Epistemology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Indian pramana=== {{Main|Pramana}} [[Indian philosophy|Indian schools of philosophy]], such as the [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] [[Nyaya]] and [[Carvaka]] schools, as well as the [[Jain philosophy|Jain]] and [[Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist]] philosophical schools, developed an epistemological tradition independently of the Western philosophical tradition called "pramana". Pramana can be translated as "instrument of knowledge" and refers to various means or sources of knowledge that Indian philosophers held to be reliable. Each school of Indian philosophy had their own theories about which pramanas were valid means to knowledge and which were unreliable (and why).<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N–Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, pp. 520–521</ref> A [[Vedas|Vedic]] text, [[Taittiriya Aranyaka|Taittirīya Āraṇyaka]] ({{circa|9th}}–6th centuries BCE), lists "four means of attaining correct knowledge": ''smṛti'' ("tradition" or "scripture"), ''pratyakṣa'' ("perception"), ''aitihya'' ("communication by one who is expert", or "tradition"), and ''anumāna'' ("reasoning" or "inference").<ref>A.B. Keith (1989), [https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&dq=pratyaksa&pg=PA482 ''The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132734/https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&pg=PA482&dq=pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, Part II, p.482</ref><ref>S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). [https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa&pg=PA23 ''A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&pg=PA23&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, p.23</ref> In the Indian traditions, the most widely discussed pramanas are: ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception), ''Anumāṇa'' (inference), ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation, derivation from circumstances), ''Anupalabdi'' (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof), and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). While the Nyaya school (beginning with the [[Nyāya Sūtras]] of Gotama, between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE<ref>Jeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, {{ISBN|978-1-898723-94-3}}, p. 129</ref><ref>B.K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.</ref>) were a proponent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, inference, comparison/analogy, and testimony), the Buddhist epistemologists ([[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]]) generally accepted only perception and inference. The [[Carvaka]] school of [[materialists]] only accepted the pramana of perception, and hence were among the first [[empiricists]] in the Indian traditions.<ref>MM Kamal (1998), [https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf The Epistemology of the Cārvāka Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180214202758/https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf |date=14 February 2018 }}, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13–16</ref> Another school, the [[Ajñana]], included notable proponents of [[philosophical skepticism]]. The [[Buddhist philosophy#Epistemology|theory of knowledge of the Buddha]] in the early Buddhist texts has been interpreted as a form of pragmatism as well as a form of correspondence theory.<ref>Jayatilleke, K.N.; Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 356</ref> Likewise, the Buddhist philosopher [[Dharmakirti]] has been interpreted both as holding a form of pragmatism or correspondence theory for his view that what is true is what has effective power (''arthakriya'').<ref>Cabezón, José I., 2000, "Truth in Buddhist Theology," in R. Jackson and J. Makransky, (eds.), Buddhist Theology, Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars. London: Curzon, 136–154.</ref><ref>Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> The Buddhist [[Madhyamika]] school's theory of emptiness ([[shunyata]]) meanwhile has been interpreted as a form of [[philosophical skepticism]].<ref>Arnold, Dan; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of belief and religion] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=10 December 2022 }}, p. 132.</ref> The main contribution to epistemology by the Jains has been their theory of "many sided-ness" or "multi-perspectivism" ([[Anekantavada]]), which says that since the world is multifaceted, any single viewpoint is limited (''naya'' – a partial standpoint).<ref>Griffin, David Ray (2005) p. 145</ref> This has been interpreted as a kind of pluralism or [[perspectivism]].<ref>Stroud, Scott R; [https://www.academia.edu/download/34919888/anek_pluralism_AHR.pdf Anekantavada and Engaged Rhetorical Pluralism: Explicating Jaina Views on Perspectivism, Violence, and Rhetoric]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}.</ref><ref>D. Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction 125.</ref> According to [[Jain epistemology]], none of the pramanas gives absolute or perfect knowledge since they are each limited points of view. Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page