Epistemology

{{Short description|Branch of philosophy concerning knowledge}}
{{hatnote group|
{{Redirect|Theory of knowledge}}
{{Redirect|Epistemic|the alternative name for cognitive science|Cognitive science#Epistemics{{!}}Epistemics}}
{{For|the album|Epistemology (album){{!}}''Epistemology'' (album)}}
}}
{{Distinguish|Epidemiology}}
{{More citations needed|date=July 2022}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2020}}

[[File:Pop Art Cubism Mind in Cave by David S. Soriano.png|thumb|upright=1.2|An abstract rendering of [[Plato]]'s [[allegory of the cave]] by David S. Soriano]]

{{Philosophy sidebar|expanded = Branches}}
{{Epistemology sidebar|expanded = all}}

'''Epistemology''' ({{IPAc-en|ᵻ|ˌ|p|ɪ|s|t|ə|ˈ|m|ɒ|l|ə|dʒ|i|audio=en-uk-epistemology.ogg}} {{respell|ih|PISS|tə|MOL|ə|jee}}; {{etymology|grc|''{{wikt-lang|grc|ἐπιστήμη}}'' ({{grc-transl|ἐπιστήμη}})|knowledge||[[-logy]]|}}) is the [[Outline of philosophy|branch of philosophy]] concerned with [[knowledge]]. Epistemologists study the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, [[Justification (epistemology)|epistemic justification]], the [[rationality]] of [[belief]], and various related issues. Debates in contemporary epistemology are generally clustered around four core areas:<ref name="SEP Epistemology 2014" /><ref name="IEP Epistemology" /><ref name="Borchert1967" />

* The [[philosophical analysis]] of the nature of knowledge and the conditions required for a belief to constitute knowledge, such as [[truth]] and [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]];
* Potential sources of knowledge and justified belief, such as [[perception]], [[reason]], [[memory]], and [[Testimony#Philosophy|testimony]]
* The structure of a body of knowledge or justified belief, including whether all justified beliefs must be derived from justified [[Foundationalism|foundational beliefs]] or whether justification requires only a [[Coherentism|coherent set of beliefs]]; and,
* [[Philosophical scepticism]], which questions the possibility of knowledge, and related problems, such as whether scepticism poses a threat to our ordinary knowledge claims and whether it is possible to refute sceptical arguments.

In these debates and others, epistemology aims to answer questions such as "What do people know?", "What does it mean to say that people know something?", "What makes justified beliefs justified?", and "How do people know that they know?"<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /><ref name="SEP Epistemology 2014"/><ref name="SEP Epistemology"/><ref name="Wenning2009"/> Specialties in epistemology ask questions such as "How can people create formal models about issues related to knowledge?" (in [[#Formal epistemology|formal epistemology]]), "What are the historical conditions of changes in different kinds of knowledge?" (in [[#Historical epistemology|historical epistemology]]), "What are the methods, aims, and subject matter of epistemological inquiry?" (in [[#Metaepistemology|metaepistemology]]), and "How do people know together?" (in [[#Social epistemology|social epistemology]]).

==Etymology==
The [[etymology]] of the word ''epistemology'' is derived from the ancient Greek [[Episteme|''epistēmē'']], meaning "knowledge, understanding, skill, scientific knowledge",<ref name="OxfordEpisteme2014"/>{{Refn|group=note|name=HintikaEpistemeTechne|In Hintikka 1974, Chap. 2, episteme is said to be very close in meaning to the word tekhne, 'skill'.<ref name="Hintikka1974"/>}} and the English suffix ''-ology'', meaning "the study or discipline of (what is indicated by the first element)".<ref name="OxfordEpistemology2014"/> The word ''epistemology'' first appeared in 1847, in a review in New York's ''Eclectic Magazine'' :

{{Blockquote|text=The title of one of the principal works of Fichte is 'Wissenschaftslehre,' which, after the analogy of ''technology'' ... we render ''epistemology''.<ref name="Anonymous1847" />}}

The word was first used to present a philosophy in English by Scottish philosopher [[James Frederick Ferrier]] in 1854. It was the title of the first section of his ''Institutes of Metaphysics'':<ref>Woleński, Jan. (2004) "The History of Epistemology." In ''Handbook of Epistemology''. Ed. I. Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen, & Jan Woleński. Springer, p.3</ref>

{{Blockquote|text=This section of the science is properly termed the Epistemology—the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as [[ontology]] is the science of being.... It answers the general question, 'What is knowing and the known?'—or more shortly, 'What is knowledge?'<ref name="Ferrier1854"/>}}

==Central concepts==
===Knowledge===
[[File:Bertrand Russell 1949.jpg|thumb|[[Bertrand Russell]] famously brought attention to the distinction between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance]]
{{Main|Knowledge}}
The entry "Knowledge How" of the ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''<ref name="SEP Knowledge How"/> mentions that introductory classes to epistemology often start their analysis of knowledge by pointing out three different senses of "knowing" something: "[[Propositional knowledge|knowing that]]" (knowing the truth of propositions), "[[Procedural knowledge|knowing how]]" (understanding how to perform certain actions), and "[[Knowledge by acquaintance|knowing by acquaintance]]" (directly perceiving an object, being familiar with it, or otherwise coming into contact with it). This modern teaching of epistemology is primarily concerned with the first of these forms of knowledge, propositional knowledge. All three senses of "knowing" can be seen in the ordinary use of the word. In mathematics, it can  be known {{em|that}} 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing {{em|how}} to add two numbers, and knowing a {{em|person}} (e.g., knowing other persons,<ref name="Talbert2015"/><ref name="Benton2017"/> or knowing oneself), {{em|place}} (e.g., one's hometown), {{em|thing}} (e.g., cars), or {{em|activity}} (e.g., addition).

While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they are explicitly made in other languages, including French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch (although some languages closely related to English have been said to retain these verbs, such as [[Scots language|Scots]]).{{Refn|group=note|name=Scots_witVsken}}. In French, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch 'to know (a person)' is translated using {{lang|fr|connaître}}, {{lang|pt|conhecer}}, {{lang|es|conocer}}, {{lang|ro|a cunoaște}}, and {{lang|de|kennen}} (both German and Dutch) respectively, whereas 'to know (how to do something)' is translated using {{lang|fr|savoir}}, {{lang|es|saber}} (both Portuguese and Spanish), {{lang|ro|a şti}}, {{lang|de|wissen}}, and {{lang|nl|weten}}. Modern Greek has the verbs {{lang|el|γνωρίζω}} ({{lang|el-Latn|gnorízo}}) and {{lang|el|ξέρω}} ({{lang|el-Latn|kséro}}). Italian has the verbs {{lang|it|conoscere}} and {{lang|it|sapere}} and the nouns for ''knowledge'' are {{lang|it|conoscenza}} and {{lang|it|sapienza}}. German has the verbs {{lang|de|wissen}} and {{lang|de|kennen}}; the former implies knowing a fact, the latter knowing in the sense of being acquainted with and having a working knowledge of. There is also a noun derived from {{lang|de|kennen}}, namely {{lang|de|Erkennen}}, which has been said to imply knowledge in the form of recognition or acknowledgment.<ref name="Benton2017" />{{Rp|at=esp. Section 1.}} The verb itself implies a process of going from one state to another, from a state of "not-{{lang|de|erkennen}}" to a state of true {{lang|de|erkennen}}. This verb seems the most appropriate in terms of describing the "episteme" in one of the modern European languages, hence the German name "{{lang|de|{{ill|Erkenntnistheorie|de|vertical-align=sup}}}}". The theoretical interpretation and significance of these linguistic issues remains controversial. The distinction is most pronounced in Polish, where {{lang|pl|wiedzieć}} means "to know", {{lang|pl|umieć}} means "to know how" and {{lang|pl|znać}} means "to be familiar with" (to "know" a person).

In his paper ''On Denoting'' and his later book ''Problems of Philosophy'', [[Bertrand Russell]] brought a great deal of attention to the distinction between "[[Descriptive knowledge|knowledge by description]]" and "[[knowledge by acquaintance#Bertrand Russell|knowledge by acquaintance]]". [[Gilbert Ryle]] is similarly credited with bringing more attention to the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in ''[[The Concept of Mind]]''. In ''Personal Knowledge'', [[Michael Polanyi]] argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle's, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between "knowledge that" and "knowledge how" leads to [[infinite regress]].

====''A priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge====
{{Main|A priori and a posteriori}}
One of the most important distinctions in epistemology is between what can be known ''a priori'' (independently of experience) and what can be known ''a posteriori'' (through experience). The terms originate from the analytic methods of Aristotle's ''[[Organon]]'', and may be roughly defined as follows:<ref name="SEP apriori"/>
* ''[[A priori and a posteriori|A priori]]'' knowledge is knowledge that is independent of experience. This means that it can be known or justified prior to or independently of any specific empirical evidence or sensory observations. Such knowledge is obtained through reasoning, logical analysis, or introspection. Examples of ''a priori'' knowledge include mathematical truths, logical tautologies (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried"), and certain fundamental principles of reason and logic. One of the key proponents of'' a priori '' knowledge was the philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]]. He argued that certain fundamental truths about the nature of reality, such as the concepts of space, time, causality, and the categories of understanding, are not derived from experience, but are inherent in the structure of the mind itself. According to Kant, these ''a priori'' categories enable the organization and interpretation of sensory experiences, giving rise to an understanding of the world.
* ''[[A priori and a posteriori|A posteriori]]'' knowledge is knowledge that is derived from experience. It is based on empirical evidence, sensory perception, and observations of the external world. ''A posteriori'' knowledge is contingent upon the information gained through the senses and relies on the collection and interpretation of data. Scientific observations and experimental results are typical examples of ''a posteriori'' knowledge.

Views that emphasize the importance of ''a priori'' knowledge are generally classified as [[rationalist]]. Views that emphasize the importance of ''a posteriori'' knowledge are generally classified as [[empiricist]].<ref name="SEP rationalism-empiricism"/><ref name=Sangeetha2021/>

===Belief===
{{Main|Belief}}
One of the core concepts in epistemology is ''belief''. A belief is an attitude that a person holds regarding anything that they take to be true.<ref name="SEP Belief"/> For instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the [[proposition]] "snow is white". Beliefs can be ''occurrent'' (e.g., a person actively thinking "snow is white"), or they can be ''dispositional'' (e.g., a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white"). While there is not universal agreement about the nature of belief, most contemporary philosophers hold the view that a disposition to express belief ''B'' qualifies as holding the belief ''B''.<ref name="SEP Belief"/> There are various different ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be ([[Jerry Fodor]]), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true ([[Roderick Chisholm]]), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions ([[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]), or as mental states that fill a particular function ([[Hilary Putnam]]).<ref name="SEP Belief"/> Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to the notion of belief, including [[Eliminativism|eliminativists]] about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our [[folk psychology|folk psychological]] concept of belief ([[Paul Churchland]]) and [[Formal epistemology|formal epistemologists]], who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either I have a belief or I don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").<ref name="SEP Belief"/><ref name="SEP Formal Belief"/>

While belief plays a significant role in epistemological debates surrounding knowledge and justification, it has also generated many other philosophical debates in its own right. Notable debates include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?"; "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g., if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H<sub>2</sub>O part of the content of that belief)?"; "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?"; and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"<ref name="SEP Belief"/>

===Truth===
{{Main|Truth}}
[[Truth]] is the property or state of being in accordance with facts or reality.<ref name="SEP truth"/> On most views, truth is the correspondence of language or thought to a mind-independent world. This is called the [[correspondence theory of truth]]. Among philosophers who think that it is possible to analyze the conditions necessary for knowledge, virtually all of them accept that truth is such a condition. There is much less agreement about the extent to which a knower must know ''why'' something is true in order to know. On such views, something being known implies that it is true. However, this should not be confused for the more contentious view that one must know that one knows in order to know (the [[KK thesis|KK principle]]).<ref name="SEP Epistemology 2014"/>

Epistemologists disagree about whether belief is the only [[truth-bearer]]. Other common suggestions for things that can bear the property of being true include [[propositions]], [[sentence (mathematical logic)|sentence]]s, [[thought]]s, [[utterance]]s, and [[judgment]]s. Plato, in his [[Gorgias (dialogue)|Gorgias]], argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer.<ref name="Plato2008"/>{{clarify|date=June 2020}}

Many of the debates regarding truth are at the crossroads of epistemology and [[logic]].<ref name="SEP truth"/> Some contemporary debates regarding truth include: How do we define truth? Is it even possible to give an informative definition of truth? What things are truth-bearers and therefore capable of being true or false? Are truth and falsity [[Principle of bivalence|bivalent]], or are there other truth values? What are the [[criteria of truth]] that allow us to identify it and to distinguish it from falsity? What role does truth play in constituting [[knowledge]]? And is truth [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]], or is it merely [[knowledge relativity|relative]] to one's perspective?<ref name="SEP truth"/>

===Justification===
{{Main|Justification (epistemology)}}
As the term ''justification'' is used in epistemology, a belief is justified if one has good reason for holding it. Loosely speaking, justification is the ''reason'' that someone holds a rationally admissible belief, on the assumption that it is a ''good reason'' for holding it. Sources of justification might include [[perception|perceptual experience]] (the evidence of the senses), [[reason]], and authoritative [[testimony]]. However, a belief being justified does ''not'' guarantee that the belief is true, since a person could be justified in forming beliefs based on very convincing evidence that was nonetheless deceiving.

