Mao Zedong

=== Great Leap Forward ===
{{Main|Great Leap Forward}}
[[File:Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Soong Ching-ling.jpg|thumb|Mao with [[Nikita Khrushchev]], [[Ho Chi Minh]], and [[Soong Ching-ling]] during a state dinner in Beijing, 1959]]

In January 1958, Mao launched the second five-year plan, known as the Great Leap Forward, a plan intended to turn China from an agrarian nation to an industrialised one<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-silence-that-preceded-chinas-great-leap-into-famine-51898077/ |title=The Silence that Preceded China's Great Leap into Famine |last=King |first=Gilbert |website=[[Smithsonian]] |access-date=28 November 2019}}</ref> and as an alternative model for economic growth to the Soviet model focusing on heavy industry that was advocated by others in the party. Under this economic program, the relatively small agricultural collectives that had been formed to date were rapidly merged into far larger [[people's commune]]s, and many of the peasants were ordered to work on massive infrastructure projects and on the production of iron and steel. Some private food production was banned, and livestock and farm implements were brought under collective ownership.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Slatyer |first=Will |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tprrCQAAQBAJ |title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes - Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400-2100 |date=20 February 2015 |publisher=Partridge Publishing Singapore |isbn=978-1-4828-2961-7 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]|page=509}}</ref>

Under the Great Leap Forward, Mao and other party leaders ordered the implementation of a variety of unproven and unscientific new agricultural techniques by the new communes. The combined effect of the diversion of labour to steel production and infrastructure projects, and cyclical [[natural disaster]]s led to an approximately 15% drop in grain production in 1959 followed by a further 10% decline in 1960 and no recovery in 1961.<ref name="Spence1999 p553">{{Harvnb|Spence|1999}}{{Page needed|date=January 2013}}<!-- Book has only 188 pages, so page 553 does not look right --></ref>

In an effort to win favour with their superiors and avoid being purged, each layer in the party exaggerated the amount of grain produced under them. Based upon the falsely reported success, party cadres were ordered to requisition a disproportionately high amount of that fictitious harvest for state use, primarily for use in the cities and urban areas but also for export. The result, compounded in some areas by drought and in others by floods, was that farmers were left with little food for themselves and many millions starved to death in the [[Great Chinese Famine]]. The people of urban areas in China were given food stamps each month, but the people of rural areas were expected to grow their own crops and give some of the crops back to the government. The death count in rural parts of China surpassed the deaths in the urban centers. Additionally, the Chinese government continued to export food that could have been allocated to the country's starving citizens.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last1=Yushi |first1=Mao |title=Lessons from China's Great Famine |journal=The Cato Journal |date=22 September 2014 |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=483–491 |id={{Gale|A387348115}} |url=https://www.proquest.com/openview/7453e8c6f7d53a0684e517742c966e39/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=37750}}</ref> The famine was a direct cause of the death of some 30 million Chinese peasants between 1959 and 1962.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Smil |first1=V. |title=China's great famine: 40 years later |journal=[[British Medical Journal|BMJ]] |date=18 December 1999 |volume=319 |issue=7225 |pages=1619–1621 |doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619 |pmid=10600969 |pmc=1127087}}</ref> Furthermore, many children who became malnourished during years of hardship died after the Great Leap Forward came to an end in 1962.<ref name="Spence1999 p553"/>

In late autumn 1958, Mao condemned the practices that were being used during Great Leap Forward such as forcing peasants to do exhausting labour without enough food or rest which resulted in epidemics and starvation. He also acknowledged that anti-rightist campaigns were a major cause of "production at the expense of livelihood." He refused to abandon the Great Leap Forward to solve these difficulties, but he did demand that they be confronted. After the July 1959 [[Lushan Conference|clash at Lushan]] Conference with [[Peng Dehuai]], Mao launched a new anti-rightist campaign along with the radical policies that he previously abandoned. It wasn't until the spring of 1960, that Mao would again express concern about abnormal deaths and other abuses, but he did not move to stop them. Bernstein concludes that the Chairman "wilfully ignored the lessons of the first radical phase for the sake of achieving extreme ideological and developmental goals".<ref name="wilfulness">{{cite journal |last1=Thomas P.|first1=Bernstein |title=Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959–1960: A Study in Wilfulness |journal=The China Quarterly |date=June 2006 |volume=186 |issue=186 |pages=421–445 |doi=10.1017/S0305741006000221 |jstor=20192620 |s2cid=153728069}}</ref>

