Lyndon B. Johnson

===Vietnam War===
{{Further|United States in the Vietnam War}}
At Kennedy's death, there were 16,000 American military personnel in [[Vietnam]] supporting [[South Vietnam]] in the war against [[North Vietnam]].<ref name="Vietnam War">{{cite web |url=http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/conscientiousobjection/OverviewVietnamWar.htm |title=Brief Overview of Vietnam War |publisher=Swarthmore College Peace Collection |access-date=December 4, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160803124531/http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/conscientiousobjection/OverviewVietnamWar.htm |archive-date=August 3, 2016}}</ref> Vietnam had been partitioned at the 1954 [[Geneva Conference (1954)|Geneva Conference]], with North Vietnam led by a Communist government. Johnson subscribed to the [[Domino Theory]] and to a [[containment]] policy that required the United States to make a serious effort to stop all Communist expansion.<ref name="scholastic">{{cite news |title=The Sixties |publisher=Junior Scholastic |date=February 11, 1994 |page=4}}</ref> On taking office, Johnson immediately reversed Kennedy's order to withdraw 1,000 military personnel by the end of 1963.<ref>{{harvnb|Reeves|1993|p=613}}</ref> In late summer 1964, Johnson seriously questioned the value of staying in Vietnam but, after meeting with Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [[Maxwell D. Taylor]], declared his readiness "to do more when we had a base" or when Saigon was politically more stable.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=239}}</ref> He expanded the numbers and roles of the American military following the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]].{{Citation needed|date=April 2021}}

====1964====
In August 1964, allegations arose from the military that two U.S. destroyers had been attacked by [[North Vietnam]]ese torpedo boats in international waters {{convert|40|mi|km}} from the [[Vietnam]]ese coast in the [[Gulf of Tonkin]]; naval communications and reports of the attack were contradictory. Although Johnson wanted to keep discussions about Vietnam out of the [[1964 United States presidential election|1964 presidential campaign]], he felt obligated to respond, and sought and obtained from [[United States Congress|Congress]] the [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] on August 7. Johnson was determined to embolden his image on foreign policy, and also wanted to prevent criticism, as [[Harry S. Truman|Truman]] received by proceeding without congressional endorsement of military action in the [[Korean War]]. Responding to the purported attack also blunted campaign criticism of Johnson's perceived weakness, which was the political messaging of [[Barry Goldwater]], Johnson's [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] opponent. The resolution gave congressional approval for use of military force by the commander-in-chief to repel future attacks and also to assist members of [[SEATO]] requesting assistance. Johnson later in the campaign expressed assurance that the primary U.S. goal remained the preservation of [[South Vietnam]]'s independence through material and advice, as opposed to any offensive posture.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=144–155}}</ref> The public's reaction to the resolution at the time was positive—48&nbsp;percent favored stronger measures in Vietnam and only 14&nbsp;percent wanted to negotiate a settlement and leave.<ref name="Dallek 1998, p. 157"/>

In the 1964 presidential campaign, Johnson restated his determination to provide measured support for Vietnam while avoiding another Korea, but privately had a sense that no matter what he did, things were likely to end badly. He had great passion for his [[Great Society]] agenda, and he even felt that his political opponents favored greater intervention in Vietnam to divert attention and resources away from his War on Poverty. The situation on the ground was aggravated in the fall by additional [[Viet Minh]] attacks on U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf, and an attack on [[Bien Hoa Air Base]] in South Vietnam.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=240}}</ref> Johnson decided against retaliatory action after consultation with the Joint Chiefs and after public pollster [[Louis Harris|Lou Harris]] confirmed that his decision would not detrimentally impact him in the 1964 presidential election.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=241}}</ref> By the end of 1964, there were approximately 23,000 military personnel in South Vietnam; U.S. casualties for 1964 totaled 1,278.<ref name="Vietnam War"/>

