Teleological argument

== Criticism ==

===Classical===
The original development of the argument from design was in reaction to atomistic, explicitly non-teleological understandings of nature. Socrates, as reported by Plato and Xenophon, was reacting to such natural philosophers. While less has survived from the debates of the Hellenistic and Roman eras, it is clear from sources such as [[Cicero]] and [[Lucretius]], that debate continued for generations, and several of the striking metaphors used still today, such as the unseen watchmaker, and the [[infinite monkey theorem]], have their roots in this period. While the Stoics became the most well-known proponents of the argument from design, the atomistic counter arguments were refined most famously by the [[Epicurus|Epicureans]]. On the one hand, they criticized the supposed evidence for intelligent design, and the logic of the Stoics. On the defensive side, they were faced with the challenge of explaining how un-directed chance can cause something which appears to be a rational order. Much of this defence revolved around arguments such as the infinite monkey metaphor. Democritus had already apparently used such arguments at the time of Socrates, saying that there will be infinite planets, and only some having an order like the planet we know. But the Epicureans refined this argument, by proposing that the actual number of types of atoms in nature is small, not infinite, making it less coincidental that after a long period of time, certain orderly outcomes will result.<ref name=sed/>

These were not the only positions held in classical times. A more complex position also continued to be held by some schools, such as the Neoplatonists, who, like Plato and Aristotle, insisted that Nature did indeed have a rational order, but were concerned about how to describe the way in which this rational order is caused. According to Plotinus for example, Plato's metaphor of a craftsman should be seen only as a metaphor, and Plato should be understood as agreeing with Aristotle that the rational order in nature works through a form of causation unlike everyday causation. In fact, according to this proposal each thing already has its own nature, fitting into a rational order, whereby the thing itself is "in need of, and directed towards, what is higher or better".<ref>Chiaradonna, Riccardo. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=7Wt2BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 Plotinus' account of demiurgic causation and its philosophical background]". Pp. 31–50 in ''Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity'', edited by A. Marmodoro and B. D. Prince. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7Wt2BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 p.&nbsp;31].</ref>

===David Hume===
[[File:David Hume.jpg|thumb|David Hume outlined his criticisms of the teleological argument in his ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''.]]

Louis Loeb writes that [[David Hume]], in his ''[[An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding|Enquiry]]'', "insists that inductive inference cannot justify belief in extended objects". Loeb also quotes Hume as writing:{{blockquote|text=It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other. {{omission}} If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inference of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes…which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with another. {{omission}} [The proponents of the argument] always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled.}}

Loeb notes that "we observe neither God nor other universes, and hence no conjunction involving them. There is no observed conjunction to ground an inference either to extended objects or to God, as unobserved causes."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Radcliffe |first=Elizabeth S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6ECxW_2tAf0C&dq=%22insists+that+inductive%22+hume&pg=PA118 |title=Loeb, LE., in Radcliffe, ES (ed.), ''A Companion to Hume'', John Wiley & Sons, 2010, p. 118. |date=31 May 2011 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=9781444337860}}</ref>
 
Hume also presented a criticism of the argument in his ''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''. The character ''Philo'', a religious sceptic, voices Hume's criticisms of the argument. He argues that the design argument is built upon a faulty analogy as, unlike with man-made objects, we have not witnessed the design of a universe, so do not know whether the universe was the result of design. Moreover, the size of the universe makes the analogy problematic: although our experience of the universe is of order, there may be chaos in other parts of the universe.<ref name="IEP Hume">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=David Hume (1711–1776) |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume |access-date=November 24, 2011 |date=June 30, 2011 |author=Fiesar, James}}</ref> Philo argues:
{{Blockquote|text=A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?|author=David Hume|source=Dialogues 2<ref name="IEP Hume" />}}