====Internalism and externalism====
{{Main|Internalism and externalism}}
A central debate about the nature of justification is a debate between epistemological externalists on the one hand and epistemological internalists on the other. While epistemic externalism first arose in attempts to overcome the [[Gettier problem]], it has flourished in the time since as an alternative way of conceiving of epistemic justification. The initial development of epistemic externalism is often attributed to [[Alvin Goldman]], although numerous other philosophers have worked on the topic in the time since.<ref name="SEP knowledge-analysis" />

Externalists hold that factors deemed "external", meaning outside of the psychological states of those who gain knowledge, can be conditions of justification. For example, an externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, there must be a link or dependency between the belief and the state of the external world. Usually, this is understood to be a causal link. Such causation, to the extent that it is "outside" the mind, would count as an external, knowledge-yielding condition. Internalists, on the other hand, assert that all knowledge-yielding conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge.

Though unfamiliar with the internalist-externalist debate himself, many point to [[René Descartes]] as an early example of the internalist path to justification. He wrote that because the only method by which we perceive the external world is through our senses, and that, because the senses are not infallible, we should not consider our concept of knowledge infallible. The only way to find anything that could be described as "indubitably true", he advocates, would be to see things "clearly and distinctly".<ref name=Descartes1985/> He argued that if there is an omnipotent, good being who made the world, then it is reasonable to believe that people are made with the ability to know. However, this does not mean that the human ability to know is perfect. God gave humankind the ability to know, but not the capacity for omniscience. Descartes said that we must use our capacities for knowledge correctly and carefully through methodological doubt.<ref name="Descartes1985b"/>

The dictum "''Cogito ergo sum''" (I think, therefore I am) is also commonly associated with Descartes's theory. In his own methodological doubt—doubting everything he previously knew so that he could start from a blank slate—the first thing that he could not logically bring himself to doubt was his own existence: "I do not exist" would be a contradiction in terms. The act of saying that one does not exist assumes that someone must be making the statement in the first place. Descartes could doubt his senses, his body, and the world around him—but he could not deny his own existence, because he was able to doubt and must exist to manifest that doubt. Even if some "evil genius" were deceiving him, he would have to exist to be deceived. This one sure point provided him with what he called his Archimedean point, in order to further develop his foundation for knowledge. Simply put, Descartes's epistemological justification depended on his indubitable belief in his own existence and his clear and distinct knowledge of God.<ref name="Descartes1985b"/>

==Defining knowledge==
{{main|Definitions of knowledge}}
A central issue in epistemology is the question of what the nature of knowledge is or how to define it. Sometimes the expressions "theory of knowledge" and "analysis of knowledge" are used specifically for this form of inquiry.<ref name="Hannon2021"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> The term "knowledge" has various meanings in [[natural language]]. It can refer to an [[awareness]] of [[fact]]s, as in knowing that [[Mars]] is a planet, to a possession of [[skill]]s, as in knowing how to swim, or to an [[Experience|experiential]] acquaintance, as in knowing [[Daniel Craig]] personally.<ref name="StanleyWilllamson2001"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Factual knowledge, also referred to as ''propositional knowledge'' or ''[[descriptive knowledge]]'', plays a special role in epistemology. On the linguistic level, it is distinguished from the other forms of knowledge since it can be expressed through a that-clause, for instance, using a formulation like "They know that..." followed by the known [[proposition]].<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Britannica Epistemology" />

Some features of factual knowledge are widely accepted: it is a form of cognitive success that establishes epistemic contact with [[reality]].<ref name="SEP Epistemology"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> However, even though it has been studied intensely, there are still various disagreements about its exact nature. Different factors are responsible for these disagreements. Some theorists try to furnish a practically useful definition by describing its most noteworthy and easily identifiable features.<ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Others engage in an [[analysis of knowledge]], which aims to provide a theoretically precise definition that identifies the set of [[Essence|essential]] features characteristic for all instances of knowledge and only for them.<ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="SEP definitions #ReaNomDef"/> Differences in the [[Philosophical methodology|methodology]] may also cause disagreements. In this regard, some epistemologists use abstract and general intuitions in order to arrive at their definitions. A different approach is to start from concrete individual cases of knowledge to determine what all of them have in common.<ref name="Pritchard2013"/><ref name="IEP problem-of-the-criterion"/><ref name="Fumerton2008"/> Yet another method is to focus on linguistic evidence by studying how the term "knowledge" is commonly used.<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> Different standards of knowledge are further sources of disagreement. A few theorists set these standards very high by demanding that absolute certainty or infallibility is necessary. On such a view, knowledge is a very rare thing. Theorists more in tune with [[Ordinary language philosophy|ordinary language]] usually demand lower standards and see knowledge as something commonly found in everyday life.<ref name="Black2002"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Sidelle2001"/>

=== As justified true belief ===
The historically most influential definition, discussed since [[ancient Greek philosophy]], characterizes knowledge in relation to three essential features: as (1) a [[belief]] that is (2) [[Truth|true]] and (3) [[Justification (epistemology)|justified]].<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="Parikh2017"/> There is still wide acceptance that the first two features are correct, that is, that knowledge is a [[mental state]] that affirms a true proposition.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> However, there is a lot of dispute about the third feature: justification.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> This feature is usually included to distinguish knowledge from true beliefs that rest on [[superstition]], [[luck]]y guesses, or [[Fallacy|faulty reasoning]]. This expresses the idea that knowledge is not the same as being right about something.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> Traditionally, justification is understood as the possession of evidence: a belief is justified if the believer has good evidence supporting it. Such evidence could be a [[Experience#Perception|perceptual experience]], a [[memory]], or a second belief.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/>

=== Gettier problem and alternative definitions ===
[[File:Justified_True_Belief_model_of_knowledge.svg|thumb|300px|An [[Euler diagram]] representing a version of the traditional definition of knowledge that is adapted to the Gettier problem. This problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.]]
The justified-true-belief account of knowledge came under severe criticism in the second half of the 20th century, when [[Edmund Gettier]] proposed various counterexamples.<ref name="IEP Gettier"/> In a famous example of what came to be known as a Gettier case, a person is driving on a country road lined with multiple [[Potemkin village|barn façades]], only one of which is real barn, but it is not possible to tell the difference between them from the road. The person then stops by a fortuitous coincidence in front of the only real barn and forms the belief that it is a barn. The idea behind this thought experiment is that this is not knowledge even though the belief is both justified and true. The reason is that it is just a lucky accident since the person cannot tell the difference: They would have formed exactly the same justified belief if they had stopped at another site, in which case the belief would have been false.<ref name="Rodriguez2018"/><ref name="Goldman1976"/><ref name="IEP defeaters-in-epistemology #sh2b"/>

Various additional examples were proposed along similar lines. Most of them involve a justified true belief that apparently fails to amount to knowledge because the belief's justification is in some sense not relevant to its truth.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> These counterexamples have provoked very diverse responses. Some theorists think that one only needs to modify one's conception of justification to avoid them. But the more common approach is to search for an additional criterion.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="DuránFormanek2018"/> On this view, all cases of knowledge involve a justified true belief but some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge since they lack this additional feature. There are diverse suggestions for this fourth criterion. Some epistemologists require that no false belief is involved in the justification or that no [[defeater]] of the belief is present.<ref name="IEP defeaters-in-epistemology #sh2b"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> A different approach is to require that the belief tracks truth, that is, that the person would not have the belief if it was false.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Some even require that the justification has to be infallible, that is, that it necessitates the belief's truth.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Kraft2012"/>

A quite different approach is to affirm that the justified-true-belief account of knowledge is deeply flawed and to seek a complete reconceptualization of knowledge. These reconceptualizations often do not require justification at all.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> One such approach is to require that the true belief was produced by a reliable process. Naturalized epistemologists often hold that the believed fact has to cause the belief.<ref name="Swain1998"/><ref name="IEP int-ext"/><ref name="Klein1998"/> [[Virtue epistemology|Virtue theorists]] are also interested in how the belief is produced. For them, the belief must be a manifestation of a cognitive virtue.<ref name="IEP Virtue Epistemology" /><ref name="TurriAlfanoGreco2021"/><ref name="SEP Epistemology"/>

== The value problem ==
The primary value problem is to determine why knowledge should be more valuable than simply true belief. In Plato's ''Meno'', Socrates points out to Meno that a man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there correctly. But so, too, could a man who had true beliefs about how to get there, even if he had not gone there or had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says that it seems that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action. Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than true belief and why knowledge and true belief are different. Socrates responds that knowledge, unlike belief, must be 'tied down' to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus.<ref name="Plato2002"/><ref name="SEP knowledge-value"/>

More generally, the problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more valuable than a minimal conjunction of its components such as mere true belief or justified true belief. Other components considered besides belief, truth, and justification are safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and any anti-Gettier condition. This is done within analyses that conceive of knowledge as divided into components. Knowledge-first epistemological theories, which posit knowledge as fundamental, are notable exceptions to these kind of analyses.<ref name="SEP knowledge-value"/> The value problem re-emerged in the philosophical literature on epistemology in the 21st century following the rise of [[virtue epistemology]] in the 1980s, partly because of the obvious link to the concept of value in ethics.<ref name="Pritchard2007"/>

=== Virtue epistemology ===
{{Main|Virtue epistemology}}
In contemporary philosophy, epistemologists including [[Ernest Sosa]], [[John Greco (philosopher)|John Greco]], [[Jonathan Kvanvig]],<ref name="Kvanvig2003"/> [[Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski|Linda Zagzebski]], and [[Duncan Pritchard]] have defended virtue epistemology as a solution to the value problem. They argue that epistemology should also evaluate the "properties" of people as epistemic agents (i.e., intellectual virtues), rather than merely the properties of propositions and propositional mental attitudes.

The value problem has been presented as an argument against epistemic [[reliabilism]] by [[Linda Zagzebski]], Wayne Riggs, and [[Richard Swinburne]], among others. Zagzebski analogizes the value of knowledge to the value of espresso produced by an espresso maker: "The liquid in this cup is not improved by the fact that it comes from a reliable espresso maker. If the espresso tastes good, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable machine."<ref name="Zagzebski2017"/> For Zagzebski, the value of knowledge deflates to the value of mere true belief. She assumes that reliability in itself has no value or disvalue, but Goldman and Olsson disagree. They point out that Zagzebski's conclusion rests on the assumption of veritism: all that matters is the acquisition of true belief.<ref name="GoldmanOlsson2009"/> To the contrary, they argue that a reliable process for acquiring a true belief adds value to the merely true belief by making it more likely that future beliefs of a similar kind will be true. By analogy, having a reliable espresso maker that produced a good cup of espresso would be more valuable than having an unreliable one that luckily produced a good cup because the reliable one would more likely produce good future cups compared to the unreliable one.

The value problem is important to assessing the adequacy of theories of knowledge that conceive of knowledge as consisting of true belief and other components. According to [[Jonathan Kvanvig]], an adequate account of knowledge should resist counterexamples and allow an explanation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Should a theory of knowledge fail to do so, it would prove inadequate.<ref name="Kvanvig2003" />{{page needed|date=March 2019}}

One of the more influential responses to the problem is that knowledge is not particularly valuable and is not what ought to be the main focus of epistemology. Instead, epistemologists ought to focus on other mental states, such as understanding.<ref name="Kvanvig2003" /> Advocates of virtue epistemology have argued that the value of knowledge comes from an internal relationship between the knower and the mental state of believing.<ref name="SEP knowledge-value" />

==Acquiring knowledge==
===Sources of knowledge===
{{Main|Knowledge#Sources of knowledge}}
There are many proposed sources of knowledge and justified belief which we take to be actual sources of knowledge in our everyday lives. Some of the most commonly discussed include [[perception]], [[reason]], [[memory]], and [[Testimony#Philosophy|testimony]].<ref name="IEP Epistemology"/><ref name="SEP Epistemology"/>

===Important distinctions===
====''A priori''–''a posteriori'' distinction====
{{Main|A priori and a posteriori}}
As mentioned above, epistemologists draw a distinction between what can be known ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' (independently of experience) and what can only be known ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a posteriori]]'' (through experience). Much of what we call ''a priori'' knowledge is thought to be attained through reason alone, as featured prominently in [[rationalism]]. This might also include a non-rational faculty of [[intuition]], as defended by proponents of [[innatism]]. In contrast, ''a posteriori'' knowledge is derived entirely through experience or as a result of experience, as emphasized in [[empiricism]]. This also includes cases where knowledge can be traced back to an earlier experience, as in memory or testimony.<ref name="SEP apriori"/>

A way to look at the difference between the two is through an example. Bruce Russell gives two propositions in which the reader decides which one he believes more.{{clarify|date=July 2020}} Option A: All crows are birds. Option B: All crows are black. If you believe option A, then you are ''a priori'' justified in believing it because you do not have to see a crow to know it is a bird. If you believe in option B, then you are ''a posteriori'' justified to believe it because you have seen many crows therefore knowing they are black. He goes on to say that it does not matter if the statement is true or not, only that if you believe in one or the other that matters.<ref name="SEP apriori"/>

The idea of ''a priori'' knowledge is that it is based on intuition or rational insights. Laurence BonJour says in his article "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge",<ref>BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</ref> that a "rational insight is an immediate, non-inferential grasp, apprehension or 'seeing' that some proposition is necessarily true" (p.&nbsp;3). Going back to the crow example, by Laurence BonJour's definition the reason you would believe in option A is because you have an immediate knowledge that a crow is a bird, without ever experiencing one.

