Epistemology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Schools of thought== ===Empiricism=== [[File:David Hume 2.jpg|thumb|[[David Hume]], one of the most staunch defenders of empiricism]] {{Main|Empiricism}} [[Empiricism]] is a view in the theory of knowledge which focuses on the role of experience, especially experience based on [[perception|perceptual observations]] by the [[sense]]s, in the generation of knowledge.<ref name="PsillosCurd2010"/> Certain forms exempt disciplines such as [[mathematics]] and [[logic]] from these requirements.<ref name="Uebel2015"/> There are many variants of empiricism, including [[British empiricism]], [[Empiricism#Logical empiricism|logical empiricism]], [[phenomenalism]], and some versions of [[Scottish common sense realism|common sense philosophy]]. Most forms of empiricism give epistemologically privileged status to sensory impressions or [[sense data]], although this plays out very differently in different cases. Some of the most famous historical empiricists include [[John Locke]], [[David Hume]], [[George Berkeley]], [[Francis Bacon]], [[John Stuart Mill]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], and [[Bertrand Russell]]. ===Rationalism=== {{Main|Rationalism}} Rationalism is the epistemological view that reason is the chief source of knowledge and the main determinant of what constitutes knowledge. More broadly, it can also refer to any view which appeals to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. Rationalism is one of the two classical views in epistemology, the other being empiricism. Rationalists claim that the mind, through the use of reason, can directly grasp certain truths in various domains, including [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[ethics]], and [[metaphysics]]. Rationalist views can range from modest views in mathematics and logic (such as that of [[Gottlob Frege]]) to ambitious metaphysical systems (such as that of [[Baruch Spinoza]]). Some of the most famous rationalists include [[Plato]], [[René Descartes]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], and [[Gottfried Leibniz]]. ===Skepticism=== {{Main|Philosophical skepticism}} Skepticism is a position that questions the possibility of human knowledge, either in particular domains or on a general level.<ref name="Klein 2015"/> Skepticism does not refer to any one specific school of philosophy, but is rather a thread that runs through many epistemological debates. [[Philosophical skepticism#Ancient Greek skepticism|Ancient Greek skepticism]] began during the [[Hellenistic philosophy|Hellenistic period in philosophy]], which featured both [[Pyrrhonism]] (notably defended by [[Pyrrho]], [[Sextus Empiricus]], and [[Aenesidemus]]) and [[Academic skepticism]] (notably defended by [[Arcesilaus]] and [[Carneades]]). Among ancient Indian philosophers, skepticism was notably defended by the [[Ajñana]] school and in the Buddhist [[Madhyamika]] tradition. In modern philosophy, [[René Descartes]]' famous inquiry into mind and body began as an exercise in skepticism, in which he started by trying to doubt all purported cases of knowledge in order to search for something that was known with absolute [[certainty]].<ref name="Popkin1972"/> Epistemic skepticism questions whether knowledge is possible at all. Generally speaking, skeptics argue that knowledge requires [[certainty]], and that most or all of our beliefs are [[Fallibilism|fallible]] (meaning that our grounds for holding them always, or almost always, fall short of certainty), which would together entail that knowledge is always or almost always [[acatalepsy|impossible]] for us.<ref name="skepticism"/> Characterizing knowledge as strong or weak is dependent on a person's viewpoint and their characterization of knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Much of modern epistemology is derived from attempts to better understand and address philosophical skepticism.<ref name="Klein 2015">{{Citation|last=Klein|first=Peter|title=Skepticism|date=2015|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2015|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=1 October 2018|archive-date=23 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323100900/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/|url-status=live}}</ref> ====Pyrrhonism==== {{Main|Pyrrhonism}} One of the oldest forms of epistemic skepticism can be found in [[Agrippa's trilemma]] (named after the [[Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonist]] philosopher [[Agrippa the Skeptic]]) that demonstrates that certainty can not be achieved with regard to beliefs.<ref name="SEP Ancient Skepticism"/> Pyrrhonism dates back to [[Pyrrho of Elis]] from the 4th century BCE, although most of what we know about Pyrrhonism today is from the surviving works of [[Sextus Empiricus]].<ref name="SEP Ancient Skepticism"/> Pyrrhonists claim that for any argument for a non-evident proposition, an equally convincing argument for a contradictory proposition can be produced. Pyrrhonists do not dogmatically deny the possibility of knowledge, but instead point out that beliefs about non-evident matters cannot be substantiated. ====Cartesian skepticism==== The [[evil demon|Cartesian evil demon problem]], first raised by [[René Descartes]],{{Refn|group=note|name=PlatoCaveVsBrainVat}} supposes that our sensory impressions may be controlled by some external power rather than the result of ordinary veridical perception.