref> The [[United States Department of State|U.S. Department of State]] has branded the group a terrorist entity by adding it to the list of [[U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations|Foreign Terrorist Organizations]].<ref name="TKBAbu" />

==== Thailand ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Thailand}}
Most of the terrorist incidents in Thailand are related to the [[South Thailand insurgency]].

=== Europe ===
{{Main|Islamic terrorism in Europe|Al-Qaeda activities in Europe}}
{{See also|Foreign fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars}}
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Lethal attacks on civilians in Europe which have been credited to Islamist terrorism include the [[2004 Madrid train bombings|2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid]], where 191 people were killed, the [[7 July 2005 London bombings]], also of public transport, which killed 52 commuters, and the 2015 [[Charlie Hebdo shooting|''Charlie Hebdo'' shooting]], in [[Paris]], where 12 people were killed in response to the satirical weekly newspaper ''[[Charlie Hebdo]]'' depicting cartoons of [[Muhammad]]. On 13 November 2015 the French capital suffered [[November 2015 Paris attacks|a series of coordinated attacks]], claimed by [[ISIS]], that killed 129 people in restaurants, the [[Bataclan theatre]] and the [[Stade de France]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Dearden|first1=Lizzie|title=Paris attack: Isis warns 'This is just the beginning' after killing at least 127 people in French capital|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attacks-this-is-just-the-beginning-isis-vows-after-killing-at-least-127-people-in-french-a6734546.html|access-date=17 November 2015|newspaper=The Independent|date=15 November 2015}}</ref>

Out of 1,009 arrests for terrorism in 2008, 187 were in relation to Islamist terrorism. The report showed that the majority of Islamist terror suspects were second or third generation immigrants.<ref name="Europol-2009a">{{cite web|url=https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/tesat2009_1.pdf|title=EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TE-SAT 2009|year=2009|publisher=[[Europol]]|page=21|access-date=29 July 2015}}</ref>

In 2009, a [[Europol]] report showed that more than 99% of terrorist attacks in Europe over the last three years were, carried out by non-Muslims.<ref name="Europol-2009a" />{{Page needed|date=December 2018}} Swedish economist [[Tino Sanandaji]] has criticised the use of statistics where the number of attacks are counted instead of the number of killed, since 79% of terrorist deaths 2001–2011 in Europe were due to Islamic terrorism. Therefore, statistics focusing on the number of attacks instead of the number killed are exploited by those who wish to trivialise the phenomenon.<ref name=":1t">{{Cite news|title=Islamists caused overwhelming majority of terrorist deaths in Europe during last decade|url=http://tino.us/2011/02/islamists-caused-overwhelming-majority-of-terrorist-deaths-in-europe-during-last-decade/|work=Tino Sanandaji blog|date=20 February 2011}}</ref> The great difference in the number of attacks versus the number of killed is that separatist attacks in Spain, typically involve vandalism and not killing. So in statistics, the global terrorist plot leading to the 9/11 attack and a party headquarters being vandalised and painted with slogans by domestic terrorists each count as one terrorist attack.<ref name=":1t" /> According to a report by [[Europol]] on terrorism in the [[European Union]], in 2016 "nearly all reported fatalities and most of the casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks." A majority of about two-thirds of all terrorist-related arrests in the EU were also jihadist-related.<ref name="Europol17">{{Cite book|title=EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017|url=https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017|publisher=Europol|year=2017|page=10|isbn=978-9295200791}}</ref>

The majority of deaths by terrorism in Europe from 2001 to 2014 were caused by Islamic terrorism, not including Islamic terrorist attacks in European Russia.<ref>{{Cite news|title= Daily chart: Terror attacks |url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart-8|newspaper=The Economist|date=15 January 2015}}</ref>

According to the British think tank<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dTt0rG_B130C&pg=PA103|title=Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach|last=Archetti|first=Cristina|date=29 October 2012|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-0-230-36049-5|pages=103|language=en|quote=The London think tank, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) [...]}}{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> [[The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence|ICSR]], up to 40% of terrorist plots in Europe are part-financed through [[petty crime]] such as drug-dealing, theft, robberies, loan fraud and burglaries. Jihadists use ordinary crime as a way to finance their activity and have also argued this to be the "ideologically correct" way to wage jihad in [[Dar al-Harb|non-Muslim lands]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://icsr.info/2016/10/new-icsr-report-criminal-pasts-terrorist-futures-european-jihadists-new-crime-terror-nexus/|title=Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus / ICSR|date=11 October 2016|work=[[The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence]]|access-date=14 July 2018|language=en-US}}</ref>

The pattern of jihadist attacks in 2017 led Europol to conclude that terrorists preferred to attack people rather than causing property damage or loss of capital.<ref name="Europol18">{{cite book|url=https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2018.pdf|title=European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE SAT 2018)|date=2018|publisher=[[Europol]]|isbn=978-92-95200-91-3|pages=5–9, 22–25, 35–36|access-date=23 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180620144052/https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2018.pdf|archive-date=20 June 2018}}</ref>

According to [[Europol]], the jihadist attacks in 2017 had three patterns:<ref name="te_sat_2018_p4">{{cite book|url=https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2018.pdf|title=European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE SAT 2018)|date=2018|publisher=[[Europol]]|isbn=978-92-95200-91-3|pages=4|access-date=23 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180620144052/https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2018.pdf|archive-date=20 June 2018}}</ref>

*Indiscriminate killings: London [[2017 Westminster attack|March]] & [[2017 London Bridge attack|June]] attacks and [[2017 Barcelona attacks|Barcelona]] attacks.<ref name="te_sat_2018_p4" />
*Attacks on Western lifestyle: the [[Manchester Arena bombing|Manchester bombing in May 2017]].<ref name="te_sat_2018_p4" />
*Attacks on symbols of authority: Paris attacks in February, June and August.<ref name="te_sat_2018_p4" />

The agency's report also noted that jihadist attacks had caused more deaths and casualties than any other type of terrorist attack, that such attacks had become more frequent, and that there had been a decrease in the sophistication and preparation of the attacks.<ref name="Europol18" />

According to [[Susanne Schröter]], the 2017 attacks in European countries showed that the military defeat of the Islamic State did not mean the end of Islamist violence. Schröter also wrote that the events in Europe looked like a delayed implementation of jihadist strategy formulated by [[Abu Musab al Suri|Abu Musab al-Suri]] in 2005, where an intensification of terror should destabilise societies and encourage Muslim youth to revolt. The expected civil war never materialised Europe, but did occur in other regions such as North Africa and the Philippines.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.normativeorders.net/de/presse/medienecho/40-presse/presse-echo/5606-dschihadisten-als-elitetruppe-des-islams-eine-klare-ablehnung-dieser-position-durch-islamische-verbaende-in-deutschland-fehlt-von-susanne-schroeter|title=Dschihadisten als Elitetruppe des Islams. Eine klare Ablehnung dieser Position durch islamische Verbände in Deutschland fehlt / Von Susanne Schröter|last=Storm|first=Linde|website=normativeorders.net|language=de-de|access-date=1 December 2018|archive-date=27 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181027190000/https://www.normativeorders.net/de/presse/medienecho/40-presse/presse-echo/5606-dschihadisten-als-elitetruppe-des-islams-eine-klare-ablehnung-dieser-position-durch-islamische-verbaende-in-deutschland-fehlt-von-susanne-schroeter|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In April 2018, EU anti-terror coordinator estimated there to be 50,000 radicalized Muslims living in Europe.<ref name="ELMUNDO">{{Cite news|url=http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2017/08/31/59a70a48ca4741f7588b45e4.html|title=El coordinador antiterrorista de la UE: "Lo de Barcelona volverá a pasar, hay 50.000 radicales en Europa"|work=ELMUNDO|access-date=9 September 2018|language=es}}</ref>

==== Austria ====
* [[2020 Vienna attack]]

==== Belgium ====
{{See also|Terrorist activity in Belgium#Islamist attacks|Islam in Belgium|Foreign fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars#Belgium}}
{{#section-h:Terrorism in Belgium|Islamic terrorism}}

==== Finland ====
{{Main|Islam in Finland}}
{{#section-h:Islam in Finland|Terrorism and radicalisation}}

==== France ====
{{See also|November 2015 Paris attacks|Terrorism in France|Islam in France}}
France had its first occurrences with religious extremism in the 1980s due to French involvement in the [[Lebanese Civil War]]. In the 1990s, a series of attacks on French soil were executed by the [[Armed Islamic Group of Algeria]] (GIA).