[[Evolutionary psychology]] takes a novel approach to the problem. It says that there is an innate predisposition for certain types of learning. "Only small parts of the brain resemble a [[tabula rasa]]; this is true even for human beings. The remainder is more like an exposed negative waiting to be dipped into a developer fluid".<ref>Wilson, E.O., [[Sociobiology: The New Synthesis]]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1975</ref>

====Analytic–synthetic distinction====
[[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|thumb|The analytic–synthetic distinction was first proposed by [[Immanuel Kant]].]]
{{Main|Analytic–synthetic distinction}}
[[Immanuel Kant]], in his ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', drew a distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions. He contended that some propositions are such that we can know they are true just by understanding their meaning. For example, consider, "My father's brother is my uncle." We can know it is true solely by virtue of our understanding in what its terms mean. Philosophers call such propositions "analytic". Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and predicates. An example would be, "My father's brother has black hair." Kant stated that all mathematical and scientific statements are synthetic a priori propositions because they are [[logical truth|necessarily true]], but our knowledge about the attributes of the mathematical or physical subjects we can only get by logical inference.

While this distinction is first and foremost about [[Meaning (philosophy of language)|meaning]] and is therefore most relevant to the [[philosophy of language]], the distinction has significant epistemological consequences, seen most prominently in the works of the [[logical positivism|logical positivists]].<ref name="SEP Analytic Synthetic"/> In particular, if the set of propositions which can only be known ''a posteriori'' is coextensive with the set of propositions which are synthetically true, and if the set of propositions which can be known ''a priori'' is coextensive with the set of propositions which are analytically true (or in other words, which are true by definition), then there can only be two kinds of successful inquiry: Logico-mathematical inquiry, which investigates what is true by definition, and empirical inquiry, which investigates what is true in the world. Most notably, this would exclude the possibility that branches of philosophy like [[metaphysics]] could ever provide informative accounts of what actually exists.<ref name="SEP apriori"/><ref name="SEP Analytic Synthetic"/>

The American philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. O. Quine]], in his paper "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]", famously challenged the analytic-synthetic distinction, arguing that the boundary between the two is too blurry to provide a clear division between propositions that are true by definition and propositions that are not. While some contemporary philosophers take themselves to have offered more sustainable accounts of the distinction that are not vulnerable to Quine's objections, there is no consensus about whether or not these succeed.<ref>Russell, G.: Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008</ref>

=== Science as knowledge acquisition ===
{{Main|Philosophy of science}}

Science is often considered to be a refined, formalized, systematic, institutionalized form of the pursuit and acquisition of [[empirical knowledge]]. As such, the [[philosophy of science]] may be viewed as an application of the principles of epistemology and as a foundation for epistemological inquiry.<ref name="Piaget1967"/>

==The regress problem==
{{Main|Regress argument}}

The [[Regress argument|regress problem]] (also known as [[Agrippa's Trilemma]]) is the problem of providing a complete logical foundation for human knowledge. The traditional way of supporting a rational argument is to appeal to other rational arguments, typically using chains of reason and rules of logic. A classic example that goes back to Aristotle is deducing that ''Socrates is mortal''. We have a logical rule that says ''All humans are mortal'' and an assertion that ''Socrates is human'' and we deduce that ''Socrates is mortal''. In this example how do we know that Socrates is human? Presumably we apply other rules such as: ''All born from human females are human''. Which then leaves open the question how do we know that all born from humans are human? This is the regress problem: how can we eventually terminate a logical argument with some statements that do not require further justification but can still be considered rational and justified? As John Pollock stated,

<blockquote>to justify a belief one must appeal to a further justified belief. This means that one of two things can be the case. Either there are some beliefs that we can be justified for holding, without being able to justify them on the basis of any other belief, or else for each justified belief there is an infinite regress of (potential) justification [the nebula theory]. On this theory there is no rock bottom of justification. Justification just meanders in and out through our network of beliefs, stopping nowhere.<ref name="Pollock1975"/>{{Rp|26}}</blockquote>

The apparent impossibility of completing an infinite chain of reasoning is thought by some to support [[skepticism]]. It is also the impetus for Descartes's famous dictum: ''[[I think, therefore I am]]''. Descartes was looking for some logical statement that could be true without appeal to other statements.

===Responses to the regress problem===
Many epistemologists studying justification have attempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress problem.

====Foundationalism====
[[Foundationalism|Foundationalists]] respond to the regress problem by asserting that certain "foundations" or "basic beliefs" support other beliefs but do not themselves require justification from other beliefs. These beliefs might be justified because they are self-evident, infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms. Perception, memory, and ''a priori'' intuition are often considered possible examples of basic beliefs.

The chief criticism of foundationalism is that if a belief is not supported by other beliefs, accepting it may be arbitrary or unjustified.<ref name="SEP justep-foundational"/>

====Coherentism====
Another response to the regress problem is [[coherentism]], which is the rejection of the assumption that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, [[coherentism|coherentists]] hold that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some particular class of beliefs. Yet, since a system can be coherent while also being wrong, coherentists face the difficulty of ensuring that the whole system [[correspondence theory of truth|corresponds]] to reality. Additionally, most logicians agree that any argument that is circular is, at best, only trivially valid. That is, to be illuminating, arguments must operate with information from multiple premises, not simply conclude by reiterating a premise.

Nigel Warburton writes in ''Thinking from A to Z'' that "[[circular argument]]s are not invalid; in other words, from a logical point of view there is nothing intrinsically wrong with them. However, they are, when viciously circular, spectacularly uninformative."<ref name="Warburton1996"/>

====Infinitism====
An alternative resolution to the regress problem is known as "[[infinitism]]". Infinitists take the infinite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to them, without having consciously thought through all of these reasons when the need arises. This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors, foundationalism and coherentism. The most prominent defense of infinitism has been given by [[Peter D. Klein|Peter Klein]].<ref name="KleinTurri"/>

====Foundherentism====
An intermediate position, known as "[[foundherentism]]", is advanced by [[Susan Haack]]. Foundherentism is meant to unify foundationalism and coherentism. Haack explains the view by using a crossword puzzle as an analogy. Whereas, for example, infinitists regard the regress of reasons as taking the form of a single line that continues indefinitely, Haack has argued that chains of properly justified beliefs look more like a crossword puzzle, with various different lines mutually supporting each other.<ref name="Haack1993"/> Thus, Haack's view leaves room for both chains of beliefs that are "vertical" (terminating in foundational beliefs) and chains that are "horizontal" (deriving their justification from coherence with beliefs that are also members of foundationalist chains of belief).

==Schools of thought==

===Empiricism===
[[File:David Hume 2.jpg|thumb|[[David Hume]], one of the most staunch defenders of empiricism]]
{{Main|Empiricism}}
[[Empiricism]] is a view in the theory of knowledge which focuses on the role of experience, especially experience based on [[perception|perceptual observations]] by the [[sense]]s, in the generation of knowledge.<ref name="PsillosCurd2010"/> Certain forms exempt disciplines such as [[mathematics]] and [[logic]] from these requirements.<ref name="Uebel2015"/>

There are many variants of empiricism, including [[British empiricism]], [[Empiricism#Logical empiricism|logical empiricism]], [[phenomenalism]], and some versions of [[Scottish common sense realism|common sense philosophy]]. Most forms of empiricism give epistemologically privileged status to sensory impressions or [[sense data]], although this plays out very differently in different cases. Some of the most famous historical empiricists include [[John Locke]], [[David Hume]], [[George Berkeley]], [[Francis Bacon]], [[John Stuart Mill]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], and [[Bertrand Russell]].

===Rationalism===
{{Main|Rationalism}}
Rationalism is the epistemological view that reason is the chief source of knowledge and the main determinant of what constitutes knowledge. More broadly, it can also refer to any view which appeals to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. Rationalism is one of the two classical views in epistemology, the other being empiricism. Rationalists claim that the mind, through the use of reason, can directly grasp certain truths in various domains, including [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[ethics]], and [[metaphysics]]. Rationalist views can range from modest views in mathematics and logic (such as that of [[Gottlob Frege]]) to ambitious metaphysical systems (such as that of [[Baruch Spinoza]]).

Some of the most famous rationalists include [[Plato]], [[René Descartes]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], and [[Gottfried Leibniz]].

===Skepticism===
{{Main|Philosophical skepticism}}
Skepticism is a position that questions the possibility of human knowledge, either in particular domains or on a general level.<ref name="Klein 2015"/> Skepticism does not refer to any one specific school of philosophy, but is rather a thread that runs through many epistemological debates. [[Philosophical skepticism#Ancient Greek skepticism|Ancient Greek skepticism]] began during the [[Hellenistic philosophy|Hellenistic period in philosophy]], which featured both [[Pyrrhonism]] (notably defended by [[Pyrrho]], [[Sextus Empiricus]], and [[Aenesidemus]]) and [[Academic skepticism]] (notably defended by [[Arcesilaus]] and [[Carneades]]). Among ancient Indian philosophers, skepticism was notably defended by the [[Ajñana]] school and in the Buddhist [[Madhyamika]] tradition. In modern philosophy, [[René Descartes]]' famous inquiry into mind and body began as an exercise in skepticism, in which he started by trying to doubt all purported cases of knowledge in order to search for something that was known with absolute [[certainty]].<ref name="Popkin1972"/>

Epistemic skepticism questions whether knowledge is possible at all. Generally speaking, skeptics argue that knowledge requires [[certainty]], and that most or all of our beliefs are [[Fallibilism|fallible]] (meaning that our grounds for holding them always, or almost always, fall short of certainty), which would together entail that knowledge is always or almost always [[acatalepsy|impossible]] for us.<ref name="skepticism"/> Characterizing knowledge as strong or weak is dependent on a person's viewpoint and their characterization of knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Much of modern epistemology is derived from attempts to better understand and address philosophical skepticism.<ref name="Klein 2015">{{Citation|last=Klein|first=Peter|title=Skepticism|date=2015|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2015|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=1 October 2018|archive-date=23 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323100900/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Pyrrhonism====
{{Main|Pyrrhonism}}
One of the oldest forms of epistemic skepticism can be found in [[Agrippa's trilemma]] (named after the [[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonist]] philosopher [[Agrippa the Skeptic]]) that demonstrates that certainty can not be achieved with regard to beliefs.<ref name="SEP Ancient Skepticism"/> Pyrrhonism dates back to [[Pyrrho of Elis]] from the 4th century BCE, although most of what we know about Pyrrhonism today is from the surviving works of [[Sextus Empiricus]].<ref name="SEP Ancient Skepticism"/> Pyrrhonists claim that for any argument for a non-evident proposition, an equally convincing argument for a contradictory proposition can be produced. Pyrrhonists do not dogmatically deny the possibility of knowledge, but instead point out that beliefs about non-evident matters cannot be substantiated.