<ref name="Descartes1"/> In such a scenario, nothing we sense would actually exist, but would instead be mere illusion. As a result, we would never be able to know anything about the world, since we would be systematically deceived about everything. The conclusion often drawn from evil demon skepticism is that even if we are not completely deceived, all of the information provided by our senses is still ''compatible'' with skeptical scenarios in which we are completely deceived, and that we must therefore either be able to exclude the possibility of deception or else must deny the possibility of ''infallible'' knowledge (that is, knowledge which is completely certain) beyond our immediate sensory impressions.<ref name="Descartes2"/> While the view that no beliefs are beyond doubt other than our immediate sensory impressions is often ascribed to Descartes, he in fact thought that we ''can'' exclude the possibility that we are systematically deceived, although his reasons for thinking this are based on a highly contentious [[ontological argument]] for the existence of a benevolent God who would not allow such deception to occur.<ref name="Descartes1"/> ====Responses to philosophical skepticism==== Epistemological skepticism can be classified as either "mitigated" or "unmitigated" skepticism. Mitigated skepticism rejects "strong" or "strict" knowledge claims but does approve weaker ones, which can be considered "virtual knowledge", but only with regard to justified beliefs. Unmitigated skepticism rejects claims of both virtual and strong knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Characterizing knowledge as strong, weak, virtual or genuine can be determined differently depending on a person's viewpoint as well as their characterization of knowledge.<ref name="skepticism"/> Some of the most notable attempts to respond to unmitigated skepticism include [[direct realism]], [[disjunctivism]], [[Scottish common sense realism|common sense philosophy]], [[pragmatism]], [[fideism]], and [[fictionalism]].<ref name="Suber1996"/> ===Pragmatism=== {{Main|Pragmatism}} [[Pragmatism]] is a fallibilist epistemology that emphasizes the role of action in knowing.<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> Different interpretations of pragmatism variously emphasize: truth as the final outcome of ideal scientific inquiry and experimentation, truth as closely related to usefulness, experience as transacting with (instead of representing) nature, and human practices as the foundation of language.<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> Pragmatism's origins are often attributed to [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]].<ref name="SEP pragmatism"/> In 1878, Peirce formulated the maxim, "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."<ref name="Peirce"/> William James suggested that through a pragmatist epistemology, theories "become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest".<ref name="James2000"/>{{Rp|28}} In James's pragmatic method, which he adapted from Peirce, metaphysical disputes can be settled by tracing the practical consequences of the different sides of the argument. If this process does not resolve the dispute, then "the dispute is idle".<ref name="James2000"/>{{Rp|25}} Contemporary versions of pragmatism have been developed by thinkers such as [[Richard Rorty]] and [[Hilary Putnam]]. Rorty proposed that values were historically contingent and dependent upon their utility within a given historical period.<ref>Rorty, R. and Saatkamp, H. (n.d.). Rorty & Pragmatism. Nashville [u.a.]: Vanderbilt Univ. Press.</ref> Contemporary philosophers working in pragmatism are called [[neopragmatism|neopragmatists]], and also include [[Nicholas Rescher]], [[Robert Brandom]], [[Susan Haack]], and [[Cornel West]]. === Naturalized epistemology === {{Main|Naturalized epistemology}} In certain respects an intellectual descendant of pragmatism, [[naturalized epistemology]] considers the evolutionary role of knowledge for agents living and evolving in the world.<ref name="Quine2004"/> It de-emphasizes the questions around justification and truth, and instead asks how reliable beliefs are formed empirically and what role that evolution plays in the development of such processes. It suggests a more empirical approach to the subject as a whole, leaving behind philosophical definitions and consistency arguments, and instead using psychological methods to study and understand how "knowledge" is actually formed and is used in the natural world. As such, it does not attempt to answer the analytic questions of traditional epistemology, but rather replace them with new empirical ones.<ref name="Kim1988"/> Naturalized epistemology was first proposed in "Epistemology Naturalized", a seminal paper by [[W.V.O. Quine|W. V. O. Quine]].<ref name="Quine2004"/> A less radical view has been defended by [[Hilary Kornblith]] in ''Knowledge and its Place in Nature'', in which he seeks to turn epistemology towards empirical investigation without completely abandoning traditional epistemic concepts.