Free will

====Free will and views of causality====
{{See also|Principle of sufficient reason}}

In 1739, [[David Hume]] in his ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' approached free will via the notion of causality. It was his position that causality was a mental construct used to explain the repeated association of events, and that one must examine more closely the relation between things ''regularly succeeding'' one another (descriptions of regularity in nature) and things that ''result'' in other things (things that cause or necessitate other things).<ref name=Kane>
{{cite book |title=The significance of free will |author=Robert Kane |publisher=Oxford University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dBlXH3FtwJIC&pg=PA226 |page= 226 |chapter=Notes to pages 74–81, note 22 |isbn=978-0-19-512656-3 |year=1998 |edition=Paperback}}
</ref> According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity."<ref name=Lorkowski>{{cite encyclopedia |author=CM Lorkowski |date=November 7, 2010 |title=David Hume: Causation |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called [[apriority]] of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world):
* [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s proof in ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (which referenced time and time ordering of causes and effects)<ref>Kant argued that, in order that human life is not just a "dream" (a random or projected by subjects juxtaposition of moments), the temporality of event A as before or after B must submit to a rule. An established order then implies the existence of some necessary conditions and causes, that is: sufficient bases (a so-called sufficient reason is the coincidence of all the necessary conditions). Without established causality, both [[Transcendental apperception|in subject]] and in the external world, the passing of time would be impossible, because it is essentially directional. See [[s:Critique of Pure Reason/Volume 1/Division 1#B. Second Analogy. Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality. All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.|online text of his proof]]</ref>
* [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]]'s proof from ''The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason'' (which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and [[qualia]] perceived with senses)<ref>Schopenhauer, who by the way continued and simplified Kant's system, argued (among others basing on optical illusions and the "initial processing") that it is the intellect or even the brain what generates the image of the world out of something else, by ''concluding from effects, e.g. optical, about appropriate causes'', e.g. concrete physical objects. Intellect in his works is strictly connected with recognizing causes and effects and associating them, it is somewhat close to the contemporary view of [[cerebral cortex]] and formation of associations. The intellectuality of all perception implied then of course that causality is rooted in the world, precedes and enables experience. See [[s:Page:On the Fourfold Root, and On the Will in Nature.djvu/90|online text of his proof]]</ref>

In the 1780s [[Immanuel Kant]] suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects.<ref name=Hill>
{{cite book |author=R Kevin Hill |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y1CHkFRdYD4C&pg=PA196 |chapter=Chapter 7: The critique of morality: The three pillars of Kantian ethics |title=Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought |pages=196–201 |isbn=978-0-19-928552-5 |edition=Paperback |year=2003| publisher=Clarendon Press }}
</ref> "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be ''a priori'' judgments."<ref name=Paton>
{{cite book |title=The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy |author=Herbert James Paton |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8Y7RS1cM9KUC&pg=PA20 |isbn=978-0-8122-1023-1 |year=1971 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |chapter= §2 Moral judgements are ''a priori''|page=20 }}
</ref>

Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses... and between the behaving animal and its environment".<ref name=Freeman>{{cite book |title=Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? |editor1=Susan Pockett |editor2=WP Banks |editor3=Shaun Gallagher |chapter=Consciousness, intentionality and causality |author=Freeman, Walter J. |publisher=MIT Press |year =2009 |isbn=978-0-262-51257-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G5CaTnNksgkC&pg=PA88 |page=88| quote=Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes.... The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world.}}</ref> In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example, [[neuron]]s and their [[synapse]]s) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both.