Free will

==Scientific approaches==
Science has contributed to the free will problem in at least three ways. First, physics has addressed the question of whether nature is deterministic, which is viewed as crucial by incompatibilists (compatibilists, however, view it as irrelevant). Second, although free will can be defined in various ways, all of them involve aspects of the way people make decisions and initiate actions, which have been studied extensively by neuroscientists. Some of the experimental observations are widely viewed as implying that free will does not exist or is an illusion (but many philosophers see this as a misunderstanding). Third, psychologists have studied the beliefs that the majority of ordinary people hold about free will and its role in assigning moral responsibility.

From an anthropological perspective, free will can be regarded as an explanation for human behavior that justifies a socially sanctioned system of rewards and punishments.  Under this definition, free will may be described as a political ideology.  In a society where people are taught to believe that humans have free will, free will may be described as a political doctrine.

===Quantum physics===
Early scientific thought often portrayed the universe as deterministic&nbsp;– for example in the thought of [[Democritus]] or the [[Cārvāka]]ns&nbsp;– and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient information would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand, is a mixture of deterministic and [[stochastic]] theories.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Boniolo |first1=G. |title=Filosofia della Scienza |last2=Vidali |first2=P. |publisher=Mondadori |year=1999 |isbn=88-424-9359-7 |location=Milan}}</ref> [[Quantum mechanics]] predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all, although evolution of the universal state vector{{explain|date=April 2024}} is completely deterministic. Current physical theories cannot resolve the question of whether determinism is true of the world, being very far from a potential [[theory of everything]], and open to many different [[Interpretation of quantum mechanics|interpretations]].<ref name="stanfordcausaldeterminism">{{cite encyclopedia |first=Carl |last=Hoefer |title=Causal Determinism |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2008 |access-date=2008-11-01 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title=Is the Universe Deterministic? |first=Vlatko |last=Vedral |volume=192 |issue=2578 |date=2006-11-18 |journal=New Scientist |pages=52–55 |quote=Physics is simply unable to resolve the question of free will, although, if anything, it probably leans towards determinism.|doi=10.1016/S0262-4079(06)61122-6 }}</ref>
 
Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, one may still object that such indeterminism is for all practical purposes confined to microscopic phenomena.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousHonderichKanebook.htm |author=Honderich, E.|title= Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem |publisher=Ucl.ac.uk |access-date=2010-11-21}}</ref> This is not always the case: many macroscopic phenomena are based on quantum effects. For instance, some [[hardware random number generator]]s work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals. A more significant question is whether the indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for the traditional idea of free will (based on a perception of free will). If a person's action is, however, only a result of complete quantum randomness, mental processes as experienced have no influence on the probabilistic outcomes (such as volition).<ref name="RKane1"/> According to many interpretations, indeterminism enables free will to exist,<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/quantum-physics-free-will/ | title=The Quantum Physics of Free Will| website=[[Scientific American]]}}</ref> while others assert the opposite (because the action was not controllable by the physical being who claims to possess the free will).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/features/2000/lujan1.html |title=Infidels. "Metaphysical Freedom" |date=25 August 2000 |publisher=Infidels.org |access-date=2010-11-21}}</ref>

===Genetics===
Like physicists, [[biologist]]s have frequently addressed questions related to free will. One of the most heated debates in biology is that of "[[nature versus nurture]]", concerning the relative importance of genetics and biology as compared to culture and environment in human behavior.<ref name="Pin">{{Cite book |last=Pinel |first=P.J. |title=Biopsychology |publisher=Prentice Hall Inc. |year=1990 |isbn=88-15-07174-1}}</ref> The view of many researchers is that many human behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, and evolutionary histories.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=DeFries |first1=J.C. |title=Behavioral Genetics |last2=McGuffin |first2=P. |last3=McClearn |first3=G.E. |last4=Plomin |first4=R. |publisher=W.H. Freeman and Company |year=2000 |edition=4th}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Morris |first=D. |title=The Naked Ape |publisher=McGraw-Hill |year=1967 |isbn=0-385-33430-3 |location=New York}}</ref><ref name="Dawk">{{Cite book |last=Dawkins |first=R. |title=The Selfish Gene |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1976 |isbn=88-04-39318-1 |location=Oxford}}</ref> This point of view raises the fear that such attribution makes it impossible to hold others responsible for their actions. [[Steven Pinker]]'s view is that fear of determinism in the context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake, that it is "a confusion of ''explanation'' with ''exculpation''". Responsibility does not require that behavior be uncaused, as long as behavior responds to praise and blame.<ref name="Pink">{{Cite book |last=Pinker |first=S. |title=The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature' |publisher=Penguin |year=2002 |isbn=0-14-200334-4 |location=London |page=179}}</ref> Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination.<ref name="Lew">{{Cite book |last=Lewontin |first=R. |title=It Ain't Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and other Illusions |publisher=NYREV Inc. |year=2000 |isbn=88-420-6418-1 |location=New York}}</ref>

