Free will Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Believing in free will{{anchor|Believing in free will}}=== Since at least 1959,<ref name="Nettler1959">{{cite journal |last1=Nettler |first1=Gwynn |title=Cruelty, Dignity, and Determinism |journal=American Sociological Review |date=June 1959 |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=375–384 |doi=10.2307/2089386|jstor=2089386 }}</ref> free will belief in individuals has been analysed with respect to traits in social behaviour. In general, the concept of free will researched to date in this context has been that of the incompatibilist, or more specifically, the libertarian, that is freedom from determinism. ====What people believe==== Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive – it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=Stephen G Morris|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|author4=Jason Turner|date=2006-07-01|title=Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=73|issue=1|pages=28–53|citeseerx=10.1.1.364.1083|doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x|issn=1933-1592}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive – it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|date=2009-02-01|title=Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board|journal=Mind & Language|volume=24|issue=1|pages=1–23|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x|issn=1468-0017}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response – for example if it involves harming another human being.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nichols|first=Shaun|author2=Joshua Knobe|date=2007-12-01|title=Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions|journal=Noûs|volume=41|issue=4|pages=663–85|citeseerx=10.1.1.175.1091|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sarkissian|first=HAGOP|author2=Amita Chatterjee|author3=Felipe de Brigard|author4=Joshua Knobe|author5=Shaun Nichols|author6=Smita Sirker|s2cid=18837686|date=2010-06-01|title=Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?|journal=Mind & Language|volume=25|issue=3|pages=346–58|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x|issn=1468-0017|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAIBI-2 }}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1073/pnas.1012046108| pmid = 21149703| volume = 107| issue = 52| pages = 22469–74| last = Pronin| first = Emily|author2=Matthew B. Kugler| title = People believe they have more free will than others| journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences| date = 2010-12-28| bibcode = 2010PNAS..10722469P| pmc = 3012523| doi-access = free}}</ref> Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral responsibility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|date=March 2009|title=Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism|journal=Consciousness and Cognition|volume=18|issue=1|pages=342–50|doi=10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001|issn=1053-8100|pmid=18805023|s2cid=16953908}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> [[Roy Baumeister]] and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".<ref name=BAC>{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R. | last2 = Crescioni | first2 = A.W. | last3 = Alquist | first3 = J. | year = 2009 | title = Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture | journal = Neuroethics | volume =4| pages =1–11| doi = 10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4 | s2cid = 143223154 }}</ref><ref>Paulhus, D.L. and Margesson. A., (1994). ''Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale''. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia.</ref> The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions.<ref>Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in preparation.</ref> Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.<ref>Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Wagenaar | first1 = W.A. | year = 1972 | title = Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 77 | pages = 65–72 | doi = 10.1037/h0032060 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.211.9085 }}</ref> ====Among philosophers==== A recent 2020 survey has shown that compatibilism is quite a popular stance among those who specialize in philosophy (59.2%). Belief in libertarianism amounted to 18.8%, while a lack of belief in free will equaled 11.2%.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://dailynous.com/2021/11/01/what-philosophers-believe-results-from-the-2020-philpapers-survey/ | title=What Philosophers Believe: Results from the 2020 PhilPapers Survey | date=November 2021 }}</ref> ====Among evolutionary biologists==== 79 percent of evolutionary biologists said that they believe in free will according to a survey conducted in 2007, only 14 percent chose no free will, and 7 percent did not answer the question.<ref>Gregory W. Graffin and William B. Provine, "Evolution, Religion, and Free Will," American Scientist 95 (July–August 2007), 294–97; results of Cornell Evolution Project survey, http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/Evolution%20in%20America/evol%20religion%20free%20will.pdf.</ref> ====Effects of the belief itself==== {{see also|Self-efficacy}} Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in [[determinism]] that causes those negative effects.<ref name=BAC/> Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat.<ref name="Vohs&Sschooler2008">{{cite journal | last1 = Vohs | first1 = K.D. | last2 = Schooler | first2 = J.W. | s2cid = 2643260 | year = 2008 | title = The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating | journal = Psychological Science | volume = 19 | issue = 1| pages = 49–54 | doi = 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x | pmid = 18181791 }}</ref> In a study conducted by Roy Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a test where they would be rewarded with cash.