Apartheid

=== Effect of the Cold War ===
===="Total Onslaught"====
[[File:SADF Pamphlet1.PNG|thumb|Apartheid-era propaganda leaflet issued to South African military personnel in the 1980s. The pamphlet decries "Russian colonialism and oppression" in English, Afrikaans and Portuguese.]]
During the 1950s, South African military strategy was decisively shaped by fears of communist espionage and a conventional [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] threat to the strategic Cape trade route between the [[Atlantic Ocean|south Atlantic]] and [[Indian Ocean]]s.<ref name=Berridge>{{cite book|last=Berridge|first=G.R.|title=South Africa, the Colonial Powers and African Defence: The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948–60|date=1992|pages=1–16, 163–164|publisher=Palgrave Books|location=Basingstoke|isbn=978-0333563519}}</ref> The apartheid government supported the US-led [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] (NATO), as well as its policy of regional ''[[containment]]'' against Soviet-backed regimes and insurgencies worldwide.<ref name=Lulat>{{cite book|last=Lulat|first=Y.G.M.|title=United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present|date=1992|pages=143–146|publisher=Peter Lang Publishing, Incorporated|location=New York|isbn=978-0820479071}}</ref> By the late-1960s, the rise of Soviet [[client state]]s on the African continent, as well as Soviet aid for militant anti-apartheid movements, was considered one of the primary external threats to the apartheid system.<ref name=Campbell>{{cite book|last=Campbell|first=Kurt|title=Soviet Policy Towards South Africa|date=1986|pages=129–131|publisher=Palgrave-Macmillan|location=Basingstoke|isbn=978-1349081677}}</ref> South African officials frequently accused domestic opposition groups of being communist proxies.<ref name="Devils">{{cite book|last1=Herbstein|first1=Denis|last2=Evenson|first2=John|title=The Devils Are Among Us: The War for Namibia|date=1989|pages=14–23|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|location=London|isbn=978-0862328962}}</ref> For its part, the Soviet Union viewed South Africa as a bastion of [[neocolonialism]] and a regional Western ally, which helped fuel its support for various anti-apartheid causes.<ref name=Shultz>{{cite book|last=Shultz|first=Richard|title=Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons|url=https://archive.org/details/sovietunionrevo00shul/page/121|url-access=registration|date=1988|pages=[https://archive.org/details/sovietunionrevo00shul/page/121 121–123, 140–145]|publisher=Hoover Institution Press|location=Stanford, California|isbn=978-0817987114}}</ref>

From 1973 onwards, much of South Africa's white population increasingly looked upon their country as a bastion of the [[free world]] besieged militarily, politically, and culturally by Communism and radical [[black nationalism]].<ref name=Onslaught1>{{cite book|last=Potgieter|first=De Wet|title=Total Onslaught: Apartheid's Dirty Tricks Exposed|date=2007|pages=93–95|publisher=Zebra Press|location=Cape Town|isbn=978-1770073289}}</ref> The apartheid government perceived itself as being locked in a proxy struggle with the [[Warsaw Pact]] and by implication, armed wings of black nationalist forces such as [[Umkhonto we Sizwe]] (MK) and the [[People's Liberation Army of Namibia]] (PLAN), which often received arms and training in Warsaw Pact member states.<ref name=Shultz/> This was described as "Total Onslaught".<ref name=Onslaught1/><ref name=Minter>{{cite book|last=Minter|first=William|title=Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique|date=1994|pages=37–49|publisher=Witwatersrand University Press|location=Johannesburg|isbn=978-1439216187}}</ref>