===Neuroscience and neurophilosophy===
{{Main|Neurophilosophy|Neuroscience of free will}}
{{see also|Neurostimulation}}

It has become possible to study the living [[Human brain|brain]], and researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making process at work. A seminal experiment in this field was conducted by [[Benjamin Libet]] in the 1980s, in which he asked each subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain; in particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the [[readiness potential]] (after German [[Bereitschaftspotential]], which was discovered by [[Hans Helmut Kornhuber|Kornhuber]] & [[Lüder Deecke|Deecke]] in 1965.<ref>[[Hans Helmut Kornhuber|Kornhuber]] & [[Lüder Deecke|Deecke]], 1965. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkürbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflügers Arch 284: 1–17.</ref>). Although it was well known that the readiness potential reliably preceded the physical action, Libet asked whether it could be recorded before the conscious intention to move. To determine when subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock. After making a movement, the volunteer reported the time on the clock when they first felt the conscious intention to move; this became known as Libet's W time.<ref name="LGW" />

Libet found that the ''unconscious'' brain activity of the readiness potential leading up to subjects' movements began approximately half a second before the subject was aware of a conscious intention to move.<ref name="LGW"/><ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1017/S0140525X00044903 | last1 = Libet | first1 = B. | s2cid = 6965339 | year = 1985 | title = Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action | journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences | volume = 8 | issue = 4| pages = 529–66 }}</ref>

These studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears ''after'' the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision ''before'' the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset.<ref name=Libet>
{{cite journal|title=Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential) |author=Benjamin Libet |display-authors=etal |journal=Brain |year=1983 |volume=106 |pages=623–42 |url=http://trans-techresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Brain-1983-LIBET.pdf |doi=10.1093/brain/106.3.623 |pmid=6640273 |issue=3 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130526054605/http://trans-techresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Brain-1983-LIBET.pdf |archive-date=2013-05-26 }}</ref> However, these authors also found that awareness of action was ''anticipatory'' to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the ''onset'' of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.<ref name=Strother>{{cite journal|title=The conscious experience of action and intention |author1=Lars Strother |author2=Sukhvinder Singh Obhi |journal=Exp Brain Res |volume=198 |year=2009 |pages=535–39 |doi=10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7 |url=http://publish.uwo.ca/~lstroth/StrotherObhi_EBR_2009.pdf |issue=4 |pmid=19641911 |s2cid=43567513 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141217013640/http://publish.uwo.ca/~lstroth/StrotherObhi_EBR_2009.pdf |archive-date=2014-12-17 }}</ref><ref name= Rosenbaum>A brief discussion of possible interpretation of these results is found in {{cite book |title=Human Motor Control |page=86 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MsFmds_ACBwC&pg=PA86 |isbn=978-0-12-374226-1 |year=2009 |edition=2nd |publisher=Academic Press |author=David A. Rosenbaum}}</ref>

Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350 [[Millisecond|ms]]; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..."<ref name=Gallagher>{{cite book |title=Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? |author= Gallagher, Shaun|chapter=Chapter 6: Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will |editor=Susan Pockett |editor2=William P. Banks |editor3=Shaun Gallagher |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G5CaTnNksgkC&pg=PA119 |pages=119–21 |isbn=978-0-262-51257-2 |publisher=MIT Press |year=2009}}</ref> The bearing of timing experiments upon free will is still under discussion.

