Scientific method Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Philosophy==<!--Section set to frame 'usefulness' in order to encourage perspectives that advance discussion; not (just) critique without context. Keep in mind, that 'useful' needs to be the consideration of your source, and not any interpretation of it.--> {{See also|Philosophy of science|Sociology of scientific knowledge}} {{anchor|Characterization}} Philosophy of science looks at [[#polyaFirstUnderstand|the underpinning logic]] of the scientific method, at what separates [[Demarcation problem|science from non-science]], and the [[Research ethics|ethic]] that is implicit in science. There are basic assumptions, derived from philosophy by at least one prominent scientist,{{efn-ua|name= introspection| [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page%3APopular_Science_Monthly_Volume_12.djvu/300 Never fail to recognize an idea]... .— C. S. Peirce, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE, SECOND PAPER. —HOW TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR. ''Popular Science Monthly'' '''Volume 12''', January 1878, p.286<ref name= How/>}}<ref name=comprehensibility/> that form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.<ref name=comprehensibility>Einstein, Albert (1936, 1956) One may say "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility." From the article "Physics and Reality" (1936), reprinted in ''Out of My Later Years'' (1956). 'It is one of the great realizations of Immanuel Kant that the setting up of a real external world would be senseless without this comprehensibility.'</ref> These assumptions from [[naturalism (philosophy)|methodological naturalism]] form a basis on which science may be grounded. [[Logical positivism|Logical positivist]], [[empiricism|empiricist]], [[falsifiability|falsificationist]], and other theories have criticized these assumptions and given alternative accounts of the logic of science, but each has also itself been criticized. There are several kinds of modern philosophical conceptualizations and attempts at definitions of the method of science.{{efn-lg|There is no universally agreed upon definition of the method of science. This was expressed with [[Neurath's boat]] already in 1913. There is however a consensus that stating this somewhat nihilistic assertion without introduction and in too unexpected a fashion is counterproductive, confusing, and can even be damaging. There may never be one, too. As [[Steven Weinberg|Weinberg]] described it in 1995:<ref name="Weinberg 1995">Weinberg, (1995) “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live”, page: 8</ref> {{Quote|quote=The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend.}}}} The one attempted by the ''unificationists'', who argue for the existence of a unified definition that is useful (or at least 'works' in every context of science). The ''pluralists'', arguing degrees of science being too fractured for a universal definition of its method to by useful. And those, who argue that the very attempt at definition is already detrimental to the free flow of ideas. Additionally, there have been views on the social framework in which science is done, and the impact of the sciences social envrionment on research. Also, there is 'scientific method' as popularised by Dewey in ''How We Think'' (1910) and Karl Pearson in ''Grammar of Science'' (1892), as used in fairly uncritical manner in education. === Pluralism === {{Main|Scientific pluralism}} Scientific pluralism is a position within the [[philosophy of science]] that rejects various proposed [[unity of science|unities]] of scientific method and subject matter. Scientific pluralists hold that science is not unified in one or more of the following ways: the [[metaphysics]] of its subject matter, the [[epistemology]] of scientific knowledge, or the [[research methods]] and models that should be used. Some pluralists believe that pluralism is necessary due to the nature of science. Others say that since [[scientific discipline]]s already vary in practice, there is no reason to believe this variation is wrong until a specific unification is [[empirically]] proven. Finally, some hold that pluralism should be allowed for [[normative]] reasons, even if unity were possible in theory. === Unificationism === {{Main|Unity of science}} Unificationism, in science, was a central tenet of [[logical positivism]].