Reason

===Reason compared to logic===
{{See also|Logic}}
The terms ''logic'' or ''logical'' are sometimes used as if they were identical with ''reason'' or ''rational'', or sometimes logic is seen as the most pure or the defining form of reason: "Logic is about reasoning—about going from premises to a conclusion.&nbsp;... When you do logic, you try to clarify reasoning and separate good from bad reasoning."<ref>{{cite book |last=Gensler |first=Harry J. |date=2010 |title=Introduction to Logic |edition=2nd |location=New York |publisher=[[Routledge]] |page=1 |isbn=978-0415996501 |oclc=432990013 |doi=10.4324/9780203855003}}</ref> In modern [[economics]], [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]] is assumed to equate to logically [[Consistency|consistent]] choice.<ref>{{cite book |last=Gächter |first=Simon |date=2013 |chapter=Rationality, social preferences, and strategic decision-making from a behavioral economics perspective |editor1-last=Wittek |editor1-first=Rafael |editor2-last=Snijders |editor2-first=T. A. B. |editor3-last=Nee |editor3-first=Victor |title=The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research |location=Stanford, CA |publisher=Stanford Social Sciences, an imprint of [[Stanford University Press]] |pages=33–71 (33) |isbn=978-0804784184 |oclc=807769289 |doi=10.1515/9780804785501-004 |s2cid=242795845 |quote=The central assumption of the rational choice approach is that decision-makers have logically consistent goals (whatever they are), and, given these goals, choose the best available option.}}</ref>

However, reason and logic can be thought of as distinct—although logic is one important aspect of reason. Author [[Douglas Hofstadter]], in ''[[Gödel, Escher, Bach]]'', characterizes the distinction in this way: Logic is done inside a system while reason is done outside the system by such methods as skipping steps, working backward, drawing diagrams, looking at examples, or seeing what happens if you change the rules of the system.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hofstadter |first=Douglas R. |author-link=Douglas Hofstadter |date=1999 |orig-year=1979 |title=Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid |edition=20th anniversary |location=New York |publisher=[[Basic Books]] |isbn=0394756827 |oclc=40724766}}</ref> Psychologists Mark H. Bickard and Robert L. Campbell argue that "rationality cannot be simply assimilated to logicality"; they note that "human knowledge of logic and [[Formal system#Logical system|logical systems]] has developed" over time through reasoning, and logical systems "can't construct new logical systems more powerful than themselves", so reasoning and rationality must involve more than a system of logic.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bickhard |first1=Mark H. |last2=Campbell |first2=Robert L. |date=July 1996 |title=Developmental aspects of expertise: rationality and generalization |journal=[[Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence]] |volume=8 |issue=3–4 |pages=399–417 |doi=10.1080/095281396147393}}</ref><ref name=Moshman2004>{{cite journal |last=Moshman |first=David |date=May 2004 |title=From inference to reasoning: the construction of rationality |journal=Thinking & Reasoning |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=221–239 |doi=10.1080/13546780442000024 |s2cid=43330718 |url=https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/44/}}</ref> Psychologist David Moshman, citing Bickhard and Campbell, argues for a "[[metacognitive]] conception of rationality" in which a person's development of reason "involves increasing consciousness and control of logical and other inferences".<ref name=Moshman2004/><ref>{{cite book |last=Ricco |first=Robert B. |date=2015 |chapter=The development of reasoning |editor-last=Lerner |editor-first=Richard M. |editor-link=Richard M. Lerner |title=Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science |edition=7th |volume=2. Cognitive Processes |location=Hoboken, N.J. |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |pages=519–570 (534) |isbn=978-1118136850 |oclc=888024689 |doi=10.1002/9781118963418.childpsy213 |quote=Moshman's... theory of the development of deductive reasoning considers changes in metacognition to be the essential story behind the development of deductive (and inductive) reasoning. In his view, reasoning involves explicit conceptual knowledge regarding inference (metalogical knowledge) and metacognitive awareness of, and control over, inference.}}</ref>

Reason is a type of [[thought]], and [[logic]] involves the attempt to describe a system of formal rules or norms of appropriate reasoning.<ref name=Moshman2004/> The oldest surviving writing to explicitly consider the rules by which reason operates are the works of the [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] [[philosopher]] [[Aristotle]], especially ''Prior Analytics'' and ''Posterior Analytics''.<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=Complete Works|url=https://archive.org/details/completeworksofa0000aris|url-access=registration|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1984|volume=1|pages=39–166|isbn=0691099502}}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=August 2021}} Although the Ancient Greeks had no separate word for logic as distinct from language and reason, Aristotle's [[neologism|newly coined word]] "[[syllogism]]" ({{transliteration|grc|syllogismos}}) identified logic clearly for the first time as a distinct field of study.<ref>{{Citation |last=Smith |first=Robin |title=Aristotle's Logic |date=2017 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-logic/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Fall 2020 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2022-06-08}}</ref> When Aristotle referred to "the logical" ({{transliteration|grc|hē logikē}}), he was referring more broadly to rational thought.<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?all_words=logiko/s&all_words_expand=yes&la=greek See this Perseus search, and compare English translations.] and see [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph.jsp?l=logikw%3Ds&la=greek&prior=le/getai&d=Perseus:text:1999.01.0049:book=1:section=1217b&i=1#lexicon LSJ dictionary entry for {{lang|grc|λογικός}}, section II.2.b.]</ref>