Nigerian Civil War

===Politics and economics of federalism===
The colonial administration divided Nigeria into three regions—North, West and East—something which exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social differences among Nigeria's different [[ethnic group]]s. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. There were also widespread reports of [[fraud]] during Nigeria's first [[census]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ipobinusa.org/nigeria-britains-creation|title=NIGERIA: BRITAIN'S CREATION HANDED OVER TO THE FULANI|website=Indigenous People of Biafra USA|language=en-US|access-date=2019-04-13}}</ref> and even today population remains a highly political issue in Nigeria. On this basis, the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively formed political parties that were largely regional and based on ethnic [[allegiance]]s: the [[Northern People's Congress]] (NPC) in the North; the [[Action Group (Nigeria)|Action Group]] in the West (AG); and the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons]] (NCNC) in the East. Although these parties were not exclusively [[Homogeneous charge compression ignition|homogeneous]] in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up, the disintegration of Nigeria resulted largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe.<ref name="Britannica"/><ref>{{Cite book|last=Azikiwe|first=Nnamdi|title=The development of political parties in Nigeria: office of the commissioner in U.K for eastern regions of Nigeria, London; (1961) Zik: A selection of the speeches of Dr. Nnamdi A. : A peace proposals for ending the Nigeria Civil War|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1970}}</ref>

The basis of modern Nigeria formed in 1914 when the United Kingdom amalgamated the [[Northern Nigeria Protectorate|Northern]] and [[Southern Nigeria Protectorate|Southern]] protectorates. Beginning with the Northern Protectorate, the [[British Empire|British]] implemented a system of [[indirect rule]] of which they exerted influence through alliances with local forces. This system worked so well, Colonial Governor [[Frederick Lugard]] successfully lobbied to extend it to the Southern [[Protectorate]] through amalgamation. In this way, a foreign and hierarchical system of governance was imposed on the Igbos.<ref name="Ejiogu2013">{{cite journal |first=E. C. |last=Ejiogu |title=Chinua Achebe on Biafra: An Elaborate Deconstruction |journal=[[Journal of Asian and African Studies]] |volume=48 |issue=6 |pages=653–670 |year=2013 |doi=10.1177/0021909613506457 |s2cid=145129982 }}</ref> [[Intellectual]]s began to agitate for greater rights and independence.<ref>Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 53–73. "...{{nbsp}}there was a tendency for British officials to build social barriers between themselves and Westernised Nigerians which, on the one hand, gave strength to nationalistic paroxysms. The Westernised Nigerian was an isolated individual, possibly because he was seen as a potential rival. He thus became a creature left to seek his own salvation. All that was left for him then was to seek expression in nationalistic organisations."</ref> The size of this intellectual class increased significantly in the 1950s, with the massive expansion of the national education program.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 17–18.</ref> During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the campaign for independence from British rule. Northern leaders, fearful that independence would mean political and [[Economy|economic]] domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the continuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, anxious to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nwadike |first=Jerome Agu |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MhhD6NOcBUgC&pg=PA10 |title=A Biafran Soldier'S Survival from the Jaws of Death: Nigerian – Biafran Civil War |date=2010-09-25 |publisher=Xlibris Corporation |isbn=978-1-4535-1381-1 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Patrick A. |first=Anwunah |title=The Nigeria -Biafra War (1967 -1970): my memoirs |publisher=Spectrum Books Limited |year=2007}}</ref>