<ref name="Neurath† Bonk 2011">{{cite book | last=Neurath† | first=Otto | author1-link=Otto Neurath| last2=Bonk | first2=Thomas | title=Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science | chapter=Unity of Science and Logical Empiricism: A Reply | publisher=Springer Netherlands | publication-place=Dordrecht | date=2011 | isbn=978-94-007-0142-7 | doi=10.1007/978-94-007-0143-4_2 | page=15–30}}</ref><ref name="McGill 1937">{{cite journal | last=McGill | first=V. J. | title=Logical Positivism and the Unity of Science | journal=Science & Society | publisher=Guilford Press | volume=1 | issue=4 | year=1937 | issn=00368237 | jstor=40399117 | pages=550–561 }}</ref> Different logical positivists construed this doctrine in several different ways, e.g. as a [[reductionism|reductionist]] thesis, that the objects investigated by the [[special sciences]] reduce to the objects of a common, putatively more basic domain of science, usually thought to be physics; as the thesis that all theories and results of the various sciences can or ought to be expressed in a common language or "universal slang"; or as the thesis that all the special sciences share a common scientific method. Development of the idea has been troubled by accelerated advancement in technology that has opened up many new ways to look at the world. {{Quote|quote=The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. |source=[[Steven Weinberg]], 1995<ref name="Weinberg 1995" />}} === Anti-formalism === {{Main|Anti-formalism in science}}<!--meant as an invitation to either find or write the relevant article, WP:REDLINK--> {{anchor|noMethod}}[[Paul Feyerabend]] examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a methodological process. In his book ''[[Against Method]]'' he argued that no description of scientific method [[#critiquesOfFeyerabend|could possibly be broad enough]] to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free [[methodology|methodological rules]] governing the progress of science. In essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science. He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be '[[#theTermSci|anything goes]]'.<ref>[[Paul Feyerabend|Feyerabend, Paul K.]], ''Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge'', 1st published, 1975. Reprinted, Verso, London, 1978. </ref> As has been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; [[Problem solving|problem solver]]s, and researchers are to be prudent with their resources during their inquiry.{{efn-ua|name= FRL-1.136 |{{harvp|Peirce|1899}} First rule of logic (F.R.L)<ref name= reasonsFirstRule /> Paragraph 1.136: From the first rule of logic, if we truly desire the goal of the inquiry we are not to waste our resources.<ref name=econ/><ref name= SuitableTest/> — [[Terence Tao]] wrote on the matter that not all approaches can be regarded as "equally suitable and deserving of equal resources" because such positions would "sap mathematics of its sense of direction and purpose".<ref name= taoTime >{{cite web | last=Tao | first=Terence | title=What is good mathematics? | website=arXiv.org | date=13 February 2007 | url=https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702396 | access-date=11 April 2024}}</ref>}} A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method. This research indicated that scientists frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses. This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.<ref name="Schickore Hangel 2019">{{cite journal | last=Schickore | first=Jutta | last2=Hangel | first2=Nora | title=“It might be this, it should be that…” uncertainty and doubt in day-to-day research practice | journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Science | volume=9 | issue=2 | date=2019 | issn=1879-4912 | doi=10.1007/s13194-019-0253-9 | page=}}</ref> === Myth, education, and scientific literacy === {{See also|Science education|Scientific literacy}} In education, the idea of a general and universal scientific method has been notably influential, and numerous studies (in the US) have shown that this framing of method often forms part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science.<ref name="Aikenhead 1987 pp. 459–487">{{cite journal | last=Aikenhead | first=Glen S. | title=High‐school graduates' beliefs about science‐technology‐society. III. Characteristics and limitations of scientific knowledge | journal=Science Education | volume=71 | issue=4 | date=1987 | issn=0036-8326 | doi=10.1002/sce.3730710402 | pages=459–487}}</ref><ref name="Osborne Simon Collins 2003 pp. 1049–1079">{{cite journal | last=Osborne | first=Jonathan | last2=Simon | first2=Shirley | last3=Collins | first3=Sue | title=Attitudes towards science: A review of the literature and its implications | journal=International Journal of Science Education | volume=25 | issue=9 | date=2003 | issn=0950-0693 | doi=10.1080/0950069032000032199 | pages=1049–1079}}</ref> This convention of traditional education has been argued against by scientists, as there is a consensus that educations' sequential elements and unified view of scientific method do not reflect how scientists actually work.<ref name="Bauer 1992 p. ">{{cite book | last=Bauer | first=Henry H. | title=Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method | publisher=University of Illinois Press | date=1992 | isbn=978-0-252-06436-4 | page=}}</ref><ref name="McComas 1996 pp. 10–16">{{cite journal | last=McComas | first=William F. | title=Ten Myths of Science: Reexamining What We Think We Know About the Nature of Science | journal=School Science and Mathematics | volume=96 | issue=1 | date=1996 | issn=0036-6803 | doi=10.1111/j.1949-8594.1996.tb10205.x | pages=10–16}}</ref><ref name="Wivagg 2002 pp. 645–646">{{cite journal | last=Wivagg | first=Dan | title=The Dogma of "The" Scientific Method | journal=The American Biology Teacher | volume=64 | issue=9 | date=2002-11-01 | issn=0002-7685 | doi=10.2307/4451400 | pages=645–646}}</ref> [[History of science|Historian of science]] Daniel Thurs' chapter in the 2015 book ''Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science'', concluded that the scientific method is a myth or, at best, an idealization.