====Cartesian skepticism====
The [[evil demon|Cartesian evil demon problem]], first raised by [[René Descartes]],{{Refn|group=note|name=PlatoCaveVsBrainVat}} supposes that our sensory impressions may be controlled by some external power rather than the result of ordinary veridical perception.<ref name="Descartes1"/> In such a scenario, nothing we sense would actually exist, but would instead be mere illusion. As a result, we would never be able to know anything about the world, since we would be systematically deceived about everything. The conclusion often drawn from evil demon skepticism is that even if we are not completely deceived, all of the information provided by our senses is still ''compatible'' with skeptical scenarios in which we are completely deceived, and that we must therefore either be able to exclude the possibility of deception or else must deny the possibility of ''infallible'' knowledge (that is, knowledge which is completely certain) beyond our immediate sensory impressions.<ref name="Descartes2"/> While the view that no beliefs are beyond doubt other than our immediate sensory impressions is often ascribed to Descartes, he in fact thought that we ''can'' exclude the possibility that we are systematically deceived, although his reasons for thinking this are based on a highly contentious [[ontological argument]] for the existence of a benevolent God who would not allow such deception to occur.<ref name="Descartes1"/>

====Responses to philosophical skepticism====
Epistemological skepticism can be classified as either "mitigated" or "unmitigated" skepticism. Mitigated skepticism rejects "strong" or "strict" knowledge claims but does approve weaker ones, which can be considered "virtual knowledge", but only with regard to justified beliefs. Unmitigated skepticism rejects claims of both virtual and strong knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Characterizing knowledge as strong, weak, virtual or genuine can be determined differently depending on a person's viewpoint as well as their characterization of knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Some of the most notable attempts to respond to unmitigated skepticism include [[direct realism]], [[disjunctivism]], [[Scottish common sense realism|common sense philosophy]], [[pragmatism]], [[fideism]], and [[fictionalism]].<ref name="Suber1996"/>

===Pragmatism===
{{Main|Pragmatism}}
[[Pragmatism]] is a fallibilist epistemology that emphasizes the role of action in knowing.<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> Different interpretations of pragmatism variously emphasize: truth as the final outcome of ideal scientific inquiry and experimentation, truth as closely related to usefulness, experience as transacting with (instead of representing) nature, and human practices as the foundation of language.<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> Pragmatism's origins are often attributed to [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]].<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> In 1878, Peirce formulated the maxim, "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."<ref name="Peirce"/>

William James suggested that through a pragmatist epistemology, theories "become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest".<ref name="James2000"/>{{Rp|28}} In James's pragmatic method, which he adapted from Peirce, metaphysical disputes can be settled by tracing the practical consequences of the different sides of the argument. If this process does not resolve the dispute, then "the dispute is idle".<ref name="James2000"/>{{Rp|25}}

Contemporary versions of pragmatism have been developed by thinkers such as [[Richard Rorty]] and [[Hilary Putnam]]. Rorty proposed that values were historically contingent and dependent upon their utility within a given historical period.<ref>Rorty, R. and Saatkamp, H. (n.d.). Rorty & Pragmatism. Nashville [u.a.]: Vanderbilt Univ. Press.</ref> Contemporary philosophers working in pragmatism are called [[neopragmatism|neopragmatists]], and also include [[Nicholas Rescher]], [[Robert Brandom]], [[Susan Haack]], and [[Cornel West]].

=== Naturalized epistemology ===
{{Main|Naturalized epistemology}}
In certain respects an intellectual descendant of pragmatism, [[naturalized epistemology]] considers the evolutionary role of knowledge for agents living and evolving in the world.<ref name="Quine2004"/> It de-emphasizes the questions around justification and truth, and instead asks how reliable beliefs are formed empirically and what role that evolution plays in the development of such processes. It suggests a more empirical approach to the subject as a whole, leaving behind philosophical definitions and consistency arguments, and instead using psychological methods to study and understand how "knowledge" is actually formed and is used in the natural world. As such, it does not attempt to answer the analytic questions of traditional epistemology, but rather replace them with new empirical ones.<ref name="Kim1988"/>

Naturalized epistemology was first proposed in "Epistemology Naturalized", a seminal paper by [[W.V.O. Quine|W. V. O. Quine]].<ref name="Quine2004"/> A less radical view has been defended by [[Hilary Kornblith]] in ''Knowledge and its Place in Nature'', in which he seeks to turn epistemology towards empirical investigation without completely abandoning traditional epistemic concepts.<ref name="Kornblith2002"/>

===Epistemic relativism===
{{Main|Relativism}}
Epistemic relativism is the view that what is true, rational, or justified for one person need not be true, rational, or justified for another person. Epistemic relativists therefore assert that – while there are ''relative'' facts about truth, rationality, justification, and so on – there is no ''perspective-independent'' fact of the matter.<ref name="Boghossian2006"/> Note that this is distinct from epistemic [[contextualism]], which holds that the ''meaning'' of epistemic terms vary across contexts (e.g., "I know" might mean something different in everyday contexts and skeptical contexts). In contrast, epistemic relativism holds that the relevant ''facts'' vary, not just linguistic meaning. Relativism about truth may also be a form of [[ontological]] relativism, insofar as relativists about truth hold that facts about what ''exists'' vary based on perspective.<ref name="Boghossian2006"/>

===Epistemic constructivism===
{{Main|Constructivist epistemology|Social constructivism}}
Constructivism is a view in philosophy according to which all "knowledge is a compilation of human-made constructions",<ref>Raskin, J.D. (2002). Constructivism in psychology: Personal construct psychology, radical constructivism, and social constructivism. In J.D. Raskin & S.K. Bridges (Eds.), ''Studies in meaning: Exploring constructivist psychology'' (pp. 1–25). New York: [[Pace University Press]]. p. 4</ref> "not the neutral discovery of an objective truth".<ref>Castelló M., & Botella, L. (2006). [https://books.google.com/books?id=O1ugEIEid6YC Constructivism and educational psychology] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=O1ugEIEid6YC&printsec=frontcover |date=10 December 2022 }}. In J.L. Kincheloe & R.A. Horn (Eds.), ''The Praeger handbook of education and psychology'' (Vol. 2, pp. 263–270). Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 263</ref> Whereas objectivism is concerned with the "object of our knowledge", constructivism emphasizes "how we construct knowledge".<ref name="Jonassen1991"/> Constructivism proposes new definitions for [[knowledge]] and [[truth]], which emphasize intersubjectivity rather than objectivity, and viability rather than truth. The constructivist point of view is in many ways comparable to certain forms of pragmatism.<ref>For an example, see Weber, Eric Thomas. 2010. ''[http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/rawls-dewey-and-constructivism-9781441199447/ Rawls, Dewey, and Constructivism: On the Epistemology of Justice] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140722103450/http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/rawls-dewey-and-constructivism-9781441199447/ |date=22 July 2014 }}'' (London: Continuum).</ref>

===Bayesian epistemology===
[[Bayesian epistemology]] is a formal approach to various topics in epistemology that has its roots in [[Thomas Bayes]]' work in the field of probability theory. One advantage of its formal method in contrast to traditional epistemology is that its concepts and theorems can be defined with a high degree of precision. It is based on the idea that beliefs can be interpreted as [[Subjective probability|subjective probabilities]]. As such, they are subject to the laws of [[probability theory]], which act as the norms of [[rationality]]. These norms can be divided into static constraints, governing the rationality of beliefs at any moment, and dynamic constraints, governing how rational agents should change their beliefs upon receiving new evidence. The most characteristic Bayesian expression of these principles is found in the form of [[Dutch book]]s, which illustrate irrationality in agents through a series of bets that lead to a loss for the agent no matter which of the probabilistic events occurs. Bayesians have applied these fundamental principles to various epistemological topics but Bayesianism does not cover all topics of traditional epistemology.<ref name="Talbott"/><ref name="Olsson2018"/><ref name="HartmannSprenger2010"/><ref name="HájekLin2017"/>

=== Feminist epistemology ===
{{Main|Feminist epistemology}}
[[Feminist epistemology]] is a subfield of epistemology which applies [[feminist theory]] to epistemological questions. It began to emerge as a distinct subfield in the 20th century. Prominent feminist epistemologists include [[Miranda Fricker]] (who developed the concept of [[epistemic injustice]]), [[Donna Haraway]] (who first proposed the concept of [[situated knowledge]]), [[Sandra Harding]], and [[Elizabeth S. Anderson|Elizabeth Anderson]].<ref name="SEP Feminist Epistemology"/> Harding proposes that feminist epistemology can be broken into three distinct categories: feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology, and postmodern epistemology.

Feminist epistemology has also played a significant role in the development of many debates in [[social epistemology]].<ref name="SEP Feminist Social"/>

=== Decolonial epistemology ===
{{Main|Decolonization of knowledge}}
Epistemicide<ref name="Santos2015"/> is a term used in decolonisation studies that describes the killing of knowledge systems under systemic oppression such as colonisation and slavery. The term was coined by [[Boaventura de Sousa Santos]], who presented the significance of such physical violence creating the centering of Western knowledge in the current world.<ref name="Bennett2007"/> This term challenges the thought of what is seen as knowledge in academia today.

===Indian pramana===
{{Main|Pramana}}
[[Indian philosophy|Indian schools of philosophy]], such as the [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] [[Nyaya]] and [[Carvaka]] schools, as well as the [[Jain philosophy|Jain]] and [[Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist]] philosophical schools, developed an epistemological tradition independently of the Western philosophical tradition called "pramana". Pramana can be translated as "instrument of knowledge" and refers to various means or sources of knowledge that Indian philosophers held to be reliable. Each school of Indian philosophy had their own theories about which pramanas were valid means to knowledge and which were unreliable (and why).<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N–Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, pp. 520–521</ref> A [[Vedas|Vedic]] text, [[Taittiriya Aranyaka|Taittirīya Āraṇyaka]] ({{circa|9th}}–6th centuries BCE), lists "four means of attaining correct knowledge": ''smṛti'' ("tradition" or "scripture"), ''pratyakṣa'' ("perception"), ''aitihya'' ("communication by one who is expert", or "tradition"), and ''anumāna'' ("reasoning" or "inference").<ref>A.B. Keith (1989), [https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&dq=pratyaksa&pg=PA482 ''The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132734/https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&pg=PA482&dq=pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, Part II, p.482</ref><ref>S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). [https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa&pg=PA23 ''A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&pg=PA23&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, p.23</ref>

In the Indian traditions, the most widely discussed pramanas are: ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception), ''Anumāṇa'' (inference), ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation, derivation from circumstances), ''Anupalabdi'' (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof), and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). While the Nyaya school (beginning with the [[Nyāya Sūtras]] of Gotama, between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE<ref>Jeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, {{ISBN|978-1-898723-94-3}}, p. 129</ref><ref>B.K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.</ref>) were a proponent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, inference, comparison/analogy, and testimony), the Buddhist epistemologists ([[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]]) generally accepted only perception and inference. The [[Carvaka]] school of [[materialists]] only accepted the pramana of perception, and hence were among the first [[empiricists]] in the Indian traditions.<ref>MM Kamal (1998), [https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf The Epistemology of the Cārvāka Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180214202758/https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf |date=14 February 2018 }}, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13–16</ref> Another school, the [[Ajñana]], included notable proponents of [[philosophical skepticism]].

The [[Buddhist philosophy#Epistemology|theory of knowledge of the Buddha]] in the early Buddhist texts has been interpreted as a form of pragmatism as well as a form of correspondence theory.<ref>Jayatilleke, K.N.; Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 356</ref> Likewise, the Buddhist philosopher [[Dharmakirti]] has been interpreted both as holding a form of pragmatism or correspondence theory for his view that what is true is what has effective power (''arthakriya'').<ref>Cabezón, José I., 2000, "Truth in Buddhist Theology," in R. Jackson and J. Makransky, (eds.), Buddhist Theology, Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars. London: Curzon, 136–154.</ref><ref>Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> The Buddhist [[Madhyamika]] school's theory of emptiness ([[shunyata]]) meanwhile has been interpreted as a form of [[philosophical skepticism]].<ref>Arnold, Dan; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of belief and religion] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=10 December 2022 }}, p. 132.</ref>

The main contribution to epistemology by the Jains has been their theory of "many sided-ness" or "multi-perspectivism" ([[Anekantavada]]), which says that since the world is multifaceted, any single viewpoint is limited (''naya'' – a partial standpoint).<ref>Griffin, David Ray (2005) p. 145</ref> This has been interpreted as a kind of pluralism or [[perspectivism]].<ref>Stroud, Scott R; [https://www.academia.edu/download/34919888/anek_pluralism_AHR.pdf Anekantavada and Engaged Rhetorical Pluralism: Explicating Jaina Views on Perspectivism, Violence, and Rhetoric]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}.</ref><ref>D. Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction 125.</ref> According to [[Jain epistemology]], none of the pramanas gives absolute or perfect knowledge since they are each limited points of view.

==Domains of inquiry==
===Formal epistemology===
{{Main|Formal epistemology|Computational epistemology}}
Formal epistemology uses formal tools and methods from [[decision theory]], [[logic]], [[probability theory]], and [[computability theory]] to model and reason about issues of epistemological interest.<ref name="SEP Formal Epistemology" /> Work in this area spans several academic fields, including [[philosophy]], [[computer science]], [[economics]], and [[statistics]]. The focus of formal epistemology has tended to differ somewhat from that of traditional epistemology, with topics like uncertainty, induction, and belief revision garnering more attention than the analysis of knowledge, skepticism, and issues with justification.

===Historical epistemology===
{{Main|Historical epistemology}}
Historical epistemology is the study of the historical conditions of, and changes in, different kinds of knowledge.<ref name="Wartofsky1979"/><ref name="Wartofsky1983"/> There are many versions of or approaches to historical epistemology, which is different from history of epistemology.<ref name="Sturm2011"/> Twentieth-century French historical epistemologists like [[Abel Rey]], [[Gaston Bachelard]], [[Jean Cavaillès]], and [[Georges Canguilhem]] focused specifically on changes in scientific discourse.<ref name="Braustein2012"/><ref name="Peña-Guzmán2020"/>

===Metaepistemology===
{{Main|Metaepistemology}}
Metaepistemology is the [[metaphilosophical]] study of the [[philosophical method|methods]], aims, and subject matter of epistemology.<ref name="REP Metaepistemology"/> In general, metaepistemology aims to better understand our first-order epistemological inquiry. Some goals of metaepistemology are identifying inaccurate assumptions made in epistemological debates and determining whether the questions asked in mainline epistemology are the ''right'' epistemological questions to be asking.