In the 1990–2010 time span, France experienced repeated attacks linked to international jihadist movements.<ref name="ispi2018">{{Cite book|url=https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/mediterraneo_def_web.pdf|title=De-Radicalization in the Mediterranean – Comparing Challenges and Approaches|last=Vidino|display-authors=etal|publisher=ISPI|year=2018|isbn=9788867058198|location=Milano|pages=13–15, 24, 26, 35–36, 42–43, 48, 62–63, 69–70}}</ref> ''[[Le Monde]]'' reported on 26 July 2016 that "Islamist Terrorism" had caused 236 dead in France in the preceding 18-month period.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/07/26/le-terrorisme-islamiste-a-fait-236-morts-en-france-en-18-mois_4975000_4355770.html|title=Le terrorisme islamiste a fait 236 morts en France en 18 mois|date=26 July 2016|work=Le Monde|language=fr|quote=De l'attaque de « Charlie Hebdo » et de l'« Hyper casher » en janvier 2015 à la mort du père Jacques Hamel à Saint-Etienne-de-Rouvray, mardi 26 juillet, ce sont 236 personnes qui ont perdu la vie dans des attentats et attaques terroristes|access-date=27 July 2016}}</ref>

In the 2015–2018 timespan in France, 249 people were killed and 928 wounded in a total of 22 terrorist attacks.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational/national-today-newsletter-terrorism-implant-registry-rice-1.4939071|title=By the numbers: France's battle against terror |date=12 December 2018|first=Jonathon |last=Gatehouse |publisher=Canadian Broadcasting Corporation|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190404210321/https://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational/national-today-newsletter-terrorism-implant-registry-rice-1.4939071|archive-date=4 April 2019 |access-date=23 April 2019|quote=22 — the number of terror incidents on French soil since the beginning of 2015. / 249 — the number of dead in those attacks. / 928 — the number of wounded.}}</ref>

The deadly attacks in 2015 in France changed the issue of Islamist radicalization from a security threat to also constitute a social problem. Prime minister [[François Hollande]] and prime minister [[Manuel Valls]] saw the fundamental values of the French republic being challenged and called them attacks against secular, enlightenment and democratic values along with "what makes us who we are".<ref name="ispi2018" />

Although jihadists in the 2015-onward timeframe legitimized their attacks with a narrative of reprisal for France's participation in the international coalition fighting the Islamic State, Islamic terrorism in France has other, deeper and older causes. The main reasons France suffers frequent attacks are, in no particular order:<ref name="FranceThreat">{{Cite web|url=https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2017/12/14/publication-jihadist-women-a-threat-not-to-be-underestimated|title=Jihadist women, a threat not to be underestimated – Publication – pdf|last=Koninkrijksrelaties|first=Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en|date=14 December 2017|publisher=[[AIVD]]|page=5|language=en-GB|access-date=1 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181201181028/https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2017/12/14/publication-jihadist-women-a-threat-not-to-be-underestimated|archive-date=1 December 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

* France's secular domestic policies (''[[Laïcité]]'') which jihadists perceive to be hostile towards Islam. Also, France's status as an officially secular nation and jihadists label France as "the flagship of disbelief".<ref name="FranceThreat" />
*France has a strong cultural tradition in comics, which in the context of Muhammad cartoons is a question of freedom of expression.<ref name="expressen20201104">{{cite web|title=Därför är Frankrike så hårt terrordrabbat|url=https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/darfor-ar-frankrike-sa-hart-terrordrabbat/|access-date=4 November 2020|website=Expressen|date=3 November 2020 |language=sv}}</ref>
*France has a large Muslim minority<ref name="expressen20201104" />
*France's foreign policy towards Muslim countries and jihadist fronts. France is seen as the spearhead directed against jihadist groups in Africa, just as the United States is seen as the main force opposing jihadist groups elsewhere. France's former foreign policies such as that as its colonization of Muslim countries is also brought up in jihadist propaganda, for example, that the influence of French education, culture and political institutions had served to erase the Muslim identity of those colonies and their inhabitants.<ref name=":7h">{{cite journal|last=Bindner|first=Laurence|year=2018|title=Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France|url=https://icct.nl/publication/jihadists-grievance-narratives-against-france/|journal=Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies|pages=4–8|doi=10.19165/2018.2.01|doi-access=free}}</ref>
* Jihadists consider France as a strong proponent of disbelief. For instance, [[Marianne]], the national emblem of France, is considered as "a false idol" by jihadists and the French to be "idol worshippers". France also has no law against blasphemy and an [[Anti-clericalism|anticlerical]] satirical press which is less respectful towards religion than that of the US or the United Kingdom{{dubious|date=April 2024}}. The French nation state is also perceived as an obstacle towards establishing a caliphate.<ref name=":7h" />
In 2020 two Islamic terrorist attacks were foiled by authorities, bringing the total to 33 since 2017 according to [[Laurent Nuñez]], the director of [[National Centre for Counter Terrorism|CNRLT]], who declared that Sunni Islamist terrorism was a prioritised threat. Nuñez drew parallels between the three attacks of 2020 which all were attacks on "blasphemy and the will to avenge their prophet".<ref>{{cite web|title=Terrorisme: deux attentats islamistes déjoués en 2020, 33 depuis 2017|url=https://www.rtl.fr/actu/justice-faits-divers/terrorisme-deux-attentats-islamistes-dejoues-en-2020-33-depuis-2017-7800949425|access-date=10 January 2021|website=RTL.fr|date=3 January 2021 |language=fr-FR}}</ref>

==== Germany ====
In the 2015–2020 time span, there were 9 [[Islamic terrorism in Europe|Islamic terrorist attacks]] and thwarted terrorist plots where at least one of the perpetrators had entered Germany as an asylum seeker during the [[European migrant crisis]]. The Islamic terrorists entered Germany either without identity documents or with falsified documents. The number of discovered plots began to decline in 2017. In 2020 German authorities noted that the majority of the asylum seekers entered Germany without identification papers during the crisis and security agencies considered unregulated immigration as problematic from a security aspect.<ref>{{cite web|date=20 July 2020|title=Terroristen "kein Massenphänomen" in der Flüchtlingskrise|url=https://www.merkur.de/politik/terroristen-kein-massenphaenomen-in-fluechtlingskrise-zr-13837730.html|access-date=28 July 2020|website=Merkur.de|language=de}}</ref>

==== Italy ====
{{See also|Terrorism in Italy#Islamic terrorism}}
Despite its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, relatively porous borders, and a large influx of migrants from Muslim majority countries, Italy has not experienced the same surge in radicalization as other European countries. Just 125 individuals with ties to Italy left to join jihadist groups, compared with Belgium's 470 and Sweden's 300 such individuals in the same period from their much smaller populations. Since the [[September 11 attacks]] in 2001, there have been a small number of plots either thwarted or failed. Two individuals born in Italy have been involved in terrorist attacks, Youssef Zaghba one of the trio of attackers in the June [[2017 London Bridge attack]] while ISIS sympathizer Tomasso Hosni attacked soldiers at [[Milano Centrale railway station|Milan's Central station]] in May 2017.<ref name="ispi2018" />

Deportation (expulsion) of suspects who are foreign nationals has been the cornerstone of Italy's preventive counter-terrorism strategy against jihadists.<ref name=":2">{{cite web|url=https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/measure-expulsions-extremism-21804|title=The measure of expulsions for extremism|last=ispisito|date=14 December 2018|website=ISPI|language=en|access-date=21 December 2018}}</ref> Deportees are prohibited from re-entering Italy and the entire Schengen Area for at least five years. This measure is particularly effective because in Italy, unlike in other Western European countries, many radicalized Muslims are first-generation immigrants without [[Italian nationality law|Italian citizenship]]. As elsewhere in Europe, prison inmates show signs of radicalization while incarcerated. In 2018, 41 individuals were deported upon release.<ref name=":2" /> Of the 147 people deported from 2015 to 2017, all were related to Islamist radicalization and 12 were imams.<ref name=":3">{{cite journal|last=Marone|first=Francesco|date=13 March 2017|title=The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from the Italian Case|website=International Center for Counter-Terrorism|url=https://icct.nl/publication/the-use-of-deportation-in-counter-terrorism-insights-from-the-italian-case/|language=en-US|access-date=21 December 2018|archive-date=21 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181221134649/https://icct.nl/publication/the-use-of-deportation-in-counter-terrorism-insights-from-the-italian-case/|url-status=dead}}</ref> From January 2015 to April 2018, 300 individuals were expelled from Italian soil.<ref name="ispi2018" /> The vast majority of the deportees come from [[North Africa]], with most of the deportees come from [[Moroccans in Italy|Morocco]], [[Tunisian people in Italy|Tunisia]] and [[Egyptians in Italy|Egypt]]. A noted group came from [[Balkans|the Balkans]], with 13 individuals from Albania, 14 from Kosovo and 12 from Macedonia. A smaller group were from Asia, with [[Pakistanis in Italy|Pakistanis]] constituting the largest group.<ref name=":3" />