More studies have since been conducted, including some that try to:
* support Libet's original findings
* suggest that the cancelling or "veto" of an action may first arise subconsciously as well
* explain the underlying brain structures involved
* suggest models that explain the relationship between conscious intention and action

Benjamin Libet's results are quoted<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wegner |first=D. |title=The Illusion of Conscious Will |publisher=MIT Press |year=2002 |location=Cambridge, MA |author-link=Daniel Wegner}}</ref> in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In ''[[Freedom Evolves]]'', [[Daniel Dennett]] argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results. Kornhuber and Deecke underlined that absence of conscious will during the early Bereitschaftspotential (termed BP1) is not a proof of the non-existence of free will, as also unconscious agendas may be free and non-deterministic. According to their suggestion, man has relative freedom, i.e. freedom in degrees, that can be increased or decreased through deliberate choices that involve both conscious and unconscious (panencephalic) processes.<ref>[[Hans Helmut Kornhuber|Kornhuber]] & [[Lüder Deecke|Deecke]], 2012. ''The will and its brain – an appraisal of reasoned free will''. University Press of America, Lanham, MD, {{ISBN|978-0-7618-5862-1}}.</ref>

Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power... as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".<ref name="Flanagan1992">{{cite book |first=O.J. |last=Flanagan |year=1992 |title=Consciousness Reconsidered |series=Bradford Books |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-56077-1 |lccn=lc92010057 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yFOqQgAACAAJ |page=131}}</ref>

Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.<ref>{{cite journal|pmc=3746176 | pmid=23966921 | doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385 | volume=7 | title=Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late? | year=2013 | journal=Front Hum Neurosci | pages=385 | last1 = Guggisberg | first1 = AG | last2 = Mottaz | first2 = A| doi-access=free }}</ref>

A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences<ref>{{cite journal|title=An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement |first1=Aaron|last1=Schurger |first2=Jacobo D.|last2=Sitt|first3=Stanislas|last3=Dehaene|date=16 October 2012 |journal=PNAS|volume=109|issue=42|pages=16776–77 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1210467109|pmid=22869750|pmc=3479453|bibcode=2012PNAS..109E2904S|doi-access=free}}</ref> challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's<ref name="LGW">{{cite journal |doi=10.1093/brain/106.3.623 |title=Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential) |year=1983 |last1=Libet |first1=Benjamin |last2=Gleason |first2=Curtis A. |last3=Wright |first3=Elwood W. |last4=Pearl |first4=Dennis K. |journal=Brain |volume=106 |issue=3 |pages=623–42 |pmid=6640273}}</ref> and Fried's.<ref name=Fried>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045 |title=Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition |year=2011 |last1=Fried |first1=Itzhak |last2=Mukamel |first2=Roy |last3=Kreiman |first3=Gabriel |journal=Neuron |volume=69 |issue=3 |pages=548–62 |pmid=21315264 |pmc=3052770}}</ref>

A study that compared deliberate and arbitrary decisions, found that the early signs of decision are absent for the deliberate ones.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Maoz|first1=Uri|last2=Yaffe|first2=Gideon|last3=Koch|first3=Christof|last4=Mudrik|first4=Liad|date=2019-02-28|title=Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice|journal=eLife|volume=8|doi=10.7554/elife.39787|pmid=31642807|pmc=6809608 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

It has been shown that in several brain-related conditions, individuals cannot entirely control their own actions, though the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will. Neuroscientific studies are valuable tools in developing models of how humans experience free will.

For example, people with [[Tourette syndrome]] and related [[tic disorder]]s make involuntary movements and utterances (called [[tic]]s) despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or ''unvoluntary'',<ref name=TSADef>Tourette Syndrome Association. [https://web.archive.org/web/20050322170245/http://www.tsa-usa.org/research/definitions.html Definitions and Classification of Tic Disorders.]. Retrieved 19 August 2006.</ref> because they are not strictly ''involuntary'': they may be experienced as a ''voluntary'' response to an unwanted, premonitory urge. Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed.<ref name=TSADef/> People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward. The control exerted (from seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.<ref name=Zinner>{{cite journal | last1 = Zinner | first1 = S.H. | year = 2000 | title = Tourette disorder | journal = Pediatrics in Review| volume = 21 | issue = 11| pmid = 11077021 | pages = 372–83 | doi=10.1542/pir.21-11-372| s2cid = 7774922 }}</ref>