However, the two Southern regions had significant cultural and ideological differences, leading to discord between the two Southern political parties. Firstly, the AG favoured a loose confederacy of regions in the emergent Nigerian nation whereby each region would be in total control of its own distinct territory. The status of Lagos was a sore point for the AG, which did not want Lagos, a Yoruba town situated in Western Nigeria (which was at that time the federal capital and seat of national government) to be designated as the capital of Nigeria, if it meant loss of Yoruba [[sovereignty]]. The AG insisted that Lagos must be completely recognised as a Yoruba town without any loss of identity, control or autonomy by the Yoruba. Contrary to this position, the NCNC was anxious to declare Lagos, by virtue of it being the "Federal Capital Territory" as "no man's land"—a declaration which as could be expected angered the AG, which offered to help fund the development of another territory in Nigeria as [[Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria)|"Federal Capital Territory"]] and then threatened secession from Nigeria if it didn't get its way. The threat of secession by the AG was tabled, documented and recorded in numerous constitutional conferences, including the constitutional conference held in London in 1954 with the demand that a right of secession be enshrined in the constitution of the emerging Nigerian nation to allow any part of the emergent nation to opt out of Nigeria, should the need arise.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914 |first=Tekena N. |last=Tamuno |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=8 |issue=4 |pages=563–584 |doi=10.1017/s0022278x00023909 |jstor=159090 |year=1970|s2cid=153672623 }}</ref> This proposal for inclusion of right of secession by the regions in independent Nigeria by the AG was rejected and resisted by NCNC which vehemently argued for a tightly bound united/unitary structured nation because it viewed the provision of a secession clause as detrimental to the formation of a unitary Nigerian state. In the face of sustained opposition by the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons|NCNC]] delegates, later joined by the NPC and backed by threats to view maintenance of the inclusion of secession by the AG as treasonable by the British, the AG was forced to renounce its position of inclusion of the right of secession a part of the Nigerian constitution. Had such a provision been made in the Nigerian constitution, later events which led to the Nigerian/Biafran civil war may have been avoided. The pre-independence alliance between the NCNC and the NPC against the aspirations of the AG would later set the tone for political governance of independent Nigeria by the NCNC/NPC and lead to disaster in later years in Nigeria.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 3. "On 31st March 1953, Anthony Enaharo of the Action Group (AG) tabled a motion in the House of Representatives in Lagos which called for independence in 1956. The National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which had earlier committed itself to a 1956 independence date, during its annual party convention held in Kano in August 1951, supported the Enahoro motion, while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) rejected it out of hand. Instead, the NPC sought an amendment to the motion and advocated independence 'as soon as practicable.'"</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Madiebo|first=Alex|title=The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War|publisher=Fourth Dimension Publishers|year=1980}}</ref>

Northern–Southern tension manifested firstly in the [[1945 Jos riots]]<ref name="auto3"/> and again on 1 May 1953, as [[1953 Kano riot|fighting in the Northern city of Kano]].<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 9. "It slipped several more notches after the vulgarity of the Lagos mob – <u>con mutunci</u>, personal humiliation through public abuse, is to the Hausa a worse offense than physical assault – and the Kano riots. If 1953 was to become one of the Biafran points of no return because of the slaughter of Ibos in Kano, it had never been anything less in the NPC demonology of the South because of their treatment by politicians and proletariat alike in Lagos."</ref> The political parties tended to focus on building power in their own regions, resulting in an incoherent and disunified dynamic in the federal government.<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 12. "Once (a) the principle of federalism (b) the quality of Nigerian federalism (loose and lopsided, the very negation of classic Whearism) had been agreed on by the Nigerian leaders, the direction from 1954 onwards was progressively towards the construction of impregnable bases of power within each Region. Nearly every move can be analysed in terms of increasing the rigidity of the Regional cores and inhibiting the effective extension of the central authority."</ref>

In 1946, the British [[Federalism in Nigeria|divided]] the Southern Region into the Western Region and the [[Eastern Region, Nigeria|Eastern Region]]. Each government was entitled to collect [[Royalty payment|royalties]] from resources extracted within its area. This changed in 1956 when [[Shell Nigeria|Shell]]-[[BP]] found large petroleum deposits in the Eastern region. A Commission led by [[Jeremy Raisman|Sir Jeremy Raisman]] and [[Ronald Tress]] determined that resource royalties would now enter a "Distributable Pools Account" with the money split between different parts of government (50% to region of origin, 20% to federal government, 30% to other regions).<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 115–116.</ref> To ensure continuing influence, the British government promoted unity in the Northern bloc and secessionist sentiments among and within the two Southern regions. The Nigerian government, following independence, promoted discord in the West with the creation of a new [[Mid-Western Region, Nigeria|Mid-Western Region]] in an area with oil potential.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 116–117. "In the struggle over the national wealth, control depended on who dominated the government at the centre. With Southern Nigeria virtually split into two, the North, which was now by far the largest region, had the upper hand. British Colonial Officers also encouraged it to promote the philosophy of one North in order to maintain its political control.{{nbsp}}... In an attempt to weaken the opposition the ruling coalition (NPC and NCNC) sponsored a crisis within the Western Region parliament culminating in the declaration of a State of Emergency in the Region in 1962. In 1963, the Western Region was further split into two. This effectively separated the core Yoruba group from the minorities. Interestingly, the new Mid-Western Region, dominated by minorities also had prospects for oil exploration."</ref> The new constitution of 1946 also proclaimed that "The entire property in and control of all [[mineral oil]]s, in, under, or upon any lands, in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in, the Crown."<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 11.</ref> The United Kingdom profited significantly from a fivefold rise in Nigerian exports amidst the post-war economic boom.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp.&nbsp;19–20. "But Nigeria was still a British colony, with a political economy that existed principally to serve British interests."</ref>