Philo also proposes that the order in nature may be due to nature alone. If nature contains a principle of order within it, the need for a designer is removed. Philo argues that even if the universe is indeed designed, it is unreasonable to justify the conclusion that the designer must be an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God – the God of classical theism.<ref name="IEP Hume" /> It is impossible, he argues, to infer the perfect nature of a creator from the nature of its creation. Philo argues that the designer may have been defective or otherwise imperfect, suggesting that the universe may have been a poor first attempt at design.<ref name="God Hypothesis">{{Cite book |last=Auerbach, Albert A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OtDSNNPjpRwC&q=teleological+argument+from+ignorance&pg=PA60 |title=The God Hypothesis and Other Theories of the Universe |publisher=Infinity Publishing |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-7414-0245-5 |pages=59–60}}</ref> Hume also pointed out that the argument does not necessarily lead to the existence of one God: “why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing the world?” (p.&nbsp;108).<ref name="Hume1779" />

[[Wesley C. Salmon]] developed Hume's insights, arguing that all things in the universe which exhibit order are, to our knowledge, created by material, imperfect, finite beings or forces. He also argued that there are no known instances of an immaterial, perfect, infinite being creating anything. Using the probability calculus of [[Bayes Theorem]], Salmon concludes that it is very improbable that the universe was created by the type of intelligent being theists argue for.<ref>Wesley C. Salmon, "Religion and Science: A New Look at Hume's Dialogues", Philosophical Studies, 33 (1978), 143–176.</ref>

[[Nancy Cartwright (philosopher)|Nancy Cartwright]] accuses Salmon of [[begging the question]]. One piece of evidence he uses in his probabilistic argument – that atoms and molecules are not caused by design – is equivalent to the conclusion he draws, that the universe is probably not caused by design. The atoms and molecules are what the universe is made up of and whose origins are at issue. Therefore, they cannot be used as evidence against the theistic conclusion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cartwright |first=Nancy |year=1978 |title=Comments on Wesley Salmon's 'Science and Religion ...' |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=177–183 |doi=10.1007/BF00571885 |jstor=4319204 |s2cid=170346176}}</ref>

==={{anchor|The intelligence may not be God}}Intelligence may not be God===
Referring to it as the [[Natural theology|physico-theological]] proof, [[Immanuel Kant]] discussed the teleological argument in his [[Critique of Pure Reason]]. Even though he referred to it as "the oldest, clearest and most appropriate to human reason", he nevertheless rejected it, heading section VI with the words, "On the impossibility of a physico-theological proof."<ref>Buroker, J. V. ''Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason': An Introduction'', Cambridge University Press. p.&nbsp;279.[https://books.google.com/books?id=2DaHzDGjR48C&q=%22argument+from+design%22+&pg=PA278]</ref><ref>Kant, Immanuel. [1781] 1998. ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''. in Guyer, P. and A. W. Wood, trans. [[Cambridge University Press]]. p. 578.</ref> In accepting some of Hume's criticisms, Kant wrote that the argument "proves at most intelligence only in the arrangement of the 'matter' of the universe, and hence the existence not of a 'Supreme Being', but of an 'Architect'". Using the argument to try to prove the existence of God required "a concealed appeal to the [[Ontological argument]]".<ref>Rabitte, E. 1995. ''David Hume: Critical Assessments'' 5, edited by S. Tweyman. [[Taylor & Francis]]. p. 192.</ref>[[File:D'après Nicolas de Largillière, portrait de Voltaire (Institut et Musée Voltaire) -001.jpg|thumb|[[Voltaire]] argued that, at best, the teleological argument could only indicate the existence of a powerful, but not necessarily all-powerful or all-knowing, intelligence.]]