In [[alien hand syndrome]], the affected individual's limb will produce unintentional movements without the will of the person. The affected limb effectively demonstrates 'a will of its own.' The [[sense of agency]] does not emerge in conjunction with the overt appearance of the purposeful act even though the sense of ownership in relationship to the body part is maintained. This phenomenon corresponds with an impairment in the premotor mechanism manifested temporally by the appearance of the readiness potential recordable on the scalp several hundred milliseconds before the overt appearance of a spontaneous willed movement. Using [[functional magnetic resonance imaging]] with specialized multivariate analyses to study the temporal dimension in the activation of the cortical network associated with voluntary movement in human subjects, an anterior-to-posterior sequential activation process beginning in the supplementary motor area on the medial surface of the frontal lobe and progressing to the primary motor cortex and then to parietal cortex has been observed.<ref name=Kayser>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1002/hbm.20771 | last1 = Kayser | first1 = A.S. | last2 = Sun | first2 = F.T. | last3 = D'Esposito | first3 = M. | year = 2009 | title = A comparison of Granger causality and coherency in fMRI-based analysis of the motor system | journal = Human Brain Mapping | volume = 30 | issue = 11| pages = 3475–94 | pmid = 19387980 | pmc = 2767459 }}</ref> The sense of agency thus appears to normally emerge in conjunction with this orderly sequential network activation incorporating premotor association cortices together with primary motor cortex. In particular, the supplementary motor complex on the medial surface of the frontal lobe appears to activate prior to primary motor cortex presumably in associated with a preparatory pre-movement process. In a recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging, alien movements were characterized by a relatively isolated activation of the primary motor cortex contralateral to the alien hand, while voluntary movements of the same body part included the natural activation of motor association cortex associated with the premotor process.<ref name=Assal>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1002/ana.21173 | last1 = Assal | first1 = F. | last2 = Schwartz | first2 = S. | last3 = Vuilleumier | first3 = P. | s2cid = 14180577 | year = 2007 | title = Moving with or without will: Functional neural correlates of alien hand syndrome | journal = Annals of Neurology | volume = 62 | issue = 3| pages = 301–06 | pmid = 17638304 }}</ref> The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a ''will of its own,'' together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original).<ref name=Doody>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1136/jnnp.55.9.806 | last1 = Doody | first1 = RS | last2 = Jankovic | first2 = J. | year = 1992 | title = The alien hand and related signs | journal = Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry | volume = 55 | issue = 9| pages = 806–10 | pmid = 1402972 | pmc = 1015106 }}</ref> This syndrome is often a result of damage to the [[corpus callosum]], either when it is severed to treat intractable [[epilepsy]] or due to a [[stroke]]. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will.<ref name=Scepkowski>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1177/1534582303260119 | last1 = Scepkowski | first1 = L.A. | last2 = Cronin-Golomb | first2 = A. | year = 2003 | title = The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates | journal = Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews | volume = 2 | issue = 4| pages = 261–77 | pmid = 15006289 }}</ref><ref name=Bundick>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1136/jnnp.68.1.83 | last1 = Bundick | first1 = T. | last2 = Spinella | first2 = M. | year = 2000 | title = Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome | journal = Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry | volume = 68 | issue = 1| pages = 83–85 | pmid = 10601408 | pmc = 1760620 }}</ref>

In addition, one of the most important ("first rank") diagnostic symptoms of [[schizophrenia]] is the patient's delusion of being controlled by an external force.<ref name="Schneider">{{Cite book |last=Schneider |first=K. |title=Clinical Psychopathology |publisher=Grune and Stratton |year=1959 |location=New York}}</ref> People with schizophrenia will sometimes report that, although they are acting in the world, they do not recall initiating the particular actions they performed. This is sometimes likened to being a robot controlled by someone else. Although the neural mechanisms of schizophrenia are not yet clear, one influential hypothesis is that there is a breakdown in brain systems that compare motor commands with the feedback received from the body (known as [[proprioception]]), leading to attendant [[hallucination]]s and delusions of control.<ref name=frith>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1016/S0165-0173(99)00052-1 | last1 = Frith | first1 = CD | last2 = Blakemore | first2 = S | last3 = Wolpert | first3 = DM | title = Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action | journal = Brain Research. Brain Research Reviews | volume = 31 | issue = 2–3 | pages = 357–63 | year = 2000 | pmid = 10719163 | s2cid = 206021496 }}</ref>

