Free will

====Hard determinism====
{{main|Hard determinism}}
[[File:FreeWillTaxonomy4.svg|thumb|A simplified [[Taxonomy (general)|taxonomy]] of philosophical positions regarding free will and determinism]]

Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism.<ref name="Parkinson2012">{{cite encyclopaedia|author=G.H.R. Parkinson|encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia of Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IqbJnEYKpW4C|access-date=26 December 2012|year= 2012|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-00323-0|title=determinism|pages=891–92}}</ref> Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will.<ref name="Viv">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Arguments for Incompatibilism |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Winter 2003 |last1=Vihvelin |first1=Kadri|date=2003 }}</ref> Hard determinism is the claim that [[determinism]] is true, and that it is [[incompatibilism|incompatible with free will]], so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to [[nomological determinism]] (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.<ref name=VanArragon2010 /> Relevant forms of determinism include:
;[[Causal determinism]]: The idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen.<ref name=stanfordmoralresponsibility /> In its most common form, [[nomological determinism|nomological (or scientific) determinism]], future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.<ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00266.x | last1 = Suppes | first1 = P. | s2cid = 14586058 | year = 1993 | title = The Transcendental Character of Determinism | journal = Midwest Studies in Philosophy | volume = 18 | pages = 242–57 }}</ref><ref name=determinism>
The view of ''scientific determinism'' goes back to [[Pierre Simon Laplace|Laplace]]: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state." For further discussion see {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. N–Z, Indeks, Volume 1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=od68ge7aF6wC&pg=PA198 |pages= 197 ''ff'' |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2006 |chapter=Determinism |isbn=978-0-415-93927-0 |editor=Sahotra Sarkar |editor2=Jessica Pfeifer |editor3=Justin Garson |author=John T Roberts}}
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;[[Logical determinism]]: The notion that all [[proposition]]s, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.<ref name="Viv" />
;[[Theological determinism]]: The idea that the future is already determined, either by a [[creator deity]] decreeing or [[omniscience|knowing]] its outcome in advance.<ref name="FischerGod1989">{{Cite book |last=Fischer |first=John Martin |title=God, Foreknowledge and Freedom |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=1989 |isbn=1-55786-857-3 |location=Stanford, CA}}</ref><ref name="Watt">{{Cite book |last=Watt |first=Montgomery |title=Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam |publisher=Luzac & Co |year=1948 |location=London}}</ref> The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in time.

Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as [[biological determinism]], the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment, [[cultural determinism]] and [[psychological determinism]].<ref name="Viv" /> Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common.

Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as [[determinism|adequate determinism]], is perhaps more relevant.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismarguments>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Vihvelin |first=Kadri |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Arguments for Incompatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Spring 2011 | year=2011 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments}}</ref> Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false&nbsp;– yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism.<ref name="stanfordcompatibilism">{{cite encyclopedia|last=McKenna |first=Michael |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Compatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Winter | year=2009 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism}}</ref>