Justice

===Subordinate value===
According to utilitarian thinkers including [[John Stuart Mill]], justice is not as fundamental as we often think. Rather, it is derived from the more basic standard of rightness, [[consequentialism]]: what is right is what has the best consequences (usually measured by the total or average [[Quality of life|welfare]] caused). So, the proper principles of justice are those that tend to have the best consequences. These rules may turn out to be familiar ones such as keeping [[contract]]s; but equally, they may not, depending on the facts about real consequences. Either way, what is important is those consequences, and justice is important, if at all, only as derived from that fundamental standard. Mill tries to explain our mistaken belief that justice is overwhelmingly important by arguing that it derives from two natural human tendencies: our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, or the feeling of self-defense and our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in another's place, sympathy. So, when we see someone harmed, we project ourselves into their situation and feel a desire to retaliate on their behalf. If this process is the source of our feelings about justice, that ought to undermine our confidence in them.<ref>John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism'' in ''On Liberty and Other Essays'' ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 5.</ref>