==== Netherlands ====
{{Main|List of terrorist incidents in the Netherlands|Islam in the Netherlands}}
{{#section-h:Islam in the Netherlands|Jihadists}}

===== Attacks in the Netherlands =====
* [[Theo van Gogh (film director)|'''Murder of Theo van Gogh''']] on 2 November 2004. Dutch filmmaker and political activist Theo van Gogh was assassinated by [[Mohammed Bouyeri]], a second-generation Moroccan-Dutchman, [[Islamist]] and member of the [[Hofstad Network]].{{citation needed|date=March 2021}}
* '''[[2018 Amsterdam stabbing attack]]''': On 31 August 2018, a man randomly attacked two people in [[Amsterdam Centraal station]] with a blade weapon – both victims were American-[[Demographics of Eritrea|Eritrean]] tourists who were injured.<ref>{{cite news|last=Rosman|first=Cyril|date=11 December 2018|title=Toestand van slachtoffer 'terreursteker' Amsterdam CS is 'catastrofaal'|language=nl|newspaper=[[Algemeen Dagblad]]|url=https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/toestand-van-slachtof-fer-terreur-ste-ker-amsterdam-cs-is-catastrofaal~a2a13314/|access-date=13 November 2019}}</ref> The attacker was a 19-year-old [[Afghans in the Netherlands|from Afghanistan]] under the name Jawad S. who held a German [[residency permit]] and was denied asylum there.<ref>{{cite web|title=Knivman i Amsterdam ville hämnas skymfandet av islam|url=https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2018/09/03/knivman-i-amsterdam-ville-hamnas-skymfandet-av-islam|access-date=19 January 2019|website=svenska.yle.fi|language=sv-FI}}</ref> The suspect was aggrieved at the Netherlands for [[Blasphemy and Islam|insulting Islam]], directly referring to politician [[Geert Wilders]].<ref>{{cite news|date=5 September 2018|title=Jihadist knifeman shot in nine seconds|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419445|access-date=7 November 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Suspect in stabbing|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-09-03/suspect-in-stabbing-of-americans-believes-dutch-insult-islam|website=usnews.com}}</ref>
* '''[[Utrecht tram shooting]]''': On 18 March 2019, Gökmen Tanis carried out a shooting attack against tram passengers in Utrecht, killing four civilians and wounding six others. Tanis was arrested and convicted of murder with terrorist intent and sentenced to life in prison. He expressed support for Islamic extremism.<ref name="life imprisonment">{{Cite news|date=20 March 2020|title=Gökmen T. krijgt levenslang voor aanslag in Utrechtse tram|language=nl-NL|work=nu.nl|url=https://www.nu.nl/schietpartij-utrecht/6039024/gokmen-t-krijgt-levenslang-voor-aanslag-in-utrechtse-tram.html|access-date=20 March 2020}}</ref>

==== Norway ====
In 2012, two men were sentenced in Oslo to seven and a half years in jail for an attack against Mohammad-cartoonist [[Kurt Westergaard]]. This was the first sentence under the new anti-terror legislation. A third man was freed from the accusation of terrorism, but was sentenced for helping with explosives and he received a fourth-month prison sentence.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/terror-prozess-in-oslo-haftstrafen-fuer-geplanten-mord-an-mohammed-zeichner-a-812250.html|title=Terror-Prozess in Oslo: Haftstrafen für geplanten Mord an Mohammed-Zeichner|date=30 January 2012|work=Der Spiegel|access-date=9 September 2018}}</ref>

==== Poland ====
In 2015, the terrorist threat level was zero, on its scale which has four levels plus the "zero level". About 20–40 Polish nationals had [[Foreign fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars|travelled to the conflict zone in Syria-Iraq]].<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1 April 2016|title= The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies|url=https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles-threats-policies/|journal= Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies|language=en-US|pages=46|doi=10.19165/2016.1.02|last1=Van Ginkel|first1=Bibi|last2=Boutin|first2=Bérénice|last3=Chauzal|first3=Grégory|last4=Dorsey|first4=Jessica|last5=Jegerings|first5=Marjolein|last6=Paulussen|first6=Christophe|last7=Pohl|first7=Johanna|last8=Reed|first8=Alastair|last9=Zavagli|first9=Sofia|doi-access=free}}</ref>

==== Russia ====
[[File:Beslan school no 1 victim photos.jpg|thumb|[[Beslan school siege|Beslan school]] victim photos]]
Politically and religiously motivated attacks on civilians in Russia have been traced to separatist sentiment among the largely Muslim population of its [[North Caucasus]] region, particularly in [[Chechnya]], where the central government of the Russian Federation has waged two bloody wars against the local [[Chechen Republic of Ichkeria|secular separatist government]] since 1994. In the [[Moscow theater hostage crisis]] in October 2002, three Chechen separatist groups took an estimated 850 people hostage in the Russian capital; at least 129 hostages died during the storming by Russian special forces, all but one killed by the chemicals used to subdue the attackers (whether this attack would more properly be called a [[nationalism|nationalist]] rather than an Islamist attack is in question). In the September 2004 [[Beslan school hostage crisis]] more than 1,000 people were taken hostage after a school in the [[Republics of Russia|Russian republic]] of [[North Ossetia–Alania]] was seized by a pro-Chechen multi-ethnic group aligned to [[Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs]]; hundreds of people died during the storming by Russian forces.<ref>''Foreign Affairs'', January/February 2008, p. 74, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model"</ref>

Since 2000, Russia has also experienced [[Suicide attacks in the North Caucasus conflict|a string of suicide bombings]] that killed hundreds of people in the Caucasian republics of Chechnya, [[Dagestan]] and [[Ingushetia]], as well as in Russia proper including Moscow. Responsibility for most of these attacks was claimed by either [[Shamil Basayev]]'s Islamic-nationalist rebel faction or, later, by [[Dokka Umarov]]'s pan-Islamist movement [[Caucasus Emirate]] which is aiming to unite most of Russia's North Caucasus as an [[emirate]] since its creation in 2007.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40b2b7e8-3e84-11df-a706-00144feabdc0.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40b2b7e8-3e84-11df-a706-00144feabdc0.html |archive-date=10 December 2022 |url-access=subscription|title=Changing face of terror in Russia|work=Financial Times|access-date=7 January 2015}}</ref> Since the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, the group has abandoned its secular nationalist goals and fully adopted the ideology of Salafist-takfiri Jihadism<ref>{{Cite web |date=3 September 2014 |title=Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate |url=http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate |access-date=11 February 2022 |website= |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903083632/http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate |archive-date=3 September 2014 |url-status=dead}}</ref> which seeks to advance the cause of Allah on the earth by waging war against the Russian government and non-Muslims in the North Caucasus, such as the local [[Sufi]] Muslim population, whom they view as [[mushrikeen]] (polytheists) who do not adhere to true Islamic teachings. In 2011, the U.S. Department of State included the Caucasus Emirate on its list of terrorist organisations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164312.htm|title=Designation of Caucasus Emirate|work=U.S. Department of State|access-date=7 January 2015}}</ref>

==== Spain ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Spain|Islam in Spain}}
{{#section-h:Terrorism in Spain|Islamic terrorism}}

==== Sweden ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Sweden}}
{{#section-h:Terrorism in Sweden|Islamic terrorism}}

===== Islamic terror attacks in Sweden =====
In 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an [[Swedish Iraqis|Iraqi-born Swedish]] citizen, attempted to kill Christmas shoppers in Stockholm in the [[2010 Stockholm bombings]]. According to investigations by [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], the bombing would likely have killed between 30 and 40 people had it succeeded, and it is thought that al-Abdaly operated with a network.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.svd.se/bomben-skulle-ha-dodat-40-personer|title=Bomben skulle ha dödat 40 personer|date=5 December 2011|work=Svenska Dagbladet|language=sv}}</ref>