In his ''Traité de métaphysique'' [[Voltaire]] argued that, even if the argument from design could prove the existence of a powerful intelligent designer, it would not prove that this designer is God.<ref name="Voltaire">{{Cite book |last=Voltaire |title=The Works of Voltaire: The Henriade: Letters and miscellanies |publisher=Werner |others=trans. William F. Fleming |year=1901 |volume=XXI |pages=239–240 |chapter=On the Existence of God |author-link=Voltaire |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RCctAAAAYAAJ |orig-year=1734}}</ref>
{{Blockquote|text= {{omission}} from this sole argument I cannot conclude anything further than that it is probable that an intelligent and superior being has skillfully prepared and fashioned the matter. I cannot conclude from that alone that this being has made matter out of nothing and that he is infinite in every sense.|author=Voltaire|source={{lang|fr|Traité de métaphysique}}<ref name="Voltaire" />}}

=== Argument from improbability ===
{{further|Problem of the creator of God}}
[[Richard Dawkins]] is harshly critical of intelligent design in his book ''[[The God Delusion]].'' In this book, he contends that an appeal to intelligent design can provide no explanation for biology because it not only [[begs the question]] of the designer's own origin but raises additional questions: an intelligent designer must itself be far more complex and difficult to explain than anything it is capable of designing.<ref name="dawkins2006" /> He believes the chances of life arising on a planet like the Earth are many orders of magnitude less probable than most people would think, but the [[anthropic principle]] effectively counters skepticism with regard to improbability. For example Astronomer [[Fred Hoyle#Rejection of Earth-based abiogenesis|Fred Hoyle]] suggested that potential for life on Earth was no more probable than a [[Boeing 747]] being assembled by a hurricane from the scrapyard. Dawkins argues that a one-time event is indeed subject to improbability but once under way, natural selection itself is nothing like random chance. Furthermore, he refers to his counter argument to the argument from improbability by that same name:<ref name="dawkins2006" />

{{blockquote|text=The argument from improbability is the big one. In the traditional guise of the argument from design, it is easily today's most popular argument offered in favour of the existence of God and it is seen, by an amazingly large number of theists, as completely and utterly convincing. It is indeed a very strong and, I suspect, unanswerable argument—but in precisely the opposite direction from the theist's intention. The argument from improbability, properly deployed, comes close to proving that God does ''not'' exist. My name for the statistical demonstration that God almost certainly does not exist is the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit.

The creationist misappropriation of the argument from improbability always takes the same general form, and it doesn't make any difference {{omission}} [if called] 'intelligent design' (ID). Some observed phenomenon—often a living creature or one of its more complex organs, but it could be anything from a molecule up to the universe itself—is correctly extolled as statistically improbable. Sometimes the language of information theory is used: the Darwinian is challenged to explain the source all the information in living matter, in the technical sense of information content as a measure of improbability or 'surprise value'… However statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable. God is the Ultimate Boeing 747.

{{omission}} The whole argument turns on the familiar question 'Who made God?' {{omission}} A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right. God presents an infinite regress from which he cannot help us to escape. This argument... demonstrates that God, though not technically disprovable, is very very improbable indeed.<ref name="dawkins2006" />|author=Richard Dawkins|source=''The God Delusion''}}

Dawkins considered the argument from improbability to be "much more powerful" than the teleological argument, or argument from design, although he sometimes implies the terms are used interchangeably. He paraphrases St. Thomas' teleological argument as follows: "Things in the world, especially living things, look as though they have been designed. Nothing that we know looks designed unless it is designed. Therefore there must have been a designer, and we call him God."<ref name="dawkins2006">{{Cite book |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yq1xDpicghkC&pg=PA103 |title=The God Delusion |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Co. |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-618-68000-9 |pages=103, 136–138, 162–166 |lccn=2006015506}}</ref>

Philosopher [[Edward Feser]] contends that Dawkins fundamentally misunderstands the teleological argument, particularly Aquinas' version, and refutes a [[straw man]].<ref>[[Edward Feser|Feser, Edward]]. 2008. ''The Last Superstition''. St. Augustine Press. p. 111.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2010-03-26 |title=The New Philistinism |url=https://www.aei.org/articles/the-new-philistinism/}}</ref>