===Experimental psychology===
{{See also|Cognitive science|Cognitive psychology|Neuroscience}}
[[Experimental psychology]]'s contributions to the free will debate have come primarily through social psychologist [[Daniel Wegner]]'s work on conscious will. In his book, ''The Illusion of Conscious Will,''<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|url=https://zodml.org/sites/default/files/%5bDaniel_M._Wegner%5d_The_Illusion_of_Conscious_Will.pdf|title=The Illusion of Conscious Will|last=Wegener|first=Daniel Merton|publisher=MIT Press|year=2002|isbn=978-0-262-23222-7|access-date=2018-12-12|archive-date=2018-12-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181212162904/https://zodml.org/sites/default/files/%5bDaniel_M._Wegner%5d_The_Illusion_of_Conscious_Will.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> Wegner summarizes what he believes is [[empirical evidence]] supporting the view that human perception of conscious control is an illusion. Wegner summarizes some empirical evidence that may suggest that the perception of conscious control is open to modification (or even manipulation). Wegner observes that one event is inferred to have caused a second event when two requirements are met:
# The first event immediately precedes the second event, and
# The first event is consistent with having caused the second event.
For example, if a person hears an explosion and sees a tree fall down that person is likely to infer that the explosion caused the tree to fall over. However, if the explosion occurs after the tree falls down (that is, the first requirement is not met), or rather than an explosion, the person hears the ring of a telephone (that is, the second requirement is not met), then that person is not likely to infer that either noise caused the tree to fall down.

Wegner has applied this principle to the inferences people make about their own conscious will. People typically experience a thought that is consistent with a behavior, and then they observe themselves performing this behavior. As a result, people infer that their thoughts must have caused the observed behavior. However, Wegner has been able to manipulate people's thoughts and behaviors so as to conform to or violate the two requirements for causal inference.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480 | last1 = Wegner | first1 = D.M. | last2 = Wheatley | first2 = T. | year = 1999 | title = Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will | journal = American Psychologist | volume = 54 | issue = 7| pages = 480–91 | pmid=10424155| citeseerx = 10.1.1.188.8271 }}</ref> Through such work, Wegner has been able to show that people often experience conscious will over behaviors that they have not, in fact, caused&nbsp;– and conversely, that people can be led to experience a lack of will over behaviors they did cause. For instance, [[priming (psychology)|priming]] subjects with information about an effect increases the probability that a person falsely believes is the cause.<ref>{{Cite journal
| doi = 10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001
| pmid = 16091264
| year = 2005
| last1 = Aarts | first1 = H.
| last2 = Custers | first2 = R.
| last3 = Wegner | first3 = D.
| title = On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information.
| volume = 14
| issue = 3
| pages = 439–58
| journal = Consciousness and Cognition
| s2cid = 13991023
}}</ref> The implication for such work is that the perception of conscious will (which he says might be more accurately labelled as 'the emotion of authorship') is not tethered to the execution of actual behaviors, but is inferred from various cues through an intricate mental process, ''authorship processing''. Although many interpret this work as a blow against the argument for free will, both psychologists<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kihlstrom|first=John|title=An unwarrantable impertinence|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|year=2004|volume=27|pages=666–67|doi=10.1017/S0140525X04300154|issue=5|s2cid=144699878}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=John Baer |author2=James C. Kaufman |author3=Roy F. Baumeister |title=Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will|year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press.|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-518963-6|pages=155–80|url=http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/AutomaticityJuggernaut.htm}}</ref> and philosophers<ref>{{cite journal|last=Nahmias |first=Eddy |title=When consciousness matters: a critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will |journal=Philosophical Psychology |year=2002 |volume=15 |issue=4 |doi=10.1080/0951508021000042049 |url=http://www2.gsu.edu/~phlean/papers/When_Consciousness_Matters.pdf |pages=527–41 |s2cid=16949962 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813113509/http://www2.gsu.edu/~phlean/papers/When_Consciousness_Matters.pdf |archive-date=2011-08-13 }}</ref><ref name=Power>{{cite book|last=Mele|first=Alfred R.|title=Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will|year=2009|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=US|isbn=978-0-19-538426-0|url=http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/academic/pn/9780199764686.do?sortby=bookTitleAscend|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111113052610/http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/academic/pn/9780199764686.do?sortby=bookTitleAscend|archive-date=2011-11-13}}</ref> have criticized Wegner's theories.