In April 2017 Rakhmat Akilov, a 39-year-old rejected [[asylum seeker]] born in the [[Soviet Union]] and a citizen of [[Uzbekistan]], drove a truck down a pedestrian area in Stockholm and killed five people and injured dozens of others in the [[2017 Stockholm truck attack]]. He has expressed sympathy with extremist organizations, among them the [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]] (ISIL).<ref name=":02">[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-attack-idUSKBN17B089 "Uzbek suspect in Swedish attack sympathized with Islamic State: police"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170520192306/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-attack-idUSKBN17B089|date=20 May 2017}}. [[Reuters]]. 10 April 2017. Retrieved 12 April 2017.</ref>

==== Balkans ====
{{Main|Terrorism in the Balkans}}

=== Middle East/West Asia ===

==== Turkey ====
{{See also|Terrorism in Turkey}}
Historians have said that militant Islamism first gained ground among Kurds before its appeal grew among ethnic Turks and that the two most important radical Islamist organizsations have been an outgrowth of Kurdish Islamism rather than Turkish Islamism.<ref name="ReferenceA">*German Jihad: On the Internationalisation of Islamist Terrorism by Guido Steinberg. Columbia University Press, 2013</ref> The Turkish or Kurdish Hizbullah is a primarily Kurdish group has its roots in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of Turkey and among Kurds who migrated to the cities in Western Turkey.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> The members of the [[Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front|İBDA-C]] were predominantly Kurds, most members if not all are ethnic Kurds like its founder, as in the Hizbullah. The İBDA-C stressed its Kurdish roots, and is fighting Turkish secularism, and is also anti-Christian. The Hizbula reestablished in 2003 in southeastern Turkey and "today its ideology might be more widespread than ever among Kurds there".<ref name="ReferenceA" /> The influence of these groups confirms "the continuing Kurdish domination of Turkish islamism". Notable Kurdish Islamists include also<ref>Mamdouh Mahmud Salim</ref>(an Iraqi Kurd born in Sudan) co-founder of the Islamist terrorist network al-Qaeda. There is a strong Kurdish element in Turkish radical Islamism.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> Kurdish and Turkish Islamists have also co-operated together, one example being the 2003 Istanbul bombings, and this co-operation has also been observed in Germany, as in the case of the Sauerland terror cell. Political scientist Guido Steinberg stated that many top leaders of Islamist organizations in Turkey fled to Germany in the 2000s, and that the Turkish Hizbullah has also "left an imprint on Turkish Kurds in Germany".<ref name="ReferenceA" /> Also many Kurds from Iraq (there are about 50,000 to 80,000 Iraqi Kurds in Germany) financially supported Kurdish-Islamist groups like Ansar al Islam.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> Many Islamists in Germany are ethnic Kurds (Iraqi and Turkish Kurds) or Turks. Before 2006, the German Islamist scene was dominated by Iraqi Kurds and Palestinians, but since 2006 Kurds and Turks from Turkey are dominant.<ref name="ReferenceA" />

[[Hizbollah (Turkey)|Hezbollah in Turkey]] (unrelated to the [[Shia Islam|Shia]] Hezbollah in Lebanon) is a [[Sunni Islam|Sunni]] terrorist group accused of a series of attacks, including the [[2003 Istanbul bombings|November 2003 bombings]] of two synagogues, the British consulate in [[Istanbul]] and HSBC bank headquarters that killed 58.<ref>{{cite web|last=Kohlmann|first=Evan|author-link=Evan Kohlmann |url=http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kohlmann200311250844.asp|title=Terrorized Turkey: Pointing fingers at al Qaeda|work=National Review |date=25 November 2003|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040217221333/http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kohlmann200311250844.asp |archive-date=17 February 2004}}</ref> <!-- Wikipedia article actually says: "Perpetrator: Al-Qaeda" --> Hizbullah's leader, [[Hüseyin Velioğlu]], was killed in action by Turkish police in Beykoz on 17 January 2000. Besides Hizbullah, other Islamic groups listed as a terrorist organization by [[General Directorate of Security (Turkey)|Turkish police]] counter-terrorism include [[Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front]], [[al-Qaeda]] in Turkey, [[Tevhid-Selam]] (also known as ''[[al-Quds]] Army''), and [[Kalifatstaat]] ("Caliphate State", Hilafet Devleti). [[Islamic Party of Kurdistan]] and [[Hereketa İslamiya Kurdistan]] are also Islamist groups active against Turkey, however unlike Hizbullah they're yet to be listed as active terrorist organizations in Turkey by Turkish police counter-terrorism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html|title=Türkiye'de Halen Faaliyetlerine Devam Eden Başlıca Terör Örgütleri|language=tr|trans-title=Current Operations Continuing in Turkey – Major Terrorist Organizations |work=egm.gov.tr|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020827063338/http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html|archive-date=27 August 2002}}</ref><!-- This content appears to be extremely dated. One group has merged with another organisation since 2004; the other is possibly listed if it still exists -->

==== Iraq ====
{{Main|List of bombings during the Iraq War}}

The area that has seen some of the worst terror attacks in modern history has been Iraq as part of the [[Iraq War]]. In 2005, there were more than 400 incidents of suicide bombing attacks, killing more than 2,000 people.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Atran|first=Scott|author-link=Scott Atran|url=http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf |title=The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism|journal=The Washington Quarterly |year=2006 |volume=29 |issue=2 |page=131 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150623022648/http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf|archive-date=23 June 2015|doi=10.1162/wash.2006.29.2.127|s2cid=154382700}}</ref> In 2006, almost half of all reported terrorist attacks in the world (6,600), and more than half of all terrorist fatalities (13,000), occurred in Iraq, according to the [[National Counterterrorism Center]] of the United States.<ref>[https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror_06.pdf Report on Terrorist Incidents – 2006] 6600 out of 14000</ref>

==== Israel and the Palestinian territories ====
{{Main|Israeli–Palestinian conflict}}

[[Hamas]] ("zeal" in Arabic and an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) grew in power and began attacks on military and civilian targets in [[Israel]] at the beginning of the [[First Intifada]] in 1987.<ref>p. 154, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' by Gilles Kepel (2002)</ref> The 1988 charter of Hamas calls for the destruction of [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm |title=The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) |publisher=Mideastweb.org |access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref> Hamas's armed wing, the [[Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades]], was established in mid 1991<ref name=EQB>"About us". Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office. Retrieved 15 July 2016</ref> and claimed responsibility for [[Hamas#Violence|numerous attacks]] against Israelis, principally [[List of Palestinian suicide attacks|suicide bombings]] and [[Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel|rocket attacks]]. Hamas has been accused of sabotaging the Israeli-Palestine peace process by launching attacks on civilians during Israeli elections to anger Israeli voters and facilitate the election of harder-line Israeli candidates.<ref>''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' by Gilles Kepel, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, (2002), p. 331</ref> Hamas has been designated as a terrorist group by Canada, the United States, Israel, Australia, Japan, the [[United Nations Commission on Human Rights]] and [[Human Rights Watch]]. It is banned in Jordan. Russia does not consider Hamas a terrorist group as it was "democratically elected".<ref>{{cite web|last=Waked|first=Ali|author2=Roee Nahmias|date=9 February 2006|title=Putin: Hamas not a terror organization|url=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3213707,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060324183227/http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3213707,00.html|archive-date=24 March 2006|access-date=11 February 2022|work=Ynet|location=Israel}}</ref> During the [[Second Intifada]] (September 2000 through August 2005) 39.9 percent of the suicide attacks were carried out by Hamas.<ref name="BenmelechBerrebi2007">{{cite journal|last2=Berrebi|first2=Claude|date=Summer 2007|title=Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers|url=http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/benmelech/files/JEP_0807.pdf |journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]] |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=223–38 |doi=10.1257/jep.21.3.223 |issn=0895-3309 |last1=Benmelech |first1=Efraim |author-link1=Efraim Benmelech |url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100707185129/http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/benmelech/files/JEP_0807.pdf |archive-date=7 July 2010}}</ref> The first Hamas suicide attack was the [[Mehola Junction bombing]] in 1993.<ref>Katz, Samuel (2002). ''The Hunt for the Engineer''. Lyons Press. {{ISBN|978-1585747498}}. p. 74.</ref> Hamas claims its aims are "To contribute in the effort of liberating [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] and restoring the rights of the Palestinian people under the sacred Islamic teachings of the Holy Quran, the Sunna (traditions) of Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and the traditions of Muslims rulers and scholars noted for their piety and dedication."<ref name=EQB />

[[Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine]] is a Palestinian Islamist group based in the [[Syria]]n capital, [[Damascus]], and dedicated to waging jihad to eliminate the state of Israel. It was formed by Palestinian Fathi Shaqaqi in the Gaza Strip following the [[Iranian Revolution]] which inspired its members. From 1983 onward, it engaged in "a succession of violent, high-profile attacks" on Israeli targets. The Intifada which "it eventually sparked" was quickly taken over by the much larger [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] and Hamas.<ref>p. 122, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' by Gilles Kepel</ref> Beginning in September 2000, it started a campaign of suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians. The PIJ's armed wing, the Al-Quds brigades, has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks in Israel, including suicide bombings. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by several Western countries.

