United States Army Air Forces Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Role in World War II== {{main article|Air warfare of World War II#United States: Army Air Forces}} ===Strategic planning=== {{quote box |width=32em |align=right |bgcolor= |title= |quote='''Changing USAAF Bombing Priorities''' * 13 August 1941: electrical production (AWPD/1)<ref name="wp1"/> * 6 September 1942: [[U-boat]] facilities (AWPD/42)<ref name="wp2"/> * 3 September 1944: [[Oil Campaign of World War II|Oil Campaign]]<ref>Kreis (1996), p. 241</ref> * 5 January 1945: jet aircraft<ref name=Irving2002>Irving (1989), p. 666</ref> }} On 13 August 1941, the [[Air War Plans Division]] of the USAAF produced its plan for a global air strategy, AWPD/1.<ref>Bowman (1997), p. 19.</ref> Formally known as "Annex 2, Air Requirements" to "The Victory Program", a plan of strategic estimates involving the entire U.S. military,<ref>Griffith (1999), p. 66.</ref> the plan was prepared in accordance with strategic policies drawn earlier that year in the [[U.S.βBritish Staff Conference (ABCβ1)|ABC-1]] agreement with the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]] and the U.S. war plan [[United States color-coded war plans|Rainbow 5]]. Its forecast figures, despite planning errors from lack of accurate information about weather and the German economic commitment to the war, were within 2 percent of the units and 5.5 percent of the personnel ultimately mobilized,<ref>Griffith (1999), p. 78.</ref> and it accurately predicted the time frame when [[Operation Overlord|the invasion of Europe by the Allies]] would take place.<ref name="Griffith, The Quest, p.77">Griffith (1999), p. 77.</ref> AWPD/1 called for an air defense of the Western hemisphere, a strategic defense against Japan in the Pacific, and strategic bombardment by 6,800 bombers against Germany, identifying 154 key targets of the German economic infrastructure it considered vulnerable to a sustained campaign.<ref name="Nalty, p.188">Nalty (1997), p. 188.</ref> A strategic bomber requirement of 7,500 aircraft, which included the intercontinental [[Convair B-36 Peacemaker|Convair B-36]]<ref name="Nalty, p.188"/> (then still in the design phase), was far too large for American industry to achieve to be practical, and an interim plan to attack Germany with 3,800 bombers was included in AWPD/1.<ref name="Nalty, p.188"/> AWPD/1 was approved by Marshall and [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[Henry L. Stimson|Henry Stimson]] in September 1941.<ref name="Nalty, p.190">Nalty (1997), p. 190.</ref> Although war began before the plan could be presented to Roosevelt, it became the foundation for establishing aircraft production and training requirements used during the war, and the concept of a strategic bomber offensive against Germany became policy of the U.S. government,<ref>Bowman (1997), pp. 19β20.</ref> in accordance with United States strategic policy stated in [[United States color-coded war plans|Rainbow 5]], as the only means available to the United States to take the war to Germany.<ref name="Nalty, p.190"/> In August 1942 Roosevelt called for a revision of proposed air requirements. AWPD/42 was presented on 6 September 1942, and although never accepted by the U.S. Navy, its revised estimates (which more than doubled production requirements to nearly 150,000 aircraft of all types, including those of the Navy and exports to allies) guided the Roosevelt Administration in 1943. The estimate was later reduced to 127,000, of which 80,000 were combat aircraft. Like its predecessor, AWPD/42 laid out a strategic plan for the daylight bombing of Germany by unescorted heavy bombers, but also included a similar plan for attacks on Japan. The B-17 bomber command of the U.S. [[Eighth Air Force]] had only flown six relatively unopposed missions when AWPD/42 was drawn up, and the prior mistake in AWPD/1 of disregarding the need and feasibility of long-range fighter escorts was repeated. Both plans called for the destruction of the German Air Force (GAF) as a necessary requirement before campaigns against priority economic targets. AWPD/1 established four target sets in order of priority: electrical power production, inland transportation, petroleum production, and Berlin;<ref name="wp1">Griffith (1999), p. 67.</ref> while AWPD/42 revised the priorities, placing [[U-boat]] facilities first, followed by transportation, electricity production, petroleum production, and rubber production.<ref name="wp2">Griffith (1999), pp. 96β97.</ref> ===Combat crew rotation=== To prevent or alleviate the effects of [[Combat stress reaction|combat fatigue]], the AAF developed policies for rotating combat crews between the theaters of operations and the United States.