Over the winter of 1964 and 1965, Johnson was pressured by the military to begin a bombing campaign to forcefully resist a communist takeover in South Vietnam. A plurality in the polls at the time was in favor of military action, with only 26 to 30&nbsp;percent opposed.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=244}}</ref> Johnson revised his priorities, and a new preference for stronger action came at the end of January, along with another change of the government in [[South Vietnam]]. Johnson agreed with [[McGeorge Bundy]] and McNamara that a continued passive role would lead to defeat and humiliation. Johnson said, "Stable government or no stable government in Saigon we will do what we ought to do. I'm prepared to do that; we will move strongly. General [[Nguyễn Khánh]] [head of the new government] is our boy".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=247}}</ref>

====1965====
[[File:Robert S. McNamara and General Westmoreland in Vietnam 1965.png|thumb|Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and [[William Westmoreland|General Westmoreland]] in [[Da Nang]] in August 1965 as Johnson was preparing to commence a systematic bombing campaign, known as [[Operation Rolling Thunder]], in the [[Vietnam War]]]]
Johnson decided on a systematic bombing campaign in February after a ground report from Bundy recommending immediate U.S. action to avoid defeat; also, the [[Viet Cong]] had just killed eight U.S. advisers and wounded dozens in an attack at [[Pleiku Air Base]]. The eight-week bombing campaign became known as [[Operation Rolling Thunder]]. Johnson's instructions for public consumption were clear: there was to be no comment that the war effort had been expanded.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=249}}</ref> Long-term estimates of the bombing campaign ranged from an expectation that Hanoi would rein in the Viet Cong to one of provoking Hanoi and the Viet Cong into an intensification of the war. But the short-term expectations were consistent that the morale and stability of the South Vietnamese government would be bolstered. By limiting the information given out to the public, and even to Congress, Johnson maximized his flexibility to change course.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=250–252}}</ref>

In March, Bundy began to urge the use of ground forces—air operations alone, he counseled, would not stop Hanoi's aggression against the South. Johnson approved an increase in logistical troops of 18,000 to 20,000 and the deployment of two additional Marine battalions and a Marine air squadron, in addition to planning for the deployment of two more divisions. More significantly, he authorized a change in mission from defensive to offensive operations; he nevertheless insisted that this was not to be publicly represented as a policy change.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=255}}</ref>

By mid-June, the total U.S. ground forces in Vietnam had increased to 82,000 or by 150 percent.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=268}}</ref> That same month, Ambassador Taylor reported that the bombing offensive against [[North Vietnam]] had been ineffective and that the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam|South Vietnamese army]] was outclassed and in danger of collapse.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=270}}</ref> Westmoreland recommended that Johnson increase ground troops even further, to 175,000. After consulting with his principals, Johnson announced in a press conference that he had decided to increase U.S. troops to 125,000, which was slightly less aggressively than Westmoreland recommended, with additional forces to be sent later upon request. Johnson described himself at the time as boxed in by unpalatable choices: sending Americans to die in Vietnam and being attacked as an interventionist, or giving in to the communists and risking being impeached. He continued to insist that his decision "did not imply any change in policy whatsoever". Johnson jested privately, "If you have a mother-in-law with only one eye, and she has it in the center of her forehead, you don't keep her in the living room."<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=272–277}}</ref> By October 1965, over 200,000 troops were deployed in Vietnam.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=284}}</ref>