[[Popular Resistance Committees]] is a coalition of a number of armed Palestinian groups opposed to what they regard as the conciliatory approach of the [[Palestinian Authority]] and [[Fatah]] towards Israel. The PRC is especially active in the [[Gaza Strip]], through its military wing, the [[Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades]].<ref>Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (15 September 2009). [http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2009/09/15/UNFFMGCReport.pdf "Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories"] (PDF). London: ''[[The Guardian]]''. Retrieved 15 July 2016.</ref> The PRC is said to have an extreme Islamic worldview and operates with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement. The PRC has carried out several attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers including hundreds of shooting attacks and other rocket and bombing attacks.<ref>[http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-24.htm "The Popular Resistance Committees: Hamas' New Partners? – Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi"]. Retrieved 15 July 2016.</ref>

Other groups linked with [[Al-Qaeda]] operate in the Gaza Strip including: [[Army of Islam (Gaza Strip)|Army of Islam]], [[Abdullah Azzam Brigades]], [[Jund Ansar Allah]], [[Jaljalat]] and [[Tawhid al-Jihad (Gaza Strip)|Tawhid al-Jihad]].

==== Lebanon ====
{{Overly detailed|section|date=August 2017}}
Hezbollah first emerged in 1982, as a militia during the [[1982 Lebanon War]].<ref name="HG20Ak02">{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060720154531/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html |url-status=unfit |archive-date=20 July 2006 |title=Hezbollah's transformation|last=Jamail|first=Dahr|date=20 July 2006|work=Asia Times |access-date=23 October 2007}}</ref><ref name="bbc-hi-me">{{cite news |title=Who are Hezbollah|work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4314423.stm  |date=21 May 2008 |access-date=15 August 2008}}</ref> Its leaders were inspired by the [[Ruhollah Khomeini|Ayatollah Khomeini]], and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iran's [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]].<ref name="nybooks">{{cite web|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17060 |title=In Search of Hezbollah|first=Adam|last=Shatz|work=[[The New York Review of Books]] |volume=51|issue=7|date=29 April 2004|access-date=14 August 2006 |url-status=unfit|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040503005626/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17060 |archive-date=3 May 2004}}</ref> Hezbollah's 1985 manifesto listed its three main goals as "putting an end to any [[colonialist]] entity" in Lebanon, bringing the [[Kataeb Party|Phalangists]] to justice for "the crimes they [had] perpetrated", and the establishment of an [[Islamic republic|Islamic regime]] in Lebanon.<ref name="The Hizballah Program">{{cite web|title=The Hizballah Program|url=http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071029000205/http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf|archive-date=29 October 2007|access-date=11 February 2022|publisher=[[StandWithUs]]}}</ref><ref name="Stalinsky">Stalinsky, Steven. [http://www.nysun.com/article/37184 "An Islamic Republic Is Hezbollah's Aim"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071110235519/http://www.nysun.com/article/37184 |date=10 November 2007 }}. ''[[The New York Sun]]''. 2 August 2006. 1 November 2007.</ref> Hezbollah leaders have also made numerous statements calling for the destruction of Israel, which they refer to as a "Zionist entity... built on lands wrested from their owners."<ref name="The Hizballah Program" /><ref name="Stalinsky" />

Hezbollah, which started with only a small militia, has grown to an organization with seats in the [[Lebanon|Lebanese]] government, a radio and a [[Al-Manar|satellite television-station]], and programs for [[Social change|social development]].<ref name="deeb-hzb-a-primer">{{cite magazine |last=Deeb |first=Lara  |date=31 July 2006 |title=Hizballah: A Primer |url=http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html |access-date=31 July 2006 |magazine=[[Middle East Report]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100620045425/http://merip.org/mero/mero073106.html |archive-date=20 June 2010 |url-status=dead}}</ref> They maintain strong support among Lebanon's Shi'a population, and gained a surge of support from Lebanon's broader population ([[Sunni]], [[Christians|Christian]], [[Druze]]) immediately following the [[2006 Lebanon War]],<ref name="Briefing">{{cite web |url=http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_6.htm |title=Briefing: Lebanese Public Opinion |date=September–October 2006  |access-date=8 October 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118214528/http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_6.htm |archive-date=18 January 2012}}</ref> and are able to mobilize demonstrations of hundreds of thousands.<ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4329201.stm "Huge Beirut protest backs Syria"]. [[BBC News]]. 8 March 2005. 7 February 2007.</ref> Hezbollah along with some other groups began the [[2006–2008 Lebanese political protests]] in opposition to the government of Prime Minister [[Fouad Siniora]].<ref name="Ghattas">{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6200804.stm|title=Political ferment in Lebanon |first=Kim |last=Ghattas |publisher=BBC News  |date=1 December 2006 |access-date=15 August 2008}}</ref> A later dispute over Hezbollah preservation of its telecoms network led to [[2008 conflict in Lebanon|clashes]] and Hezbollah-led opposition fighters seized control of several [[West Beirut]] neighborhoods from [[Future Movement]] militiamen loyal to Fouad Siniora. These areas were then handed over to the [[Lebanese Army]].<ref name="Haaretz1">{{cite web|title=Lebanese army moves into W. Beirut after Hezbollah takeover |url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/981696.html |work=[[Haaretz]]  |access-date=10 May 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512082543/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/981696.html |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref>

