Free will

====What people believe====
Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive&nbsp;– it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=Stephen G Morris|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|author4=Jason Turner|date=2006-07-01|title=Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=73|issue=1|pages=28–53|citeseerx=10.1.1.364.1083|doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x|issn=1933-1592}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive&nbsp;– it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|date=2009-02-01|title=Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board|journal=Mind & Language|volume=24|issue=1|pages=1–23|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x|issn=1468-0017}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response&nbsp;– for example if it involves harming another human being.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nichols|first=Shaun|author2=Joshua Knobe|date=2007-12-01|title=Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions|journal=Noûs|volume=41|issue=4|pages=663–85|citeseerx=10.1.1.175.1091|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sarkissian|first=HAGOP|author2=Amita Chatterjee|author3=Felipe de Brigard|author4=Joshua Knobe|author5=Shaun Nichols|author6=Smita Sirker|s2cid=18837686|date=2010-06-01|title=Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?|journal=Mind & Language|volume=25|issue=3|pages=346–58|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x|issn=1468-0017|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAIBI-2 }}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1073/pnas.1012046108| pmid = 21149703| volume = 107| issue = 52| pages = 22469–74| last = Pronin| first = Emily|author2=Matthew B. Kugler| title = People believe they have more free will than others| journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences| date = 2010-12-28| bibcode = 2010PNAS..10722469P| pmc = 3012523| doi-access = free}}</ref>

Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral responsibility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|date=March 2009|title=Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism|journal=Consciousness and Cognition|volume=18|issue=1|pages=342–50|doi=10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001|issn=1053-8100|pmid=18805023|s2cid=16953908}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

[[Roy Baumeister]] and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".<ref name=BAC>{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R. | last2 = Crescioni | first2 = A.W. | last3 = Alquist | first3 = J. | year = 2009 | title = Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture | journal = Neuroethics | volume =4| pages =1–11| doi = 10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4 | s2cid = 143223154 }}</ref><ref>Paulhus, D.L. and Margesson. A., (1994). ''Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale''. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia.</ref>

The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions.<ref>Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in preparation.</ref> Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.<ref>Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Wagenaar | first1 = W.A. | year = 1972 | title = Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 77 | pages = 65–72 | doi = 10.1037/h0032060 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.211.9085 }}</ref>