Inductive reasoning

====Gilbert Harman====
In a 1965 paper, [[Gilbert Harman]] explained that enumerative induction is not an autonomous phenomenon, but is simply a disguised consequence of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE).<ref name="Poston">Ted Poston [http://www.iep.utm.edu/found-ep "Foundationalism"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190926003413/http://www.iep.utm.edu/found-ep |date=26 September 2019 }}, § b "Theories of proper inference", §§ iii "Liberal inductivism", ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', 10 Jun 2010 (last updated): "Strict inductivism is motivated by the thought that we have some kind of inferential knowledge of the world that cannot be accommodated by deductive inference from epistemically [[basic belief]]s.  A fairly recent debate has arisen over the merits of strict inductivism.  Some philosophers have argued that there are other forms of nondeductive inference that do not fit the model of enumerative induction.  [[C.S. Peirce]] describes a form of inference called '[[abductive reasoning|abduction]]' or '[[inference to the best explanation]]'.  This form of inference appeals to explanatory considerations to justify belief.  One infers, for example, that two students copied answers from a third because this is the best explanation of the available data—they each make the same mistakes and the two sat in view of the third.  Alternatively, in a more theoretical context, one infers that there are very small unobservable [[molecules|particles]] because this is the best explanation of [[Brownian motion]].  Let us call 'liberal inductivism' any view that accepts the legitimacy of a form of inference to the best explanation that is distinct from enumerative induction.  For a defense of liberal inductivism, see [[Gilbert Harman]]'s classic (1965) paper.  Harman defends a strong version of liberal inductivism according to which enumerative induction is just a disguised form of [[inference to the best explanation]]".</ref>  IBE is otherwise synonymous with [[C S Peirce]]'s ''[[abductive reasoning|abduction]]''.<ref name="Poston" />  Many philosophers of science espousing [[scientific realism]] have maintained that IBE is the way that scientists develop approximately true scientific theories about nature.<ref>Stathis Psillos, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956303 "On Van Fraassen's critique of abductive reasoning"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818183602/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956303 |date=18 August 2018 }}, ''Philosophical Quarterly'', 1996 Jan;'''46'''(182):31–47, [31].</ref>