===Social epistemology===
{{Main|Social epistemology}}
Social epistemology deals with questions about knowledge in contexts where our knowledge attributions cannot be explained by simply examining individuals in isolation from one another, meaning that the scope of our knowledge attributions must be widened to include broader social contexts.<ref name="SEP epistemology-social"/> It also explores the ways in which interpersonal beliefs can be justified in social contexts.<ref name="SEP epistemology-social"/> The most common topics discussed in contemporary social epistemology are [[testimony]], which deals with the conditions under which a belief "x is true" that result from being told "x is true" constitutes knowledge; peer disagreement, which deals with when and how I should revise my beliefs in light of other people holding beliefs that contradict mine; and group epistemology, which deals with what it means to attribute knowledge to groups rather than individuals, and when group knowledge attributions are appropriate.<!--PLEASE EXPAND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY SUBSECTIONS; DO NOT REMOVE
====Testimony====
====Peer disagreement====
====Group knowledge====
-->

== Historical context ==
{{anchor|History of epistemology}}
Contemporary philosophers consider that epistemology is a major subfield of philosophy, along with [[ethics]], [[logic]], and [[metaphysics]],<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /> which are more ancient subdivisions of philosophy.<ref name="Blair2006" /> But in the early and mid 20th century, epistemology was not seen as an independent field on its own. [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]] viewed epistemology as a chapter of psychology.<ref name="Quine1969" /><ref name="Malpas1992" /><sup>Sect.1.1</sup> [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]] viewed it as a mix of psychology and logic.<ref name="Kitchener2007" /> William Alston presents a similar contemporary perspective, but in a historically 'oriented' manner: for him, epistemology has historically always been a part of cognitive psychology.{{refn|group=note|name=AlstonEpistemologyVsPsychology}}

The claim that psychology is a background for epistemology is often called its [[Naturalized epistemology|naturalization]]. The epistemology of Russell and Quine in the 20th century were naturalized in that way. More recently, [[Laurence BonJour|Laurence Bonjour]] rejects that there is a need for that kind of psychologism in contemporary epistemology.<ref name=Bonjour2010 /> His argument is that, nowadays, the required part of psychology, which he refers as ''minimal psychologism'', ''conceptual psychologism'', and ''meliorative psychologism,'' are self evident within contemporary (traditional) epistemology, "involves at most a quite minor departure from traditional, nonnaturalized epistemology" or "poses no real threat to traditional epistemology".<ref name=Bonjour2010 /> In this view point, naturalized epistemology has integrated all required psychological aspects, which are considered non controversial, and can be severed from psychologism.

For [[Luciano Floridi]], "at the turn of the [20th] century there had been a resurgence of interest in epistemology through an anti-metaphysical, naturalist, reaction against the nineteenth-century development of Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealism." In that perspective, contemporary epistemology, which in Bonjour's perspective does not need to be "naturalized" through psychologism anymore, emerged after a naturalization that rejected meta-physical perspectives associated with Immanuel Kant and [[G. W. F. Hegel]].<ref name=Floridi2003 />

Historians of philosophy traditionally divide the modern period into a dispute between [[Empiricism|empiricists]] (including [[Francis Bacon]], [[John Locke]], [[David Hume]], and [[George Berkeley]]) and [[Rationalism|rationalists]] (including [[René Descartes]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], and [[Gottfried Leibniz]]).<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /> The debate between them has often been framed using the question of whether knowledge comes primarily from [[Experience|sensory experience]] (empiricism), or whether a significant portion of our knowledge is derived entirely from our faculty of [[reason]] (rationalism). According to some scholars, this dispute was resolved in the late 18th century by [[Immanuel Kant]],{{Citation needed|date=August 2021|reason="Some scholars" is too vague for such a big statement. It should be attributed and sources provided. Also, Kant's view is presented here out of context, so it's not clear in which way this resolved the dispute in the mind of these scholars. Having sources will help.}} whose [[transcendental idealism]] famously made room for the view that "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all [knowledge] arises out of experience".<ref name="Carus1891" />

==Epistemological concepts in past philosophies==
In ''Meno'', the definition of knowledge as justified true belief appears for the first time.<ref name="Hetherington2012" />{{Rp|page=33}} In other words, belief is required to have an explanation in order to be correct, beyond just happening to be right.<ref name="Hetherington2012" />{{Rp|page=34}} A number of important epistemological concerns also appeared in the works of [[Aristotle]].<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" />
[[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|[[René Descartes]], who is often credited as the father of modern philosophy, was often preoccupied with epistemological questions in his work.]]

During the subsequent [[Hellenistic philosophy|Hellenistic period]], philosophical schools began to appear which had a greater focus on epistemological questions, often in the form of [[philosophical skepticism]].<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /> For instance, the Hellenistic Sceptics, especially [[Sextus Empiricus]] of the [[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonian school]] rejected justification on the basis of [[Agrippa's trilemma]] and so, in the view of {{Harvtxt|Irwin|2010}},<ref name="Irwin2010"/> rejected the possibility of knowledge as well. The Pyrrhonian school of [[Pyrrho]] and [[Sextus Empiricus]] held that [[eudaimonia]] (flourishing, happiness, or "the good life") could be attained through the application of [[epoché]] (suspension of judgment) regarding all non-evident matters. Pyrrhonism was particularly concerned with undermining the epistemological [[dogma]]s of [[Stoicism]] and [[Epicureanism]].<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /> The other major school of Hellenistic skepticism was [[Academic skepticism]], most notably defended by [[Carneades]] and [[Arcesilaus]], which predominated in the [[Platonic Academy]] for almost two centuries.<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" />

In ancient India, the [[Ajñana]] school of [[Hindu philosophy|ancient Indian philosophy]] promoted skepticism. Ajñana was a [[Śramaṇa|Śramaṇa movement]] and a major rival of [[Pre-sectarian Buddhism|early Buddhism]], [[Jainism]], and the [[Ājīvika]] school. They held that it was impossible to obtain knowledge of metaphysical nature or to ascertain the truth value of philosophical propositions; and even if knowledge was possible, it was useless and disadvantageous for final salvation. They were specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own.

During the [[Islamic Golden Age]], one of the most prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, logicians, and mystics in Islamic epistemology was [[Al-Ghazali]]. During his life, he wrote over 70 books on science, Islamic reasoning, and Sufism.<ref name="Smith1936" /> Al-Ghazali distributed his book ''The Incoherence of Philosophers'', set apart as a defining moment in Islamic epistemology. He shaped a conviction that all occasions and connections are not the result of material conjunctions, but are the present and prompt will of God.<ref name="Al-Ghazali" />

After the ancient philosophical era but before the modern philosophical era, a number of (non Islamic) [[Medieval philosophy|medieval philosophers]] also engaged with epistemological questions at length. Most notable among the Medievals for their contributions to epistemology were [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[John Duns Scotus]], and [[William of Ockham]].<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" />

According to historian of philosophy [[Jan Woleński]], the development of philosophy divides, with some exceptions, into the pre-Cartesian ''ontologically oriented'' and the post-Cartesian ''epistemologically oriented''.<ref>Woleński, Jan. (2004) "The History of Epistemology." In ''Handbook of Epistemology''. Ed. I. Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen, & Jan Woleński. Springer, p.4</ref> 
<!-- Missing: Discussion of Medieval Islamic epistemology -->

=== Contemporary historiography ===
There are a number of different methods that contemporary scholars use when trying to understand the relationship between past epistemology and contemporary epistemology. One of the most contentious questions is this: "Should we assume that the problems of epistemology are perennial, and that trying to reconstruct and evaluate Plato's or Hume's or Kant's arguments is meaningful for current debates, too?"<ref name="Sturm2011"/> Similarly, there is also a question of whether contemporary philosophers should aim to ''rationally reconstruct and evaluate'' historical views in epistemology, or to ''merely describe'' them.<ref name="Sturm2011" />

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy}}
{{for outline}}

* {{annotated link|Epistemological pluralism}}
* {{annotated link|Evolutionary epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Knowledge falsification}}
* {{annotated link|Knowledge-first epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Moral epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Noology|Noölogy}}
* {{annotated link|Personal epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Reformed epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Self-evidence}}
* {{annotated link|Sociology of knowledge}}
* {{annotated link|Theory of Knowledge (IB Course)}}

== Notes and references ==
===Notes===
{{Reflist|30em|group=note| refs=

<!--{{Refn|name=Floridiargument|group=note|In the context of a lexicographical analysis of the concept of "knowledges" versus "knowledge", [[Luciano Floridi]] mentions {{Harv|Floridi|1996}}: "the attention to historical data in general conceals a deep dissatisfaction with contemporary analytic philosophy, whose intentional lack of concern for the past I find almost sacrilegious."}}

{{Refn|name=Stroudargument|group=note|[[Barry Stroud]] {{harv|Stroud|2011}} claims that doing epistemology competently requires the historical study of past attempts to find philosophical understanding of the nature and scope of human knowledge. He argues that since inquiry may progress over time, we may not realize how different the questions that contemporary epistemologists ask are from questions asked at various different points in the history of philosophy.}} -->

{{Refn|group=note|name=AlstonEpistemologyVsPsychology|Some philosophers such as [[William Alston]] say {{harv|Alston|2006}} that "if anything is clear with respect to those portions of the work of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Reid—to mention a few—that have been treated in the twentieth century as contributions to epistemology, it is not only that they are intimately connected with cognitive psychology but that they are best classified as cognitive psychology, with the result that extensive surgery is required to extract those portions that we are inclined to regard as 'pure' epistemology."}}

{{Refn|group=note|name=Scots_witVsken|In Scots, the distinction is between {{lang|sco|wit}} and {{lang|sco|[[wikt:ken#Scots|ken]]}}}}
{{Refn|group=note|name=PlatoCaveVsBrainVat|[[Skeptical scenario]]s in a similar vein date back to [[Plato]]'s ''[[Allegory of the Cave]]'', although Plato's Allegory was quite different in both presentation and interpretation. In contemporary philosophical literature, something akin to evil demon skepticism is presented in [[brain in a vat]] scenarios. See also {{harvsp|IEP New Evil}}.}}
}}

===References===
{{Reflist |30em| refs=
<!-- Please order references alphabetically by ref name -->

<ref name="Al-Ghazali">{{Cite book |last=Al-Ghazali |url=https://www.ghazali.org/works/taf-eng.pdf |title=The Incoherence of Philosophers |language=English |access-date=27 December 2022 |archive-date=2 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230102161409/https://www.ghazali.org/works/taf-eng.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Anonymous1847">{{cite journal |last1=Anonymous |title=Jean-Paul Frederich Richter |journal=The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, Science and Art |date=Nov 1847 |volume=12 |page=317 |hdl=2027/iau.31858055206621 }}</ref>

<!--{{Refn|name=Antognazza2015|{{Cite journal | last = Antognazza | first = Maria Rosa | date = 2015-01-02 | title = The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History | url = http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09608788.2014.974020 | journal = British Journal for the History of Philosophy | language = en | volume = 23 | issue = 1 | pages = 161–184 | doi = 10.1080/09608788.2014.974020
| s2cid = 146427733 | issn = 0960-8788}}}}-->

<!-- <ref name="BengsonMoffett2012">{{Cite book |editor-last=Bengson |editor-first=John |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/25384 |title=Knowing How : Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action |editor-last2=Moffett |editor-first2=Marc A. |date=2012-01-06 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-538936-4 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001}}</ref> -->

<ref name="Bennett2007">{{Cite journal |last=Bennett |first=Karen |date=November 2007 |title=Epistemicide!: The Tale of a Predatory Discourse |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13556509.2007.10799236 |journal=The Translator |language=en |volume=13 |issue=2 |pages=151–169 |doi=10.1080/13556509.2007.10799236 |s2cid=220274129 |issn=1355-6509 |access-date=17 January 2022 |archive-date=21 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220121001056/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13556509.2007.10799236 |url-status=live}}</ref>

<ref name="Benton2017">{{cite journal |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew |title=Epistemology Personalized |journal=The Philosophical Quarterly |date=2017 |volume=67 |issue=269 |pages=813–834 |doi=10.1093/pq/pqx020 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BENEP-3 |access-date=2 September 2019 |archive-date=2 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213801/https://philpapers.org/rec/BENEP-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Black2002">{{cite journal |last1=Black |first1=Tim |title=Relevant alternatives and the shifting standards of knowledge |journal=Southwest Philosophy Review |date=1 April 2002 |volume=18 |issue=1 |pages=23–32 |doi=10.5840/swphilreview20021813 |url=https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_0001_0023_0032 |language=en |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215108/https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_0001_0023_0032 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Blair2006">{{Cite book |last=Blair |first=Ann |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781139054010/type/book |title=The Cambridge History of Science |date=2006-07-03 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-05401-0 |editor-last=Park |editor-first=Katharine |edition=1 |chapter=Chapter 17: Natural Philosophy |doi=10.1017/chol9780521572446 |editor-last2=Daston |editor-first2=Lorraine}}</ref>