<ref>Little (1968), p. 24</ref> Replacement limitations and operational requirements caused the modification of basic AAF policy several times during the war. On 1 July 1942 the War Department first set a one-year tour of duty for all AAF combat crews, but a simple, uniform policy service-wide was unrealistic and never put into effect. Instead field commanders developed their own criteria for determining completion of tours. While varying substantially between theaters, most of these programs attempted to establish fixed tours based on numbers of missions and other quantifiable factors. Nonetheless, Headquarters AAF did not interfere with theater programs but did prohibit any rotation unless replacements had first arrived in the unit.<ref name="Little 1968, p. 25">Little (1968), p. 25</ref> After studying the situation, the War Department rescinded the one-year tour policy on 29 May 1943 and changed procedures for assignment of replacements to include both attrition and rotation purposes. However a continuing shortage forced commanders to lengthen the tours they had established, to the detriment of aircrew morale.<ref>Little (1968), pp. 8β9</ref> By January 1944 nearly all active tactical units had been programmed for deployment and the overall loss rate in the AAF was less than predicted. Arnold began to build reserves in tactical units to provide enough personnel for multiple crews for each aircraft but was hampered by the rotation policies, particularly among those fighting in Europe. Rotated personnel also believed that they were permanently exempt from further combat service, which was never the case at any time during World War II.<ref>Little (1968), pp. 11β12</ref> He ordered the revocation on 16 February 1944 of policies that arbitrarily set fixed "goals" for completion of combat tours and directed that the impression that no airman would be required to serve more than one tour of combat be "unmistakably corrected".<ref>Little (1968), p. 13</ref> The use of in-theater rest camps as a short term measure for relief of stress only served to delay the onset of combat fatigue. The AAF approved in April 1944 the use of 30 days leave in the United States on a limited basis as a substitute for rotation but by August found it counterproductive for rehabilitative purposes.<ref>Little (1968), pp. 14β16</ref> In September 1944 Arnold, without rescinding his "no fixed tours" order, notified field commands that his objective was to provide enough replacement crews that rotation "based on war weariness" became unnecessary. This resulted in a revision of rotation policies whose "guidelines" had the effect of again setting fixed limits for a tour of duty for the remainder of the war.<ref name="Little 1968, p. 25"/> ===Operations summary=== The Air Force Historical Studies Office summarizes the execution of USAAF strategy during World War II:<ref name="sum"/> <blockquote> "Arnold's staff made the first priority in the war to launch a strategic bombing offensive in support of the [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] against Germany. The Eighth Air Force, sent to England in 1942, took on that job. After a slow and often costly effort to bring the necessary strength to bear, joined in 1944 by the [[Fifteenth Air Force]] stationed in Italy, strategic bombing finally began to get results, and by the end of the war, the German economy had been dispersed and pounded to rubble.</blockquote> <blockquote>"Tactical air forces supported the ground forces in the [[Mediterranean Theater of Operations|Mediterranean]] and [[European Theater of Operations, United States Army|European theaters]], where the enemy found Allied [[air supremacy]] a constant frustration. In the war against Japan, General [[Douglas MacArthur]] made his advance along [[New Guinea]] by [[Leapfrogging (strategy)|leap frogging]] his air forces forward and using [[amphibious warfare|amphibious]] forces to open up new bases. The AAF also supported Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz|Chester Nimitz]]'s [[aircraft carrier]]s in their island-hopping across the [[Pacific Ocean Areas|Central Pacific]] and assisted Allied forces in [[Myanmar|Burma]] and China.</blockquote> <blockquote>"Arnold directly controlled the [[Twentieth Air Force]], equipped with the new long-range B-29 Superfortresses used for bombing Japan's [[Japanese archipelago|home islands]], first from China and then from the [[Mariana Islands|Marianas]]. Devastated by [[air raids on Japan|fire-raids]], Japan was so weakened by August 1945 that Arnold believed neither the [[Nuclear weapon|atomic bomb]] nor the planned [[Operation Downfall|invasion]] would be necessary to win the war. The fact that AAF B-29s [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|dropped the atomic bombs]] on [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]], nevertheless, demonstrated what air power could do in the future. The [[United States Strategic Bombing Survey|Strategic Bombing Survey]] provided ammunition for the leaders of the AAF in the postwar debates over armed forces unification and national strategy."