Free will

====Free will as an illusion====
[[File:Spinoza.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Baruch Spinoza]] thought that there is no free will.]]
:"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined." [[Baruch Spinoza]], ''Ethics''<ref name=Spinoza>{{cite book |author=Benedict de Spinoza |year=2008 |chapter=Part III: On the origin and nature of the emotions; Postulates (Proposition II, Note) |editor=R.H.M. Elwes, trans |title=The Ethics |publisher=Digireads.com Publishing |edition=Original work published 1677 |isbn=978-1-4209-3114-3 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2tTweH2JeXsC&pg=PA54 |page=54 }}{{Dead link|date=April 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
[[David Hume]] discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a ''velleity''), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.<ref>Hume, D. (1765). ''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'', Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co. Second edition. 1993. {{ISBN|0-87220-230-5}}</ref>

[[File:Schopenhauer.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] claimed that phenomena do not have freedom of the will, but the will as [[noumenon]] is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free.]]
According to [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], the actions of humans, as [[phenomena]], are subject to the [[principle of sufficient reason]] and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the [[Will (philosophy)|will]] [urging, craving, striving, wanting, and desiring], as the [[noumenon]] underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Book 2, Sec. 23:

{{blockquote|But the fact is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as [[thing-in-itself]], but is ''phenomenon'' of the will, is as such determined, and has entered the form of the phenomenon, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence we get the strange fact that everyone considers himself to be ''a priori'' quite free, even in his individual actions, and imagines he can at any moment enter upon a different way of life... But ''a posteriori'' through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns, and, as it were, must play to the end the part he has taken upon himself.<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 1., trans. E. F. J. Payne, p. 113-114</ref>}}

Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]].'' In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."<ref>[[Schopenhauer]], Arthur, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell {{ISBN|0-631-14552-4}}</ref>