Six-Day War

== Conclusion ==
{{Main|Israeli Military Governorate|Israeli occupation of the West Bank}}
{{Quote box
 | quote = A week ago, the fateful campaign began. The existence of the State of Israel hung in the balance, the hopes of generations, and the vision that was realised in our own time... During the fighting, our forces destroyed about 450 enemy planes and hundreds of tanks. The enemy forces were decisively defeated in battles. Many fled for their lives or were captured. For the first time since the establishment of the state, the threat to our security has been removed at once from the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank and the northern border.
 | source = –  [[Levi Eshkol]], 12 June 1967 (Address to Israeli Parliament)<ref>{{harvp|Eshkol|1967|pp=39, 49}}</ref>
 | width = 33em
}}
[[File:1967-06-13 Cease-Fire.ogv|thumb|A [[Universal Newsreel]] from 13 June about the war]]

By 10 June, Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan Heights, and a [[ceasefire]] was signed the day after. Israel had seized the [[Gaza Strip]], the [[Sinai Peninsula]], the [[West Bank]] of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the [[Golan Heights]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War|title=Six-Day War – Middle East [1967]|access-date=26 September 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161001103230/https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War|archive-date=1 October 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> About one million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometres in the south, 60 kilometres in the east, and 20 kilometres of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that would prove useful in the [[Yom Kippur War]] six years later.

Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an honorary degree from [[Hebrew University of Jerusalem|Hebrew University]], [[Yitzhak Rabin]] gave his reasoning behind the success of Israel:

<blockquote>Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so accurately that no one in the world understands how it was done and people seek technological explanations or secret weapons; our armoured troops who beat the enemy even when their equipment was inferior to his; our soldiers in all other branches ... who overcame our enemies everywhere, despite the latter's superior numbers and fortifications—all these revealed not only coolness and courage in the battle but ... an understanding that only their personal stand against the greatest dangers would achieve victory for their country and for their families, and that if victory was not theirs the alternative was annihilation.{{Sfnp|Sachar|1976|p=660}}</blockquote>

In recognition of contributions, Rabin was given the honour of naming the war for the Israelis. From the suggestions proposed, including the "War of Daring", "War of Salvation", and "War of the Sons of Light", he "chose the least ostentatious, the Six-Day War, evoking the days of creation".{{Sfnp|Oren|2002e|loc=Section "Aftershocks"}}

Dayan's final report on the war to the Israeli general staff listed several shortcomings in Israel's actions, including misinterpretation of Nasser's intentions, overdependence on the United States, and reluctance to act when Egypt closed the Straits. He also credited several factors for Israel's success: Egypt did not appreciate the advantage of striking first and their adversaries did not accurately gauge Israel's strength and its willingness to use it.{{Sfnp|Oren|2002e|loc=Section "Aftershocks"}}

In Egypt, according to [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal|Heikal]], Nasser had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in June 1967.<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p110" /> According to historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan, Nasser's mistaken decisions to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967 led to a state of war with Israel, despite Egypt's lack of military preparedness.<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p105" />

After the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], Egypt reviewed the causes of its loss of the 1967 war. Issues that were identified included "the individualistic bureaucratic leadership"; "promotions on the basis of loyalty, not expertise, and the army's fear of telling Nasser the truth"; lack of intelligence; and better Israeli weapons, command, organization, and will to fight.{{Sfnp|Oren|2002e|loc=Section "Aftershocks"}}

=== Casualties ===
{{See also|Israeli casualties of war}}

Between 776<ref name="Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs"/> and 983 Israelis were killed and 4,517 were wounded. Fifteen Israeli soldiers were captured. Arab casualties were far greater. Between 9,800<ref name="Gammasy p.79">El Gamasy 1993 p.&nbsp;79</ref> and {{gaps|15|000}}{{Sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=165}} Egyptian soldiers were listed as killed or missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were captured.<ref name="Israel Ministry 2004"/> Jordanian losses are estimated to be 700 killed in action with another 2,500 wounded.{{Sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=3}}<ref name="tsdwb" /> The Syrians were estimated to have sustained between 1000{{Sfnp|Churchill|Churchill|1967|p=189}} and 2,500{{Sfnp |Tucker|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=U05OvsOPeKMC&pg=PA1198 1198]}}<ref name="Sachar, 2013" /> killed in action. Between 367<ref name="Israel Ministry 2004"/> and 591<ref name="Woolf" /> Syrians were captured.

Casualties were also suffered by [[United Nations Emergency Force|UNEF]], the [[United Nations Emergency Force]] that was stationed on the Egyptian side of the border. In three different episodes, Israeli forces attacked a UNEF convoy, camps in which UNEF personnel were concentrated and the UNEF headquarters in [[Gaza Strip|Gaza]],<ref name=":0" /> resulting in one Brazilian peacekeeper and 14 Indian officials killed by Israeli forces, with an additional seventeen peacekeepers wounded in both contingents.<ref name=":0" />