====Israeli arms sales====
Soviet support for militant anti-apartheid movements worked in the government's favour, as its claim to be reacting in opposition to aggressive communist expansion gained greater plausibility, and helped it justify its own domestic militarisation methods, known as "Total Strategy".<ref name=Onslaught1 /> Total Strategy involved building up a formidable conventional military and counter-intelligence capability.<ref name=Onslaught1 /> It was formulated on counter-revolutionary tactics as espoused by noted French tactician [[André Beaufre]].<ref name=Minter /> Considerable effort was devoted towards circumventing [[International sanctions|international arms sanctions]], and the government even went so far as to develop [[South Africa and weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons]],<ref>Von Wielligh, N. & von Wielligh-Steyn, L. (2015). ''The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme''. Pretoria: Litera.</ref> allegedly with covert assistance from [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Brothers in Arms – Israel's secret pact with Pretoria |url=https://www.theguardian.com/israel/Story/0,,1704037,00.html |work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=7 February 2006 |first=Chris |last=McGreal |access-date=3 April 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080725232738/http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0%2C%2C1704037%2C00.html |archive-date=25 July 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2010, ''[[The Guardian]]'' released South African government documents that revealed an Israeli offer to sell the apartheid regime nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite news|title=Revealed: how Israel offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons|work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=24 May 2010|first=Chris|last=McGreal|access-date=24 May 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100525212221/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons|archive-date=25 May 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=The memos and minutes that confirm Israel's nuclear stockpile|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-documents|work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=24 May 2010|first=Chris|last=McGreal|access-date=24 May 2010|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20100525214324/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-documents|archive-date=25 May 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref> Israel denied these allegations and claimed that the documents were minutes from a meeting which did not indicate any concrete offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. [[Shimon Peres]] said that ''The Guardian''{{'}}s article was based on "selective interpretation ... and not on concrete facts."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/middleeast/25israel.html |work=The New York Times |title=Israel Denies It Offered South Africa Warheads |first=Isabel |last=Kershner |date=24 May 2010 |access-date=14 February 2017 |archive-date=30 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630105745/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/middleeast/25israel.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

As a result of "Total Strategy", South African society became increasingly militarised. Many domestic civil organisations were modelled upon military structures, and military virtues such as discipline, patriotism, and loyalty were highly regarded.<ref name="War">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zEQ-Km_KShAC&q=Coventry+Four&pg=PA238|title=War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa|author=Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan|year=1989|publisher=New Africa Books|isbn=978-0-86486-115-3|pages=36–37, 283–289|access-date=8 November 2020|archive-date=9 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709201235/https://books.google.com/books?id=zEQ-Km_KShAC&q=Coventry+Four&pg=PA238|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1968, national service for White South African men lasted nine months at minimum, and they could be called up for reserve duty into their late-middle age if necessary.<ref name=Reflections>{{cite book|last1=Potgieter|first1=Thean|last2=Liebenberg|first2=Ian|title=Reflections on War: Preparedness and Consequences|year=2012|pages=70–81|publisher=Sun Media Press|location=Stellenbosch|isbn=978-1-920338-85-5}}</ref> The length of national service was gradually extended to 12 months in 1972 and 24 months in 1978.<ref name="Reflections" /> At state schools, white male students were organised into paramilitary formations and drilled as cadets or as participants in a civil defence or "Youth Preparedness" curriculum.<ref name="War" /> Compulsory military education and in some cases, paramilitary training was introduced for all older white male students at state schools in three South African provinces.<ref name="War" /> These programmes presided over the construction of bomb shelters at schools and drills aimed at simulating mock insurgent raids.<ref name="War" />

From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, [[Military budget|defence budgets]] in South Africa were raised exponentially.<ref name=Minter /> In 1975, [[Ministry of Defense (Israel)|Israeli defence minister]] [[Shimon Peres]] signed a security pact with South African defence minister [[P.W. Botha]] that led to $200&thinsp;million in arms deals. In 1988, Israeli arm sales to South Africa totalled over $1.4&thinsp;billion.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.thenation.com/article/banquos-ghost-israeli-foreign-policy/|title=The Banquo's Ghost of Israeli Foreign Policy|journal=[[The Nation]]|date=14 May 2010|last1=Blumenthal|first1=Max|access-date=13 December 2018|archive-date=11 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190811024245/https://www.thenation.com/article/banquos-ghost-israeli-foreign-policy/|url-status=live}}</ref> Covert operations focused on espionage and domestic counter-subversion became common, the number of [[special forces]] units swelled, and the [[South African Defence Force]] (SADF) had amassed enough sophisticated conventional weaponry to pose a serious threat to the "[[front-line states]]", a regional alliance of neighbouring countries opposed to apartheid.<ref name=Minter />

==== Foreign military operations ====
{{see also|South African Border War|Raid on Gaborone|Operation Skerwe|Operation Beanbag}}
[[File:SADF-Operations 4.jpg|thumb|right|South African paratroops on a raid in Angola, 1980s]]

