Cooperation Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==The prisoner's dilemma== {{Main article|Prisoner's dilemma}} The prisoner's dilemma is a model that demonstrates how, in certain conditions, members of a group will not cooperate even though cooperation would mutually benefit them all. It makes clear that collective self-interest is insufficient to achieving cooperative behavior, at least when an uncooperative individual who "cheats" can exploit cooperating group members. The prisoner's dilemma formalizing this problem using [[game theory]] and has been the subject of much theoretical and experimental research. The first extensive experimental studies were conducted in the early 1960s by [[Anatol Rapoport]] and Albert Chammah.<ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref> Results from [[experimental economics]] show that humans often act more cooperatively than strict self-interest, modeled as the Nash Equilibrium, would seem to dictate. While economic experiments require subjects to make relatively abstract decisions for small stakes, evidence from natural experiments for high stakes support the claim that humans act more cooperatively than strict self-interest would dictate.<ref>{{cite journal | author=van den Assem, van Dolder, and Thaler | title=''Split or Steal''? Cooperative Behavior when the Stakes are Large|year=2012 | ssrn=1592456}}</ref> One reason may be that if the prisoner's dilemma situation is repeated (the [[Prisoner's dilemma#The iterated prisoner's dilemma|iterated prisoner's dilemma]]), it allows non-cooperation to be punished more, and cooperation to be rewarded more, than the single-shot version of the problem would suggest. It has been suggested that this is one reason for the evolution of complex [[emotion]]s in higher life forms.<ref>{{cite journal | author=Olsen, Harrington, and Siegelmann | title=Conspecific Emotional Cooperation Biases Population Dynamics: A Cellular Automata Approach|year=2010 | url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Conspecific+Emotional+Cooperation+Biases+Population+Dynamics:+A+Cellular+Automata+Approach&oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&hl=en&tab=ws}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author=Harrington, Olsen, and Siegelmann | title=Communicated Somatic Markers Benefit the Individual and the Species|year=2011}}</ref> Playing the iterated version of the game leads to a cascade of [[brain]] signals that relate the speed with which players reciprocate cooperation at subsequent rounds.<ref>{{cite journal | author=Cervantes Constantino, Garat, Nicolaisen, Paz, Martínez-Montes, Kessel, Cabana, and Gradin | title=Neural processing of iterated prisoner's dilemma outcomes indicates next-round choice and speed to reciprocate cooperation| journal=Social Neuroscience|year=2021 | volume=16| issue=2| pages=103–120| doi=10.1080/17470919.2020.1859410| pmid=33297873| s2cid=228087900| url=https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2020.1859410}}</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page