Nigerian Civil War

==Legacy==

===Atrocities against the Igbos===
[[File:Starving woman africa biafra nigeria conflict famine (cropped).jpg|thumb|A severely malnourished woman during the war.]]
The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to one million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease caused by Nigerian forces.<ref>{{cite web|title=Nigerian Civil War|url=http://www.war-memorial.net/Nigerian-Civil-War--3.140|work=Polynational War Memorial|access-date=2 January 2024 |quote=It has been estimated that up to a million people may have died due to the conflict, hunger and disease.}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Biafra: Thirty years on|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm|work=Africa|publisher=BBC News|access-date=4 January 2014|quote=Ethnic split: At independence, Nigeria had a federal constitution comprising three regions defined by the principal ethnic groups in the country – the Hausa and Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the south-west, and Ibo in the south-east. Crowd The fighting led to famine and chaos but as the military took over in the mid-1960s, and the economic situation worsened, ethnic tensions broke out. Up to 30,000 Ibos were killed in fighting with Hausas, and around 1 million refugees fled to their Ibo homeland in the east}}</ref> More than half a million people died from the famine imposed deliberately through blockade throughout the war. Lack of medicine also contributed. Thousands of people starved to death every day as the war progressed.<ref name="Block">Stevenson, "Capitol Gains" (2014), p. 314.</ref> The International Committee of the Red Cross in September 1968 estimated 8,000 to 10,000 deaths from starvation each day.{{sfn|Korieh|2013|p=737}} The leader of a Nigerian peace conference delegation said in 1968 that "starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels". This stance is generally considered to reflect the policy of the Nigerian government.<ref name="Njoku2013"/><ref>Colin Campbell, "[https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/29/books/starvation-was-the-policy.html Starvation Was The Policy]", ''New York Times'', 29 March 1987.</ref> The federal Nigerian army is accused of further atrocities including deliberate bombing of civilians, mass slaughter with machine guns, and rape.<ref name="Njoku2013">{{cite journal | last1 = Ijeoma Njoku | first1 = Carol | title = A Paradox of International Criminal Justice: The Biafra Genocide | journal = Journal of Asian and African Studies | volume = 48 | issue = 6| year = 2013 }}</ref>

===Igbo nationalism===

The first generation of [[Igbo nationalism]] began to develop in the immediate aftermath of the war.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Onuoha |first1=C |last2=Nwangwu |first2=FC |date=November 2020|title=The political economy of Biafra separatism and post-war Igbo nationalism in Nigeria |journal=African Affairs |volume=119 |issue=477 |pages=526–551 |doi=10.1093/afraf/adaa025 |quote="The first generation of Igbo nationalism started immediately after the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, and it is championed and dominated by the conservative Igbo petty bourgeoisie."}}</ref>

===Ethnic minorities in Biafra===
Ethnic minorities (Ibibio, Ijaw, Ikwerre, Etche, Ogoni and others) made up approximately 40% of the Biafran population in 1966.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Omaka|first=Arua|date=2014-02-17|title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970|url=https://encompass.eku.edu/jora/vol1/iss1/2|journal=Journal of Retracing Africa (JORA)|volume=1|issue=1|pages=25–40|issn=2168-0531}}</ref> The attitude of ethnic minorities in Biafra towards the conflict were initially divided early in the war, having suffered the same fate as Igbos in the North held the same fear and dread as Igbos.<ref>Akpan, Ntieyong U. The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. (2nd ed.). online: Routledge. p. 152, {{ISBN|0714629499}}.</ref> However, actions by Biafra authorities suggesting they favoured the Igbo majority turned these attitudes negative.<ref>Akpan, Ntieyong U. The Struggle for Secession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War. (2nd ed.). online: Routledge. p. 152, "The first evidence came when the East started to recruit young men into the army. Thousands from all over the Region turned up daily for recruitment. While the Ibo candidates were regularly selected, scarcely any from non-Ibo areas were recruited." {{ISBN|0714629499}}.</ref> Great suspicion was directed towards ethnic minorities and opponents of Biafra, with 'combing' exercises conducted to sift these communities for saboteurs, or 'sabo,' as they were commonly branded.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Omaka |first=Arua Oko |title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970 |journal=Journal of Retracing Africa |volume=1 |issue=1 |year=2014 |pages=25–40 |url=http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/vol1/iss1/2 }}</ref> This brand was widely feared, as it generally resulted in death by the Biafran forces or even mobs.<ref>"William Norris of the ''London Times'' who visited Biafra, also reported an eyewitness account in which some of the great men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at Umuahia on April 2, 1968. These Ibibios who included old men and young men were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people attacked them with sticks and clubs."</ref> The accusations subjected entire communities to violence in the form of killings, rapes, kidnapping and internments in camps by Biafran forces.<ref>Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu's Rebellion, p. 17. "Some six thousand Rivers people were sent to different refugee camps in the Igbo hinterland."</ref> The Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighter (BOFF) was a paramilitary organisation set up by the civil defence group with instructions to suppress the enemy, and engaged in "combing" exercises in minority communities.<ref>{{cite journal | title=The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970 | publisher=African Tree Press | isbn=978-1592320134 | url=http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora | first=Arua Oko | last=Omaka | journal=Journal of Retracing Africa | volume=1 | issue=1 | date=February 2014 | access-date=25 October 2020 | pages=25–40 }}</ref><ref>The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970, http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora "The sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suffered the same intimidation and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha and Enugu"</ref>

