United States Army Air Forces Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Army Air Forces created=== [[File:021002-O-9999G-013.jpg|right|thumb|General of the Army [[Henry H. Arnold|Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold]]]] {{see also|Air warfare of World War II}} The likelihood of U.S. participation in [[World War II]] prompted the most radical reorganization of the [[aviation]] branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with the ground forces by March 1942. In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British [[Royal Air Force]] and the German [[Wehrmacht]]'s military air arm, the [[Luftwaffe]]) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as "[[Lernaean Hydra|hydra]]-headed" by one congressman,<ref group=n>Rep. [[James G. Scrugham]] (D-Nev). (Craven and Cate Vol. 6, p. 24)</ref> had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after the rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement ([[U.S.–British Staff Conference (ABC–1)|ABC-1]]) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces.<ref>Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, p. 20</ref> A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew the dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and [[Robert A. Lovett]], recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation.<ref name="goss"/> On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to the air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5.<ref name="goss">Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, p. 293</ref> Arnold assumed the title of ''Chief of the Army Air Forces'', creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamed ''Air Force Combat Command'' (AFCC) in the new organization. The AAF gained the formal "Air Staff" long opposed by the General Staff,<ref group=n>These staff positions were designated A-1 through A-5 and corresponded to the WDGS positions of G-1 through G-5. The AAF began the war with this air staff but replaced it in the March 1942 reorganization.</ref> and a single air commander,<ref name="goss"/> but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command.<ref name="Nalty, p.181">Nalty (1997), p. 181.</ref> The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel,<ref name="csm7"/> but under the new field manual FM-5 the Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of the [[Army Service Forces]] providing "housekeeping services" as support<ref group=n>This issue was not completely resolved until November 1943 when the units of those services (Quartermaster, Signal, Ordnance, etc.), amounting to 600,000 personnel, were transferred from the ASF into the AAF. (Mooney 1946, p. 54)</ref> nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States.<ref>Mooney (1946), p. 43</ref><ref>Greer (1985), p. 114</ref> Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy a general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] within the [[United States Department of the Navy|Department of the Navy]])<ref name="csm7">Mooney (1956), p. 7</ref> until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence.<ref group=n>AAF senior leadership actually decided in the fall of 1941 to oppose for the duration any bill to create an independent air force. (Mooney 1946, p. 42)</ref> Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, left understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] on 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of the role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on the [[Combined Chiefs of Staff|Combined Chiefs]]. In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step was never officially recognized by the [[United States Navy]], and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 179–181.</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. 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