Cosmological argument

== Objections and counterarguments ==
=== What caused the first cause? ===
One objection to the argument asks why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Proponents argue that the first cause is exempt from having a cause, as this is part of what it is to be the first cause, while opponents argue that this is [[special pleading]] or otherwise untrue.<ref name="Reichenbach"/> Critics often press that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why the first cause is indeed exempt,<ref name=cline>{{cite news |last=Cline |first=Austin |title=Cosmological Argument: Does the Universe Require a First Cause? {{pipe}} Agnosticism/Atheism |newspaper=Learn Religions |publisher=About.com |access-date=June 20, 2008 |url=http://atheism.about.com/od/argumentsforgod/a/cosmological.htm |archive-date=October 18, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111018031647/http://atheism.about.com/od/argumentsforgod/a/cosmological.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> whereas defenders maintain that this question has been answered by the various arguments, emphasizing that none of the major cosmological arguments rests on the premise that everything has a cause, and so the question does not address the actual premises of an argument and rests on a misunderstanding of them.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=07bHgxbG6A4C&q=curious+blind+spot+in+the+anglo+cause+everything&pg=PA49|title=The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old|first=W. Norris|last=Clarke|date=August 25, 2009|publisher=Fordham Univ Press|via=Google Books|isbn=9780823229307}}</ref> 

[[William Lane Craig]], who popularized and is notable for defending the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], argues that the infinite is impossible, whichever perspective the viewer takes, and so there must always have been one unmoved thing to begin the universe. He uses [[Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel]] and the question "What is infinity minus infinity?" to illustrate the idea that the infinite is metaphysically, mathematically, and even conceptually impossible. Other reasons include the fact that it is impossible to count down from infinity, and that, had the universe existed for an infinite amount of time, every possible event, including the final end of the universe, would already have occurred. He therefore states his argument in three points: firstly, everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; secondly, the universe began to exist; so, thirdly, therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/cosmological-argument/|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first=Bruce|last=Reichenbach|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|date=September 24, 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> Craig argues in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology that there cannot be an infinite regress of causes and thus there must be a first uncaused cause, even if one posits a plurality of causes of the universe.<ref>The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, The Kalam Cosmological Argument by William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, pp.191-192</ref> He argues [[Occam's razor]] may be employed to remove unneeded further causes of the universe to leave a single uncaused cause.<ref>The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, p.192</ref>

Secondly, it is argued that the premise of [[causality]] has been arrived at via ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' ([[Inductive reasoning|inductive]]) reasoning, which is dependent on experience. [[David Hume]] highlighted this [[problem of induction]] and argued that [[Causality|causal relations]] were not true ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]''. However, as to whether inductive or [[deductive reasoning]] is more valuable remains a matter of debate, with the general conclusion being that neither is prominent.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php |title=Deduction & Induction |publisher=Socialresearchmethods.net |date=2006-10-20 |access-date=2012-09-02}}</ref> Opponents of the argument tend to argue that it is unwise to draw conclusions from an extrapolation of causality beyond experience.<ref name=reichenbach/> Andrew Loke replies that, according to the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], only things which begin to exist require a cause. On the other hand, something that is without beginning has always existed and therefore does not require a cause. The Kalam and the Thomistic cosmological argument posit that there cannot be an actual infinite regress of causes,<ref name="LeaderU">{{cite web |last1=Craig |first1=William L. |title=THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT |url=https://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/cosmological_argument.html |website=leaderu.com |publisher=LeaderU |access-date=1 August 2021}}</ref> therefore there must be an uncaused first cause that is beginningless and does not require a cause.<ref>Andrew Loke, God and Ultimate Origins (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017), p. 189; Chapter 5.</ref>

=== Not evidence for a theistic God ===
According to this objection, the basic cosmological argument merely establishes that a first cause exists, not that it has the attributes of a [[theistic]] god, such as [[omniscience]], [[omnipotence]], and [[omnibenevolence]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God |first=Austin |last=Cline |publisher=About, Inc. |date=27 July 2015 |access-date=3 August 2016 |url=http://atheism.about.com/od/argumentsforgod/a/cosmological.htm |archive-date=18 October 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111018031647/http://atheism.about.com/od/argumentsforgod/a/cosmological.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> This is why the argument is often expanded to assert that at least some of these attributes are necessarily true, for instance in the modern Kalam argument given above.<ref name=reichenbach /> 