A [[Lebanese government of July 2008|national unity government]] was formed in 2008, in Lebanon, giving Hezbollah and its opposition allies control of 11 of 30 cabinets seats; effectively veto power.<ref name="CFR">{{cite web|url=http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/hezbollah.html?breadcrumb=%2F|title=Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]  |date=13 September 2008|access-date=15 September 2008|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080913091527/http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/hezbollah.html?breadcrumb=%2F|archive-date=13 September 2008}}</ref> Hezbollah receives its financial support from the governments of Iran and Syria, as well as donations from Lebanese people and foreign Shi'as.<ref name="irinnews52494">{{cite web|url=http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=52494&SelectRegion=Middle_East |title=Lebanon: The many hands and faces of Hezbollah  |date=29 March 2006|author=UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |access-date=17 August 2006}}</ref><ref name="Haaretz 746631">{{cite web|url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=746631|title=Iranian official admits Tehran supplied missiles to Hezbollah|date=4 August 2006 |work=Haaretz |access-date=7 January 2015}}</ref> It has also gained significantly in military strength in the 2000s.<ref name="met">{{cite news |url=http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/08/29/mideast_powers_proxies_and_paymasters_bluster_and_rearm/5485/ |title=Mideast Powers, Proxies and Paymasters Bluster and Rearm |last=Frykberg|first=Mel |date=29 August 2008|work=[[Middle East Times]]|quote=And if there is one thing that ideologically and diametrically opposed Hezbollah and Israel agree on, it is Hezbollah's growing military strength.  |access-date=29 August 2008|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080902080503/http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/08/29/mideast_powers_proxies_and_paymasters_bluster_and_rearm/5485/ |archive-date=2 September 2008}}</ref> Despite a June 2008 certification by the [[United Nations]] that Israel had withdrawn from all Lebanese territory,<ref name="SC/6878">{{cite web |date=18 June 2000 |publisher=United Nations Security Council |title=Security council endorses secretary-general's conclusion on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June |url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html  |access-date=29 September 2006}}</ref> in August, Lebanon's new Cabinet unanimously approved a draft policy statement which secures Hezbollah's existence as an armed organization and guarantees its right to "liberate or recover [[Shebaa farms|occupied lands]]". Since 1992, the organization has been headed by [[Hassan Nasrallah]], its [[Secretary-General]]. The United States, Canada, Israel, Bahrain,<ref name="JPostBahrain">{{cite news|url=http://www.jpost.com/International/Bahrains-parliament-declares-Hezbollah-a-terrorist-group-307806|title=Bahrain's parliament declares Hezbollah a terrorist group |date=26 March 2013|newspaper=The Jerusalem Post}}</ref><ref name="bahrain">{{cite news|last=Spangler|first=Timothy|url=http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=213829 |title=Bahrain complains over Hezbollah comments on protests|newspaper=The Jerusalem Post|date=25 March 2011 |access-date=22 November 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-bombs-hezbollah-idUSBRE8A512A20121106 |title=Bahrain arrests bombing suspects and blames Hezbollah |work=Reuters |date=6 November 2012 |access-date=1 July 2017 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924171823/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/06/us-bahrain-bombs-hezbollah-idUSBRE8A512A20121106 |url-status=live }}</ref> France,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.algemeiner.com/2013/04/04/jewish-leaders-applaud-hezbollah-terror-designation-by-france |title=Jewish Leaders Applaud Hezbollah Terror Designation by France &#124; Jewish & Israel News |publisher=Algemeiner.com  |date=4 April 2013 |access-date=18 August 2014}}</ref> [[Gulf Cooperation Council]],<ref name="GCC">{{cite web |url=http://www.arabnews.com/news/453834 |title=GCC: Hezbollah terror group |work=Arab News |date=3 June 2013 |access-date=3 June 2013}}</ref> and the Netherlands regard Hezbollah as a [[terrorism|terrorist]] organization, while the United Kingdom, the European Union<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/middleeast/european-union-adds-hezbollah-wing-to-terror-list.html|work=The New York Times |first1=James |last1=Kanter |first2=Jodi |last2=Rudoren |title=European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations |date=22 July 2013}}</ref> and Australia consider only Hezbollah's military wing or its external security organization to be a terrorist organization. Many consider it, or a part of it, to be a terrorist group<ref>Roy, Olivier, ''The Failure of Political Islam'', Harvard University Press, (1994), p. 115</ref><ref>Pape, Robert, ''Dying to Win'', Random House, 2005, p. 129</ref> responsible for [[1983 United States Embassy bombing|blowing up the American embassy]]<ref>Ranstorp, Magnus, ''Hizb'allah in Lebanon'', St. Martins Press, 1997 pp. 89–90</ref> and later its [[1984 United States embassy annex bombing|annex]], as well as the [[1983 Beirut barracks bombing|barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops]] and [[Lebanon hostage crisis|dozens of kidnappings of foreigners in Beirut]].<ref name="autogenerated2">Ranstorp, Magnus, ''Hizb'allah in Lebanon'', St. Martins Press, 1997, p. 54</ref><ref name="autogenerated3">Kepel, Gilles, ''Jihad'', (2002), p. 129</ref> It is also accused of being the recipient of massive aid from Iran,<ref>Ranstorp, Magnus, ''Hizb'allah in Lebanon'', St. Martins Press, 1997, p. 127</ref> and of serving "Iranian foreign policy calculations and interests",<ref name="autogenerated2" /> or serving as a "subcontractor of Iranian initiatives"<ref name="autogenerated3" /> Hezbollah denies any involvement or dependence on Iran.<ref>Ranstorp, Magnus, ''Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis,'' p. 60</ref> In 2006, in the most of the Arab and Muslim worlds, Hezbollah was regarded as a legitimate resistance movement.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060720154531/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html|url-status=unfit|archive-date=20 July 2006|title=Middle East News – Hezbollah's transformation|date=20 July 2006|publisher=Asia Times Online Atimes.com|access-date=25 April 2010}}</ref> In 2005, the Lebanese Prime Minister said of Hezbollah, it "is not a militia. It's a resistance."<ref name="cnn-2005-05-07">{{cite news |publisher=CNN |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/06/lebanon.report/index.html |title=Hezbollah disarmament unclear|date=7 May 2005 |access-date=5 August 2006}}</ref>

[[Fatah al-Islam]] is an Islamist group operating out of the [[Nahr al-Bared]] refugee camp in northern Lebanon. It was formed in November 2006, by fighters who broke off from the pro-[[Syria]]n [[Fatah al-Intifada]], itself a splinter group of the Palestinian [[Fatah]] movement, and is led by a Palestinian fugitive militant named [[Shaker al-Abssi]].<ref name="IHT_20070315">''International Herald Tribune'' (15 March 2007). [http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/15/news/lebanon.php] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080515071626/http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/15/news/lebanon.php|date=15 May 2008}}</ref> The group's members have been described as militant [[jihad]]ists,<ref name="Figaro_20070416">''Le Figaro'' (16 April 2007). [http://www.lefigaro.fr/english/20070416.WWW000000477_fatah_al_islam_the_new_terrorist_threat_hanging_over_lebanon.html "Fatah Al-Islam: the new terrorist threat hanging over Lebanon"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070606101014/http://www.lefigaro.fr/english/20070416.WWW000000477_fatah_al_islam_the_new_terrorist_threat_hanging_over_lebanon.html |date=6 June 2007 }}. Retrieved 20 May 2007.</ref> and the group itself has been described as a terrorist movement that draws inspiration from [[al-Qaeda]].<ref name="IHT_20070315" /><ref name="Figaro_20070416" /><ref name="Reuters_20070519">{{Cite web|url=http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?storyID=2007-05-20T031424Z_01_L20250509_RTRUKOC_0_US-LEBANON-CAMP-FIGHTING.xml|title=Lebanon Camp Fighting|website=Reuters.com}}{{dead link|date=July 2021|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> Its stated goal is to reform the Palestinian refugee camps under [[Sharia|Islamic sharia law]],<ref name="Reuters_FactBox">Reuters (20 May 2007). [http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L20400320.htm "Facts about militant group Fatah al-Islam"]. Retrieved 20 May 2007.</ref> and its primary targets are the Lebanese authorities, Israel and the United States.<ref name="IHT_20070315" />

==== Saudi Arabia ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Saudi Arabia}}

==== Syria ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Syria}}

==== Yemen ====
{{Main|Terrorism in Yemen}}

=== North America ===

==== Canada ====
{{See also|Terrorism in Canada}}

According to recent government statements, Islamic terrorism is the biggest threat to Canada.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/09/06/harper-911-terrorism-islamic-interview.html|title=Harper says 'Islamicism' biggest threat to Canada  |date=6 September 2011 |publisher=CBC News – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.ca |access-date=16 October 2011}}</ref> The [[Canadian Security Intelligence Service|Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)]] reported that terrorist radicalization at home is now the chief preoccupation of Canada's spy agency.<ref>{{cite news |last=Macleod|first=Ian|url=http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=09fe30f3-84ad-458e-b8e7-8add2a9fc8c7|title=CSIS focuses on homegrown terrorism threat|newspaper=Ottawa Citizen|date=14 March 2008|access-date=16 October 2011|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080317192234/http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=09fe30f3-84ad-458e-b8e7-8add2a9fc8c7 |archive-date=17 March 2008}}</ref> The most notorious arrest in Canada's fight on terrorism, was the [[2006 Ontario terrorism plot]] in which 18 Al-Qaeda-inspired cell members were arrested for planning a mass bombing, shooting, and hostage taking terror plot throughout [[Southern Ontario]]. There have also been other arrests mostly in Ontario involving terror plots.<ref>{{cite web |last=Seymour |first=Andrew |url=https://ottawacitizen.com/news/canada-in-afghanistan/RCMP+homegrown+terror+suspects+were+preparing+build+IEDs/3445591/story.html |title=RCMP say homegrown terror suspects were preparing to build IEDs |work=Ottawa Citizen |date=26 August 2010 |access-date=16 October 2011 }}{{Dead link|date=September 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

==== United States ====
[[File:North face south tower after plane strike 9-11.jpg|thumb|[[United Airlines Flight 175]] explodes after being flown into the South Tower of the [[World Trade Center (1973–2001)|World Trade Center]] during the [[September 11 attacks|11 September terrorist attacks]].]]
{{main category|Islamic terrorism in the United States}}
{{See also|Terrorism in the United States|Jihadist extremism in the United States}}

