Free will

====Free will according to Thomas Aquinas====
Thirteenth century philosopher [[Thomas Aquinas]] viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian [[telos (philosophy)|telos]]). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism.<ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 2| issue = 2| page = 74| last = Staley| first = Kevin M.| title = Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian| journal = The Saint Anselm Journal| access-date = 2015-12-09| date = 2005| url = http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Staley.pdf| url-status=dead| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151221073832/http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Staley.pdf| archive-date = 2015-12-21}}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis| last = Hartung| first = Christopher| title = Thomas Aquinas on Free Will| access-date = 2015-12-09| date = May 2013| publisher = University of Delaware| url = http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/12979| type = Thesis}}
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In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by ''intellect'', ''will'', and ''passions''. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body."<ref name=Stump>

A discussion of the roles of will, intellect and passions in Aquinas' teachings is found in {{cite book |title=Aquinas, ''Arguments of the philosophers series'' |author= Stump, Eleonore|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1GvL3eKhoM8C&pg=PA278 |pages=278 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-415-02960-5 |year=2003 |publisher=Routledge (Psychology Press) |chapter= Intellect and will}}

</ref> Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution.<ref name=OConnor0>{{cite encyclopedia |author=Timothy O'Connor |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/freewill/ |title= Free Will |encyclopedia= The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta |date=Oct 29, 2010 |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University|quote=Philosophers who distinguish ''freedom of action'' and ''freedom of will'' do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".}}</ref> Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination").<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01656a.htm |title=Catholic Encyclopedia: Appetite |publisher=Newadvent.org |date=1907 |access-date=2012-08-13}}</ref> He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite [that is, the free-will]."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm |title=Summa Theologica: Free-will (Prima Pars, Q. 83) |publisher=Newadvent.org |access-date=2012-08-13}}</ref>

A compatibilist interpretation of Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."<ref>Thomas Aquinas, ''Summa Theologiae'', Q83 A1.</ref><ref>Further discussion of this compatibilistic theory can be found in Thomas' ''Summa contra gentiles'', Book III about Providence, c. 88–91 (260–267), where it is postulated that everything has its cause and it is again and again in detail referred also to all individual choices of man etc., even refuting opposite views. [http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#88 Here the online text of the Summa] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171123185058/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#88 |date=2017-11-23 }}. In order to avoid, at least in concept, the absolution of man of any guilt he then notes the contingency of all that takes place, i.e. lack of ''direct'' necessity from God strictly with regard to a concrete ("contingent") act. A typical choice was not separately ordained to be so-and-so by God; St. Thomas says the choice is not necessary, but in fact that apparently means it was ''contingent'' with regard to God and the law of nature (as a specific case that could have not existed in other circumstances), and ''necessary'' with regard to its direct previous cause in will and intellect. (The contingency, or fortuity, is even intuitive under modern [[chaos theory]], where one can try to show that more and more developed products appearing in the evolution of a universe or, simpler, an automaton are [[chaos theory|chaotic]] with regard to its principles.)</ref>