Cult of personality Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! === Syria === {{See also|Assad dynasty}} [[File:Pounds_President_Assad-silver.jpg|thumb|Syrian silver pound with [[Hafez al-Assad]]'s image carved into it]] Syria's [[Hafez al-Assad]], a [[Ba'athism|Ba'athist]] officer who seized power through a [[1970 Syrian coup d'Γ©tat|coup d'Γ©tat in 1970]], established a pervasive cult of personality to maintain his dictatorship. As soon as he took over power, Ba'ath party loyalists designated him as "''Al-Abad''"; an Arabic terminology with deep religious dimensions. Linguistically, <nowiki>''</nowiki>''Al-Abad''<nowiki>''</nowiki> means "forever, infinite and immortality" and religious clerics use this term in relation to [[Attributes of God in Islam|Divine Attributes]]. By designating Assad as "''Al-Abad''", [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Syrian Ba'ath Movement]] ideologically elevated Hafez al-Assad as its "Immortal", "god-like figure" who is supposed to represent the state as well as the [[Syrians|Syrian nation]] itself. Another meaning of ''Al-Abad'' is "permanent", which is used in state propaganda to denote the perpetual ''status quo'' of an "eternal political order" created by Hafez al-Assad, who continues to live in Assadist ideology. The term's verbal form "''Abada''" means "to commit [[genocide]]" including the "symbolical; performative side of violence". This dimension has been weaponized by the Assad regime to monopolize violence against alleged dissidents and justify [[state terrorism]], including genocidal acts of mass murder like the [[1982 Hama massacre|Hama Massacre]], [[2004 Qamishli riots|Qamishli Massacre]] and other [[List of massacres during the Syrian civil war|massacres of the Syrian civil war]].<ref name="auto">{{Cite journal |last=Bader Eddin |first=Eylaf |date=8 November 2022 |title=Al-Abad: On the Ongoing |url=https://brill.com/view/journals/mjcc/15/4/article-p367_5.xml?language=en&ebody=full%20html-copy1 |journal=Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=367β372 |doi=10.1163/18739865-01504004 |s2cid=253455744 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230604090746/https://brill.com/view/journals/mjcc/15/4/article-p367_5.xml?language=en&ebody=full%20html-copy1 |archive-date=4 June 2023 |via=Brill|doi-access=free }}</ref> [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party β Syria Region|Arab Socialist Ba'ath party]] initially manufactured Hafez al-Assad's cult of [[Arab socialism|Arab socialist]] heroism in consultancy with [[Soviet propaganda|Soviet state propagandists]], mimicking the pervasive personality cults prevalent across [[Soviet Bloc]] dictatorships like [[Romania]] and North Korea. Beginning as a tool to bind every Syrian citizen with the obligation of undying loyalty (''bay'ah'') to Assad in 1970s, the propaganda was further intensified and personalist depictions reached new heights during the 1980s. The state began re-writing [[History of Syria|Syrian history]] itself, with the Ba'ath party deifying Hafez al-Assad as their "leader for eternity" ["''qa'iduna ila l-abad''"] and portraying him as "the second [[Saladin]]" who guarantees [[Arabs|Arab peoples]] victory over [[Zionist]] [[Crusaders]]. Through kindergarten, school books, educational institutions and [[Media in Syria|Baathist media]]; Assadist propaganda constructed the image of a homogenous [[Arab nation]] protected by a fatherly leader revelling under the "cult of Saladin". Assad regime venerates Hafez al-Assad's [[Personalist dictator|personalist]] [[iconography]] perpetually in the public and private spheres of everyday Syrian life; through monuments, images, murals, posters, statues, stamps, Ba'athist symbolism, currency notes, photos, banners, state TV, etc.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Gruber, Haugbolle |first1=Christiane, Sune |title=Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image |last2=Heidemann |first2=Stefan |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-253-00884-8 |location=Bloomington, Indiana 47405 USA |pages=57β75 |chapter=3: Memory and Ideology: Images of Saladin in Syria and Iraq}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |date=15 February 2017 |title=From Kurdish Sultan to Pan-Arab Champion and Muslim Hero: The Evolution of the Saladin Myth in Popular Arab Culture |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpcu.12503 |journal=The Journal of Popular Culture |volume=50 |issue=1 |pages=65β83 |doi=10.1111/jpcu.12503 |via=Wiley Online Library |last1=Sayfo |first1=Omar |hdl=1874/361826 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> More than a leader of the masses, Ba'athist propaganda equated Hafez al-Assad itself with "the people", apart from declaring him as the "[[father of the nation]]" and as an exceptional human being; being assigned with multiple roles as a doctor, soldier, lawyer, educator, statesman, general, etc. Every civil society organization, trade union and any form of cultural or religious associations in Syria, are obliged to declare their "binding covenant to Hafez al-Assad and display his iconography, in order to be legalized. The far-reaching personality cult of his father has been weaponized by [[Bashar al-Assad]] as a pillar of his regime's legitimacy and also as a supplement to enhance his own personality cult. Bashar's cult downplays religious elements for technocratic Arab socialist themes, with a constant [[militaristic]] emphasis on conspiratorial threats from forces of Zionism due to an allegedly ongoing "dormant war with [[Israel]]".<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Gruber, Haugbolle |first1=Christiane, Sune |title=Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image |last2=Heidemann |first2=Stefan |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-253-00884-8 |location=Bloomington, Indiana 47405 USA |pages=67β74 |chapter=3: Memory and Ideology: Images of Saladin in Syria and Iraq}}</ref> One utilization of the personality cult has been to enable the Assad dynasty to downplay the rural [[Alawite]] origins of their family from public eyes. Images of [[Assad family]] members are installed across Syria's numerous heritage sites and monuments, to wed the dynasty with [[Ba'athist Syria]]n history. Murals and statues of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad are constructed across Syrian cities, towns, villages, etc. depicting them in the costumes of medieval [[Bedouin]]s or as sultans like [[Harun al-Rashid]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Gruber, Haugbolle |first1=Christiane, Sune |title=Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image |last2=Heidemann |first2=Stefan |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-253-00884-8 |location=Bloomington, Indiana 47405 USA |pages=79β80 |chapter=3: Memory and Ideology: Images of Saladin in Syria and Iraq}}</ref> Assadist cult of personality functions as a [[Psychological warfare|psychological tool]] for the totalitarian regime; which attempts to claim towards the Syrian society that the Ba'athist system shall continue ruling eternally, forever, with no end.<ref name="auto" /> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. 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