On November 8, 1965, Johnson underwent surgery at [[Bethesda Naval Hospital]] to remove his [[gallbladder]] and a [[kidney stone]]. After the procedure, Johnson's doctors reported that the president had come through the surgery "beautifully as expected."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gilbert |first=Robert E. |title=Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness |journal=Fordham Law Review |volume=79 |issue=3 |year=2010 |url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss3/5 |pages=843–879}}</ref> He was able to resume his duties the following day, and he met with reporters a couple of days later to reassure the nation that he was recovering well. Although Johnson was incapacitated during surgery, there was no transfer of presidential power to Vice President Humphrey, since no constitutional procedure then existed to do so. The [[Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Twenty-fifth Amendment]], which Congress sent to the states for [[ratification]] four months earlier, included such provisions, but was not ratified until 1967.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Politics and the president's gallbladder |last=Pappas |first=Theodore N. |date=July 1, 2017 |journal=Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons |volume=102 |issue=7 |pages=71–72 |pmid=28885794 |url=http://bulletin.facs.org/2017/07/politics-and-the-presidents-gallbladder/ |access-date=October 5, 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | title=The Political Effects of Presidential Illness: The Case of Lyndon B. Johnson |last=Gilbert |first=Robert E. |journal=Political Psychology |volume=16 |issue=4 |date=December 1995 |pages=761–776 |publisher=International Society of Political Psychology |jstor=3791892 |doi=10.2307/3791892}}</ref>

====1966====
[[File:Visit of President Johnson in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|Johnson awarding a medal to a U.S. soldier during a visit to [[South Vietnam]] in 1966]]
Public and political impatience with the war began to emerge in the spring of 1966, and Johnson's approval ratings reached a new low of 41&nbsp;percent. [[Richard Russell Jr.|Sen. Richard Russell]], chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], declared in June 1966 that it was time to "get it over or get out". Johnson responded, telling media, "we are trying to provide the maximum deterrence that we can to communist aggression with a minimum of cost."<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=364–365}}</ref> In response to the intensified criticism of the war effort, Johnson raised suspicions of communist subversion in the country, and press relations became strained.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=366}}</ref> Johnson's primary opponent of his [[Vietnam War]] policies in Congress was [[James William Fulbright]], chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]],<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=369}}</ref> who convened a series of public hearings in February on the progress of the war.<ref>[https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-28/1966-fulbright-hearings-vietnam-parted-curtains-president-johnsons-conduct-war "The 1966 Fulbright hearings on Vietnam parted the curtains on President Johnson's conduct of the war"], September 28, 2017, PRI.org.</ref> Johnson began to seriously consider a more focused bombing campaign against [[North Vietnam]]'s petroleum, oil, and lubrication facilities in hopes of accelerating victory.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=372–373}}</ref> Humphrey, Rusk, and McNamara all agreed, and the bombing began at the end of June.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=373–374}}</ref> In July, polling results indicated that Americans favored the bombing campaign by a five-to-one margin; however, in August a [[United States Department of Defense|U.S. Defense Department]] study indicated that the bombing campaign was having minimal impact on North Vietnam.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=376}}</ref>

In fall 1966, multiple sources reported that progress was being made against the North Vietnamese logistics and infrastructure; Johnson was urged from every corner to begin peace discussions. There was no shortage of peace initiatives; nevertheless, among protesters, English philosopher Bertrand Russell attacked Johnson's policy as "a barbaric aggressive war of conquest", and in June he initiated the [[Russell Tribunal|International War Crimes Tribunal]] to condemn the American effort.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p= 380}}</ref> The gap with Hanoi was an unbridgeable demand on both sides for a unilateral end to bombing and withdrawal of forces. In August, Johnson appointed [[Averell Harriman]] "Ambassador for Peace" to promote negotiations. Westmoreland and McNamara recommended a concerted program to promote pacification; Johnson formally placed this effort under military control in October.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=381}}</ref> Also in October 1966, to reassure and promote his war effort, Johnson initiated a meeting with allies in [[Manila]], including representatives from [[South Vietnam]], [[Thailand]], [[South Korea]], the [[Philippines]], [[Australia]], and [[New Zealand]].<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=383}}</ref> The conference ended with pronouncements to stand fast against communist aggression and to promote ideals of democracy and development in Vietnam and across Asia.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=384}}</ref> For Johnson, it was a fleeting public relations success as approval for Johnson's Vietnam policies reached 63 percent in November. The following month, in December, however, Johnson's Vietnam approval rating fell back down to the 40s; Johnson had become anxious about his ability to justify further war casualties, and he talked of the need for a decisive victory despite the growing unpopularity of the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=385–386}}</ref> In a discussion about the war with former President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] on October 3, 1966, Johnson said he was "trying to win it just as fast as I can in every way that I know how" and later stated that he needed "all the help I can get".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/Press.hom/tape_release_11_2006.shtm |title=LBJ Library releases telephone conversation recordings |publisher=Lbjlib.utexas.edu |access-date=October 6, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080611221222/http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/Press.hom/tape_release_11_2006.shtm |archive-date=June 11, 2008}}</ref>