=== Perception of purpose in biology ===
{{main|Teleology in biology}}

The [[philosophy of biology|philosopher of biology]] [[Michael Ruse]] has argued that Darwin treated the structure of organisms as if they had a purpose: "the organism-as-if-it-were-designed-by God picture was absolutely central to Darwin's thinking in 1862, as it always had been".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ruse, Michael |url=https://archive.org/details/darwindesigndoes00ruse_0 |title=Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2003 |isbn=9780674010239 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/darwindesigndoes00ruse_0/page/122 122] |url-access=registration}}</ref> He refers to this as "the metaphor of design ... Organisms give the appearance of being designed, and thanks to Charles Darwin's discovery of natural selection we know why this is true." In his review of Ruse's book, R.J. Richards writes, "Biologists quite routinely refer to the design of organisms and their traits, but properly speaking it's ''apparent'' design to which they refer – an 'as if' design."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Richards, Robert J. |year=2004 |title=Michael Ruse's Design for Living |url=http://home.uchicago.edu/~rjr6/articles/Richards%20on%20Ruse.pdf |journal=Journal of the History of Biology |volume=37 |pages=25–38 |doi=10.1023/b:hist.0000020388.99933.5b |s2cid=9034212}}</ref> [[Robert Foley (academic)|Robert Foley]] refers to this as "the illusion of purpose, design, and progress". He adds, "there is no purpose in a fundamentally causative manner in evolution but that the processes of selection and adaptation give the illusion of purpose through the utter functionality and designed nature of the biological world".<ref>Foley, RA., in Morris, SC., ''The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal'', Templeton Foundation Press, 2008 p. 175.</ref>

Richard Dawkins suggests that while biology can at first seem to be purposeful and ordered, upon closer inspection its true function becomes questionable. Dawkins rejects the claim that biology serves any designed function, claiming rather that biology only mimics such purpose. In his book ''[[The Blind Watchmaker]]'', Dawkins states that animals are the most complex things in the known universe: "Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." He argues that natural selection should suffice as an explanation of biological complexity without recourse to [[divine providence]].<ref name="Dawkins1986">{{Cite book |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sPpaZnZMDG0C&pg=PA1 |title=The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design |publisher=Norton |year=1986 |isbn=978-0-393-31570-7 |page=1 |lccn=96229669}}</ref>

However, theologian [[Alister McGrath]] has pointed out that the fine-tuning of carbon is even responsible for nature's ability to tune itself to any degree.
{{blockquote|text=[The entire biological] evolutionary process depends upon the unusual chemistry of carbon, which allows it to bond to itself, as well as other elements, creating highly complex molecules that are stable over prevailing terrestrial temperatures, and are capable of conveying genetic information (especially DNA). {{omission}} Whereas it might be argued that nature creates its own fine-tuning, this can only be done if the primordial constituents of the universe are such that an evolutionary process can be initiated. The unique chemistry of carbon is the ultimate foundation of the capacity of nature to tune itself.<ref name="biologos.org" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=McGrath |first=Alister E. |title=A fine-tuned universe: the quest for God in science and theology |date=2009 |publisher=Westminster John Knox Press |isbn=978-0664233105 |edition=1st |location=Louisville, KY. |page=176}}</ref>}}

Proponents of [[intelligent design]] creationism, such as [[William A. Dembski]] question the philosophical assumptions made by critics with regard to what a designer would or would not do. Dembski claims that such arguments are not merely beyond the purview of science: often they are tacitly or overtly theological while failing to provide a serious analysis of the hypothetical objective's relative merit. Some critics, such as [[Stephen Jay Gould]] suggest that any purported 'cosmic' designer would only produce optimal designs, while there are numerous biological criticisms to demonstrate that such an ideal is manifestly untenable. Against these ideas, Dembski characterizes both Dawkins' and Gould's argument as a rhetorical [[straw man]].<ref name="Dembski2004" /> He suggests a principle of [[constrained optimization]] more realistically describes the best any designer could hope to achieve:

