United States Army Air Forces Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Strategic planning=== {{quote box |width=32em |align=right |bgcolor= |title= |quote='''Changing USAAF Bombing Priorities''' * 13 August 1941: electrical production (AWPD/1)<ref name="wp1"/> * 6 September 1942: [[U-boat]] facilities (AWPD/42)<ref name="wp2"/> * 3 September 1944: [[Oil Campaign of World War II|Oil Campaign]]<ref>Kreis (1996), p. 241</ref> * 5 January 1945: jet aircraft<ref name=Irving2002>Irving (1989), p. 666</ref> }} On 13 August 1941, the [[Air War Plans Division]] of the USAAF produced its plan for a global air strategy, AWPD/1.<ref>Bowman (1997), p. 19.</ref> Formally known as "Annex 2, Air Requirements" to "The Victory Program", a plan of strategic estimates involving the entire U.S. military,<ref>Griffith (1999), p. 66.</ref> the plan was prepared in accordance with strategic policies drawn earlier that year in the [[U.S.–British Staff Conference (ABC–1)|ABC-1]] agreement with the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]] and the U.S. war plan [[United States color-coded war plans|Rainbow 5]]. Its forecast figures, despite planning errors from lack of accurate information about weather and the German economic commitment to the war, were within 2 percent of the units and 5.5 percent of the personnel ultimately mobilized,<ref>Griffith (1999), p. 78.</ref> and it accurately predicted the time frame when [[Operation Overlord|the invasion of Europe by the Allies]] would take place.<ref name="Griffith, The Quest, p.77">Griffith (1999), p. 77.</ref> AWPD/1 called for an air defense of the Western hemisphere, a strategic defense against Japan in the Pacific, and strategic bombardment by 6,800 bombers against Germany, identifying 154 key targets of the German economic infrastructure it considered vulnerable to a sustained campaign.<ref name="Nalty, p.188">Nalty (1997), p. 188.</ref> A strategic bomber requirement of 7,500 aircraft, which included the intercontinental [[Convair B-36 Peacemaker|Convair B-36]]<ref name="Nalty, p.188"/> (then still in the design phase), was far too large for American industry to achieve to be practical, and an interim plan to attack Germany with 3,800 bombers was included in AWPD/1.<ref name="Nalty, p.188"/> AWPD/1 was approved by Marshall and [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[Henry L. Stimson|Henry Stimson]] in September 1941.<ref name="Nalty, p.190">Nalty (1997), p. 190.</ref> Although war began before the plan could be presented to Roosevelt, it became the foundation for establishing aircraft production and training requirements used during the war, and the concept of a strategic bomber offensive against Germany became policy of the U.S. government,<ref>Bowman (1997), pp. 19–20.</ref> in accordance with United States strategic policy stated in [[United States color-coded war plans|Rainbow 5]], as the only means available to the United States to take the war to Germany.<ref name="Nalty, p.190"/> In August 1942 Roosevelt called for a revision of proposed air requirements. AWPD/42 was presented on 6 September 1942, and although never accepted by the U.S. Navy, its revised estimates (which more than doubled production requirements to nearly 150,000 aircraft of all types, including those of the Navy and exports to allies) guided the Roosevelt Administration in 1943. The estimate was later reduced to 127,000, of which 80,000 were combat aircraft. Like its predecessor, AWPD/42 laid out a strategic plan for the daylight bombing of Germany by unescorted heavy bombers, but also included a similar plan for attacks on Japan. The B-17 bomber command of the U.S. [[Eighth Air Force]] had only flown six relatively unopposed missions when AWPD/42 was drawn up, and the prior mistake in AWPD/1 of disregarding the need and feasibility of long-range fighter escorts was repeated. Both plans called for the destruction of the German Air Force (GAF) as a necessary requirement before campaigns against priority economic targets. AWPD/1 established four target sets in order of priority: electrical power production, inland transportation, petroleum production, and Berlin;<ref name="wp1">Griffith (1999), p. 67.</ref> while AWPD/42 revised the priorities, placing [[U-boat]] facilities first, followed by transportation, electricity production, petroleum production, and rubber production.<ref name="wp2">Griffith (1999), pp. 96–97.</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page