Advaita Vedanta

===Differences from Buddhism===
The Advaita Vedānta tradition has historically rejected accusations of [[crypto-Buddhism]] highlighting their respective views on ''Atman'', ''Anatta'' and ''Brahman''.{{sfn|Isaeva|1993|pp=60, 145–154}} Yet, some Buddhist texts chronologically placed in the 1st millennium of common era, such as the Mahayana tradition's ''Tathāgatagarbha sūtras'' suggest self-like concepts, variously called ''Tathāgatagarbha'' or ''[[Buddha nature]]''.{{sfn|Williams|2008|pp=104, 125–127}}{{sfn|Hookham|1991|pp=100–104}} In modern era studies, scholars such as Wayman and Wayman state that these "self-like" concepts are neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality.{{sfn|Williams|2008|pp=107, 112}}{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JqLa4xWot-YC&pg=PA96 96]}} Some scholars posit that the ''Tathāgatagarbha Sutras'' were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.<ref>{{harvnb|Williams|2008|pp=104–105, 108–109}}: "(...) it refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Merv Fowler|title=Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=A7UKjtA0QDwC|year=1999|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=978-1-898723-66-0|pages=101–102}}{{Dead link|date=August 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=John W. Pettit|title=Mipham's Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection|year=1999|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-0-86171-157-4|pages=48–49|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Kz4ox1vp5IC|access-date=2 February 2017|archive-date=16 January 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116175559/https://books.google.com/books?id=6Kz4ox1vp5IC|url-status=live}}</ref>

The epistemological foundations of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta are different. Buddhism accepts two valid means to reliable and correct knowledge – perception and inference, while Advaita Vedānta accepts six (described elsewhere in this article).{{sfn|Grimes|1996|p=238}}<ref name=ds>{{cite journal| author= D Sharma |year= 1966| title= Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic — Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi| journal= [[Indo-Iranian Journal]]| volume= 9| number= 4| pages= 291–300|doi= 10.1163/000000066790086530}}</ref><ref>John Clayton (2010), Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Religion, Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|978-0521126274}}, p. 54</ref> However, some Buddhists in history, have argued that Buddhist scriptures are a reliable source of spiritual knowledge, corresponding to Advaita's ''Śabda'' pramana, however Buddhists have treated their scriptures as a form of inference method.<ref>Alex Wayman (1999), A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120816466}}, pp. xix–xx</ref>

Advaita Vedānta posits a [[Substance theory|substance ontology]], an ontology which holds that underlying the change and impermanence of empirical reality is an unchanging and permanent absolute reality, like an eternal substance it calls Atman-Brahman.{{sfn|Puligandla|1997|pp=49–50, 60–62}} In its substance ontology, as like other philosophies, there exist a universal, particulars and specific properties and it is the interaction of particulars that create events and processes.<ref name="Bartley2011p91"/> In contrast, [[Buddhism]] posits a [[Process philosophy|process ontology]], also called as "event ontology".{{sfn|Williams|Tribe|Wynne|2000|p=92}}<ref name="Bartley2011p91">{{cite book|author=Christopher Bartley|title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PlupnDEr5iAC|year=2011|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|isbn=978-1-84706-449-3|pages=90–91}}</ref> According to the Buddhist thought, particularly after the rise of ancient Mahayana Buddhism scholarship, there is neither empirical nor absolute permanent reality and ontology can be explained as a process.{{sfn|Williams|Tribe|Wynne|2000|p=92}}{{sfn|Puligandla|1997|pp=40–50, 60–62, 97}}{{refn|group=note|Kalupahana describes how in Buddhism there is also a current which favours substance ontology. Kalupahanan sees [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogacara]] as reactions against developments toward substance ontology in Buddhism.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994}}}} There is a system of relations and interdependent phenomena (''pratitya samutpada'') in Buddhist ontology, but no stable persistent identities, no eternal universals nor particulars. Thought and memories are mental constructions and fluid processes without a real observer, personal agency or cognizer in Buddhism. In contrast, in Advaita Vedānta, like other schools of Hinduism, the concept of self (atman) is the real on-looker, personal agent and cognizer.<ref>{{cite book|author=Christopher Bartley|title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PlupnDEr5iAC|year=2011|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|isbn=978-1-84706-449-3|pages=90–91, 96, 204–208}}</ref>