{{blockquote|text=Not knowing the objectives of the designer, Gould was in no position to say whether the designer proposed a faulty compromise among those objectives… In criticizing design, biologists tend to place a premium on functionalities of individual organisms and see design as optimal to the degree that those individual functionalities are maximized. But higher-order designs of entire ecosystems might require lower-order designs of individual organisms to fall short of maximal function.<ref name="Dembski2004">{{Cite book |last=Dembski |first=William A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sKVqpXqE0VwC&pg=PA58 |title=The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design |publisher=InterVarsity Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-8308-3216-3 |pages=58–59, 61 |lccn=2003020589}}</ref>|author=William A. Dembski|source=''[[The Design Revolution]]: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design''}}

=== Fideism and rejection of natural theology ===
{{main|Natural theology#Faith and fideism}}
Some theologians [[Natural theology#Criticism|oppose the usage of human reason and science in attaining knowledge of God]] altogether, asserting the primacy of faith in this endeavour.

=== Alleged argument from analogy===
The design claim can be challenged as an [[argument from analogy]]. Supporters of design suggest that natural objects and man-made objects have many similar properties, and man-made objects have a designer. Therefore, it is probable that natural objects must be designed as well. However, proponents must demonstrate that all the available evidence has been taken into account.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cornman |first=James W. |url=https://books.google.com/books/about/Philosophical_Problems_and_Arguments.html?id=cRHegYZgyfUC |title=Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction |last2=Lehrer |first2=Keith |last3=Pappas |first3=George Sotiros |date=1992-01-01 |publisher=Hackett Publishing |isbn=978-0-87220-124-8 |language=en}}</ref> Eric Rust argues that, when speaking of familiar objects such as watches, "we have a basis to make an inference from such an object to its designer". However, the "universe is a unique and isolated case" and we have nothing to compare it with, so "we have no basis for making an inference such as we can with individual objects. ... We have no basis for applying to the whole universe what may hold of constituent elements in the universe."<ref>Rust, E., ''Religion, Revelation and Reason'', Mercer University Press, 1981, p.&nbsp;[https://books.google.com/books?id=AcSw6GDlLVwC&dq=criticism+%22teleological+argument%22&pg=PA96 96].</ref>

=== Other criticisms ===
[[George H. Smith]], in his book ''[[Atheism: The Case Against God]]'', points out what he considers to be a flaw in the argument from design:<ref>[[George H. Smith|Smith, George H.]] 2003. ''[[Atheism: The Case Against God]]''. [[Prometheus Books]]. p. 155.</ref>
{{blockquote|text=Now consider the idea that nature itself is the product of design. How could this be demonstrated? Nature {{omission}} provides the basis of comparison by which we distinguish between designed objects and natural objects. We are able to infer the presence of design only to the extent that the characteristics of an object differ from natural characteristics. Therefore, to claim that nature as a whole was designed is to destroy the basis by which we differentiate between artifacts and natural objects.}}

The teleological argument assumes that one can infer the existence of intelligent design merely by examination, and because life is reminiscent of something a human might design, it too must have been designed. However, considering "snowflakes and crystals of certain salts", "[i]n no case do we find intelligence". "There are other ways that order and design can come about" such as by "purely physical forces."<ref>Cornman, J. W., K. Lehrer, and G. S. Pappas. 1992. ''[https://books.google.com/books/about/Philosophical_Problems_and_Arguments.html?id=cRHegYZgyfUC Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction]''. [[Hackett Publishing]]. pp. 245–56.</ref>

Most professional biologists [[Level of support for evolution#Scientific support|support]] the [[Modern synthesis (20th century)|modern evolutionary synthesis]], not merely as an alternative explanation for the complexity of life but a better explanation with more supporting evidence.<ref>[http://www.interacademies.net/10878/13901.aspx IAP Statement on the Teaching of Evolution] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717190031/http://www.interacademies.net/10878/13901.aspx |date=2011-07-17 }} Joint statement issued by the national science academies of 67 countries, including the [[United Kingdom]]'s [[Royal Society]] (PDF file)</ref> Living organisms obey the same physical laws as inanimate objects. Over [[Geologic time scale|very long periods of time]] self-replicating structures arose and later formed [[DNA]].<ref>Russell, P. J. 2008. ''Biology: The Dynamic Science'' 1. [[Cengage Learning]]. p. 72.</ref>