<ref>{{Citation | last = Thurs | first = Daniel P. | chapter = That the scientific method accurately reflects what scientists actually do | editor-last1 = Numbers | editor-first1 = Ronald L. | editor-link = Ronald L. Numbers | editor-last2 = Kampourakis | editor-first2 = Kostas | title = Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science | pages = 210–218 | publisher = Harvard University Press | year = 2015 | chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science | isbn = 978-0-674-91547-3 | quote = It's probably best to get the bad news out of the way first, the so-called scientific method is a myth. ... If typical formulations were accurate, the only location true science would be taking place in would be grade-school classrooms. | access-date = 2020-10-20 | archive-date = 2023-11-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20231129112729/https://books.google.com/books?id=pWouCwAAQBAJ&q=newton%27s+apple+and+other+myths+about+science#v=snippet&q=newton's%20apple%20and%20other%20myths%20about%20science&f=false | url-status = live }}</ref> Educations approach to scientific method was inspired by [[Karl Pearson|Karl Pearson’s]] ''Grammar of Science'' (1892),<ref>{{cite web| url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/scientific-method/| access-date=12 March 2024 |last1=Hepburn|first1=Brian|first2=Hanne|last2=Andersen|author-link2=Hanne Andersen (philosopher)| title=Scientific Method |work=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] (Summer 2021 Edition)|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|editor-link=Edward N. Zalta|orig-date=13 November 2015|date=1 June 2021|quote=The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.}}</ref> and [[#CITEREFDewey1910|Dewey's 1910 book]], ''[[How We Think]]''.<ref name= cowles>{{harvp|Cowles|2020|p=264}}</ref>{{efn|name= deweySchool}} Van der Ploeg (2016) indicated that Dewey's views{{efn|... in Dewey, John (1916) ''Democracy and Education''}} on education had long been used to further an idea of citizen education removed from "sound education", claiming that references to Dewey in such arguments were undue interpretations (of Dewey).<ref name="van der Ploeg 2016 pp. 145–159">{{cite journal | last=van der Ploeg | first=Piet | title=Dewey versus ‘Dewey’ on democracy and education | journal=Education, Citizenship and Social Justice | publisher=SAGE Publications | volume=11 | issue=2 | date=8 June 2016 | issn=1746-1979 | doi=10.1177/1746197916648283 | pages=145–159}}</ref> ===Sociology of knowledge=== {{Main|Sociology of scientific knowledge}} The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those ideas arise.{{efn-lg|{{Quote|quote=The sociology of knowledge is concerned with "the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises."<ref>Here, King quotes [[Peter L. Berger]] and [[Thomas Luckmann|Thomas Luckman]], [[The Social Construction of Reality|''The Social Construction of Reality'']] (London, 1967), 16.</ref> So, on this reading, the sociology of science may be taken to be considered with the analysis of the social context of scientific thought. But scientific thought, most sociologists concede, is distinguished from other modes of thought precisely by virtue of its immunity from social determination — insofar as it is governed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as it is rational it escapes determination by "non-logical" social forces. |source=M. D. King leading into his article on ''Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science (1971)''<ref name="King_JA1971">{{cite journal | last=King | first=M. D. | title=Reason, Tradition, and the Progressiveness of Science | journal=History and Theory | publisher=[Wesleyan University, Wiley] | volume=10 | issue=1 | year=1971 | issn=14682303 | jstor=2504396 | doi=10.2307/2504396 | pages=3–32}}</ref>}}}} ====Thought collectives==== A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is [[Ludwik Fleck|Fleck's]] thought, echoed in [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn's]] concept of [[normal science]]. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called [[Thought collective|''thought collectives'']]. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Harwood | first=Jonathan | title=Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge | journal=Social Studies of Science | volume=16 | number=1 | date=1986 | pages=173–187 | JSTOR=285293}}</ref>{{rp|177}} Comparably, following the [[field research]] in an academic scientific laboratory by [[Bruno Latour|Latour]] and [[Steve Woolgar|Woolgar]], [[Karin Knorr Cetina]] has conducted a comparative study of two scientific fields (namely [[Particle physics|high energy physics]] and [[molecular biology]]) to conclude that the epistemic practices and reasonings within both scientific communities are different enough to introduce the concept of "[[epistemic cultures]]", in contradiction with the idea that a so-called "scientific method" is unique and a unifying concept.