By the end of 1966, it was clear that pacification efforts, like the bombing campaign, were proving ineffective. Johnson agreed to McNamara's new recommendation to add 70,000 troops in 1967 to the 400,000 previously that were already in Vietnam. While McNamara recommended no increased bombings, Johnson agreed with [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] recommendations to increase the bombings.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=386–388}}</ref> Despite initial secret talks being held with [[North Vietnam]] in [[Saigon]], [[Hanoi]], and [[Warsaw]], the bombings increased, which led to a discontinuation of the talks, which North Vietnam labeled as not genuine.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=390}}</ref>

====1967====
[[File:Vietnam War protestors at the March on the Pentagon.jpg|thumb|Vietnam War protestors march at [[the Pentagon]] outside [[Washington, D.C.]], on October 21, 1967, as support for the [[Vietnam War]] was falling and the [[Opposition to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War|anti-Vietnam War movement]] was increasing]]
In January and February 1967, probes were made to assess North Vietnamese's willingness to discuss peace, but they fell on deaf ears. Ho Chi Minh declared that the only solution was a unilateral U.S. withdrawal.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=445–447}}</ref> A Gallup poll in July 1967 showed that 52&nbsp;percent of Americans disapproved of the president's handling of the war, and only 34&nbsp;percent thought progress was being made.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=474}}</ref> Johnson's anger and frustration over the lack of a solution to Vietnam and its effect on him politically was exhibited in a statement to Robert F. Kennedy, who had become a prominent public critic of the war and loomed as a potential challenger in the 1968 presidential election.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=461}}</ref> Johnson had just received several reports predicting military progress by the summer, and warned Kennedy, "I'll destroy you and every one of your dove friends in six months".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=447}}</ref> McNamara offered Johnson a way out of Vietnam in May; the administration could declare its objective in the war—South Vietnam's self-determination—was being achieved and the upcoming September elections in South Vietnam would provide the chance for a coalition government. The United States could reasonably expect that country to then assume responsibility for the election outcome. But Johnson was reluctant, in light of some optimistic reports about the conflict that provided hope of improvement, though those were of questionable reliability. Meantime, the CIA was reporting wide food shortages in Hanoi and an unstable power grid, as well as military manpower reductions.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=463–464}}</ref>

By mid-1967, nearly 70,000 Americans had been killed or wounded in the war. In July, Johnson sent McNamara, Wheeler, and other officials to meet with Westmoreland and reach an agreement on plans for next steps in the war. At the time, the war was being described by media and others as having reached a "stalemate". Westmoreland said such a description was pure fiction, and that "we are winning slowly but steadily and the pace can excel if we reinforce our successes".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=470–471}}</ref> Though Westmoreland sought the deployment of additional U.S. troops, Johnson agreed to an increase of 55,000 troops, fewer than Westmoreland sought, which brought the total number of U.S. troops deployed in Vietnam to 525,000.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=473}}</ref> In August, Johnson, with support from the Joint Chiefs', chose to expand the air campaign, exempting only [[Hanoi]], [[Haiphong]], and a buffer zone with [[China]] from its list of targets.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=477}}</ref> In September, [[Ho Chi Minh]] and North Vietnamese premier [[Pham Van Dong]] appeared amenable to French mediation, leading Johnson to ceas bombing in a 10-mile zone around Hanoi. In a Texas speech, known as the "San Antonio formula", Johnson agreed to halt all bombing if Ho Chi Minh would launch productive discussions and if North Vietnam would not seek to take advantage of the halt. North Vietnam was unresponsive to the proposal, but Johnson pursued the possibility of negotiations and paused the bombings.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=482–484}}</ref>