<ref name="Boghossian2006">{{cite book |last1=Boghossian |first1=Paul |title=Fear of Knowledge |date=2006 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford}}</ref>

<ref name=Bonjour2010>{{cite book |last=BonJour |first=L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6hOxXxRAWcwC |title=Epistemology: Classic problems and contemporary responses |date=2010 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |isbn=9780742564190 |series=Elements of philosophy}}</ref>

<ref name="Borchert1967">{{cite book |editor-last=Borchert |editor-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |title-link=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Epistemology |volume=3 |publisher=Macmillan |date=1967}}</ref>

<ref name="Braustein2012">{{cite book |last=Braunstein |first=Jean-François |date=2012 |chapter=Historical epistemology, old and new |title=Epistemology and history from Bachelard and Canguilhem to today's history of science: conference, 9–11 Dezember 2010 |location=Berlin |publisher=[[Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte]] |pages=33–40 |oclc=930958013 |url=https://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/Preprints/P434.PDF |access-date=30 April 2023 |archive-date=30 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230430163943/https://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/Preprints/P434.PDF |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Britannica Epistemology">{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Britannica.com |last1=Stroll |first1=Avrum |title=epistemology |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |access-date=20 May 2022 |language=en |archive-date=10 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190710175341/https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Carus1891">{{Cite book |last=Carus |first=Paul |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dgkOAAAAYAAJ&dq=%22though+all+our+knowledge+begins+with+experience%22+carus&pg=PA29 |title=Fundamental Problems: The Method of Philosophy as a Systematic Arrangement of Knowledge |date=1891 |publisher=Open Court |pages=29 |language=en}}</ref>

<ref name="Descartes1">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Descartes' Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=16 June 2020 |archive-date=18 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190118024854/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Descartes2">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Descartes |url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=16 June 2020 |archive-date=6 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220306030559/https://iep.utm.edu/descarte/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Descartes1985">{{cite book |last=Descartes |first=Rene |title=The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes Vol. I |year=1985 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-28807-1}}</ref>

<ref name="Descartes1985b">{{cite book |last=Descartes |first=Rene |title=Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes Vol. II |year=1985b |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-28808-8}}</ref>

<ref name="DuránFormanek2018">{{cite journal |last1=Durán |first1=Juan M. |last2=Formanek |first2=Nico |title=Grounds for Trust: Essential Epistemic Opacity and Computational Reliabilism |journal=Minds and Machines |date=1 December 2018 |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=645–666 |doi=10.1007/s11023-018-9481-6 |s2cid=53102940 |language=en |issn=1572-8641 |doi-access=free |arxiv=1904.01052 }}</ref>

<ref name="Ferrier1854">{{cite book |last1=Ferrier |first1=James Frederick |title=Institutes of metaphysic: the theory of knowing and being |date=1854 |publisher=W. Blackwood |location=Edinburgh |page=46 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mDICAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA46 |access-date=21 June 2018}}</ref>

<ref name=Floridi2003>{{Cite book |last=Floridi |first=Luciano |chapter=The renaissance of epistemology |date=2003-11-27 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9781139053563A059/type/book_part |title=The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945 |pages=533–543 |editor-last=Baldwin |editor-first=Thomas |access-date=2023-10-19 |edition=1 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/chol9780521591041.045 |isbn=978-0-521-59104-1}}</ref>

<ref name="Fumerton2008">{{cite book |last1=Fumerton |first1=Richard |title=The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism |date=25 September 2008 |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195183214-e-3 |language=en |chapter=The Problem of the Criterion |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215110/https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195183214-e-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Goldman1976">{{cite journal |last1=Goldman |first1=Alvin I. |title=Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |date=18 November 1976 |volume=73 |issue=20 |pages=771–791 |doi=10.2307/2025679 |jstor=2025679 }}</ref>

<ref name="GoldmanOlsson2009">{{cite book |last1=Goldman |first1=Alvin I. |last2=Olsson |first2=E.J. |editor1-first=A. |editor1-last=Haddock |editor2-first=A. |editor2-last=Millar |editor3-first=D. |editor3-last=Pritchard |title=Epistemic Value |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2009 |page=24 |chapter=Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge |isbn=978-0-19-923118-8 |name-list-style=amp}}</ref>

<ref name="Haack1993">{{cite book |title=Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology |first=Susan |last=Haack |author-link=Susan Haack |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |year=1993 |isbn=978-0-631-19679-2}}</ref>

<ref name="HájekLin2017">{{cite journal |last1=Hájek |first1=Alan |last2=Lin |first2=Hanti |title=A Tale of Two Epistemologies? |journal=Res Philosophica |date=2017 |volume=94 |issue=2 |pages=207–232 |doi=10.11612/resphil.1540 |s2cid=160029122 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HJEATO |access-date=7 March 2021 |archive-date=4 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220104182746/https://philpapers.org/rec/HJEATO |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Hannon2021">{{cite book |last1=Hannon |first1=Michael |date=2021 |chapter=Knowledge, concept of |title=[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |location=London; New York |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HANTCO-45 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P031-2 |isbn=9780415250696 |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215108/https://philpapers.org/rec/HANTCO-45 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="HartmannSprenger2010">{{cite book |last1=Hartmann |first1=Stephan |last2=Sprenger |first2=Jan |title=The Routledge Companion to Epistemology |date=2010 |publisher=London: Routledge |pages=609–620 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=7 March 2021 |archive-date=16 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095047/https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Hetherington2012">{{Cite book |year=2012 |first=Stephen |last=Hetherington |publisher=Continuum |location=New York |title=Epistemology: The Key Thinkers |edition=1 |isbn=978-1-4411-1783-0}}</ref>

<ref name="Hintikka1974">{{Cite book |last=Hintikka |first=Jaakko |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-010-2217-0 |title=Knowledge and the Known |date=1974 |publisher=Springer Netherlands |isbn=978-94-010-2219-4 |location=Dordrecht |doi=10.1007/978-94-010-2217-0}}</ref>

<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Ichikawa |first1=Jonathan Jenkins |last2=Steup |first2=Matthias |title=The Analysis of Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 May 2022 |date=2018 |archive-date=2 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220502031402/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP defeaters-in-epistemology #sh2b">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Sudduth |first1=Michael |title=Defeaters in Epistemology: 2b Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional Defeaters |url=https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=17 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105748/https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP Epistemology">{{cite encyclopedia  |last1=Truncellito |first1=David |title=Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/Epistemo/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=10 June 2020 |archive-date=13 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220113223803/https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP Gettier">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Gettier Problems |url=https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=28 May 2022 |archive-date=19 February 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090219085540/http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP int-ext">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Poston |first1=Ted |title=Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/int-ext/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=17 May 2022 |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331074000/https://iep.utm.edu/int-ext/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP Knowledge">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Knowledge |url=https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=18 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP problem-of-the-criterion">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=McCain |first1=Kevin |title=Problem of the Criterion |url=https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=28 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105754/https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="IEP Virtue Epistemology" >{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Baehr |first1=Jason S. |title=Virtue Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/virtueep/ |encyclopedia=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=18 May 2022 |archive-date=25 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220525032036/https://iep.utm.edu/virtueep/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

<ref name="Irwin2010">{{Cite book |last=Irwin|first=Terence| chapter=Aristotle| url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444315080 |title=A Companion to Epistemology |date=2010-01-15 |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-3900-7 |editor-last=Dancy |editor-first=Jonathan |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.1002/9781444315080 |editor-last2=Sosa |editor-first2=Ernest |editor-last3=Steup |editor-first3=Matthias}}</ref>

<ref name="James2000">{{Cite book |last=James |first=William |editor-last=Gunn |editor-first=Giles B. |title=Pragmatism and Other Writings |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=2000 |isbn=9780140437355 |oclc=41871068}}</ref>

<ref name="Jonassen1991">{{Cite journal |doi=10.1007/bf02296434 |title=Objectivism versus constructivism: Do we need a new philosophical paradigm? |journal=Educational Technology Research and Development |volume=39 |issue=3 |pages=5–14 |year=1991 |last1=Jonassen |first1=David H. |s2cid=53412771}}</ref>

<ref name="Kim1988">{{cite journal |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=What Is Naturalized Epistemology? |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1988 |volume=2 |pages=381–405 |doi=10.2307/2214082 |jstor=2214082 }}</ref>

<ref name="Kitchener2007">{{Cite journal| last = Kitchener| first = Richard F.| date = 2007| title = Bertrand Russell's Naturalistic Epistemology| url = https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0031819107319050/type/journal_article| journal = Philosophy| language = en| volume = 82| issue = 1| pages = 115–146| doi = 10.1017/S0031819107319050| s2cid = 170710338| issn = 0031-8191}}</ref>

<ref name="Klein1998">{{cite book |last=Klein |first=Peter D. |date=1998 |chapter=Knowledge, concept of |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=Edward |title=[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |location=London; New York |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1 |isbn=9780415250696 |oclc=38096851 |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=13 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613025031/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="KleinTurri">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Klein |first1=Peter D. |last2=Turri |first2=John |title=Infinitism in Epistemology |url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=8 June 2020 |archive-date=15 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200515200827/https://www.iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Kornblith2002">{{cite book |last1=Kornblith |first1=Hilary |title=Knowledge and its Place in Nature |date=2002 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>

<ref name="Kraft2012">{{cite journal |last1=Kraft |first1=Tim |title=Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism |journal=Discipline Filosofiche |date=2012 |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=49–70 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215107/https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Kvanvig2003">{{cite book |last1=Kvanvig |first1=Jonathan L. |title=The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding |date=2003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781139442282 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ILTIEjvbeLoC |language=en}}</ref>

<ref name="Lehrer2015">{{cite book |last1=Lehrer |first1=Keith |title=Theory of Knowledge |date=15 October 2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-19609-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=1. The Analysis of Knowledge}}</ref>

<ref name="Malpas1992">{{Cite book|last=Malpas| first= Jeff| year=1992 | title= Donald Davidson and the mirror of meaning: holism, truth, interpretation | location = New York | publisher= Cambridge University Press}}</ref>

<ref name="Olsson2018">{{cite book |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J. |title=Introduction to Formal Philosophy |date=2018 |publisher=Springer |pages=431–442 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=7 March 2021 |archive-date=16 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095057/https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="OxfordEpisteme2014">{{cite book |title=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=3rd |chapter=Episteme}}</ref>

<ref name="OxfordEpistemology2014">{{cite book |title=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=3rd |chapter=Epistemology}}</ref>

<ref name="Parikh2017">{{cite book |last1=Parikh |first1=Rohit |author1-link=Rohit Jivanlal Parikh |last2=Renero |first2=Adriana |title=Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing |series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science |date=2017 |volume=324 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-319-53280-6 |pages=93–102 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 |language=en |chapter=Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Peirce">{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html |title=How to Make Our Ideas Clear |access-date=15 February 2018 |archive-date=3 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181003203035/http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>

<ref name="Peña-Guzmán2020">{{cite journal |last=Peña-Guzmán |first=David M. |date=February 2020 |title=French historical epistemology: discourse, concepts, and the norms of rationality |journal=[[Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A]] |volume=79 |pages=68–76 |doi=10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.01.006 |pmid=32072927 |bibcode=2020SHPSA..79...68P |s2cid=171955388 }}</ref>

<ref name="Piaget1967">{{cite book |last=Piaget |first=Jean |date=1967 |chapter=L'Épistémologie et ses variétés |editor-last=Piaget |editor-first=Jean |title=Logique et connaissance scientifique |series=Encyclopédie de la Pléiade |volume=22 |location=Paris |publisher=[[Éditions Gallimard]] |pages=3–61 ([https://archive.org/details/logiqueetconnais0000unse_l6/page/6 6]) |oclc=1691632 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/logiqueetconnais0000unse_l6/page/6 |chapter-url-access=registration |language=fr}} Translated into English by Richard F. Kitchener as: {{cite encyclopedia |title=Epistemology and its varieties |url=https://www.academia.edu/36978229 |publisher=academia.edu |access-date=2023-05-06 |archive-date=6 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230506155131/https://www.academia.edu/36978229 |url-status=live |last1=Kitchener |first1=Richard }}</ref>

<ref name="Plato2002">{{cite book |last1=Plato |title=Five Dialogues |date=2002 |publisher=Hackett Pub. Co. |location=Indianapolis, IN |pages=[https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 89–90; 97b–98a] |isbn=978-0-87220-633-5 |url=https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 }}</ref>