Total Strategy was advanced in the context of MK, PLAN, and [[Azanian People's Liberation Army]] (APLA) guerrilla raids into South Africa or against South African targets in South West Africa; frequent South African reprisal attacks on these movements' external bases in [[Angola]], [[Zambia]], [[Mozambique]], [[Zimbabwe]], and [[Botswana]], often involving [[collateral damage]] to foreign infrastructure and civilian populations; and periodic complaints brought before the international community about South African violations of its neighbours' sovereignty.<ref name=Wilkenfeld>{{cite book|last1=Brecher|first1=Michael|last2=Wilkenfeld|first2=Jonathan|title=A Study of Crisis|year=1997|pages=[https://archive.org/details/studyofcrisis0000brec/page/79 79–82, 477]|publisher=University of Michigan Press|location=Ann Arbor|isbn=978-0472087075|url=https://archive.org/details/studyofcrisis0000brec/page/79}}</ref>

The apartheid government made judicious use of [[extraterritorial operation]]s to eliminate its military and political opponents, arguing that neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, which hosted, tolerated on their soil, or otherwise sheltered anti-apartheid insurgent groups could not evade responsibility for provoking retaliatory strikes.<ref name=Wilkenfeld/> While it did focus on militarising the borders and sealing up its domestic territory against insurgent raids, it also relied heavily on an aggressive [[Preemptive war|preemptive]] and [[Counterattack|counter-strike]] strategy, which fulfilled a preventive and deterrent purpose.<ref name=SACP>{{cite book|last1=Sechaba|first1=Tsepo|last2=Ellis|first2=Stephen|title=Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC & the South African Communist Party in Exile|year=1992|pages=184–187|publisher=Indiana University Press|location=Bloomington|isbn= 978-0253210623}}</ref> The reprisals which occurred beyond South Africa's borders involved not only hostile states, but neutral and sympathetic governments as well, often forcing them to react against their will and interests.<ref name="James">{{cite book|title=A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974–1990|last=James III|first=W. Martin|location=New Brunswick|publisher=Transaction Publishers|year=2011|orig-year=1992|isbn=978-1-4128-1506-2|pages=207–214, 239–245}}</ref>

External South African military operations were aimed at eliminating the training facilities, [[Safe house|safehouses]], infrastructure, equipment, and manpower of the insurgents.<ref name=SACP/> However, their secondary objective was to dissuade neighbouring states from offering sanctuary to MK, PLAN, APLA, and similar organisations.<ref name=SACP/> This was accomplished by deterring the supportive foreign population from cooperating with infiltration and thus undermining the insurgents' external sanctuary areas.<ref name="Zambian">{{cite book|title=Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia|last=Larmer|first=Miles|year=2011|location=Surrey|publisher=Ashgate Publishing Ltd|isbn=978-1409482499|pages=209–217}}</ref> It would also send a clear message to the host government that collaborating with insurgent forces involved potentially high costs.<ref name="Zambian"/>

The scale and intensity of foreign operations varied, and ranged from small special forces units carrying out raids on locations across the border which served as bases for insurgent infiltration to major conventional offensives involving armour, artillery, and aircraft.<ref name=SACP/> Actions such as [[Operation Protea]] in 1981 and [[Operation Askari]] in 1983 involved both full scale [[conventional warfare]] and a [[counter-insurgency]] reprisal operation.<ref name="Blank">{{cite book|title=Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges|last=Blank|first=Stephen|location=Montgomery |publisher=Air University Press|year=1991|isbn=978-0160293320|pages=223–239}}</ref><ref name=Insurgencies>{{cite book|last=Radu|first=Michael|title=The New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World|year=1990|pages=131–141|publisher=Routledge Books|location=Abingdon-on-Thames|isbn=978-0887383076}}</ref> The insurgent bases were usually situated near military installations of the host government, so that SADF retaliatory strikes hit those facilities as well and attracted international attention and condemnation of what was perceived as aggression against the armed forces of another sovereign state.<ref name=Dale>{{cite book|last=Dale|first=Richard|title=The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns|year=2014|pages=74–77, 93–95|publisher=McFarland & Company, Incorporated Publishers|location=Jefferson|isbn=978-0786496594}}</ref> This would inevitably result in major engagements, in which the SADF's [[Expeditionary warfare|expeditionary units]] would have to contend with the firepower of the host government's forces.<ref name=Dale/> Intensive conventional warfare of this nature carried the risk of severe casualties among white soldiers, which had to be kept to a minimum for political reasons.<ref name=SACP/> There were also high economic and diplomatic costs associated with openly deploying large numbers of South African troops into another country.<ref name=SACP/> Furthermore, military involvement on that scale had the potential to evolve into wider conflict situations, in which South Africa became entangled.<ref name=SACP/> For example, South Africa's activities in Angola, initially limited to containing PLAN, later escalated to direct involvement in the [[Angolan Civil War]].<ref name=SACP/>