With the war still arguably in a stalemate and with growing and widespread disapproval of the conflict, Johnson convened a group called the "Wise Men" for an in-depth look at the war, including [[Dean Acheson]], General [[Omar Bradley]], [[George Ball (diplomat)|George Ball]], [[McGeorge Bundy]], [[Arthur Dean (lawyer)|Arthur Dean]], [[C. Douglas Dillon]], [[Abe Fortas]], [[Averell Harriman]], [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.|Henry Cabot Lodge]], [[Robert Daniel Murphy]], and [[Maxwell D. Taylor]].<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=494}}</ref> At the time, McNamara reversed his position on the Vietnam War, recommending a cap of 525,000 on the number of forces deployed and that the bombing be halted since he saw no military progress from it. This recommendation agitated Johnson, and McNamara soon resigned. Except for George Ball, the "Wise Men" all agreed the administration should "press forward".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=495–496}}</ref> Johnson was confident that Hanoi would await the 1968 U.S. election results before deciding to negotiate.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=501}}</ref>

On June 23, 1967, Johnson traveled to [[Los Angeles]] for a Democratic fundraiser. Thousands of [[Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War|anti-war protesters]] led by a coalition of peace protestors tried to march past the hotel where he was speaking. However, a small group of [[Progressive Labor Party (United States)|Progressive Labor Party]] and [[Students for a Democratic Society|SDS]] protestors activists placed themselves at the head of the march and, when they reached the hotel, staged a sit-down. Efforts by march monitors to keep the main body of the marchers moving were only partially successful.

Hundreds of [[Los Angeles Police Department|LAPD]] officers were massed at the hotel. When the march slowed, a police order was given to disperse the crowd. The riot act was read and 51 protestors arrested.<ref name="NYT62467">{{cite news |first1=Gladwin |last1=Hill |title=51 Protesters Arrested |access-date=December 12, 2016 |work=The New York Times |date=June 24, 1967 |url=http://nyti.ms/2heLqF0}}</ref><ref name="Marxist5R">{{cite web |author1=Jim Dann and Hari Dillon |title=The Five Retreats: A History of the Failure of the Progressive Labor Party – Chapter 2: The retreat from the anti-war movement 1967–1968 |url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/1960-1970/5retreats/chapter2.htm#bk15 |website=Marxist.org |access-date=December 12, 2016 |quote=On June 23, 1967 President Johnson came to Century City, Los Angeles to speak. The Mobe got permission to march past his hotel without stopping. PLP, SDS, the War Resisters' League, and other left forces determined to stop in front of the hotel. The leadership of the march of 20,000 was wrested from the hands of the Mobe's marshals by the PL-led militants. A four-hour bloody battle ensued after the police attacked the march, with injuries on both sides and a partial victory for the anti-war movement because LBJ never dared speak in public again.}}</ref> The Los Angeles demonstration was one of the first massive war protests in the United States, and the first in Los Angeles. The demonstration ended with protesters clashing with riot police, setting a pattern for the massive anti-[[List of protests against the Vietnam War|Vietnam War protests]] that followed.<ref name=LATretro >[http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/thedailymirror/2009/05/crowd-battles-lapd-as-war-protest-turns-violent-.html  "Crowd Battles LAPD as War Protest Turns Violent"]</ref> Due to the size and violence of this event, Johnson attempted no further public speeches outside military bases.<ref name=LATretro /><ref name="Marxist5R"/>

In October, with ever-increasing public protests against the war, Johnson engaged the FBI and the CIA to investigate, monitor, and undermine anti-war activists.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=486–487}}</ref> In mid-October, there was a demonstration of 100,000 at [[the Pentagon]]; Johnson and [[Dean Rusk]] were convinced that foreign communist sources were behind the demonstration, but that was refuted in the CIA's findings.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=489}}</ref>