<ref name="Baumeister 2009">{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R.F. | last2 = Masicampo | first2 = E.J. | last3 = DeWall | first3 = C.N. | s2cid = 16010829 | year = 2009 | title = Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 35 | issue = 2| pages = 260–68 | doi = 10.1177/0146167208327217 | pmid = 19141628 }}</ref> Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour.<ref name="Baumeister 2009" /> However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Monroe |first1=Andrew E. |last2=Brady |first2=Garrett L. |last3=Malle |first3=Bertram F. |title=This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |date=21 September 2016 |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=191–199 |doi=10.1177/1948550616667616|s2cid=152011660 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Crone |first1=Damien L. |last2=Levy |first2=Neil L. |title=Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not) |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |volume=10 |issue=5 |date=28 June 2018 |pages=612–619 |doi=10.1177/1948550618780732 |pmid=31249653 |pmc=6542011 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Caspar |first1=Emilie A. |last2=Vuillaume |first2=Laurène |last3=Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama |first3=Pedro A. |last4=Cleeremans |first4=Axel |title=The Influence of (Dis)belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=17 January 2017 |volume=8 |pages=20 |doi=10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020 |pmid=28144228 |pmc=5239816 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nadelhoffer |first1=Thomas |last2=Shepard |first2=Jason |last3=Crone |first3=Damien L. |last4=Everett |first4=Jim A.C. |last5=Earp |first5=Brian D. |last6=Levy |first6=Neil |title=Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will |journal=Cognition |date=October 2020 |volume=203 |pages=104342 |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342|pmid=32593841 |s2cid=220057834 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/NADDEA }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Buttrick |first1=Nicholas R. |last2=Aczel |first2=Balazs |last3=Aeschbach |first3=Lena F. |last4=Bakos |first4=Bence E. |last5=Brühlmann |first5=Florian |last6=Claypool |first6=Heather M. |last7=Hüffmeier |first7=Joachim |last8=Kovacs |first8=Marton |last9=Schuepfer |first9=Kurt |last10=Szecsi |first10=Peter |last11=Szuts |first11=Attila |last12=Szöke |first12=Orsolya |last13=Thomae |first13=Manuela |last14=Torka |first14=Ann-Kathrin |last15=Walker |first15=Ryan J. |last16=Wood |first16=Michael J. |title=Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1 |journal=Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science |date=September 2020 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=429–438 |doi=10.1177/2515245920917931|s2cid=227095775 |doi-access=free }}</ref> {{Quotebox|align=right|width=40%|quoted=1|quote= An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.|source=—[[Richard Holton]]<ref name=Holton/>}} Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate.<ref name=Holton/> First of all, free will can at least refer to either [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian (indeterministic) free will]] or [[Compatibilism|compatibilistic (deterministic) free will]]. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits.<ref name=Holton/> In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in [[fatalism]], which may provide an alternative explanation for previous experimental findings.<ref name=Holton>{{cite journal | last1 = Holton | first1 = Richard | year = 2011 | title = Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist | url =https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/71223/1/Holton_Baumeister.commentary.pdf | journal = Neuroethics | volume = 4 | pages = 13–16 | doi = 10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8 | hdl = 1721.1/71223 | s2cid = 143687015 | hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Miles | first1 = J.B. | year = 2011 | title = 'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 52 | issue = 2| pages = 205–18 | doi = 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02077.x |doi-access=free | pmid = 22074173 | pmc = 3757306 }}</ref> To test the effects of belief in determinism, it has been argued that future studies would need to provide articles that do not simply "attack free will", but instead focus on explaining determinism and compatibilism.<ref name=Holton/><ref>Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See {{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=D. Justin Coates|author3=Trevor Kvaran|s2cid=15648622|date=2007-09-01|title=Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions|journal=Midwest Studies in Philosophy|volume=31|issue=1|pages=214–42|doi=10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x|issn=1475-4975}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of [[counterfactual thinking]].<ref name=BAC/> This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others.<ref>{{cite journal | pmc=2408534 | year=2008 | last1=Epstude | first1=K. | last2=Roese | first2=N. J. | title=The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking | journal=Personality and Social Psychology Review | volume=12 | issue=2 | pages=168–192 | doi=10.1177/1088868308316091 | pmid=18453477 }}</ref> Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism.<ref name=Holton/> Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/1948550609351600| volume = 1| issue = 1| pages = 43–50| last = Stillman| first = Tyler F.|author2=Roy F. Baumeister |author3=Kathleen D. Vohs |author4=Nathaniel M. Lambert |author5=Frank D. Fincham |author6=Lauren E. Brewer | s2cid = 3023336| title = Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance| journal = Social Psychological and Personality Science| date = 2010-01-01}}</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page