Lyndon B. Johnson

====1966====
[[File:Visit of President Johnson in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|Johnson awarding a medal to a U.S. soldier during a visit to [[South Vietnam]] in 1966]]
Public and political impatience with the war began to emerge in the spring of 1966, and Johnson's approval ratings reached a new low of 41&nbsp;percent. [[Richard Russell Jr.|Sen. Richard Russell]], chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], declared in June 1966 that it was time to "get it over or get out". Johnson responded, telling media, "we are trying to provide the maximum deterrence that we can to communist aggression with a minimum of cost."<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=364–365}}</ref> In response to the intensified criticism of the war effort, Johnson raised suspicions of communist subversion in the country, and press relations became strained.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=366}}</ref> Johnson's primary opponent of his [[Vietnam War]] policies in Congress was [[James William Fulbright]], chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]],<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=369}}</ref> who convened a series of public hearings in February on the progress of the war.<ref>[https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-28/1966-fulbright-hearings-vietnam-parted-curtains-president-johnsons-conduct-war "The 1966 Fulbright hearings on Vietnam parted the curtains on President Johnson's conduct of the war"], September 28, 2017, PRI.org.</ref> Johnson began to seriously consider a more focused bombing campaign against [[North Vietnam]]'s petroleum, oil, and lubrication facilities in hopes of accelerating victory.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=372–373}}</ref> Humphrey, Rusk, and McNamara all agreed, and the bombing began at the end of June.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=373–374}}</ref> In July, polling results indicated that Americans favored the bombing campaign by a five-to-one margin; however, in August a [[United States Department of Defense|U.S. Defense Department]] study indicated that the bombing campaign was having minimal impact on North Vietnam.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=376}}</ref>

In fall 1966, multiple sources reported that progress was being made against the North Vietnamese logistics and infrastructure; Johnson was urged from every corner to begin peace discussions. There was no shortage of peace initiatives; nevertheless, among protesters, English philosopher Bertrand Russell attacked Johnson's policy as "a barbaric aggressive war of conquest", and in June he initiated the [[Russell Tribunal|International War Crimes Tribunal]] to condemn the American effort.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p= 380}}</ref> The gap with Hanoi was an unbridgeable demand on both sides for a unilateral end to bombing and withdrawal of forces. In August, Johnson appointed [[Averell Harriman]] "Ambassador for Peace" to promote negotiations. Westmoreland and McNamara recommended a concerted program to promote pacification; Johnson formally placed this effort under military control in October.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=381}}</ref> Also in October 1966, to reassure and promote his war effort, Johnson initiated a meeting with allies in [[Manila]], including representatives from [[South Vietnam]], [[Thailand]], [[South Korea]], the [[Philippines]], [[Australia]], and [[New Zealand]].<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=383}}</ref> The conference ended with pronouncements to stand fast against communist aggression and to promote ideals of democracy and development in Vietnam and across Asia.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=384}}</ref> For Johnson, it was a fleeting public relations success as approval for Johnson's Vietnam policies reached 63 percent in November. The following month, in December, however, Johnson's Vietnam approval rating fell back down to the 40s; Johnson had become anxious about his ability to justify further war casualties, and he talked of the need for a decisive victory despite the growing unpopularity of the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=385–386}}</ref> In a discussion about the war with former President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] on October 3, 1966, Johnson said he was "trying to win it just as fast as I can in every way that I know how" and later stated that he needed "all the help I can get".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/Press.hom/tape_release_11_2006.shtm |title=LBJ Library releases telephone conversation recordings |publisher=Lbjlib.utexas.edu |access-date=October 6, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080611221222/http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/Press.hom/tape_release_11_2006.shtm |archive-date=June 11, 2008}}</ref>

By the end of 1966, it was clear that pacification efforts, like the bombing campaign, were proving ineffective. Johnson agreed to McNamara's new recommendation to add 70,000 troops in 1967 to the 400,000 previously that were already in Vietnam. While McNamara recommended no increased bombings, Johnson agreed with [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] recommendations to increase the bombings.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=386–388}}</ref> Despite initial secret talks being held with [[North Vietnam]] in [[Saigon]], [[Hanoi]], and [[Warsaw]], the bombings increased, which led to a discontinuation of the talks, which North Vietnam labeled as not genuine.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=390}}</ref>