<ref name="Kornblith2002"/> ===Epistemic relativism=== {{Main|Relativism}} Epistemic relativism is the view that what is true, rational, or justified for one person need not be true, rational, or justified for another person. Epistemic relativists therefore assert that – while there are ''relative'' facts about truth, rationality, justification, and so on – there is no ''perspective-independent'' fact of the matter.<ref name="Boghossian2006"/> Note that this is distinct from epistemic [[contextualism]], which holds that the ''meaning'' of epistemic terms vary across contexts (e.g., "I know" might mean something different in everyday contexts and skeptical contexts). In contrast, epistemic relativism holds that the relevant ''facts'' vary, not just linguistic meaning. Relativism about truth may also be a form of [[ontological]] relativism, insofar as relativists about truth hold that facts about what ''exists'' vary based on perspective.<ref name="Boghossian2006"/> ===Epistemic constructivism=== {{Main|Constructivist epistemology|Social constructivism}} Constructivism is a view in philosophy according to which all "knowledge is a compilation of human-made constructions",<ref>Raskin, J.D. (2002). Constructivism in psychology: Personal construct psychology, radical constructivism, and social constructivism. In J.D. Raskin & S.K. Bridges (Eds.), ''Studies in meaning: Exploring constructivist psychology'' (pp. 1–25). New York: [[Pace University Press]]. p. 4</ref> "not the neutral discovery of an objective truth".<ref>Castelló M., & Botella, L. (2006). [https://books.google.com/books?id=O1ugEIEid6YC Constructivism and educational psychology] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=O1ugEIEid6YC&printsec=frontcover |date=10 December 2022 }}. In J.L. Kincheloe & R.A. Horn (Eds.), ''The Praeger handbook of education and psychology'' (Vol. 2, pp. 263–270). Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 263</ref> Whereas objectivism is concerned with the "object of our knowledge", constructivism emphasizes "how we construct knowledge".<ref name="Jonassen1991"/> Constructivism proposes new definitions for [[knowledge]] and [[truth]], which emphasize intersubjectivity rather than objectivity, and viability rather than truth. The constructivist point of view is in many ways comparable to certain forms of pragmatism.<ref>For an example, see Weber, Eric Thomas. 2010. ''[http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/rawls-dewey-and-constructivism-9781441199447/ Rawls, Dewey, and Constructivism: On the Epistemology of Justice] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140722103450/http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/rawls-dewey-and-constructivism-9781441199447/ |date=22 July 2014 }}'' (London: Continuum).</ref> ===Bayesian epistemology=== [[Bayesian epistemology]] is a formal approach to various topics in epistemology that has its roots in [[Thomas Bayes]]' work in the field of probability theory. One advantage of its formal method in contrast to traditional epistemology is that its concepts and theorems can be defined with a high degree of precision. It is based on the idea that beliefs can be interpreted as [[Subjective probability|subjective probabilities]]. As such, they are subject to the laws of [[probability theory]], which act as the norms of [[rationality]]. These norms can be divided into static constraints, governing the rationality of beliefs at any moment, and dynamic constraints, governing how rational agents should change their beliefs upon receiving new evidence. The most characteristic Bayesian expression of these principles is found in the form of [[Dutch book]]s, which illustrate irrationality in agents through a series of bets that lead to a loss for the agent no matter which of the probabilistic events occurs. Bayesians have applied these fundamental principles to various epistemological topics but Bayesianism does not cover all topics of traditional epistemology.<ref name="Talbott"/><ref name="Olsson2018"/><ref name="HartmannSprenger2010"/><ref name="HájekLin2017"/> === Feminist epistemology === {{Main|Feminist epistemology}} [[Feminist epistemology]] is a subfield of epistemology which applies [[feminist theory]] to epistemological questions. It began to emerge as a distinct subfield in the 20th century. Prominent feminist epistemologists include [[Miranda Fricker]] (who developed the concept of [[epistemic injustice]]), [[Donna Haraway]] (who first proposed the concept of [[situated knowledge]]), [[Sandra Harding]], and [[Elizabeth S. Anderson|Elizabeth Anderson]].<ref name="SEP Feminist Epistemology"/> Harding proposes that feminist epistemology can be broken into three distinct categories: feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology, and postmodern epistemology. Feminist epistemology has also played a significant role in the development of many debates in [[social epistemology]].<ref name="SEP Feminist Social"/> === Decolonial epistemology === {{Main|Decolonization of knowledge}} Epistemicide<ref name="Santos2015"/> is a term used in decolonisation studies that describes the killing of knowledge systems under systemic oppression such as colonisation and slavery. The term was coined by [[Boaventura de Sousa Santos]], who presented the significance of such physical violence creating the centering of Western knowledge in the current world.