Defenders of the cosmological arguments also reply that theologians of note are aware of the need to additionally prove other attributes of the first cause beyond that one exists. One notable example of this is found in Aquinas' ''Summa Theologiae'' in which much of the first part (''Prima Pars'') is devoted to establishing the attributes of this first cause, such as its uniqueness, perfection, and intelligence.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Aquinas |first1=Thomas |title=Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm |website=New Advent}}</ref> Thus defenders of cosmological arguments would reply that while it is true that the cosmological argument only establishes a first cause, this is merely the first step which then allows for the demonstration of the other theistic attributes.

=== Existence of causal loops ===
A causal loop is a form of [[predestination paradox]] arising where traveling backwards in time is deemed a possibility. A sufficiently powerful entity in such a world would have the capacity to travel backwards in time to a point before its own existence, and to then create itself, thereby initiating everything which [[Logical consequence|follows from]] it.

The usual reason given to refute the possibility of a causal loop is that it requires that the loop as a whole be its own cause. [[Richard Hanley]] argues that causal loops are not logically, physically, or epistemically impossible: "[In timed systems,] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."<ref>Richard Hanley, [https://doi.org/10.1023%2FB%3ASYNT.0000035847.28833.4f No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction], ''Synthese''</ref> However, Andrew Loke argues that causal loop of the type that is supposed to avoid a first cause suffers from the problem of vicious circularity{{what?|date=December 2023}} and thus it would not work.<ref>Andrew Loke, ''God and Ultimate Origins'' (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017), chapter 4.</ref>

=== Existence of infinite causal chains ===
[[David Hume]] and later [[Paul Edwards (philosopher)|Paul Edwards]] have invoked a similar principle in their criticisms of the cosmological argument.<ref name=Pruss>Alexander R. Pruss, [https://archive.today/20130202224654/http://www.springerlink.com/content/q134n458307w0125 The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument], ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion''</ref> [[William L. Rowe]] has called this the Hume-Edwards principle:

{{Blockquote|If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained.<ref name=Pruss/>}}

Nevertheless, David White argues that the notion of an [[infinite regress|infinite causal regress]] providing a proper explanation is fallacious.<ref>{{cite journal|last=White|first=David E.|title=An argument for God's existence|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=10|issue=1–3|pages=101–115|doi=10.1007/BF00143159|year=1979|s2cid=171007306}}</ref> Furthermore, in Hume's ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'', the character Demea states that even if the succession of causes is infinite, the whole chain still requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hume |first=David|year=1779 |title=  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=Penguin Books |place=London }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Calvert|first=Brian|title=Another problem about Part IX of Hume's Dialogues|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=14|issue=2|pages=65–70|doi=10.1007/BF00131845|year=1983|s2cid=189828318}}</ref> To explain this, suppose there exists a causal chain of infinite contingent beings. If one asks the question, "Why are there any contingent beings at all?", it does not help to be told that "There are contingent beings because other contingent beings caused them." That answer would just presuppose additional contingent beings. An adequate explanation of why some contingent beings exist would invoke a different sort of being, a necessary being that is ''not'' contingent.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://personal.stthomas.edu/mwrota/InfiniteRegress4%20Final.doc | format = DOC | title = Infinite Causal Chains and Explanation | first = Michael | last = Rota | work = Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association | access-date = 2010-06-01 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160328172453/http://personal.stthomas.edu/mwrota/InfiniteRegress4%20Final.doc | archive-date = 2016-03-28 }}</ref> A response might suppose each individual is contingent but the infinite chain as a whole is not, or the whole infinite causal chain is its own cause.

