Free will

====Effects of the belief itself====
{{see also|Self-efficacy}}

Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in [[determinism]] that causes those negative effects.<ref name=BAC/> Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat.<ref name="Vohs&Sschooler2008">{{cite journal | last1 = Vohs | first1 = K.D. | last2 = Schooler | first2 = J.W. | s2cid = 2643260 | year = 2008 | title = The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating | journal = Psychological Science | volume = 19 | issue = 1| pages = 49–54 | doi = 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x | pmid = 18181791 }}</ref> In a study conducted by Roy Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a test where they would be rewarded with cash.<ref name="Baumeister 2009">{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R.F. | last2 = Masicampo | first2 = E.J. | last3 = DeWall | first3 = C.N. | s2cid = 16010829 | year = 2009 | title = Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 35 | issue = 2| pages = 260–68 | doi = 10.1177/0146167208327217 | pmid = 19141628 }}</ref> Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour.<ref name="Baumeister 2009" /> However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Monroe |first1=Andrew E. |last2=Brady |first2=Garrett L. |last3=Malle |first3=Bertram F. |title=This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |date=21 September 2016 |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=191–199 |doi=10.1177/1948550616667616|s2cid=152011660 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Crone |first1=Damien L. |last2=Levy |first2=Neil L. |title=Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not) |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |volume=10 |issue=5 |date=28 June 2018 |pages=612–619 |doi=10.1177/1948550618780732 |pmid=31249653 |pmc=6542011 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Caspar |first1=Emilie A. |last2=Vuillaume |first2=Laurène |last3=Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama |first3=Pedro A. |last4=Cleeremans |first4=Axel |title=The Influence of (Dis)belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=17 January 2017 |volume=8 |pages=20 |doi=10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020 |pmid=28144228 |pmc=5239816 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nadelhoffer |first1=Thomas |last2=Shepard |first2=Jason |last3=Crone |first3=Damien L. |last4=Everett |first4=Jim A.C. |last5=Earp |first5=Brian D. |last6=Levy |first6=Neil |title=Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will |journal=Cognition |date=October 2020 |volume=203 |pages=104342 |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342|pmid=32593841 |s2cid=220057834 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/NADDEA }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Buttrick |first1=Nicholas R. |last2=Aczel |first2=Balazs |last3=Aeschbach |first3=Lena F. |last4=Bakos |first4=Bence E. |last5=Brühlmann |first5=Florian |last6=Claypool |first6=Heather M. |last7=Hüffmeier |first7=Joachim |last8=Kovacs |first8=Marton |last9=Schuepfer |first9=Kurt |last10=Szecsi |first10=Peter |last11=Szuts |first11=Attila |last12=Szöke |first12=Orsolya |last13=Thomae |first13=Manuela |last14=Torka |first14=Ann-Kathrin |last15=Walker |first15=Ryan J. |last16=Wood |first16=Michael J. |title=Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1 |journal=Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science |date=September 2020 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=429–438 |doi=10.1177/2515245920917931|s2cid=227095775 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

{{Quotebox|align=right|width=40%|quoted=1|quote= An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.|source=—[[Richard Holton]]<ref name=Holton/>}}

Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate.<ref name=Holton/> First of all, free will can at least refer to either [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian (indeterministic) free will]] or [[Compatibilism|compatibilistic (deterministic) free will]]. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits.<ref name=Holton/> In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in [[fatalism]], which may provide an alternative explanation for previous experimental findings.<ref name=Holton>{{cite journal | last1 = Holton | first1 = Richard | year = 2011 | title = Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist | url =https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/71223/1/Holton_Baumeister.commentary.pdf | journal = Neuroethics | volume = 4 | pages = 13–16 | doi = 10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8 | hdl = 1721.1/71223 | s2cid = 143687015 | hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Miles | first1 = J.B. | year = 2011 | title = 'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 52 | issue = 2| pages = 205–18 | doi = 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02077.x |doi-access=free | pmid = 22074173 | pmc = 3757306 }}</ref> To test the effects of belief in determinism, it has been argued that future studies would need to provide articles that do not simply "attack free will", but instead focus on explaining determinism and compatibilism.<ref name=Holton/><ref>Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See {{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=D. Justin Coates|author3=Trevor Kvaran|s2cid=15648622|date=2007-09-01|title=Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions|journal=Midwest Studies in Philosophy|volume=31|issue=1|pages=214–42|doi=10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x|issn=1475-4975}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of [[counterfactual thinking]].<ref name=BAC/> This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others.<ref>{{cite journal | pmc=2408534 | year=2008 | last1=Epstude | first1=K. | last2=Roese | first2=N. J. | title=The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking | journal=Personality and Social Psychology Review | volume=12 | issue=2 | pages=168–192 | doi=10.1177/1088868308316091 | pmid=18453477 }}</ref> Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism.<ref name=Holton/>

Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/1948550609351600| volume = 1| issue = 1| pages = 43–50| last = Stillman| first = Tyler F.|author2=Roy F. Baumeister |author3=Kathleen D. Vohs |author4=Nathaniel M. Lambert |author5=Frank D. Fincham |author6=Lauren E. Brewer | s2cid = 3023336| title = Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance| journal = Social Psychological and Personality Science| date = 2010-01-01}}</ref>