[[Emily Pronin]] has argued that the subjective experience of free will is supported by the [[introspection illusion]]. This is the tendency for people to trust the reliability of their own introspections while distrusting the introspections of other people. The theory implies that people will more readily attribute free will to themselves rather than others. This prediction has been confirmed by three of Pronin and Kugler's experiments. When college students were asked about personal decisions in their own and their roommate's lives, they regarded their own choices as less predictable. Staff at a restaurant described their co-workers' lives as more determined (having fewer future possibilities) than their own lives. When weighing up the influence of different factors on behavior, students gave desires and intentions the strongest weight for their own behavior, but rated personality traits as most predictive of other people.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Pronin|first=Emily|title=Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41|editor=Mark P. Zanna|chapter=The Introspection Illusion |volume=41|publisher=Academic Press|pages=42–43|year=2009|isbn=978-0-12-374472-2|doi=10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00401-2}}</ref>

Caveats have, however, been identified in studying a subject's awareness of mental events, in that the process of introspection itself may alter the experience.<ref name=Pockett>{{cite book|title=Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? |chapter=The neuroscience of movement |author=Susan Pockett |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G5CaTnNksgkC&pg=PA19 |page=19 |editor1=Susan Pockett |editor2=WP Banks |editor3=Shaun Gallagher |publisher=MIT Press |year =2009 |isbn=978-0-262-51257-2|quote=...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and the content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all.}}</ref>

Regardless of the validity of belief in free will, it may be beneficial to understand where the idea comes from. One contribution is randomness.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Ebert | first1 = J.P. | last2 = Wegner | first2 = D.M. | year = 2011 | title = March 1). Mistaking randomness for free will | url =https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/1/9029778/1/Ebert%2c%20J.%20P.%2c%20and%20D.%20M.%20Wegner.%20Mistaking%20randomness%20for%20free%20will.%20Consciousness%20and%20Cognition%2020%20%282011%29%20965-971.pdf | journal = Consciousness and Cognition | volume = 20 | issue = 3| pages = 965–71 | doi = 10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.012 | pmid = 21367624 | s2cid = 19502601 }}</ref> While it is established that randomness is not the only factor in the perception of the free will, it has been shown that randomness can be mistaken as free will due to its indeterminacy. This misconception applies both when considering oneself and others. Another contribution is choice.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Feldman | first1 = G. | last2 = Baumeister | first2 = R.F. | last3 = Wong | first3 = K.F. | year = 2014 | title = July 30). Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will | journal = Journal of Experimental Social Psychology | volume = 55 | pages = 239–45 | doi = 10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012 }}</ref> It has been demonstrated that people's belief in free will increases if presented with a simple level of choice. The specificity of the amount of choice is important, as too little or too great a degree of choice may negatively influence belief. It is also likely that the associative relationship between level of choice and perception of free will is influentially bidirectional. It is also possible that one's desire for control, or other basic motivational patterns, act as a third variable.

=== Other experiments ===
Other experiments have also been proposed to test free will. Ender Tosun argues for the reality of free will, based on combined experiments consisting of empirical and thought experiments. In the empirical part of these experiments, experimenter 2 is expected to predict which object experimenter 1 will touch. Experimenter 1 is always able to negate the prediction of experimenter 2. In the thought experiment part, Laplace's demon makes the predictions and experimenter 1 is never able to negate his predictions. Based on the non-correspondence of the predictions of experimenter 2 in the empirical experiment with the predictions of Laplace's demon, and contradictions in the possible layers of causality, Tosun concludes that free will is real. He also extends these experiments to indeterministic processes and real-time brain observations while willing, assuming that an agent has every technological means to probe and rewire his brain. In this thought experiment, experimenter 1 notices the "circuit" of his brain which disables him from willing one of the alternatives, then he probes other circuits to see if he can have the will to rewire that circuit. Experimenter 1 notices that all circuits of his brain being so as to prevent him from rewiring or bypassing the circuits which prevent him from willing to touch one of the objects is impossible.{{cn|date=January 2023}}

===Believing in free will{{anchor|Believing in free will}}===
Since at least 1959,<ref name="Nettler1959">{{cite journal |last1=Nettler |first1=Gwynn |title=Cruelty, Dignity, and Determinism |journal=American Sociological Review |date=June 1959 |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=375–384 |doi=10.2307/2089386|jstor=2089386 }}</ref> free will belief in individuals has been analysed with respect to traits in social behaviour. In general, the concept of free will researched to date in this context has been that of the incompatibilist, or more specifically, the libertarian, that is freedom from determinism.