Between 1993 and 2001, the major attacks or attempts against U.S. interests stemmed from militant Islamic jihad extremism except for the [[1995 Oklahoma City bombing]].<ref name="Investigation(U.S.)2007">{{cite book|author1=United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation|author2=Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (U.S.)|title=Terrorism in the United States 2002–2005|url=https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05.pdf|edition=2|year=2007|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation|page=43}}</ref> On 11 September 2001, nearly 3,000 people were killed in New York City, Washington, DC, and [[Stonycreek Township, Somerset County, Pennsylvania|Stonycreek Township]] near [[Shanksville, Pennsylvania]], during the [[September 11 attacks]] organized by 19 al-Qaeda members and largely perpetrated by Saudi nationals, sparking the [[War on Terror]]. Former CIA Director [[Michael Hayden (general)|Michael Hayden]] considers [[homegrown terrorism]] to be the most dangerous threat and concern faced by American citizens today.<ref name="Hayden">{{cite web|url=https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/167252-former-intel-chief-homegrown-terrorism-is-a-devil-of-a-problem/|title=Former intel chief: Homegrown terrorism is a 'devil of a problem'|last=Yager|first=Jordy|date=25 July 2010|work=The Hill}}</ref> As of July 2011, there have been 52 homegrown jihadist extremist plots or attacks in the United States since the 11 September attacks.<ref>{{cite news|last=Saslow|first=Eli |title=A one-man mission to stop homegrown Somali terrorism in U.S.|url=http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2015571420_somali11.html|newspaper=The Seattle Times|date=12 July 2011|access-date=12 July 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110922105411/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2015571420_somali11.html |archive-date=22 September 2011}}</ref>

One of the worst mass shootings in U.S. history was committed by a Muslim against LGBT people. [[Omar Mateen]], in an act motivated by the terrorist group [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant|Islamic State]], shot and murdered 49 people and wounded more than 50 in a gay nightclub, Pulse, in Orlando, Florida.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Ellis |first1=Ralph |author2=Ashley Fantz |author3=Faith Karimi |author4=Eliott C. McLaughlin |url=http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/ |title=Orlando shooting: 49 killed, shooter pledged ISIS allegiance |publisher=CNN |date=13 June 2016 |access-date=3 August 2016}}</ref>

=== Oceania ===

==== Australia ====
* [[2014 Endeavour Hills stabbings]]
* [[Lindt Cafe siege|2014 Lindt Cafe siege]]
* [[2015 Parramatta shooting]]
* [[2017 Brighton siege]]
* [[2018 Melbourne stabbing attack]]

==== New Zealand ====
* [[2021 Auckland supermarket stabbing]]

=== South America ===

==== Argentina ====
The [[1992 attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires]], was a suicide bombing attack on the building of the Israeli embassy of Argentina, located in Buenos Aires, which was carried out on 17 March 1992. Twenty-nine civilians were killed in the attack and 242 additional civilians were injured. A group called [[Islamic Jihad Organization]], which has been linked to [[Iran]] and possibly Hezbollah,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/interviews/baer.html|title=Interviews – Robert Baer – Terror And Tehran|publisher=PBS Frontline|access-date=7 January 2015|date=2 May 2002}}</ref> claimed responsibility.

An incident from 1994, known as the [[AMIA bombing]], was an attack on the [[Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina]] (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) building in Buenos Aires. It occurred on 18 July and killed 85 people and injured hundreds more.<ref name="wj">"AMIA Bombing Commemorated", ''Dateline World Jewry'', [[World Jewish Congress]], September 2007</ref> A suicide bomber drove a [[Renault Trafic]] van bomb loaded with about {{convert|275|kg}} of [[ammonium nitrate]] fertilizer and fuel oil explosive mixture,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.adl.org/israel-international/latin-america/c/amia-attack-in-argentina.html|title=AMIA Attack in Argentina|work=ADL}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=05-0282 |title=Discursos |publisher=OAS |date=August 2009|access-date=4 March 2013}}</ref> into the Jewish Community Center building located in a densely constructed commercial area of Buenos Aires. Prosecutors [[Alberto Nisman]] and Marcelo Martínez Burgos formally accused the government of Iran of directing the bombing, and the [[Hezbollah]] militia of carrying it out.<ref name="BBC Iran">{{cite news|title=Iran, Hezbollah charged in 1994 Argentine bombing|newspaper=[[Daily Jang]]|date=25 October 2006|url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/update_detail.asp?id=11864 |access-date=25 October 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070901221807/http://www.thenews.com.pk/update_detail.asp?id=11864 |archive-date=1 September 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Iran charged over Argentina bomb|newspaper=BBC News|date=25 October 2006|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6085768.stm|access-date=25 October 2006|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20061107173306/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6085768.stm|archive-date=7 November 2006|url-status=live}}</ref> The prosecution claimed that Argentina had been targeted by Iran after Buenos Aires' decision to suspend a [[Iran's nuclear program|nuclear technology transfer contract to Tehran]].<ref name="La Nación October 2006">[http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=852740 Acusan a Irán por el ataque a la AMIA], ''[[La Nación]]'', 26 October 2006</ref>

On 18 January 2015, [[Death of Alberto Nisman|Nisman was found dead]] at his home in Buenos Aires,<ref name=Infojus>{{cite web|title=Muerte de Nisman: la media hora que es un agujero negro en la causa|trans-title=Nisman's death: the half-hour which is a black hole in the case|url=http://www.infojusnoticias.gov.ar/nacionales/muerte-de-nisman-la-media-hora-que-es-un-agujero-negro-en-la-causa-7423.html|website=Infojus Noticias|publisher=Ifnojus Noticias|access-date=8 July 2015|language=es|date=11 February 2015|quote=El médico de Swiss Medical...no tenía dudas de que se trataba de una muerte violenta...}}</ref><ref name=LaNacionDate>{{cite news|title=Los enigmas del caso Nisman|trans-title=The mysteries of the Nisman case|url=http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1774706-los-enigmas-del-caso-nisman|website=La Nacion|access-date=8 July 2015|language=es|date=9 March 2015|quote=23 hs – Llega la ambulancia de Swiss Medical y constantan la muerte.|archive-date=8 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708104235/https://www.lanacion.com.ar/1774706-los-enigmas-del-caso-nisman|url-status=dead}}</ref> one day before he was scheduled to report on his findings, with supposedly incriminating evidence against high-ranking officials of the [[Presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner|then-current Argentinian government]] including former president [[Cristina Fernández de Kirchner]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Argentine ex-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner charged with treason |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/argentine-ex-president-cristina-fernandez-charged-with-treason/2017/12/07/e3e326e0-db80-11e7-a241-0848315642d0_story.html?noredirect=on |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Cristina Kirchner faces investigation over alleged cover-up of bombing |url=https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/12/30/inenglish/1483102020_021698.html |website=El Pais|date=30 December 2016 }}</ref><ref name="theguardian.com">{{cite web|title=Argentinian lawyer Alberto Nisman was murdered, police report finds |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/argentinian-lawyer-alberto-nisman-was-murdered-police-report-finds|website=The Guardian|date=6 November 2017}}</ref>

=== Transnational ===
{{Main|Al-Qaeda}}
{{Expand section|reason=More history (essential stuff, like the early merge with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and it needs to be explained how it's now more like a franchise|date=July 2011}}

[[Al-Qaeda]]'s stated aim is the use of jihad to defend and protect Islam against [[Zionism]], [[Christianity]], the secular West, and Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, which it sees as insufficiently Islamic and too closely tied to the United States.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm |title=Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=1 November 2004|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061114224216/http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm|archive-date=14 November 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Michael|first=Maggie|url=http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation/terror/20041029-1423-binladentape.html|title=Bin Laden, in statement to U.S. people, says he ordered Sept. 11 attacks|work=The San Diego Union-Tribune|agency=Associated Press|date=29 October 2004|access-date=4 August 2016|archive-date=3 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120903021049/http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20041029-1423-binladentape.html|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3966817.stm |title=Excerpts: Bin Laden video|work=BBC News|date=29 October 2004|access-date=4 August 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Langhorne |first=R. |year=2006 |title=The Essentials of – Global Politics |publisher=Hodder Arnold}}</ref> Formed by [[Osama bin Laden]] and [[Muhammad Atef]] in the aftermath of the [[Soviet–Afghan War]] in the late 1980s, al-Qaeda called for the use of violence against civilians and military of the United States and any countries that are allied with it.{{citation needed|date=July 2018}}