</blockquote> ===USAAF statistical summary=== The United States Army Air Forces incurred 12% of the Army's 936,000 battle casualties in World War II. 88,119 airmen died in service. 52,173 were battle casualty deaths: 45,520 [[killed in action]], 1,140 died of wounds, 3,603 were [[missing in action]] and declared dead, and 1,910 were non-hostile battle deaths. Of the United States military and naval services, only the Army Ground Forces suffered more battle deaths. 35,946 non-battle deaths included 25,844 in aircraft accidents, more than half of which occurred within the Continental United States.<ref name="cas53">"Battle casualties" ''Army Battle Casualties Final Report'', pp. 76β77</ref> 63,209 members of the USAAF were other battle casualties. 18,364 were [[wounded in action]] and required medical evacuation, and 41,057 became [[Prisoner of war|prisoners-of-war]].<ref name="cas53"/><ref name="aafsd34">''AAF Statistical Digest'', Table 34 β Battle Casualties in All Overseas Theaters, By Type of Casualty and Type of Personnel</ref> Its casualties were 5.1% of its strength, compared to 10% for the rest of the Army.<ref name="WatsonWinged">Nalty (1997), p. 268.</ref><ref group=n>However, the 115,000 battle casualties suffered by the AAF represented 19% of the 603,000 aircrew trained during the war.</ref> Total aircraft losses for the AAF from December 1941 to August 1945 were 65,164, with 43,581 lost overseas and 21,583 within the Continental United States.<ref name="aafsd99">''AAF Statistical Digest'', Table 99 β Airplane Losses in Continental US and Overseas, By Type of Airplane</ref> Combat losses of aircraft totaled 22,948 worldwide, with 18,418 lost in theaters fighting Germany and 4,530 lost in combat in the Pacific.<ref>Correll, "The US Army Air Forces at War", p. 34.</ref> The AAF credited its own forces with destroying a total of 40,259 aircraft of opposing nations by all means, 29,916 against Germany and its allies and 10,343 in the Pacific.<ref>Correll, "The US Army Air Forces at war", p. 33.</ref> The cost of the war to the AAF was approximately $50 billion,<ref group=n>Approximately $671 billion in 2016 dollars, calculated from 1945. [http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ US Inflation Calculator]</ref> or about 30% of the cost to the War Department,<ref name="WatsonWinged" /> with cash expenditures from direct appropriations between July 1942 and August 1945 amounting to $35,185,548,000.<ref>''AAF Statistical Digest'', Table 203 β Expenditures by Direct Appropriations, By Major Project</ref> Total [[sortie]]s flown by the AAF during World War II were 2,352,800, with 1,693,565 flown in Europe-related areas and 669,235 flown in the Pacific and Far East.<ref>Correll, "The US Army Air Forces at War", p. 32.</ref> 36 members of the Army Air Forces received the [[Medal of Honor]] for actions performed during air missions, 22 of them posthumously. Two additional awards were made, one posthumously, to AAF officers attached to the Western Task Force during [[Operation Torch]]. ===Demobilization and independence=== [[File:Carl Spaatz, Air Force photo portrait, color.jpg|thumb|right|[[General officer|General]] [[Carl Spaatz|Carl A. Spaatz]]]] With the defeat of Japan, the entire United States military establishment immediately began a drastic [[demobilization]], as it had at the end of World War I. The AAF was hit as hard or harder as the older services by demobilization. Officers and enlisted were discharged, installations were closed, and aircraft were stored or sold. Between August 1945 and April 1946, its strength fell from 2.25 million men to just 485,000, and a year later to 304,000. The [[Air Transport Command]], which retained its mission to support the entire military establishment worldwide, was trimmed from nine to three divisions and by the end of 1946 its personnel reduced by 80%. Aircraft inventory dropped from 79,000 to less than 30,000, many of them in storage. Permanent installations were reduced from 783 to 177, just 21 more than pre-war.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 378.</ref><ref name="Futrell p. 156"/><ref group=n>Installations closed because of demobilization included main bases, sub (satellite) bases, and auxiliary airfields.