Nigerian Civil War

==Breakaway==
[[File:Flag of Biafra.svg|left|thumb|The new republic adopted the [[Flag of Biafra]] which was unveiled on 30 May 1967.]]
The deluge of refugees in Eastern Nigeria created a difficult situation. Extensive negotiations took place between Ojukwu, representing Eastern Nigeria, and Gowon, representing the Nigerian Federal military government. In the [[Aburi Accord]], finally signed at Aburi, [[Ghana]], the parties agreed that a looser Nigerian federation would be implemented. Gowon delayed announcement of the agreement and eventually reneged.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ipobinusa.org/restructuring-nigeria|title=WHY RESTRUCTURING NIGERIA WILL NOT WORK|website=Indigenous People of Biafra USA|language=en-US |access-date=2019-04-26}}</ref>

[[File:Nigeria states-1967-1976.png|300px|thumb|right|The proposed break-up of the East, West and Northern regions following Gowon's military decree.]]

On 27 May 1967, Gowon proclaimed the division of Nigeria into twelve states. This decree carved the Eastern Region in three parts: [[South Eastern State]], [[Rivers State]], and [[East Central State]]. Now the Igbos, concentrated in the East Central State, would lose control over most of the petroleum, located in the other two areas.<ref name="Uche2008page123">Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 123. "The oil revenue issue, however, came to a head when Gowon, on 27 May 1967, divided the country into twelve states. The Eastern Region was split into three states: South Eastern State, Rivers State and East Central State. This effectively excised the main oil-producing areas from the core Ibo state (East Central State). On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu declared independence and renamed the entire Eastern Region 'the Republic of Biafra'. As part of the effort to get the Biafran leadership to change its mind, the Federal government placed a shipping embargo on the territory."</ref><ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 6. "The final high water, and the greatest of flood tides, of this phase of Gowon's leadership came in May 1967 with his Decree – and only a no-nonsense, no-referendum military government could have effected overnight such a fundamental reversal of half a century of Nigeria's political history and administrative thinking – to replace the four Regions by twelve States. Whether Decree No. 14 was designed to forestall secession (would-be Biafra was now to consist of 3 states instead of the Eastern Region, two of them mischievously emphasising the East's long-contained minorities problem of Ibibio/Efik discontent and Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers separatism, and the third a landlocked, oil-less, overpopulated Ibo enclave) or whether it pushed Ojukwu into the final defiance of declaring a secessionist Republic remains a matter of argument. What remains unchallenged is the unequalled point of no return in Nigeria's history that the States Decree constitutes."</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Biafra {{!}} secessionist state, Nigeria |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Biafra|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-05-29}}</ref>

The Federal Military Government immediately placed an [[Economic sanctions|embargo]] on all shipping to and from Biafra—but not on oil tankers.<ref name="Stevenson2014pages314to315"/><ref name="Uche2008page123"/> Biafra quickly moved to collect oil royalties from oil companies doing business within its borders.<ref name="Uche2008page123"/> When [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]]-[[BP]] acquiesced to this request at the end of June, the Federal Government extended its blockade to include oil.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> The blockade, which most foreign actors accepted, played a decisive role in putting Biafra at a disadvantage from the beginning of the war.<ref name="HeertenMoses2014page174">Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 174. "The FMG's major strategic advantage was not its military force, but its diplomatic status: internationally recognised statehood. That the FMG could argue that it was a sovereign government facing an 'insurgency' was decisive.{{nbsp}}... Nigeria's secured diplomatic status was also crucial for the most significant development in the war's early stages: the FMG's decision to blockade the secessionist state. To cut off Biafra's lines of communication with the outside world, air and sea ports were blockaded, foreign currency transactions banned, incoming mail and telecommunication blocked and international business obstructed. Even with its limited resources, Nigeria was able to organise a successful blockade without gaping holes or long interruptions{{mdash}}mostly because other governments or companies were ready to acquiesce to Lagos' handling of the matter."</ref>