====1968====
[[File:L B Johnson Model Khe Sanh.jpeg|thumb|[[Walt Rostow]], Johnson's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]], meeting with Johnson in the [[Situation Room]] in 1968, where the two reviewed a map of the region where the [[Battle of Khe Sanh]] was being waged]]
On January 30, the [[Viet Cong]] and [[North Vietnamese Army]] launched the [[Tet Offensive]] against South Vietnam's five largest cities, including Saigon and the U.S. embassy there. While the Tet Offensive failed militarily, it was a psychological victory, definitively turning American public opinion against the war. Iconically, [[Walter Cronkite]] of [[CBS News]], voted the nation's "most trusted person" in February, opined on the air that the conflict was deadlocked. Johnson reacted, saying "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=505–506}}</ref> Indeed, demoralization about the war was everywhere; 26&nbsp;percent then approved of Johnson's handling of Vietnam; 63&nbsp;percent disapproved. Johnson agreed to increase the troop level by 22,000, despite a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for ten times that number.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=509}}</ref> By March 1968, Johnson was secretly desperate for an honorable way out of the war. [[Clark Clifford]], the new Defense Secretary, described the war as "a loser" and proposed to "cut losses and get out".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=511}}</ref> On March 31, Johnson spoke to the nation of "Steps to Limit the War in Vietnam". He then announced an immediate unilateral halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and announced his intention to seek out peace talks anywhere at any time. At the close of his speech [[Shermanesque statement|he announced]], "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President".<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=513}}</ref>

In March, Johnson decided to restrict future bombing with the result that 75&nbsp;percent of North Vietnam's territory, containing 90&nbsp;percent of its population, was off-limits to bombing. In April he succeeded in opening discussions of peace talks, and after extensive negotiations over the site, Paris was agreed to and talks began in May. When the talks failed to yield any results the decision was made to resort to private discussions in Paris,<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=538–541}}</ref> which after two months were no more productive.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=564}}</ref>

As casualties mounted and success seemed less immediately possible, Johnson's popularity plummeted. College students and others protested, burned [[Conscription in the United States|draft]] cards, and chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"<ref name="scholastic"/> Johnson could scarcely travel anywhere without facing protests, and was not allowed by the Secret Service to attend the [[1968 Democratic National Convention]], where thousands of [[hippies]], [[yippies]], [[Black Panther Party|Black Panthers]] and other opponents of Johnson's policies converged to protest.<ref>Frank Kusch, ''Battleground Chicago: The Police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention'' (Chicago: [[University of Chicago Press]], 2008), p. 62.</ref> Thus by 1968, the public was polarized, with the "hawks" rejecting Johnson's refusal to continue the war indefinitely, and the "doves" rejecting his current war policies. Support for Johnson's middle position continued to shrink until he finally rejected containment and sought a peace settlement. By late summer, he realized that Nixon was closer to his position than Humphrey. He continued to support Humphrey publicly in the election, and personally despised Nixon. One of Johnson's well-known quotes was "the Democratic party at its worst, is still better than the Republican party at its best".<ref>{{harvnb|Gould|2010|p=98}}</ref>

Despite recommendations in August from Harriman, Vance, Clifford, and Bundy to halt bombing as an incentive for Hanoi to engage in substantive peace talks, Johnson refused.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=569}}</ref> In October, when the parties came close to an agreement on a bombing halt, Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon intervened with the South Vietnamese, making promises of better terms, to delay a settlement until after the election.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|pp=584–585}}</ref> After the election, Johnson's primary focus on Vietnam was to get Saigon to join the Paris peace talks. Only after Nixon added his urging did they do so. Even then they argued about procedural matters until after Nixon took office.<ref>{{harvnb|Dallek|1998|p=597}}</ref>