Vote buying

==== Argentina ====
Vote buying and the overall practice of clientelism is widespread in Argentina. According to Simeon Nichter, one of the main perpetrators of these illegal activities were the Peronist party.<ref name="Nichter2008">{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0003055408080106 |jstor=27644495 |title=Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=102 |issue=1 |pages=19–31 |year=2008 |last1=Nichter |first1=Simeon |s2cid=54757367}}</ref> The relationship between voters and Peronist candidates allegedly are such that voters are offered particular goods, services, favours or monetary compensation in exchange for their political support for the party. These rewards could include a job, medicine, a roof, clothing, foods, and other goods or services. The case of Argentina in particular in that it relies heavily on face-to-face and day-to-day interactions between "brokers" who act as middlemen and voters.<ref name="Brusco et al 2004">{{cite journal |doi=10.1353/lar.2004.0022 |title=Vote Buying in Argentina |journal=Latin American Research Review |volume=39 |issue=2 |page=66 |year=2004 |last1=Brusco |first1=Valeria |last2=Nazareno |first2=Marcelo |last3=Stokes |first3=Susan Carol |s2cid=154003297}}</ref> Since many of the communities in Argentina are ridden with poverty and are in need of these particular resources, it is these communities that have statistically shown to be in a certain demographic that were targeted for voted buying. Additionally, vote buying in this region focuses on citizens who are not strongly in favour or opposed to the political machine, and whose political loyalty does not necessarily lie with one party or another.<ref name=Stokes2005>{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0003055405051683 |title=Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=99 |issue=3 |page=315 |year=2005 |last1=Stokes |first1=Susan C |s2cid=36014179}}</ref> In this way, vote buying acts as a mechanism to sway the decisions of weakly opposed voters. In a study done by [[Susan Stokes|Susan C. Stokes]], she finds that the brokers in these communities are known to all the citizens and have access to the necessary resources from the municipality. They maintain relationships with the voters and grant them rewards and favours continuously in order to keep the party they work for in the office. This is one main explanation for why many lower-income voters are seen voting for populist leaders, as well as authoritarian ones.<ref name=Stokes2005 /> Many citizens view these brokers as positive pillars in their lives and have the utmost respect for the help they distribute. However, others view them as hands of corruption. Stokes further explains that the capacity of these brokers is constrained due to the fact that they can only maintain this type of transactional relationship with a limited number of voters.<ref name=Stokes2005 /> Furthermore, the brokers have the additional responsibility of maintaining trusting and solid relationships with their resource suppliers. Without these strong ties, they would have no means through which to carry out vote-buying practices.<ref name="Brusco et al 2004" />