Although the very young nation had a chronic shortage of weapons to go to war, it was determined to defend itself. Although there was much sympathy in Europe and elsewhere, only five countries ([[Tanzania]], [[Gabon]], [[Ivory Coast]], [[Zambia]], and [[Haiti]]) officially recognised the new republic.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ijalaye |first1=David A. |title=Was "Biafra" at Any Time A State in International Law? |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=July 1971 |volume=65 |issue=3 |pages=553–554 |doi=10.1017/S0002930000147311 |jstor=2198977 |s2cid=152122313 |access-date=18 August 2022 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2198977}}</ref><ref name="africamasterweb.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html|title=The Biafran War, Nigerian History, Nigerian Civil War|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080312215245/http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html|archive-date=12 March 2008}}</ref> The United Kingdom supplied heavy weapons and ammunition to the Nigerian side, officially to preserve the multi-ethnic country it had created but also to preserve the supply of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom and to protect the investments of Shell-BP. The Biafra side received arms and ammunition from France, even though the French government denied sponsoring Biafra. An article in ''[[Paris Match]]'' of 20 November 1968 claimed that French arms were reaching Biafra through neighbouring countries such as Gabon.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chibuike |first1=Uche |title=Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War|journal=The Journal of African History |date=2008 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=111–135 |jstor=40206616 |doi=10.1017/s0021853708003393 |s2cid=159874579 }}</ref> The heavy supply of weapons by the United Kingdom was the biggest factor in determining the outcome of the war.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Enuka |first1=C.|last2=Odife |first2=I. |date=2009 |title=The Nigerian Civil War as a Domestic Determinant of Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1967–1975 |url=https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/view/67018 |journal=UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities |language=en |volume=10 |issue=2 |doi=10.4314/ujah.v10i2.67018 |doi-broken-date=31 January 2024 |issn=1595-1413}}</ref>

Several peace accords were held, with the most notable one held at [[Aburi]], Ghana (the [[Aburi Accord]]). There were different accounts of what took place in Aburi. Ojukwu accused the federal government of going back on their promises while the federal government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half-truths.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} Ojukwu gained agreement to a [[confederation]] for Nigeria, rather than a federation. He was warned by his advisers that Gowon did not understand the difference and would renege upon the agreement.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Ogungbade|first=Gloria|title=ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT: THE NIGERIAN SITUATION |url=https://www.academia.edu/31635385|language=en}}</ref>

When this happened, Ojukwu regarded it as both a failure by Gowon to keep to the spirit of the Aburi agreement and a lack of integrity on the side of the Nigerian Military Government in the negotiations toward a united Nigeria. Gowon's advisers, to the contrary, felt that he had enacted as much as was politically feasible in fulfilment of the spirit of Aburi.<ref name="NUA">Ntieyong U. Akpan, ''The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War''.</ref> The Eastern Region was very ill-equipped for war, outmanned and outgunned by the Nigerians, but had the advantages of fighting in their homeland, support of most Easterners, determination, and use of limited resources.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Biafran Civil War: The Politics of Hunger & Starvation - SlaveRebellion.org|url=http://slaverebellion.info/index.php?page=the-biafran-civil-war-the-politics-of-hunger-starvation |website=slaverebellion.info|access-date=2020-05-28}}</ref>

The United Kingdom, which still maintained the highest level of influence over Nigeria's highly valued oil industry through Shell-BP,<ref name="shellbpinflu">{{Cite news |last=Awoyokun |first=Damola |title=BIAFRA: The Untold Story of Nigeria's civil war |publisher=P.M. News |date=19 February 2013}}</ref> and the [[Soviet Union]] supported the Nigerian government, especially by military supplies.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Omaka |first=Arua Oko |date=2019-07-03 |title=The Nigerian Civil War and the 'Italian' Oil Workers |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2019.1617662 |journal=War & Society |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=203–224 |doi=10.1080/07292473.2019.1617662 |s2cid=197787017 |issn=0729-2473}}</ref>

The Nigerian Army in 1967 was completely unready for war. The Nigerian Army had no training or experience of war on the [[Operational level of war|operational level]], still being primarily an internal security force.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 20"/> Most Nigerian officers were more concerned with their social lives than military training, spending a disproportionate amount of their time on partying, drinking, hunting and playing games.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 24</ref> Social status in the Army was extremely important and officers devoted an excessive amount of time to ensure their uniforms were always immaculate while there was a competition to own the most expensive automobiles and homes.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> The killings and purges perpetuated during the two coups of 1966 had killed most of the Sandhurst graduates.  By July 1966, all of the officers holding the rank above colonel had been either killed or discharged while only 5 officers holding the rank of lieutenant colonel were still alive and on duty.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> Almost all of the junior officers had received their commissions after 1960 and most were heavily dependent on the more experienced NCOs to provide the necessary leadership.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 24"/> The same problems that afflicted the Federal Army also affected the Biafran Army even more whose officer corps was based around former Federal Igbo officers.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 17</ref> The shortage of experienced officers was a major problem for the [[Biafran Armed Forces|Biafran Army]], made worse by a climate of paranoia and suspicion within Biafra as Ojukwu believed that other former Federal officers were plotting against him.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17"/>