Boko Haram

=== Ideology ===
The founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, was reportedly inspired by the controversial [[Islamic preacher]] Mohammed Marwa ([[Maitatsine]]), who condemned the reading of any books other than the [[Quran]].<ref name="George Percy Bargery 1934"/><ref name="managing">{{Cite book |title=Managing Conflicts in Africa's Democratic Transitions |editor-first=Akanmu G |editor-last=Adebayo |year=2012 |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0739172636 |page=176}}</ref><ref name= west>{{cite book |title=West African Studies Conflict over Resources and Terrorism |publisher=OECD |year=2013 }}</ref><ref name="worlddefensereview.com">{{cite web |author1=J. Peter Pham, Ph.D. |title=In Nigeria False Prophets Are Real Problems |url=http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml |website=worlddefensereview.com |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130209115602/http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml |archive-date=2013-02-09}}</ref>  Yusuf, himself, in one 2009 interview, expressed his opposition not only to Western education, but to the theory of [[evolution]], a [[Flat Earth|spherical]] (not flat) Earth, and to the idea that rain comes from "evaporation caused by the sun" rather than being created and sent down directly by God.<ref name=bbc20090728>{{cite news |title=Nigeria's 'Taliban' enigma |work=[[BBC News]] |date=28 July 2009 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/8172270.stm |access-date=28 July 2009 }}</ref>

Boko Haram opposes the [[Westernization]] of Nigerian society,<ref name=arguments-2011/> which it blames for "Nigeria's culture of corruption",<ref name=enc/> and demands the establishment of an [[Islamic state]] in Nigeria. It developed into a [[Jihadism|jihadist]] group in 2009. As [[Sunni]] [[Salafi jihadism|Salafi Jihadi]]s, the group strives to re-establish the Islamic [[caliphate]] and bring all peoples under its domain, doing away with modern states and [[patriotic]] feeling towards them. After Boko Haram declared its allegiance to the Islamic State, an IS statement proclaimed "It was the rejection of nationalism that drove the ''mujahidin'' (jihad fighters) in Nigeria to give ''[[bay'ah]]'' (fealty) to the Islamic State and wage war against the Nigerian ''[[Apostasy in Islam|murtaddin]]'' (apostates) fighting for the Nigerian ''[[taghut]]'' (idolatrous tyrant)".<ref name="Thurston-2019-18">{{cite book |last1=Thurston |first1=Alexander |title=Search Results Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement |date=2019 |publisher=Princeton University Press |page=18 |isbn=9780691197081 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KcmXDwAAQBAJ&dq=Wilayat+Gharb+Ifriqiyya&pg=PA17 |access-date=8 March 2021}}</ref> The movement is diffuse, and fighters who are associated with it follow the [[Salafi movement#Tenets|Salafi doctrine]].

==== Takfir ====

Members' beliefs tend to be centered on strict adherence to [[Wahabi|Wahhabi]]sm, which is an extremely strict form of Sunni Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as [[idolatrous]].<ref name="Congressional">{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf |title=Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions |publisher=Congressional Research Service |author=Lauren Ploch Blanchard |date=10 June 2014 |access-date=3 August 2014}}</ref><ref name=cfrBackgrounder>{{cite web | url=http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739 | title=Backgrounder&nbsp;— Boko Haram | publisher=Council of Foreign Relations | work=cfr.org | date=27 December 2011 | access-date=12 March 2012 | last=Johnson |first=Toni}}</ref><ref name="CTC">{{cite web |url=http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria |title=The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria |last=Cook |first=David |date=26 September 2011 |publisher=Combating Terrorism Centre |access-date=12 January 2012 |archive-date=6 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120506224112/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/the-diffusion-of-intra-islamic-violence-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-proliferation-of-salafiwahhabi-ideologies/ |title=The Diffusion of Intra-islamic Violence and Terrorism: the Impact of the Proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideologies |access-date=10 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140803072301/http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/the-diffusion-of-intra-islamic-violence-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-proliferation-of-salafiwahhabi-ideologies/ |archive-date=3 August 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=Onuoha>{{Cite book |title=Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria |chapter=Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria|last=Onuoha |first=Freedom |year=2014 |publisher=African Studies Centre|location= Leiden |isbn=978-90-5448-135-5 |pages=158–191 |chapter-url=https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/23853/ASC-075287668-3441-01.pdf |access-date=14 May 2014 |editor-last=Pérouse de Montclos |editor-first=Marc-Antoine }}</ref>

The group has denounced the members of the [[Sufi]] and the [[Shiite]] sects as infidels,<ref>[[Tolu Ogunlesi]], [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/opinion/nigerias-internal-struggles.html?_r=0 "Nigeria's Internal Struggles"], ''The New York Times'', 23 March 2015.</ref> and also mainstream Sunni Muslims who fail to support their jihad. This willingness to [[takfir]] – i.e. accuse self-professed Muslims of being [[Apostasy in Islam|apostates from Islam]] and thus subject to execution<ref name="too-much-2017-288">{{cite journal |last1=Zenna |first1=Jacob |last2=Pierib |first2=Zacharias |title=How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram's Factionalization. |journal=Journal for Deradicalization |date=Summer 2017 |issue=11 |page=288 |url=https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/download/107/90 |access-date=6 March 2021 |issn=2363-9849}}</ref> – is a departure from mainstream Islam but not Salafi jihadism.

An insurgent seeking to overthrow a Muslim government is handicapped by the mainstream Islamic doctrine forbidding the killing or enslaving of other Muslims – such as government authorities, military or mainstream Muslims who fail to embrace the insurgency. Takfiring – declaring apostates those who oppose the jihadis – has the advantage of not only eliminating that prohibition, but making the killing of these Muslims a "religious obligation". In a 18 December 2016 speech to his commanders, Shekau proclaimed that 'even if a woman is praying and fasting, once she engages in democracy I can capture her in a battle'.<ref name="too-much-2017-288-9">{{cite journal |last1=Zenna |first1=Jacob |last2=Pierib |first2=Zacharias |title=How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram's Factionalization. |journal=Journal for Deradicalization |date=Summer 2017 |issue=11 |pages=288–9|url=https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/download/107/90 |access-date=6 March 2021 |issn=2363-9849}}</ref>

According to researchers Jacob Zenna and Zacharias Pier,<ref>Watts, Michael. 2015. "Insurgent Spaces: Power, Place, and Spectacle in Nigeria" in Merrill, Heather, and Hoffman, Lisa. Spaces of Danger: Culture and Power in the Everyday, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. p.196)</ref><ref name= "too-much-2017-288-9"/> {{Blockquote|text=after 2010… Shekau, believed that jihad was obligatory and that not actively joining his jihad was tantamount to apostasy. This did not mean Shekau actively killed anyone after he announced jihad and renamed the group "JAS" in 2010. Rather, there was a "priority scale" with Christians, the government and publicly anti-JAS Muslim preachers targeted first. This also meant any Muslims killed collaterally were not a concern since they were "guilty" for not having joined his jihad. …[by] October 2010, …assassinations targeting Muslim religious leaders, especially Salafists who opposed JAS's religious interpretation, as well as civil servants, became an almost weekly occurrence in northeastern Nigeria. In addition to this, prisons, banks, churches and beer halls also were common targets of attack.}}