Minorities in Biafra suffered atrocities at the hands of those fighting for both sides of the conflict. The pogroms in the north in 1966 were indiscriminately directed against people from Eastern Nigeria.<ref name="ReferenceB">Elechi Amadi, author of ''The Concubine'' and ''The Great Ponds'', recalls in his memoir ''Sunset in Biafra'' his time in a Biafran detention camp. He and other ethnic minorities were imprisoned and tortured for their real or perceived support for the Federal Side.</ref> Despite a seemingly natural alliance between these victims of the pogroms in the north, tensions rose as minorities, who had always harboured an interest in having their own state within the Nigerian federation, were suspected of collaborating with Federal troops to undermine Biafra.<ref name="Saro-Wiwa, Ken 1992">Saro-Wiwa, Ken, ''Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy'', Saros International Publishers, Port Harcourt, 1992, {{ISBN|1-870716-22-1}}, "Port Harcourt was the last place whose fall led the inhabitants being treated as saboteurs, and so cruelly treated. I went to Igrita shortly after the fall of Port Harcourt and was terribly shocked by the number of bodies being carted into mass graves—bodies of person killed not by bullets but by cruel handling, and not by soldier but by frenzied and ill-motivated civilians," quoting ''The Struggle for Succession, 1966–1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War,'' Routledge (14 January 2014).</ref> The Federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In the Rivers area, ethnic minorities sympathetic to Biafra were killed in the hundreds by federal troops. In Calabar, some 2000 Efiks were also killed by Federal troops.<ref name="encompass.eku.edu">''The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970'', African Tree Press (18 February 2007) 978-1592320134 http://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=jora "The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities' areas. They were accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of the ''London Sunday Times'' in an article titled, "Nightmare in Biafra," reported how the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centers in Biafra. He stated that, 'Slowly, but effectively, a reign of terror has been created'."</ref> Outside of the Biafra, atrocities were recorded against the residents of Asaba in present-day Delta State by both sides of the conflict.<ref name="jstor.org">{{cite journal|jstor=722748|quote=Similarly, on 20 September 1967, 'there was a mass killing of non-Ibo MidWesterners at Boji-Boji Agbor', and on 23 September, 'non-Ibo speaking MidWesterners were apprehended by rebel soldiers at Asaba, Ibusa and Agbor and taken [in two lorries] to a rubber plantation along Uromi-Agbor road and massacred|title=The Biafran Crisis and the Midwest|journal=African Affairs|volume=86|issue=344|pages=367–383|last1=Orobator|first1=S. E.|year=1987|doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a097919}}</ref><ref name="vanguardngr.com">{{cite web|url=https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/revisiting-1967-asaba-massacre/|title=Revisiting The 1967 Asaba Massacre|first=Emmanuel|last=Okogba|date=29 October 2016}}</ref>