<ref name="Plato2008">{{Cite book |url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm |title=Gorgias |last=Plato |translator=Benjamin Jowett |date=5 October 2008 |via=Project Gutenberg |access-date=31 March 2017 |archive-date=16 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190116180531/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Pollock1975">{{cite book |author=John L. Pollock |title=Knowledge and Justification |publisher=Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey |year=1975 |isbn=978-0-691-07203-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/knowledgejustifi0000poll }}</ref>

<ref name="Popkin1972">{{cite book |last1=Popkin |first1=Richard |editor1-last=Edwards |editor1-first=Paul |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy Volume 7 |date=1972 |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-864651-0 |pages=449–461 |chapter=Skepticism}}</ref>

<ref name="Pritchard2007">{{Cite journal |title=Recent Work on Epistemic Value |first=Duncan |last=Pritchard |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=April 2007 |volume=44 |number=2 |pages=85–110 |jstor=20464361}}</ref>

<ref name="Pritchard2013">{{cite book |last1=Pritchard |first1=Duncan |title=What is this thing called Knowledge? |date=1 October 2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-57367-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=3 Defining knowledge}}</ref>

<ref name="PsillosCurd2010">{{cite book |last1=Psillos |first1=Stathis |last2=Curd |first2=Martin |title=The Routledge companion to philosophy of science |date=2010 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |isbn=978-0-415-54613-3 |pages=129–138 |edition=1. publ. in paperback}}</ref>

<ref name="Quine1969">{{Cite book |last=Quine |first=W. V. |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/quin92204/html |chapter=Epistemology Naturalized |title=Ontological Relativity and Other Essays |date=1969-12-31 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-88754-0 |doi=10.7312/quin92204}}</ref>

<ref name="Quine2004">{{cite book |chapter=Epistemology Naturalized |last=Quine |first=Willard |title=Epistemology: An Anthology |pages=292–300 |editor=E. Sosa & J. Kim |publisher=[[Blackwell Publishing]] |location=Malden, MA |isbn=978-0-631-19724-9 |date=2004}}</ref>

<ref name="REP Metaepistemology">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Metaepistemology |encyclopedia=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |location=London |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/metaepistemology |last=Gerken |first=Mikkel |date=2016 |edition=1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |accessdate=2021-05-24 |archive-date=24 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210524161758/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/metaepistemology |url-status=live}}</ref>

<ref name="Rodriguez2018">{{cite journal |last1=Rodríguez |first1=Ángel García |title=Fake barns and our epistemological theorizing |journal=Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía |date=2018 |volume=50 |issue=148 |pages=29–54 |doi=10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.02 |jstor=26767766 |s2cid=171635198 |issn=0011-1503 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

<ref name=Sangeetha2021>{{Cite book |last=Sangeetha |first=K. S. | chapter= Sources of Knowledge: Rationalism, Empiricism, and the Kantian Synthesis | chapter-url = https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/sources-of-knowledge-rationalism-empiricism-and-the-kantian-synthesis/| date=2021-08-16 | editor-first1 = Brian C. | editor-last1 = Barnett | editor-first2 = Christina | editor-last2 = Hendricks | title= Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology |url=https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/sources-of-knowledge-rationalism-empiricism-and-the-kantian-synthesis/ |language=en}}</ref>

<ref name="Santos2015">{{Cite book |last=Santos |first=Boaventura de Sousa |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781317260349 |title=Epistemologies of the South |date=2015-11-17 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-26034-9 |edition=0 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315634876}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Analytic Synthetic">{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 July 2020 |archive-date=13 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200713063242/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Ancient Skepticism">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Ancient Skepticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |year=2021 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=16 June 2020 |archive-date=17 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230317123533/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP apriori">{{cite encyclopedia |title=A Priori Justification and Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=6 July 2020 |archive-date=12 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143105/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Belief">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP definitions #ReaNomDef">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Gupta |first1=Anil |title=Definitions: 1.1 Real and nominal definitions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#ReaNomDef |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 May 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=1 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220501014300/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#ReaNomDef |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Epistemology 2014">{{Cite encyclopedia |last=Steup |first=Matthias |title=Epistemology |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |edition=Spring 2014 |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-last=Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology |date=2005 |access-date=22 March 2016 |archive-date=19 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190319040258/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Epistemology">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Steup |first1=Matthias |last2=Neta |first2=Ram |title=Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/epistemology/ |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |date=14 December 2005 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 May 2022 |edition=Fall 2020 |archive-date=9 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230109154924/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP epistemology-social">{{Cite SEP |url-id=epistemology-social |title=Social Epistemology |first=Alvin |last=Goldman |first2=Thomas |last2=Blanchard |date=2015}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Feminist Epistemology">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Feminist Epistemology |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=17 June 2020 |archive-date=27 November 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091127204532/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Feminist Social">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Feminist Social Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=17 June 2020 |archive-date=3 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220603210358/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Formal Belief">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Formal Representations of Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=11 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711105817/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Formal Epistemology">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Formal Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-epistemology/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=6 July 2020 |archive-date=14 March 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150314172053/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-epistemology/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP justep-foundational">{{cite SEP |url-id=justep-foundational |title=Foundational Theories of Epistemic Justification}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP knowledge-analysis" >{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Analysis of Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 June 2020 |archive-date=2 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220502031402/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP Knowledge How" >{{cite encyclopedia |title=Knowledge How |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=28 Nov 2023 |archive-date=25 Nov 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231125132818/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="SEP knowledge-value">{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |title=The Value of Knowledge |first1=Duncan |last1=Pritchard |first2=John |last2=Turri |access-date=24 February 2016 |archive-date=11 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180311092703/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP pragmatism" >{{cite SEP |url-id=pragmatism |title=Pragmatism |date=6 April 2021 |edition=Summer 2021 |last=Legg |first=Catherine |last2=Hookway |first2=Christopher}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP rationalism-empiricism">{{Citation |last1=Markie |first1=Peter |title=Rationalism vs. Empiricism |date=2023 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |access-date=2023-11-02 |edition=Spring 2023 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Folescu |first2=M. |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>

<ref name="SEP truth">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Truth |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 June 2020 |archive-date=20 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220120210351/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Sidelle2001">{{cite journal |last1=Sidelle |first1=Alan |title=An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2001 |volume=63 |issue=1 |pages=163–179 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00096.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAAT |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215105/https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAAT |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="skepticism">{{cite journal |title=Skepticism |journal=Encyclopedia of Empiricism |year=1997}}</ref>

<ref name="Smith1936">{{Cite journal |last=Smith |first=Margaret |title=The Forerunner of Al-Ghazālī |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25182038 |journal=Cambridge University Press |year=1936 |volume=68 |issue=1 |pages=65–78 |jstor=25182038 |via=JSTOR |access-date=27 December 2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116023828/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25182038 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="StanleyWilllamson2001">{{cite journal |last1=Stanley |first1=Jason |last2=Willlamson |first2=Timothy |title=Knowing How |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=2001 |volume=98 |issue=8 |pages=411–444 |doi=10.2307/2678403 |jstor=2678403 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215122/https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV |url-status=live }}</ref>

<!--
{{Refn| name=Stroud2011|{{Cite journal |last=Stroud |first=Barry |date=2011 |title=Epistemology, the History of Epistemology, Historical Epistemology |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-011-9337-4 |journal=Erkenntnis |language=en |volume=75 |issue=3 |pages=495–503 |doi=10.1007/s10670-011-9337-4 |s2cid=143497596 |issn=0165-0106}}}}
-->

<ref name="Sturm2011">{{cite journal |last1=Sturm |first1=Thomas |s2cid=142375514 |title=Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment |journal=Erkenntnis |date=2011 |volume=75 |issue=3 |pages=303–324 |doi=10.1007/s10670-011-9338-3 }}</ref>

<ref name="Suber1996">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Suber|first=Peter|url=http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/skept.htm#fideism |title=Classical Skepticism | year=1996|access-date=19 June 2018 |archive-date=3 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100203225220/http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/skept.htm#fideism |url-status=dead}}</ref>

<ref name="Swain1998">{{cite book |last1=Swain |first1=Marshall |date=1998 |chapter=Knowledge, causal theory of |editor-last=Craig |editor-first=Edward |title=[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |location=London; New York |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-causal-theory-of/v-1 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P004-1 |isbn=9780415250696 |oclc=38096851 |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=13 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613024958/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-causal-theory-of/v-1 |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Talbert2015">{{cite journal |last1=Talbert |first1=Bonnie |title=Knowing Other People |journal=Ratio |date=2015 |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=190–206 |doi=10.1111/rati.12059 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

<ref name="Talbott">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Talbott |first1=William |title=Bayesian Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 March 2021 |date=2016 |archive-date=1 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210401034856/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="TurriAlfanoGreco2021">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Turri |first1=John |last2=Alfano |first2=Mark |last3=Greco |first3=John |title=Virtue Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ |encyclopedia=The [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 May 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=26 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326030005/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Uebel2015">{{cite book |last=Uebel |first=Thomas |title=Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate Revisited |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nq-6CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 |year=2015 |publisher=Open Court |isbn=978-0-8126-9929-6 |page=14}}</ref>

<ref name="Warburton1996">{{cite book |last1=Warburton |first1=Nigel |title=Thinking from A to Z |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0415433716}}</ref>

<ref name="Wartofsky1979">{{cite book |last=Wartofsky |first=Marx W. |title=Models |chapter=Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action: Towards an Historical Epistemology |author-link=Marx W. Wartofsky |date=1979 |orig-year=1973 |series=Synthese library |volume=129 |location=Dordrecht; Boston |publisher=[[D. Reidel]] |pages=[https://archive.org/details/modelsrepresenta0000wart/page/188 188–210] |isbn=9027707367 |oclc=4775354 |doi=10.1007/978-94-009-9357-0_11 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/modelsrepresenta0000wart/page/188 |chapter-url-access=registration }}</ref>

<ref name="Wartofsky1983">{{cite book |last=Wartofsky |first=Marx W. |author-link=Marx W. Wartofsky |date=1983 |chapter=From genetic epistemology to historical epistemology: Kant, Marx and Piaget |editor-last=Liben |editor-first=Lynn S. |title=Piaget and the Foundations of Knowledge |series=The Jean Piaget Symposium series |location=Hillsdale, NJ |publisher=[[Lawrence Erlbaum Associates]] |pages=1–17 |isbn=0898592488 |oclc=22891908}}</ref>

<ref name="Wenning2009">{{cite journal |last=Wenning |first=Carl J. |url=http://www2.phy.ilstu.edu/pte/publications/scientific_epistemology.pdf |title=Scientific epistemology: How scientists know what they know |date=Autumn 2009 |journal=Journal of Physics Teacher Education Online |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=3–15 |access-date=23 August 2017 |archive-date=23 June 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100623183504/http://www2.phy.ilstu.edu/pte/publications/scientific_epistemology.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Zagzebski1999">{{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |author1-link=Linda Zagzebski |date=1999 |chapter=What Is Knowledge? |editor1-last=Greco |editor1-first=John |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |title=The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology |location=Malden, MA |publisher=Blackwell |pages=92–116 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |isbn=9780631202905 |oclc=39269507 |doi=10.1002/9781405164863.ch3 |s2cid=158886670 |access-date=18 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |url-status=live }}</ref>

<ref name="Zagzebski2017">{{cite journal |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |title=The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good |journal=Metaphilosophy |volume=34 |issue=1/2 |page=13 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/ZAGTFE.pdf |access-date=23 October 2018 |archive-date=8 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171008075519/https://philpapers.org/archive/ZAGTFE.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>
}}

===References specific to notes===
<span style="display:none">{{Refn|name=Alston2006}}{{Refn|name=AyersAntognazza2019}}{{Refn|name=Ballantyne2019}}{{Refn|name=Frede2020}}{{Refn|name=Floridi1996}}{{Refn|name=Fumerton2003}}{{Refn|name=Kornblith1985}}{{Refn|name=IEP evil-new}}{{Refn|name=Popkin1979}}{{Refn|name=Robinson2023}}{{Refn|name=SEP Episteme and Techne}}<!--{{Refn|name=TurriAlfanoGreco2021}}--></span>
{{Reflist|30em| refs=
{{Refn|name=Alston2006|{{Cite book |last=Alston |first=William P. |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501720574/html |title=Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation |date=2006-01-01 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-2057-4 |doi=10.7591/9781501720574}}}}

{{Refn|name=AyersAntognazza2019|{{Cite book |last1=Ayers |first1=Michael |chapter=Knowledge and Belief from Plato to Locke |date=2019-04-18 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/35220/chapter/299726893 |title=Knowing and Seeing |pages=3–33 |access-date=2023-11-15 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780198833567.003.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-883356-7 |last2=Antognazza |first2=Maria Rosa}}}}

{{Refn|name=Ballantyne2019|{{Cite book |last=Ballantyne |first=Nathan |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/35018 |title=Knowing Our Limits |date=2019-10-31 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-084728-9 |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190847289.001.0001}}}}

