Morality

== Realism and anti-realism ==
Philosophical theories on the nature and origins of morality (that is, theories of [[meta-ethics]]) are broadly divided into two classes:
* [[Moral realism]] is the class of theories which hold that there are true moral statements that report objective moral facts. For example, while they might concede that forces of social [[conformity (psychology)|conformity]] significantly shape individuals' "moral" decisions, they deny that those cultural [[norm (sociology)|norms]] and [[convention (norm)|customs]] define morally right behavior. This may be the philosophical view propounded by [[ethical naturalism|ethical naturalists]], but not all moral realists accept that position (e.g. [[ethical non-naturalism|ethical non-naturalists]]).<ref>[[Georges Chapouthier|Chapouthier, Georges]], "To what extent is moral judgment natural?", ''European Review'' (GB), 2004, 12(2): 179–83</ref>
* Moral [[anti-realism]], on the other hand, holds that moral statements either fail or do not even attempt to report objective moral facts. Instead, they hold that moral sentences are either categorically false claims of objective moral facts ([[error theory]]); claims about subjective attitudes rather than objective facts ([[ethical subjectivism]]); or else do not attempt to describe the world at all but rather something else, like an expression of an emotion or the issuance of a command ([[non-cognitivism]]).

Some forms of non-cognitivism and ethical [[subjectivism]], while considered anti-realist in the robust sense used here, are considered realist in the sense synonymous with [[moral universalism]]. For example, [[universal prescriptivism]] is a universalist form of non-cognitivism which claims that morality is derived from reasoning about implied imperatives, and [[divine command theory]] and [[ideal observer theory]] are universalist forms of ethical subjectivism which claim that morality is derived from the edicts of a god or the hypothetical decrees of a perfectly rational being, respectively.