<ref name="Bennett2007"/> This term challenges the thought of what is seen as knowledge in academia today. ===Indian pramana=== {{Main|Pramana}} [[Indian philosophy|Indian schools of philosophy]], such as the [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] [[Nyaya]] and [[Carvaka]] schools, as well as the [[Jain philosophy|Jain]] and [[Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist]] philosophical schools, developed an epistemological tradition independently of the Western philosophical tradition called "pramana". Pramana can be translated as "instrument of knowledge" and refers to various means or sources of knowledge that Indian philosophers held to be reliable. Each school of Indian philosophy had their own theories about which pramanas were valid means to knowledge and which were unreliable (and why).<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N–Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, pp. 520–521</ref> A [[Vedas|Vedic]] text, [[Taittiriya Aranyaka|Taittirīya Āraṇyaka]] ({{circa|9th}}–6th centuries BCE), lists "four means of attaining correct knowledge": ''smṛti'' ("tradition" or "scripture"), ''pratyakṣa'' ("perception"), ''aitihya'' ("communication by one who is expert", or "tradition"), and ''anumāna'' ("reasoning" or "inference").<ref>A.B. Keith (1989), [https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&dq=pratyaksa&pg=PA482 ''The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132734/https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&pg=PA482&dq=pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, Part II, p.482</ref><ref>S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). [https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa&pg=PA23 ''A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&pg=PA23&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa |date=10 December 2022 }}, p.23</ref> In the Indian traditions, the most widely discussed pramanas are: ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception), ''Anumāṇa'' (inference), ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation, derivation from circumstances), ''Anupalabdi'' (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof), and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). While the Nyaya school (beginning with the [[Nyāya Sūtras]] of Gotama, between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE<ref>Jeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, {{ISBN|978-1-898723-94-3}}, p. 129</ref><ref>B.K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.</ref>) were a proponent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, inference, comparison/analogy, and testimony), the Buddhist epistemologists ([[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]]) generally accepted only perception and inference. The [[Carvaka]] school of [[materialists]] only accepted the pramana of perception, and hence were among the first [[empiricists]] in the Indian traditions.<ref>MM Kamal (1998), [https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf The Epistemology of the Cārvāka Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180214202758/https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ibk1952/46/2/46_2_1048/_pdf |date=14 February 2018 }}, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13–16</ref> Another school, the [[Ajñana]], included notable proponents of [[philosophical skepticism]]. The [[Buddhist philosophy#Epistemology|theory of knowledge of the Buddha]] in the early Buddhist texts has been interpreted as a form of pragmatism as well as a form of correspondence theory.<ref>Jayatilleke, K.N.; Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 356</ref> Likewise, the Buddhist philosopher [[Dharmakirti]] has been interpreted both as holding a form of pragmatism or correspondence theory for his view that what is true is what has effective power (''arthakriya'').<ref>Cabezón, José I., 2000, "Truth in Buddhist Theology," in R. Jackson and J. Makransky, (eds.), Buddhist Theology, Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars. London: Curzon, 136–154.</ref><ref>Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> The Buddhist [[Madhyamika]] school's theory of emptiness ([[shunyata]]) meanwhile has been interpreted as a form of [[philosophical skepticism]].<ref>Arnold, Dan; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of belief and religion] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210132735/https://books.google.com/books?id=fHqDCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=10 December 2022 }}, p. 132.</ref> The main contribution to epistemology by the Jains has been their theory of "many sided-ness" or "multi-perspectivism" ([[Anekantavada]]), which says that since the world is multifaceted, any single viewpoint is limited (''naya'' – a partial standpoint).<ref>Griffin, David Ray (2005) p. 145</ref> This has been interpreted as a kind of pluralism or [[perspectivism]].<ref>Stroud, Scott R; [https://www.academia.edu/download/34919888/anek_pluralism_AHR.pdf Anekantavada and Engaged Rhetorical Pluralism: Explicating Jaina Views on Perspectivism, Violence, and Rhetoric]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}.</ref><ref>D. Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction 125.</ref> According to [[Jain epistemology]], none of the pramanas gives absolute or perfect knowledge since they are each limited points of view. Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page