Lyndon B. Johnson

====1968====
[[File:L B Johnson Model Khe Sanh.jpeg|thumb|[[Walt Rostow]], Johnson's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]], meeting with Johnson in the [[Situation Room]] in 1968, where the two reviewed a map of the region where the [[Battle of Khe Sanh]] was being waged]]
On January 30, the [[Viet Cong]] and [[North Vietnamese Army]] launched the [[Tet Offensive]] against South Vietnam's five largest cities, including Saigon and the U.S. embassy there. While the Tet Offensive failed militarily, it was a psychological victory, definitively turning American public opinion against the war. Iconically, [[Walter Cronkite]] of [[CBS News]], voted the nation's "most trusted person" in February, opined on the air that the conflict was deadlocked. Johnson reacted, saying "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=505–506}}</ref> Indeed, demoralization about the war was everywhere; 26&nbsp;percent then approved of Johnson's handling of Vietnam; 63&nbsp;percent disapproved. Johnson agreed to increase the troop level by 22,000, despite a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for ten times that number.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=509}}</ref> By March 1968, Johnson was secretly desperate for an honorable way out of the war. [[Clark Clifford]], the new Defense Secretary, described the war as "a loser" and proposed to "cut losses and get out".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=511}}</ref> On March 31, Johnson spoke to the nation of "Steps to Limit the War in Vietnam". He then announced an immediate unilateral halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and announced his intention to seek out peace talks anywhere at any time. At the close of his speech [[Shermanesque statement|he announced]], "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=513}}</ref>

In March, Johnson decided to restrict future bombing with the result that 75&nbsp;percent of North Vietnam's territory, containing 90&nbsp;percent of its population, was off-limits to bombing. In April he succeeded in opening discussions of peace talks, and after extensive negotiations over the site, Paris was agreed to and talks began in May. When the talks failed to yield any results the decision was made to resort to private discussions in Paris,<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=538–541}}</ref> which after two months were no more productive.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=564}}</ref>

As casualties mounted and success seemed less immediately possible, Johnson's popularity plummeted. College students and others protested, burned [[Conscription in the United States|draft]] cards, and chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"<ref name="scholastic"/> Johnson could scarcely travel anywhere without facing protests, and was not allowed by the Secret Service to attend the [[1968 Democratic National Convention]], where thousands of [[hippies]], [[yippies]], [[Black Panther Party|Black Panthers]] and other opponents of Johnson's policies converged to protest.<ref>Frank Kusch, ''Battleground Chicago: The Police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention'' (Chicago: [[University of Chicago Press]], 2008), p. 62.</ref> Thus by 1968, the public was polarized, with the "hawks" rejecting Johnson's refusal to continue the war indefinitely, and the "doves" rejecting his current war policies. Support for Johnson's middle position continued to shrink until he finally rejected containment and sought a peace settlement. By late summer, he realized that Nixon was closer to his position than Humphrey. He continued to support Humphrey publicly in the election, and personally despised Nixon. One of Johnson's well-known quotes was "the Democratic party at its worst, is still better than the Republican party at its best".<ref>{{harvnb|Gould|2010|p=98}}</ref>

Despite recommendations in August from Harriman, Vance, Clifford, and Bundy to halt bombing as an incentive for Hanoi to engage in substantive peace talks, Johnson refused.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=569}}</ref> In October, when the parties came close to an agreement on a bombing halt, Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon intervened with the South Vietnamese, making promises of better terms, to delay a settlement until after the election.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=584–585}}</ref> After the election, Johnson's primary focus on Vietnam was to get Saigon to join the Paris peace talks. Only after Nixon added his urging did they do so. Even then they argued about procedural matters until after Nixon took office.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=597}}</ref>