Free will

====Event-causal theories====
Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as ''deliberative indeterminism'', ''centred accounts'', and ''efforts of will theory''.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories /> The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world.

''Deliberative indeterminism'' asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process.<ref name=Ekstrom2000>{{cite book|author=Laura Waddell Ekstrom|title=Free Will: A Philosophical Study|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oaOpa7qlz3kC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2000|publisher=Westview Press|isbn=978-0-8133-9093-2}}</ref><ref name=Mele2006>{{cite book|author=Alfred R. Mele|title=Free Will and Luck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MV0Ohi3z4LAC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2006|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-530504-3}}</ref> This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of ''luck'' (random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by [[Daniel Dennett]]<ref name="Dennett1981">{{cite book|author=Daniel Clement Dennett|title=Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_xwObaAZEwoC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1981|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-54037-7}}</ref> and [[John Martin Fischer]].<ref name="L. PetersonFischer1995">{{cite journal|last1=L. Peterson|first1=Michael|last2=Fischer|first2=John Martin|journal=Faith and Philosophy|volume=12|year=1995|pages=119–25|issn=0739-7046|doi=10.5840/faithphil199512123|title=Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker|doi-access=free}}</ref> An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model.

''Centred accounts'' propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen.<ref name=Kane2005>{{cite book|author=Robert Kane|title=Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9BRiQgAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-514970-8}}</ref><ref name=Balaguer1999>{{cite journal |author=Mark Balaguer |title=Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View |journal= Philosophical Studies |volume=93 |issue=2 |pages=189–211 |year=1999 |doi=10.1023/a:1004218827363|s2cid=169483672 }}</ref><ref name=Nozick1981>{{cite book|author=Robert Nozick|title=Philosophical Explanations|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1981|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-66479-1}}</ref><ref name=Sorabji1980>{{cite book|author=Richard Sorabji|title=Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-8tmAAAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1980|publisher=Duckworth|isbn=978-0-7156-1549-2}}</ref><ref name=Inwagen1983>{{cite book|author=Peter Van Inwagen|title=An Essay on Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=of1sJaUSdcYC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1983|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=978-0-19-824924-5}}</ref><ref name=Wiggins1973>{{cite book|author=Ted Honderich|title=Essays on Freedom of Action:Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qY9AAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1973|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-7100-7392-1|pages=33–61}}</ref><ref name=Searle2001>{{cite book|author=John R. Searle|title=Rationality in Action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7GnfkbarMHsC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2001|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-69282-3}}</ref> An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.

''Efforts of will theory'' is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events&nbsp;– and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]], where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes&nbsp;– a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort."<ref name="RKane1">{{Cite book| title=Four Views on Free Will (Libertarianism)| last=Kane| first=Robert|author2=John Martin Fischer |author3=Derk Pereboom |author4=Manuel Vargas | year=2007| publisher=Blackwell Publishing|location=Oxford| page=39| isbn=978-1-4051-3486-6}}</ref> According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will.<ref name="Kane1996">{{cite book|author=Robert Kane|title=The Significance of Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hhuyeYKsWAkC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-510550-6}}</ref> An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see [[non-reductive physicalism]]).

Although at the time [[quantum mechanics]] (and physical [[Quantum indeterminacy|indeterminism]]) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book [[Miracles (book)|''Miracles: A preliminary study'']] C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.<ref name="CSLewis1">{{Cite book| author=Lewis, C.S.| title=Miracles| year=1947| page=[https://archive.org/details/giftofmiraclesma00mill/page/24 24]| publisher=HarperCollins| isbn=978-0-688-17369-2| url=https://archive.org/details/giftofmiraclesma00mill/page/24}}</ref> [[Indeterminism|Indeterministic]] physical models (particularly those involving [[quantum indeterminacy]]) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow [[Incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious [[Volition (psychology)|volition]]) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable,<ref name=quantum>{{cite book |title=Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy) |chapter=Libertarianism |author= Kane, Robert|page=9 |quote=It would seem that undetermined events in the brain or body would occur ''spontaneously'' and would be more likely to ''undermine'' our freedom rather than ''enhance'' it. |isbn=978-1-4051-3486-6 |year=2007 |publisher= Wiley-Blackwell}}</ref> and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the [[neuroscience of free will]]. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality.<ref name=Bohr1>{{cite web |author=Niels Bohr |title= The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; ''Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.''|work=The Information Philosopher, dedicated to the new information philosophy |url=http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bohr/fundamental_principles.html |publisher=Robert O. Doyle, publisher | quote=... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description. |access-date=2012-09-14}}</ref> [[Niels Bohr]], one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.<ref name=Bohr>
{{cite book |journal=Nature |date=April 1, 1933 |pages=457–459 |title=Light and Life |author=Niels Bohr |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4RStj6dJDSgC&pg=PA28 |doi=10.1038/131457a0 |volume=131|issue=3309 |isbn=978-0-444-89972-9|quote=For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.|bibcode=1933Natur.131..457B |s2cid=4080545 }} Full text on line at [http://www23.us.archive.org/stream/AtomicPhysicsHumanKnowledge/Bohr-AtomicPhysicsHumanKnowledge_djvu.txt us.archive.org].
</ref>