===Genocide question===
Legal scholar Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe and other academics argued that the Biafran war was a [[genocide]], for which no perpetrators have been held accountable.<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 187. "The prolific independent scholar Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe is perhaps the most outspoken articulator of this paradigm, which also depicts the Nigerian state as a prison house of nations, especially for the Igbo."</ref> Critics of this position acknowledge that starvation policies were pursued deliberately and that accountability has not been sought for the 1966 pogroms, but suggest that claims of genocide are incongruous with the fact that the Igbo were not exterminated after the war ended, alongside other arguments such as a lack of clarity surrounding Nigerian intentions and that Nigeria was fighting to retain control of Biafra and its people rather than to expel or exterminate them.<ref name="Njoku2013"/><ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), p. 188.</ref> Biafra made a formal complaint of genocide against Igbos to the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, a Paris-based [[NGO]] of international lawyers, which concluded that the actions undertaken by the Nigerian government against the Igbo amounted to a genocide.<ref>{{harvnb|Korieh|2013|p=731}}: "The International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide found evidence of genocide and intent to commit genocide by northern Nigerians against the Igbo, and accused federal Nigeria of genocide in its report."</ref> With special reference to the Asaba Massacre, jurist Emma Okocha described the killings as "the first black-on-black genocide".{{sfn|Korieh|2013|p=737}} Ekwe-Ekwe places significant blame on the British government for their support of the Nigerian government, which he argued allowed for their depredations against the Igbo to continue.<ref>Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, "The Achebean Restoration", ''Journal of Asian and African Studies'' 48.6, 2013. "Britain was a central operative, along with the Nigerian state, in the planning and execution of the Igbo genocide right from its outset in 1966 to its concluding phases in 1969/1970. It was Britain's 'punishment' of the Igbo for its audacious lead of the struggle for the freeing of Nigeria from British occupation that began in the 1930s. Twice during that struggle, the occupation regime had casually watched two organised pogroms against the Igbo in north Nigeria—in 1945 and 1953. These murders, which also included the looting and destruction of tens of thousands of pounds' worth of Igbo property and businesses, were carried out by pro-British political forces in the region who were opposed to the restoration of African independence but who Britain would hand over supreme political power of the country to on the eve of its so-called departure from Nigeria in 1960. The pogroms were clearly dress rehearsals for subsequent genocide. / Without British complicity, it was highly unlikely that the Igbo genocide would have been embarked on in its initial phase by the Nigerian state with such unrelenting stretch and consequences between May and October 1966. Without the massive arms support that Nigeria received from Britain especially, it was highly improbably the Nigeria would have been in the military position to pursue its second phase of the genocide—namely, the invasion of Igboland—between July 1967 and January 1970. Harold Wilson, the British prime minister at the time, was adamant, as the slaughtering worsened, that he 'would accept' the death of 'a half a million' Igbo 'if that was what it took' the Nigerian genocidists on the ground to accomplish their ghastly mission (Morris, 1977:122)." See also: Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, "[http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/comment/88468 Britain and the Igbo genocide: Now for the pertinent questions]", ''Pambazuka News'', 30 July 2013.</ref>

===Reconstruction===
[[File:Disabled Biafran war veterans.jpg|left|thumb|Disabled Biafran war veterans in 2017.]]

Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues.<ref>With reason. The pre-1966 tax-sharing agreements on mineral wealth were changed to okay favour the Federal government at the expense of the state. This agreement has, in the 1980s, been modified to further favour the Federal government.</ref> Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it has been hard to make this work in practice.

Igbos who ran for their lives during the pogroms and war returned to find their positions had been taken over; and when the war was over the government did not feel any need to re-instate them, preferring to regard them as having resigned. This reasoning was also extended to Igbo-owned properties and houses. People from other regions were quick to take over any house owned by an Igbo, especially in the Port Harcourt area. The Nigerian Government justified this by terming such properties abandoned.<ref>{{Cite web|author=Shayera Dark, for|title=A Nigerian town relives the brutal civil war, 50 years after it ended|url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/15/africa/biafra-nigeria-civil-war/index.html|access-date=2021-04-17|website=CNN|date=15 January 2020 }}</ref> This, however, has led to a feeling of an injustice as the Nigerian government policies were seen as further economically disabling the Igbos even long after the war. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria changing its currency, so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honoured. At the end of the war, only N£20 was given to any easterner regardless of the amount of money he or she had had in the bank. This was applied irrespective of their banking in pre-war Nigerian currency or Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.<ref>[[Ken Saro-Wiwa]], ''On a darkling plain''</ref>