====What people believe====
Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive&nbsp;– it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=Stephen G Morris|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|author4=Jason Turner|date=2006-07-01|title=Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=73|issue=1|pages=28–53|citeseerx=10.1.1.364.1083|doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x|issn=1933-1592}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive&nbsp;– it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|author3=Thomas Nadelhoffer|date=2009-02-01|title=Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board|journal=Mind & Language|volume=24|issue=1|pages=1–23|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x|issn=1468-0017}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response&nbsp;– for example if it involves harming another human being.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Nichols|first=Shaun|author2=Joshua Knobe|date=2007-12-01|title=Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions|journal=Noûs|volume=41|issue=4|pages=663–85|citeseerx=10.1.1.175.1091|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref> They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sarkissian|first=HAGOP|author2=Amita Chatterjee|author3=Felipe de Brigard|author4=Joshua Knobe|author5=Shaun Nichols|author6=Smita Sirker|s2cid=18837686|date=2010-06-01|title=Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?|journal=Mind & Language|volume=25|issue=3|pages=346–58|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x|issn=1468-0017|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAIBI-2 }}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1073/pnas.1012046108| pmid = 21149703| volume = 107| issue = 52| pages = 22469–74| last = Pronin| first = Emily|author2=Matthew B. Kugler| title = People believe they have more free will than others| journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences| date = 2010-12-28| bibcode = 2010PNAS..10722469P| pmc = 3012523| doi-access = free}}</ref>

Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral responsibility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Feltz|first=Adam|author2=Edward T. Cokely|date=March 2009|title=Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism|journal=Consciousness and Cognition|volume=18|issue=1|pages=342–50|doi=10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001|issn=1053-8100|pmid=18805023|s2cid=16953908}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

[[Roy Baumeister]] and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".<ref name=BAC>{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R. | last2 = Crescioni | first2 = A.W. | last3 = Alquist | first3 = J. | year = 2009 | title = Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture | journal = Neuroethics | volume =4| pages =1–11| doi = 10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4 | s2cid = 143223154 }}</ref><ref>Paulhus, D.L. and Margesson. A., (1994). ''Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale''. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia.</ref>

The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions.<ref>Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in preparation.</ref> Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.<ref>Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Wagenaar | first1 = W.A. | year = 1972 | title = Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 77 | pages = 65–72 | doi = 10.1037/h0032060 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.211.9085 }}</ref>

====Among philosophers====
A recent 2020 survey has shown that compatibilism is quite a popular stance among those who specialize in philosophy (59.2%). Belief in libertarianism amounted to 18.8%, while a lack of belief in free will equaled 11.2%.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://dailynous.com/2021/11/01/what-philosophers-believe-results-from-the-2020-philpapers-survey/ | title=What Philosophers Believe: Results from the 2020 PhilPapers Survey | date=November 2021 }}</ref>

====Among evolutionary biologists====
79 percent of evolutionary biologists said that they believe in free will according to a survey conducted in 2007, only 14 percent chose no free will, and 7 percent did not answer the question.<ref>Gregory W. Graffin and William B. Provine, "Evolution, Religion, and Free Will," American Scientist 95 (July–August 2007), 294–97; results of Cornell Evolution Project survey,
http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/Evolution%20in%20America/evol%20religion%20free%20will.pdf.</ref>