[[Jasper Becker]] notes that Mao was dismissive of reports he received of food shortages in the countryside and refused to change course, believing that peasants were lying and that rightists and [[kulaks]] were hoarding grain. He refused to open state granaries,<ref name="Becker81">{{Harvnb|Becker|1998|p=81}}</ref> and instead launched a series of "anti-grain concealment" drives that resulted in numerous purges and suicides.{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=86}} Other violent campaigns followed in which party leaders went from village to village in search of hidden food reserves, and not only grain, as Mao issued quotas for pigs, chickens, ducks and eggs. Many peasants accused of hiding food were tortured and beaten to death.{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=93}}

The extent of Mao's knowledge of the severity of the situation has been disputed. Mao's personal physician, [[Li Zhisui]], said that Mao may have been unaware of the extent of the famine, partly due to a reluctance of local officials to criticise his policies, and the willingness of his staff to exaggerate or outright fake reports.{{sfn|Li|1994|pp=283–284, 295}} Li writes that upon learning of the extent of the starvation, Mao vowed to stop eating meat, an action followed by his staff.{{sfn|Li|1994|p=340}}

[[File:Mao Zedong shakes hands with People's commune workers.jpg|thumb|Mao shaking hands with a people's commune farmer, 1959]]
Mao stepped down as President of China on 27 April 1959; he retained other top positions such as Chairman of the Communist Party and of the Central Military Commission.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |last1=Li |first1=Xiaobing |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Fm5BAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA41 |title=Evolution of Power: China's Struggle, Survival, and Success |last2=Tian |first2=Xiansheng |year=2013 |publisher=[[Lexington Books]] |isbn=978-0739184981 |pages=41 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> The Presidency was transferred to [[Liu Shaoqi]].<ref name=":5" /> Mao was eventually forced to abandon the policy in 1962, and he lost political power to Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping |url=http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131211053051/http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |archive-date=11 December 2013 |access-date=22 April 2020 |website=[[Columbia University]]}}</ref>

The Great Leap Forward was a tragedy for the vast majority of the Chinese. Although the steel quotas were officially reached, almost all of the supposed steel made in the countryside was iron, as it had been made from assorted scrap metal in home-made furnaces with no reliable source of fuel such as coal. This meant that proper [[smelting]] conditions could not be achieved. According to Zhang Rongmei, a geometry teacher in rural Shanghai during the Great Leap Forward: "We took all the furniture, pots, and pans we had in our house, and all our neighbours did likewise. We put everything in a big fire and melted down all the metal".{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} The worst of the famine was steered towards enemies of the state.{{sfn|Valentino|2004|p=128}} [[Jasper Becker]] explains: "The most vulnerable section of China's population, around five percent, were those whom Mao called '[[enemies of the people]]'. Anyone who had in previous campaigns of repression been labeled a 'black element' was given the lowest priority in the allocation of food. Landlords, rich peasants, former members of the nationalist regime, religious leaders, rightists, counter-revolutionaries and the families of such individuals died in the greatest numbers."{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=103}}

According to official Chinese statistics for [[Five-year plans of China|Second Five-Year Plan]] (1958–1962):"[[Industrial production|industrial output value]] value had doubled; the [[Gross value added|gross value]] of agricultural products increased by 35 percent; [[Steelmaking|steel production]] in 1962 was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AE8zAQAAIAAJ |title=People's Republic of China Yearbook |date=2009 |publisher=[[Xinhua Publishing House]] |volume=29 |pages=340 |language=en |quote=Industrial output value had doubled; the gross value of agricultural products increased by 35 percent; steel production in 1962 was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent. |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref>

At a large Communist Party conference in Beijing in January 1962, dubbed the "[[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]]", State Chairman Liu Shaoqi denounced the Great Leap Forward, attributing the project to widespread famine in China.<ref name="Chang">{{Harvnb|Chang|Halliday|2005|pp=568, 579}}</ref> The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister [[Lin Biao]] staunchly defended Mao.<ref name="Chang"/> A brief period of liberalisation followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback.<ref name="Chang"/> Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]] rescued the economy by disbanding the people's communes, introducing elements of private control of peasant smallholdings and importing grain from Canada and Australia to mitigate the worst effects of famine.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lsHLDAAAQBAJ&q=Liu+Shaoqi+and+Deng+Xiaoping+rescued+the+economy+by+disbanding+the+people's+communes,+introducing+elements+of+private+control+of+peasant+smallholdings+and+importing+grain+from+Canada+and+Australia+to+mitigate+the+worst+effects+of+famine.&pg=PT373 |title=50 Great Military Leaders of All Time |last=Tibbetts |first=Jann |year=2016 |publisher=Vij Books India Pvt Ltd |isbn=978-9385505669 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref>