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge|last=Knorr-Cetina |first=K. |date=1999|publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-25893-8|location=Cambridge, Mass.|oclc=39539508}}</ref>{{efn|Comparing 'epistemic cultures' with Fleck 1935, [[Thought collective]]s, (''denkkollektiven''): ''Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einfǖhrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv''<ref>As cited in {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=27}}, {{harvp|Fleck|1979|pp=38–50}}</ref> {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxvii}} recognizes that [[#genesisOfScientificFact|facts have lifetimes]], flourishing only after incubation periods. His selected question for investigation (1934) was "[[Thought collective#predicateIsNotStatement|HOW, THEN, DID THIS EMPIRICAL FACT ORIGINATE]] AND IN WHAT DOES IT CONSIST?".<ref>{{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxviii}}</ref> But by [[#genesisOfScientificFact|Fleck 1979, p.27]], the thought collectives within the respective fields will have to settle on common specialized terminology, publish their results and [[#Communication and community|further intercommunicate]] with their colleagues using the common terminology, in order to progress.<ref>{{harvp|Fleck | 1979|p=27}}</ref> {{see also|Cognitive revolution|Perceptual control theory#The methodology of modeling, and PCT as model}}}} ====Situated cognition and relativism==== {{See also|postpositivism|Relativism}} On the idea of Fleck's ''thought collectives'' sociologists built the concept of "[[situated cognition]]": that the perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views.<!--even writing out "Social constructivism" and "Solipsism" feels like assigning undue weight to fringe theories here--> [[Norwood Russell Hanson]], [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]] have done extensive work on the [[perception|"theory-laden" character]] of observation. Hanson (1958) first coined the term for the idea that all observation is dependent on [[Situated cognition|the conceptual framework of the observer]], using the concept of [[gestalt psychology|gestalt]] to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description.<ref>{{Citation |last=Hanson |first=Norwood |title=Patterns of Discovery |year=1958 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-05197-2 }}</ref> He opens Chapter 1 with a discussion of the [[Golgi apparatus|Golgi bodies]] and their initial rejection as an artefact of staining technique, and a discussion of [[Tycho Brahe|Brahe]] and [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler]] observing the dawn and seeing a "different" sunrise despite the same physiological phenomenon.{{efn|name= Kepler1604 }}{{efn|Brahe and Kepler are two different observers, [[intersubjectivity]] validates Hanson.}} Kuhn<ref>{{cite book |last=Kuhn |first=Thomas S. |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |publisher=University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago, IL |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4432-5544-8 |page=113 |title-link=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}<!--ISBN matches 2009 publication, not the 1962.--> </ref> and Feyerabend<ref>Feyerabend, Paul K (1960) "Patterns of Discovery" The Philosophical Review (1960) vol. 69 (2) pp. 247–252</ref> acknowledge the pioneering significance of Hanson's work.{{clarify inline|reason=this paragraph does not do well explaining things and giving context/ the notes may need clarification as well|date=April 2024}} Criticisms such as Kuhn's and Feyerabend's led to the [[strong programme]], a radical approach to the [[sociology of science]]. The [[postmodernism|postmodernist]] critiques of science, especially in its extreme variants of "[[social constructivism]]" and "[[solipsism]]", have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the [[science wars]], is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between the postmodernist and [[Scientific realism|realist]] camps. Whereas postmodernists assert that scientific knowledge is simply another discourse (this term has special meaning in this context) and not representative of any form of fundamental truth, [[Scientific realism|realists]] in the scientific community maintain that scientific knowledge does reveal real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate method of deriving truth.<ref>For example: * ''Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science'', The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 * ''Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science'', Picador. 1999 * ''The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy'', University of Nebraska Press, 2000 {{ISBN|0-8032-7995-7}} * ''A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science'', Oxford University Press, 2000 * ''Intellectual Impostures'', Economist Books, 2003</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. 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