===Fall of Biafra and restoration attempts===
{{further|Orlu Crisis}}
On 29 May 2000, ''[[The Guardian (Nigeria)|The Guardian]]'' reported that President [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2 June 2000 |title=WEST AFRICA IRIN-WA Weekly Round-up 22 |url=http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/wafrica/00a/0021.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090418012151/http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/wafrica/00a/0021.html |archive-date=18 April 2009 |access-date=28 March 2022 |website=iys.cidi.org}}</ref>

Biafra was more or less wiped off the map until its resurrection by the contemporary [[Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra]].<ref>Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 189–190. "By contrast, 'Biafra' as an Igbo project of collective assertion and liberation was destroyed in 1970 and has been a taboo subject ever sense—at least until MASSOB placed it back on the agenda."</ref> Chinua Achebe's last book, ''There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra'', has also rekindled discussion of the war.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2012-10-05 |title=There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra by Chinua Achebe – review |url=http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/oct/05/chinua-achebe-there-was-a-country-review |access-date=2022-07-19 |website=the Guardian |language=en}}</ref> In 2012, the [[Indigenous People of Biafra]] (IPOB) separatist movement was founded, led by [[Nnamdi Kanu]]. In 2021, tensions between IPOB and the Nigerian government escalated into the violent [[Orlu Crisis]], with IPOB declaring that the "second Nigeria/Biafra war" had begun. The separatists vowed that this time, Biafra would win.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://saharareporters.com/2021/02/19/second-nigeriabiafra-war-has-just-started-we-will-defend-our-land-%E2%80%94-ipob | title=Second Nigeria/Biafra War Has Just Started But We Will Defend Our Land – IPOB | publisher=Sahara Reporters | date=19 February 2021 | access-date=17 June 2021}}</ref>

=== South East Freedom Fight ===
Nnamdi Kanu's ascent to prominence and the meteoric rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a complex narrative deeply intertwined with the socio-political fabric of Nigeria. Kanu, a charismatic and outspoken leader, gained attention through his vocal advocacy for the rights of the Igbo people and the call for an independent state of Biafra in southeastern Nigeria. His platform, IPOB, emerged as a formidable force, rallying support both within Nigeria and among the Igbo diaspora globally. The movement tapped into deep-seated grievances stemming from historical injustices, marginalization, and perceived neglect of the Igbo ethnic group within the Nigerian state. Kanu's ability to leverage social media and online platforms amplified his message, resonating with a significant segment of the Igbo population disillusioned with the Nigerian government. Despite facing legal challenges and government crackdowns, Kanu's influence continued to grow, symbolizing a resurgence of Biafran identity and aspirations for self-determination within Nigeria's complex political landscape.<ref>{{Cite web|last=UNIPROJECTS|first=Project Topics and Materials for Students {{!}} Download Complete Projects from|title=South East Freedom Fight|url=https://uniprojects.net/|access-date=2021-05-19|website=www.uniprojects.net}}</ref>

=== Intergenerational impacts ===
According to a 2021 study, "War exposure among women [in the Biafran war] results in reduced adult stature, an increased likelihood of being overweight, earlier age at first birth, and lower educational attainment. War exposure of mothers has adverse impacts on next-generation child survival, growth, and education. Impacts vary with age of exposure."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Akresh|first1=Richard|last2=Bhalotra|first2=Sonia|last3=Leone|first3=Marinella|last4=Osili|first4=Una|date=2021-03-09|title=First and Second Generation Impacts of the Biafran War|url=http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2021/03/02/jhr.58.4.0118-9272R1|journal=Journal of Human Resources|volume=58 |issue=2 |pages=0118–9272R1|language=en|doi=10.3368/jhr.58.4.0118-9272R1|s2cid=233738166|issn=0022-166X|hdl=10419/170922|hdl-access=free}}</ref>