[[File:Kissinger Mao.jpg|thumb|Mao with [[Henry Kissinger]] and [[Zhou Enlai]], Beijing, 1972]]

At the [[Lushan Conference]] in July/August 1959, several ministers expressed concern that the Great Leap Forward had not proved as successful as planned. The most direct of these was Minister of Defence and Korean War veteran General [[Peng Dehuai]]. Following Peng's criticism of the Great Leap Forward, Mao orchestrated a purge of Peng and his supporters, stifling criticism of the Great Leap policies. Senior officials who reported the truth of the famine to Mao were branded as "right opportunists."{{sfn|Becker|1998|pp=92–93}} A campaign against right-wing opportunism was launched and resulted in party members and ordinary peasants being sent to prison labour camps where many would subsequently die in the famine. Years later the CCP would conclude that as many as six million people were wrongly punished in the campaign.{{sfn|Valentino|2004|p=127}}
[[File:Mao Zedong with Emperor Haile Selassie I.webp|thumb|Ethiopian Emperor [[Haile Selassie|Haile Selassie I]] with Mao in 1971 after the death of [[Lin Biao]] ]]
The number of deaths by starvation during the Great Leap Forward is deeply controversial. Until the mid-1980s, when official census figures were finally published by the Chinese Government, little was known about the scale of the disaster in the Chinese countryside, as the handful of Western observers allowed access during this time had been restricted to model villages where they were deceived into believing that the Great Leap Forward had been a great success. There was also an assumption that the flow of individual reports of starvation that had been reaching the West, primarily through Hong Kong and Taiwan, must have been localised or exaggerated as China was continuing to claim record harvests and was a net exporter of grain through the period. Because Mao wanted to pay back early to the Soviets debts totalling 1.973 billion [[Renminbi|yuan]] from 1960 to 1962,<ref name="Yang Jisheng"/> exports increased by 50%, and fellow Communist regimes in [[North Korea]], [[North Vietnam]] and [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]] were provided grain free of charge.<ref name="Becker81"/>

Censuses were carried out in China in 1953, 1964 and 1982. The first attempt to analyse this data to estimate the number of famine deaths was carried out by American demographer Dr. Judith Banister and published in 1984. Given the lengthy gaps between the censuses and doubts over the reliability of the data, an accurate figure is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, Banister concluded that the official data implied that around 15 million excess deaths incurred in China during 1958–61, and that based on her modelling of Chinese demographics during the period and taking account of assumed under-reporting during the famine years, the figure was around 30 million. [[Hu Yaobang]], a high-ranking official of the CCP, states that 20 million people died according to official government statistics.{{sfn|Short|2001|p=761}} [[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]], a former [[Xinhua News Agency]] reporter who had privileged access and connections available to no other scholars, estimates a death toll of 36 million.<ref name="Yang Jisheng">{{cite news |first=Mark |last=O'Neill |url=http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |title=A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |archive-date=10 February 2012 |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |date=6 July 2008}}</ref> Frank Dikötter estimates that there were at least 45 million premature deaths attributable to the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html |title=Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years' |last=Akbar |first=Arifa |date=17 September 2010 |access-date=20 September 2010 |location=London |work=[[The Independent]]}}; {{Harvnb|Dikötter|2010|p=333}}</ref> Various other sources have put the figure at between 20 and 46 million.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bramall |first=Chris |date=December 2011 |title=Agency and Famine in China's Sichuan Province, 1958–1962 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=208 |pages=990–1008 |doi=10.1017/s030574101100110x |s2cid=56200410 |issn=0305-7410|url=https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13836/1/Bramall_CQ_Dec_2011.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wemheuer |first1=Felix |last2=Dikötter |first2=Frank |date=July 2011 |title=Sites of Horror: Mao's Great Famine [with Response] Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962. Frank Dikötter |journal=The China Journal |volume=66 |pages=155–164 |doi=10.1086/tcj.66.41262812 |s2cid=141874259 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref><ref name="maostats">{{cite web |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao |title=Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Twentieth Century Hemoclysm |publisher=Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century |access-date=23 August 2008}}</ref>