====Effects of the belief itself====
{{see also|Self-efficacy}}

Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in [[determinism]] that causes those negative effects.<ref name=BAC/> Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat.<ref name="Vohs&Sschooler2008">{{cite journal | last1 = Vohs | first1 = K.D. | last2 = Schooler | first2 = J.W. | s2cid = 2643260 | year = 2008 | title = The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating | journal = Psychological Science | volume = 19 | issue = 1| pages = 49–54 | doi = 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x | pmid = 18181791 }}</ref> In a study conducted by Roy Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a test where they would be rewarded with cash.<ref name="Baumeister 2009">{{cite journal | last1 = Baumeister | first1 = R.F. | last2 = Masicampo | first2 = E.J. | last3 = DeWall | first3 = C.N. | s2cid = 16010829 | year = 2009 | title = Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 35 | issue = 2| pages = 260–68 | doi = 10.1177/0146167208327217 | pmid = 19141628 }}</ref> Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour.<ref name="Baumeister 2009" /> However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Monroe |first1=Andrew E. |last2=Brady |first2=Garrett L. |last3=Malle |first3=Bertram F. |title=This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |date=21 September 2016 |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=191–199 |doi=10.1177/1948550616667616|s2cid=152011660 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Crone |first1=Damien L. |last2=Levy |first2=Neil L. |title=Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not) |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science |volume=10 |issue=5 |date=28 June 2018 |pages=612–619 |doi=10.1177/1948550618780732 |pmid=31249653 |pmc=6542011 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Caspar |first1=Emilie A. |last2=Vuillaume |first2=Laurène |last3=Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama |first3=Pedro A. |last4=Cleeremans |first4=Axel |title=The Influence of (Dis)belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=17 January 2017 |volume=8 |pages=20 |doi=10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020 |pmid=28144228 |pmc=5239816 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nadelhoffer |first1=Thomas |last2=Shepard |first2=Jason |last3=Crone |first3=Damien L. |last4=Everett |first4=Jim A.C. |last5=Earp |first5=Brian D. |last6=Levy |first6=Neil |title=Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will |journal=Cognition |date=October 2020 |volume=203 |pages=104342 |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342|pmid=32593841 |s2cid=220057834 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/NADDEA }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Buttrick |first1=Nicholas R. |last2=Aczel |first2=Balazs |last3=Aeschbach |first3=Lena F. |last4=Bakos |first4=Bence E. |last5=Brühlmann |first5=Florian |last6=Claypool |first6=Heather M. |last7=Hüffmeier |first7=Joachim |last8=Kovacs |first8=Marton |last9=Schuepfer |first9=Kurt |last10=Szecsi |first10=Peter |last11=Szuts |first11=Attila |last12=Szöke |first12=Orsolya |last13=Thomae |first13=Manuela |last14=Torka |first14=Ann-Kathrin |last15=Walker |first15=Ryan J. |last16=Wood |first16=Michael J. |title=Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1 |journal=Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science |date=September 2020 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=429–438 |doi=10.1177/2515245920917931|s2cid=227095775 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

{{Quotebox|align=right|width=40%|quoted=1|quote= An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.|source=—[[Richard Holton]]<ref name=Holton/>}}

Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate.<ref name=Holton/> First of all, free will can at least refer to either [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian (indeterministic) free will]] or [[Compatibilism|compatibilistic (deterministic) free will]]. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits.<ref name=Holton/> In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in [[fatalism]], which may provide an alternative explanation for previous experimental findings.<ref name=Holton>{{cite journal | last1 = Holton | first1 = Richard | year = 2011 | title = Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist | url =https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/71223/1/Holton_Baumeister.commentary.pdf | journal = Neuroethics | volume = 4 | pages = 13–16 | doi = 10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8 | hdl = 1721.1/71223 | s2cid = 143687015 | hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Miles | first1 = J.B. | year = 2011 | title = 'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 52 | issue = 2| pages = 205–18 | doi = 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02077.x |doi-access=free | pmid = 22074173 | pmc = 3757306 }}</ref> To test the effects of belief in determinism, it has been argued that future studies would need to provide articles that do not simply "attack free will", but instead focus on explaining determinism and compatibilism.<ref name=Holton/><ref>Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See {{Cite journal|last=Nahmias|first=Eddy|author2=D. Justin Coates|author3=Trevor Kvaran|s2cid=15648622|date=2007-09-01|title=Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions|journal=Midwest Studies in Philosophy|volume=31|issue=1|pages=214–42|doi=10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x|issn=1475-4975}}<!--| access-date = 2011-04-29--></ref>

Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of [[counterfactual thinking]].<ref name=BAC/> This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others.<ref>{{cite journal | pmc=2408534 | year=2008 | last1=Epstude | first1=K. | last2=Roese | first2=N. J. | title=The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking | journal=Personality and Social Psychology Review | volume=12 | issue=2 | pages=168–192 | doi=10.1177/1088868308316091 | pmid=18453477 }}</ref> Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism.<ref name=Holton/>

Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/1948550609351600| volume = 1| issue = 1| pages = 43–50| last = Stillman| first = Tyler F.|author2=Roy F. Baumeister |author3=Kathleen D. Vohs |author4=Nathaniel M. Lambert |author5=Frank D. Fincham |author6=Lauren E. Brewer | s2cid = 3023336| title = Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance| journal = Social Psychological and Personality Science| date = 2010-01-01}}</ref>