{{Refn|name=Frede2020|{{Cite journal |last=Frede |first=Dorothea |date=2020-12-18 |title=Plato's Forms as Functions and Structures |url=https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/2/article-p291_2.xml |journal=History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=291–316 |doi=10.30965/26664275-02302002 |s2cid=234562680 |issn=2666-4283}}}}

{{Refn|name=Floridi1996|{{Cite book |last=Floridi |first=Luciano |url=https://brill.com/view/title/323 |title=Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology: A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies |date=1996-07-01 |publisher=BRILL |isbn=978-90-04-24724-6 |doi=10.1163/9789004247246_002}}}}

{{Refn|name=Fumerton2003|{{cite book | last = Fumerton | first = Richard | chapter = 13: Introspection and Internalism | pages=257–276 | date= 2003 | editor-last=Nuccetelli | editor-first=Susana| title=New essays on semantic externalism and self-knowledge | publisher=MIT Press | isbn=0262140837}}}}

{{Refn|name=IEP evil-new|{{Cite encyclopedia|encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosoph|first=Clayton | last= Littlejohn | title=The New Evil Demon Problem | access-date=16 November 2023 | url=https://iep.utm.edu/evil-new/| ref={{Harvid|IEP New Evil}}}}}}

{{Refn|name=Kornblith1985|{{cite journal | last=Kornblith | first= H. | title= Ever Since Descartes | journal=The Monist | volume=68 | issue=2 | pages=264–276 | publisher=Oxford University Press | date= 1985 | doi= 10.5840/monist198568227 | jstor= 27902915 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902915 | issn=0026-9662 | access-date=14 November 2023}}}}

{{Refn|name=Popkin1979|{{Cite book |last=Popkin |first=Richard H. |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.6142252 | title=The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza |year=1979 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley Los Angeles London|edition=1 |doi=10.2307/jj.6142252|isbn=9780520038769 }}}}

{{Refn|name=Robinson2023|{{cite encyclopedia | last=Robinson | first= Howard | editor-last=Zalta | editor-first= E. N. | editor-last2 = Nodelman | editor-first2 = U. | encyclopedia= Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| date= 2023 | title=Dualism | url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/dualism/| publisher= Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University | edition=Spring 2023}}}}

{{Refn|name=SEP Episteme and Techne|{{Cite encyclopedia| last = Parry| first = Richard| title = Episteme and Techne| year = 2021| encyclopedia = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition = Winter 2021| editor-first = Edward N.| editor-last = Zalta| url = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/episteme-techne/|ref={{Harvid|SEP Episteme and Techne}}}}}}

<!--{{Refn|name=TurriAlfanoGreco2021|{{Cite encyclopedia|last=Turri | first= John |first2=Mark |last2=Alfano| first3=John| last3=Greco | title= Virtue Epistemology | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| year=2021 | editor-first= Edward N. |editor-last= Zalta | url= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/epistemology-virtue/}}}}-->
}}

===Further reading ===
{{refbegin|40em}}
<!-- Please order books alphabetically by the author's last name -->
* {{cite journal | last = Annis | first = David | year = 1978 | title = A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification | journal = American Philosophical Quarterly | volume = 15 | pages = 213–219 }}
* [[Alfred Jules Ayer|Ayer, Alfred Jules]]. 1936. ''[[Language, Truth, and Logic]]''.
* BonJour, Laurence. 2002. ''Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses''. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
* [[Luc Bovens|Bovens, Luc]] & [[Stephan Hartmann|Hartmann, Stephan]]. 2003. ''Bayesian Epistemology''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* [[Panayot Butchvarov|Butchvarov, Panayot]]. 1970. ''The Concept of Knowledge''. Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
* {{cite journal |doi=10.1080/00048409812348411 | last = Cohen | first = Stewart | year = 1998 | title = Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery | journal = Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=76 | issue = 2 | pages = 289–306 }}
* Cohen, Stewart. 1999. "Contextualism, Skepticism, and Reasons", in Tomberlin 1999.
* [[Jonathan Dancy|Dancy, Jonathan]]. 1991. ''An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology'' (Second Edition). John Wiley & Sons. {{ISBN|0-631-13622-3}}
* {{cite journal | last1 = DeRose | first1 = Keith | author-link = Keith DeRose | year = 1992 | title = Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions | journal = Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | volume = 15 | pages = 213–219 }}
* DeRose, Keith. 1999. "[https://fitelson.org/epistemology/derose.pdf Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171215110711/http://fitelson.org/epistemology/derose.pdf |date=15 December 2017 }}", in Greco and Sosa 1999.
* [[René Descartes|Descartes, Rene]]. 1641. ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy]]''
* Feldman, Richard. 1999. "Contextualism and Skepticism", in Tomberlin 1999, pp.&nbsp;91–114.
* [[Edmund Gettier|Gettier, Edmund]]. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", ''Analysis'', Vol. 23, pp.&nbsp;121–123. [http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html Online text] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050819074607/http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html |date=19 August 2005 }}.
* Greco, J. & Sosa, E. 1999. ''Blackwell Guide to Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishing.
* [[Errol Harris|Harris, Errol E.]] 1970. ''Hypothesis And Perception'', George Allen and Unwin, London, Reprinted 2002 Routledge, London.
* {{cite journal | doi = 10.1111/j.1467-9205.1989.tb00275.x | last1 = Harwood | first1 = Sterling | year = 1989 | title = Taking Skepticism Seriously – And In Context | journal = Philosophical Investigations | volume = 12 | issue = 3 |pages = 223–233 }}
* Hay, Clare. 2008. ''The Theory of Knowledge: A Coursebook'', The Lutterworth Press, Cambridge. {{ISBN|978-0-7188-3088-5}}
* Hawthorne, John. 2005. "The Case for Closure", ''Contemporary Debates in Epistemology'', Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (ed.): 26–43.
* [[Vincent F. Hendricks|Hendricks, Vincent F]]. 2006. ''Mainstream and Formal Epistemology'', New York: [[Cambridge University Press]].
* [[Kant, Immanuel]]. 1781. ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''.
* Keeton, Morris T. 1962. "Empiricism", in ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, pp.&nbsp;89–90.
* [[Richard Kirkham|Kirkham, Richard]]. 1984. "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" ''Mind'', 93.
* [[Peter D. Klein|Klein, Peter]]. 1981. ''Certainty: a Refutation of Skepticism'', Minneapolis, MN: [[University of Minnesota Press]].
* [[Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.|Kyburg, H.E.]] 1961. ''Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief'', Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
* [[Alfred Korzybski|Korzybski, Alfred]]. 1994 (1933). ''Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics'', Fifth Edition. Ft. Worth, TX: Institute of General Semantics.
* {{Cite book |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781134877911 |title=Knowing the Difference : Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology |date=2012-10-12 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-87791-1 |editor-last=Lennon |editor-first=Kathleen |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780203216125 |editor-last2=Whitford |editor-first2=Margaret }}
* {{cite journal | doi = 10.1080/00048409612347521 | last1 = Lewis | first1 = David | author-link = David Kellogg Lewis | year = 1996 | title = Elusive Knowledge | journal = Australasian Journal of Philosophy| volume = 74 | issue = 4 | pages = 549–567 }}
* [[Edgar Morin|Morin, Edgar]]. 1986. ''La Méthode, Tome 3, La Connaissance de la connaissance'' (Method, 3rd volume : The knowledge of knowledge)
* [[Adam Morton|Morton, Adam]]. 2002. ''A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge'' (Third Edition) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. {{ISBN|1-4051-0012-5}}
* Nelson, Quee. 2007. ''The Slightest Philosophy'', Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, 296 pages.
* [[Ilkka Niiniluoto|Niiniluoto, Ilkka]]. 2002. ''Critical Scientific Realism'', Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
* [[Plato]]. ''[[Meno]]''.
* [[Karl Popper|Popper, Karl R.]] 1972. ''Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach'', Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
* Preyer, G./Siebelt, F./Ulfig, A. 1994. ''Language, Mind and Epistemology'', Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
* [[Bertrand Russell|Russell, Bertrand]]. 1912. ''The Problems of Philosophy'', New York: Oxford University Press.
* [[Bertrand Russell|Russell, Bertrand]]. 1940. ''An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'', Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
* [[George Santayana|Santayana, George]]. 1923. ''[[Scepticism and Animal Faith]]'', New York: Charles Scribner's Sons – London: Constable and Co.
* [[African Spir|Spir, African]]. 1877. ''Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie'' (Thought and Reality: Attempt at a Renewal of Critical Philosophy), (Second Edition) Leipzig: J.G. Findel.
* {{cite journal | last = Schiffer | first = Stephen | author-link = Stephen Schiffer | year = 1996 | title = Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism | journal = Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society | volume = 96 | pages = 317–333 | doi = 10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.317 }}
* Steup, Matthias. 2005. "Knowledge and Skepticism", ''Contemporary Debates in Epistemology'', Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds.): 1–13.
* Tomberlin, James (ed.). 1999. ''Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishing.
* {{cite book | last = Turri | first = John | year = 2016 | title = Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers | url = http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/397/knowledge-and-the-norm-of-assertion--an-essay-in-philosophical-science | doi = 10.11647/OBP.0083 | isbn = 978-1-78374-183-0 | publisher = Open Book Publishers | access-date = 21 April 2016 | archive-date = 10 June 2016 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160610184557/http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/397/knowledge-and-the-norm-of-assertion--an-essay-in-philosophical-science | url-status = live | doi-access = free }}
* {{Cite book|first=Pierre|last=Wagner|language=fr|editor=Pierre Wagner|pages=9–65|chapter=Introduction|title=Les Philosophes et la science|location=Paris|publisher=[[Éditions Gallimard]]|series=Folio-essais|year=2002|isbn=9782070416257}}
* [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein, Ludwig]]. 1922. ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'', [[Frank P. Ramsey]] and [[C.K. Ogden]] (trns.), Dover. [http://www.kfs.org/~jonathan/witt/tlph.html Online text] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807042824/http://www.kfs.org/~jonathan/witt/tlph.html |date=7 August 2011 }}.
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{Sister project links |commonscat=yes |b=Category:Subject:Epistemology |c=Epistemology |d=Q9471 |m=no |mw=no |n=no |q=Epistemology |s=Category:Epistemology |species=no |v=Category:Epistemology |voy=no |wikt=epistemology}}
{{Library resources box|by=no|onlinebooks=no|about=yes|wikititle=epistemology}}
'''''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' articles'''
* {{SEP|epistemology|Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|epistemology-bayesian|Bayesian Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|epistemology-evolutionary|Evolutionary Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|feminism-epistemology|Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science}}
* {{SEP|epistemology-naturalized|Naturalized Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|epistemology-social|Social Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|epistemology-virtue|Virtue Epistemology}}
* {{SEP|knowledge-how|Knowledge How}}

'''''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' articles'''
* {{cite IEP |url-id=Epistemo |title=Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|coherent|Coherentism}}
* {{IEP|contextu|Contextualism in Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|ep-circ|Epistemic Circularity}}
* {{IEP|epi-just|Epistemic Justification}}
* {{IEP|epis-per|Epistemology of Perception}}
* {{IEP|ethno-ep|Ethnoepistemology}}
* {{IEP|evo-epis|Evolutionary Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|fallibil|Fallibilism}}
* {{IEP|fem-epis|Feminist Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|inf-epis|Infinitism in Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|int-ext|Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|mor-epis|Moral Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|nat-epis|Naturalistic Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|virtueep|Virtue Epistemology}}
* {{IEP|understa|Understanding in Epistemology}}

'''''Encyclopædia Britannica'''''
* [https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology Epistemology] by Avrum Stroll and A.P. Martinich

'''Other links'''
* The [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/ London Philosophy Study Guide] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923081848/http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Language.htm |date=23 September 2009 }} offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Ep&Meth.htm Epistemology & Methodology] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210301033140/http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Ep%26Meth.htm |date=1 March 2021 }}
* {{PhilPapers|category|epistemology}}
* [http://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge-how/ Knowledge-How] at Philpapers
* {{InPho|taxonomy|2374}}
* [http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/What-Is-Epistemology.htm What Is Epistemology?] – a brief introduction to the topic by Keith DeRose.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050128145134/http://www.galilean-library.org/int5.html Epistemology Introduction, Part 1] and [https://web.archive.org/web/20051222135250/http://www.galilean-library.org/int20.html Part 2] by Paul Newall at the Galilean Library.
* [http://www.ditext.com/clay/know.html ''Teaching Theory of Knowledge'' (1986)] – Marjorie Clay (ed.), an electronic publication from The Council for Philosophical Studies.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080602203415/http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784 An Introduction to Epistemology] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
* [https://www.firasah.org/articles/aqidah/a-summary-of-sunni-epistemology/ A Summary of Sunni Epistemology] A concise and accessible introduction to epistemology in the Muslim world for laymen

{{epistemology}}
{{Navboxes
|title = Articles related to epistemology
|list =
{{Philosophy topics}}
{{philosophy of science}}
{{Positivism}}
}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Epistemology| ]]