As it became clearer that full-scale conventional operations could not effectively fulfil the requirements of a regional counter-insurgency effort, South Africa turned to a number of alternative methods. Retributive artillery bombardments were the least sophisticated means of reprisal against insurgent attacks. Between 1978 and 1979 the SADF directed artillery fire against locations in Angola and Zambia from which insurgent rockets were suspected to have been launched.<ref name=Democracy>{{cite book|last=Ndlovu|first=Sifiso Mxolisi|title=The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1970–1980|year=2006|pages=659–661|publisher=University of South Africa Press|location=Pretoria|isbn=978-1868884063}}</ref><ref name="Borderstrike">{{cite book | first = Willem | last = Steenkamp| title = Borderstrike! South Africa Into Angola 1975–1980 |edition= 2006 |pages= 132–226 | publisher = Just Done Productions| isbn= 978-1-920169-00-8| year = 2006}}</ref> This precipitated several artillery duels with the Zambian Army.<ref name="Borderstrike"/> Special forces raids were launched to harass PLAN and MK by liquidating prominent members of those movements, destroying their offices and safehouses, and seizing valuable records stored at these sites.<ref name=Botswana>{{cite book|last=Dale|first=Richard|title=Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa|date=1995|pages=55–59|publisher=Praeger|location=Westport, Connecticut|isbn=978-0313295713}}</ref> One example was the [[Raid on Gaborone|Gaborone Raid]], carried out in 1985, during which a South African special forces team crossed the border into Botswana and demolished four suspected MK safe houses, severely damaging another four.<ref name=Botswana/> Other types of special forces operations included the sabotage of economic infrastructure.<ref name=Emerson1>{{cite book|title=The Battle for Mozambique|last=Emerson|first=Stephen|location=Solihull|publisher=Helio & Co. Ltd|year=2014|isbn=978-1909384927|pages=110–111}}</ref> The SADF sabotaged infrastructure being used for the insurgents' war effort; for example, port facilities in southern Angola's [[Namibe Province|Moçâmedes District]], where Soviet arms were frequently offloaded for PLAN, as well as the railway line which facilitated their transport to PLAN headquarters in [[Lubango]], were common targets.<ref name=Fist>{{cite book|last1=Steyn|first1=Douw|last2=Söderlund|first2=Arné|title=Iron Fist From The Sea: South Africa's Seaborne Raiders 1978–1988|year=2015|pages=203–205, 304–305|publisher=Helion & Company, Publishers|location=Solihull|isbn=978-1909982284}}</ref> Sabotage was also used as a pressure tactic when South Africa was negotiating with a host government to cease providing sanctuary to insurgent forces, as in the case of [[Operation Argon]].<ref name="NYT4">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/01/world/pretoria-cools-to-us-backed-talks.html|title=Pretoria cools to US-backed talks|work=The New York Times|date=1 June 1985|access-date=7 August 2017|archive-date=22 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122052758/http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/01/world/pretoria-cools-to-us-backed-talks.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Successful sabotage actions of high-profile economic targets undermined a country's ability to negotiate from a position of strength, and made it likelier to accede to South African demands rather than risk the expense of further destruction and war.<ref name="NYT4"/>

Also noteworthy were South African transnational espionage efforts, which included covert assassinations, kidnappings, and attempts to disrupt the overseas influence of anti-apartheid organisations. South African military intelligence agents were known to have abducted and killed anti-apartheid activists and others suspected of having ties to MK in [[London]] and [[Brussels]].<ref>Purkitt, Helen E.; Burgess, Stephen Franklin (2005). ''South Africa's weapons of mass destruction.'' Indiana University Press. p. 152.</ref><ref>Watson, Wendy (2007). ''Brick by brick: an informal guide to the history of South Africa.'' New Africa Books.</ref>