Severinsen argues that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Severinsen|first=Morten|title=Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative|journal=Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics|volume=22|issue=4|pages=319–336|quote=This implies that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure behind each disease, and that the disease mechanism would have to encompass the whole structure.|doi=10.1023/A:1011830602137|pmid=11680525|year=2001|s2cid=25953826}}</ref> White tried to introduce an argument "without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress".<ref>{{cite journal|last=White|first=David E.|title=An argument for God's existence|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=10|issue=1–3|pages=101–115|quote=My intention is to show that a cosmological argument for God's existence (not that of a first cause simpliciter) can be constructed without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress.|doi=10.1007/BF00143159|year=1979|s2cid=171007306}}</ref> A number of other arguments have been offered to demonstrate that an actual infinite regress cannot exist, viz. the argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities, the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, the argument from the lack of capacity to begin to exist, and various arguments from paradoxes.<ref>Andrew Loke, ''God and Ultimate Origins'' (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017), chapters 2 and 3; Waters, Ben. 2013. "Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past". ''Philosophia Christi'' 15: 463–469; Koons, Robert. 2014. ''A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper.'' Noûs 48: 256–267.</ref>

Other defenders of cosmological arguments such as Ed Feser argue that the type of series in which causes are hierarchically dependent (essentially ordered or ''per se'' series) one on the other, cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be possible for causal series which are extended backward through time (accidentally ordered or ''per accidens'' series) to regress infinitely.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Feser |first1=Edward |author1-link=Edward Feser |title=Five Proofs of the Existence of God |date=2017 |publisher=Ignatius Press |isbn=978-1621641339}}</ref> The rationale for this is that in a hierarchical ''per se'' causal series, each member cannot so much as act without the concurrent actualization or causation of more fundamental members of the series; thus an infinite hierarchical series would mean that the entire series is composed of members none of which can act of itself, which is impossible. An example of such a series would be the composition of water, which depends on the simultaneous composition of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, which in turn depend on the simultaneous composition of protons, neutrons, and electrons, etc. into deeper levels of the hierarchy of physical reality. This is contrasted with an accidentally ordered or linear series - parents causing their children to begin to exist, who in turn cause their children to begin to exist - in which one member in the series may continue to act even if whatever caused it has ceased to exist, and so there is seemingly no issue if this type of series regresses infinitely; the impossibility of the infinite regress in an essentially ordered causal series would suffice for at least some varieties of cosmological arguments. Further discussion on this point can be found under [[Five_Ways_(Aquinas)#Essential_and_accidental_causal_chains|essential and accidental causal chains]].

===Big Bang cosmology===

Some cosmologists and physicists argue that a challenge to the cosmological argument is the nature of time: "One finds that time just disappears from the [[Wheeler–DeWitt equation]]"<ref>{{cite web|last=Folger|first=Tim|title=Time may not exist|url=http://discovermagazine.com/2007/jun/in-no-time/|access-date=August 17, 2012}}</ref> ([[Carlo Rovelli]]). The [[Big Bang theory]] states that it is the point in which all [[dimension]]s came into existence, the start of both [[space]] and [[time]].<ref name="sciam">{{cite magazine |last1=Gott III |first1=J. Richard |author1-link=J. Richard Gott |last2=Gunn |first2=James E. |author2-link=James Gunn (astronomer) |last3=Schramm |first3=David N. |author3-link=David Schramm (astrophysicist) |last4=Tinsley |first4=Beatrice M. |author4-link=Beatrice Tinsley |title=Will the Universe Expand Forever?" |magazine=[[Scientific American]] |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24950306 |jstor=24950306 |access-date=December 10, 2023 |page=65 |date=March 1976}}</ref> Then, the question "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time.<ref name="sciam"/> This has been put forward by J. Richard Gott III, [[James Gunn (astronomer)|James E. Gunn]], David N. Schramm, and [[Beatrice Tinsley]], who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the [[North Pole]].<ref name="sciam"/> However, some cosmologists and physicists do attempt to investigate causes for the Big Bang, using such scenarios as the collision of [[Membrane (M-Theory)|membrane]]s.<ref>{{cite web|last=Britt |first=Robert R. |title=Brane-Storm {{pipe}} Challenges Part of Big Bang Theory |publisher=Space.com |date=April 18, 2001 |access-date=June 21, 2008 |url=http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511144628/http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-date=11 May 2008 }}</ref>

Philosopher [[Edward Feser]] argues that most of the classical philosophers' cosmological arguments for the existence of God do not depend on the Big Bang or whether the universe had a beginning. The question is not about what got things started, or how long they have been going, but rather what keeps them going.<ref>{{cite book | first = Edward | last = Feser | author-link= Edward Feser | title = The Last Superstition | publisher = St. Augustine Press | year = 2008 | isbn = 978-1587314520 }}</ref>{{Rp|103}}