== Organizations ==
<!-- Please respect alphabetical order -->
{{div col|colwidth=25em}}
* [[Abu Sayyaf]], Philippines
* [[Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades]], [[Gaza Strip]] and [[West Bank]]
* [[Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya]], Egypt
* [[Al-Muhajiroun]], Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, UK
* [[Al-Qaeda]], worldwide
* [[Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen|Al-Shabaab]], Somalia
* [[Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan|Ansar al-Islam]], Iraq
* [[Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)|Ansar al-sharia]], Libya
* [[Armed Islamic Group of Algeria|Armed Islamic Group]] (GIA), Algeria
* [[Boko Haram]], Nigeria
* [[Caucasus Emirate]] (IK), Russia
* [[East Turkestan Islamic Movement]] (ETIM), China
* [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad]], Egypt
* [[Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front]] (İBDA-C), Turkey
* [[Hamas]], Gaza Strip and West Bank 
* [[Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh]], [[Bangladesh]]
* [[Harkat-ul-Mujahideen]] al-Alami, Pakistan
* [[Hezbollah]], Lebanon 
* [[Houthi movement]], Yemen
* [[Indian Mujahideen]], India 
* [[Islamic Movement of Central Asia]], [[Central Asia]]
* [[Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan]], [[Uzbekistan]]
* [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]], worldwide
* [[Jaish-e-Mohammed]], Pakistan and [[Kashmir]]
* [[Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna]], Iraq
* [[Jemaah Islamiyah]], Indonesia
* [[Jundallah (Pakistan)|Jundallah]], Pakistan
* [[Kata'ib Hezbollah]], Iraq
* [[Lashkar-e-Taiba]], Pakistan and Kashmir
* [[Lashkar-e-Jhangvi]], Pakistan
* [[Maute group]], Philippines
* [[Moro Islamic Liberation Front]], Philippines
* [[Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group]], Morocco and Europe
* [[National Thowheeth Jama'ath]], Sri Lanka
* [[Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine|Palestinian Islamic Jihad]], Gaza Strip and West Bank
* [[Students' Islamic Movement of India]], India
* [[Al-Qaeda in Iraq|Tawhid and Jihad]], Iraq  
* [[Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan]], Pakistan and Afghanistan
{{div col end}}

== See also ==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Portal|Islam}}
* [[9/11]]
* [[26/11]]
* [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]
* [[Christian terrorism]]
* [[Criticism of Islamism]]
* [[Domestic terrorism]]
* [[History of terrorism]]
* [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism]]
* [[Islamic extremism]]
* [[Islamism]]
* [[Jewish religious terrorism]]
* [[Jihadism]]
* [[List of Islamist terrorist attacks]]
* [[Palestinian political violence]]
* [[Religion and peacebuilding]]
* [[Religion of peace]]
* [[Religious war]]
* [[United States and state-sponsored terrorism]]
* [[Afzal Guru]]
* [[Ajmal Kasab]]

== References ==
=== Notes ===
{{reflist|group=Note}}

=== Citations ===
{{Reflist|30em}}

== Bibliography ==
* {{cite book|last1=Kepel|first1=Gilles|title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam|url=https://archive.org/details/jihad00gill_0 |url-access=registration|quote=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.|date=2002|publisher=Harvard University Press.|ref=GKJTPI2002|isbn=978-0-674-01090-1}}
* {{cite book|last1=Bin Laden|first1=Osama |author-link1=Osama bin Laden|last2=Lawrence|first2=Bruce|author-link2=Bruce Lawrence|title=Messages to the world: the statements of Osama Bin Laden|isbn=978-1-84467-045-1|year=2005|publisher=Verso|url=https://archive.org/details/messagestoworlds00binl|url-access=registration}}
* {{cite book | title=Challenges of the muslim world: present, future and past |author1=Cooper, William Wager |author2=Yue, Piyu | publisher=Emerald Group Publishing | year=2008 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3qwuhK3BBH8C|isbn=978-0-444-53243-5 }}
* {{cite book | title=Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam | author=Dreyfuss, Robert | publisher=Macmillan | year=2006 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hdfLNSnUx-AC| isbn=978-0-8050-8137-4 }}
* {{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/understandingter00sage |url-access=registration | title=Understanding terror networks |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press | isbn=978-0-8122-3808-2| author1=Sageman, Marc |year=2004}}
* {{cite book | last1 = Scheuer| first1 = Michael| last2= Anonymous | title = Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror| publisher=Potomac Books (formerly Brassey's, Inc.)| year = 2004| location = Dulles, Virginia| url =https://archive.org/details/imperialhubriswh00anon| url-access = registration| isbn = 978-0-9655139-4-4}}

== Further reading ==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book| ref=none |last1=Ishaq |first1=Ibn |last2=Guillaume |first2=A. |author-link1=Ibn Ishaq |author-link2=A. Guillaume |date=18 July 2002 |title=The Life of Muhammad |url=https://archive.org/details/GuillaumeATheLifeOfMuhammad |language=en |location=United States |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-636033-1 |oclc=911693736 |pages=860}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism|last = Amir|first = Taheri|publisher = Adler & Adler|year = 1987|isbn = 978-0-917561-45-0|title-link = Amir Taheri}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Talking to the Enemy|last = Atran|first = Scott|publisher = Ecco Press / HarperCollins, US; Allen Lane/Penguin, UK|year = 2010|isbn = 978-0-06-134490-9}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = The Legacy of Jihad|last = Bostom|first = Andrew|publisher = Prometheus Books|year = 2005|isbn = 978-1-59102-307-4|title-link = The Legacy of Jihad|oclc=900607541}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West|last = Dennis|first =Anthony J. |publisher = Wyndham Hall Press, Ohio|year = 1996|isbn = 978-1-55605-268-2}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Osama Bin Laden: A Psychological and Political Portrait|last = Dennis|first =Anthony J. |publisher = Wyndham Hall Press, Ohio|year = 2002|isbn = 978-1-55605-341-2}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom|last = Durie |first=Mark |publisher = Deror Books|year = 2010|isbn = 978-0-9807223-0-7|title-link = The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom|oclc=695930410}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title=The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? |last=Esposito |first=John L. |publisher=Oxford University Press, US |year=1995 |isbn=978-0-19-510298-7 |url=https://archive.org/details/islamicthreatmyt00espo_0 }}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam|last = Esposito|first = John L.|publisher = Oxford University Press, US|year = 2003|isbn = 978-0-19-516886-0}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title=Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives|date=2008|publisher=Praeger Security International|isbn=978-0-313-35764-0|location=Westport, Connecticut|last1=Falk|first1=Avner}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries|last = Fregosi|first = Paul|publisher = Prometheus Books|year = 1998|isbn = 978-1-57392-247-0|url = https://archive.org/details/jihadinwestmusli00freg|oclc=248903444}}
* [[Brigitte Gabriel|Gabriel, Brigitte]]. (2006). ''Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America.'' St. Martin's Press. {{ISBN|0312358377}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics of the Middle East|last = Halliday|first = Fred|publisher = I.B. Tauris, New York|year = 2003|isbn = 978-1-86064-868-7}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Infidel|last = Hirsi Ali|first = Ayaan|publisher = Free Press|year = 2007|isbn = 978-0-7432-9503-1|author-link = Ayaan Hirsi Ali|title-link = Infidel (book)}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = The Al Qaeda Reader|last = Ibrahim|first = Raymond|publisher = Broadway, US|year = 2007|isbn = 978-0-7679-2262-3|author-link=Raymond Ibrahim|oclc= 150386218}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Besenyo |first1=Janos |title=ATACURI PUŢIN COSTISITOARE, COMPLOTURI IMPERCEPTIBILE? PREZENTARE GENERALĂ PRIVIND CARACTERUL ECONOMIC AL TERORISMULUI ACTUAL |journal=Impact Strategic|trans-title=Low Cost Attacks, Imperceptible Plots? General Presentation on the Economic Character of Current Terrorism |date=2017 |volume=62 |issue=1 |pages=84–101 |url=https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=649568 |language=Romanian |issn=1582-6511}}.
* [[Gilles Kepel|Kepel, Gilles]]. ''[[Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam]]''.
* [[Gilles Kepel|Kepel, Gilles]]. ''[[The War for Muslim Minds]]''.
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Understanding Islam through Hadis|last = Swarup|first = Ram|publisher = Arvind Ghosh|year = 1982|isbn = 978-0-682-49948-4}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title=Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings|date=2011|publisher=[[Minhaj-ul-Quran UK|London: Minhaj-ul-Quran]]|isbn=978-0-9551888-9-3|first1=Muhammad|last1=Tahir-ul-Qadri|author-link=Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri|title-link=Fatwa on Terrorism}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = Why I Am Not a Muslim|last = [[Ibn Warraq]]|publisher = Prometheus Books|year = 1995|isbn = 978-0-87975-984-1|title-link = Why I Am Not a Muslim}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = The Islam in Islamic Terrorism: The Importance of Beliefs, Ideas, and Ideology|last = [[Ibn Warraq]]|publisher = New English Review|year = 2017|isbn = 978-1-943003-08-2|oclc=990505503}}
* {{Cite book| ref=none |title = [[The Decline of Eastern Christianity]] |last = Ye'or|first = Bat|publisher = [[Fairleigh Dickinson University Press]]|year = 1996|isbn = 978-0-8386-3678-7|oclc=876802597}}
{{refend}}

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