Free will

====Agent/substance-causal theories====
Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world.<ref name=Chisholm2004>{{cite book|author=Roderick M. Chisholm|title=Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2x2I93Ui9i4C|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-29593-2}}</ref><ref name=larke1996>{{cite journal |author=Randolph Clarke |title=Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action |journal =Philosophical Topics |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=19–48 |year=1996 |doi=10.5840/philtopics19962427}}</ref><ref name=Donagan1987>{{cite book|author=Alan Donagan|title=Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7Zc9AAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1987|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-7102-1168-2}}</ref><ref name=OConner2002>{{cite book|author=Timothy O'Connor|editor=Robert Kane|title=Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AeGC8k8xAOwC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2005|publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online|isbn=978-0-19-517854-8|pages=337–355}}</ref><ref name=Rowe1991>{{cite book|author=William L. Rowe|title=Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality|url=https://archive.org/details/thomasreidonfree00rowe|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1991|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-2557-8}}</ref><ref name=Taylor1966>{{cite book|author=Richard Taylor|title=Action and purpose|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ImgYAAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1966|publisher=Prentice-Hall}}</ref><ref name=Thorp1980>{{cite book|author=John Thorp|title=Free will: a defence against neurophysiological determinism|url=https://archive.org/details/freewilldefencea0000thor|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1980|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=9780710005656}}</ref><ref name=Zimmerman1984>{{cite book|author=Michael J. Zimmerman|title=An essay on human action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BUMwAAAAYAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1984|publisher=P. Lang|isbn=978-0-8204-0122-5}}</ref>
Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both [[George Berkeley]]<ref name="BerkeleyDancy1998">{{cite book|author1=George Berkeley|author2=Jonathan Dancy|title=A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cu7WAAAAMAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1998|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-875160-1}}</ref> and [[Thomas Reid]].<ref name="Reid2012">{{cite book|author=Thomas Reid|title=Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UdYxuQAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|date= 2012|publisher=HardPress|isbn=978-1-4077-2950-3}}</ref> It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by ''luck'' (without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind&nbsp;– a common problem associated with [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|interactionalist dualism]].