</ref> By July 1946, the Army Air Forces had only 2 combat-ready groups out of 52 that remained on the list of active units. A rebuilt air force of 70 groups, the authorized peacetime strength, was anticipated, with reserve and national guard forces to be available for active duty in an emergency. However considerable opposition to a large peacetime military establishment, and to the financial cost of such an establishment, resulted in planning cuts to 48 groups. In February 1946, ill health forced the retirement of Arnold before he could fulfill his goal of achieving independence of the Air Force as a service equal with the Army and Navy. Spaatz replaced Arnold as the only other commanding general of the USAAF, and he oversaw both the demobilization of the largest air force in military history and its rebirth as envisioned by Mitchell and Arnold. Arnold left the AAF with two important legacies, based on his experiences in World War II, which shaped the post-war USAAF and their independent successor. The first was a requirement that the command staff of the service must include [[Staff (military)|staff officers]] of varying expertise besides pilots. The second was the belief that despite the unqualified success of training methods that had expanded the Air Forces, the United States would never again have the time to mobilize and train the [[Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces|reserve components]] as they had in 1940, necessitating that reservists and National Guardsmen be immediately ready for service in case of national emergency.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 374.</ref> For his part, Spaatz consulted closely with the new Army Chief of Staff, General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], and reorganized the AAF into ''major commands'' including three for combat operations ([[Strategic Air Command]], [[Tactical Air Command]], and [[Aerospace Defense Command|Air Defense Command]])<ref group=n>The remainder of the AAF was reorganized into the Air Materiel, Air Training, Air Transport, Air Proving Ground, and Air University Commands. (Craven and Cate, Vol. 7, p. 576)</ref> that would not require a second restructuring once the Air Force became independent.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 375.</ref> He also re-structured the reserve components to conform with Arnold's concepts, including creation of the [[Air National Guard]] in April 1946.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 377.</ref> {{quote box |width=32em |align=left |bgcolor=#B0C4DE |title= |quote=In such a manner for the first time in the history of American aviation the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces definitely took a stand in favor of an independent military air arm. Though far from providing the initial impulse, [[Harry S. Truman|the President]]'s message of 19 December 1945 contributed considerable impetus to a series of developments within the executive and legislative branches of the government which led directly, if belatedly, to the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. βR. Earl McClendon, ''Autonomy of the Air Arm''<ref name="Mac108">McClendon (1996), p. 108</ref> }} On 11 April 1945, at the conclusion of a ten-month study that took them to every major theater to interview 80 "key military and naval personnel", the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense recommended that the armed forces of United States be organized into a single cabinet department, and that "three coordinate combat branches, Army, Navy, and Air" comprise the operational services. The committee reported that the statutory creation of a United States Air Force would merely recognize a situation that had evolved during World War II with the Army Air Forces, acknowledging that naval/marine aviation and some aspects of army aviation would remain in place. The committee also reported that its recommendation was approved by "Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fleet Admirals Chester W. Nimitz and William F. Halsey and numerous other leading military and naval personnel".<ref name="mac104107"/> The Navy Department remained opposed to a single department of defense and, at the recommendation of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, created a panel using naval personnel to study the feasibility of a coordinating agency without executive powers as an alternative. The "Eberstadt report" made such a recommendation, but also endorsed the concept of an Air Force as a separate service. The Navy Department did not acknowledge its own findings and continued to oppose creation of a separate Air Force during hearings for unification bills introduced in October 1945. When the hearings failed to submit a report, President [[Harry S. Truman]] on 19 December 1945 came out strongly in support of an air force on a parity with ground and naval forces, reminding Congress that prior to the war independent Army and Navy Departments had often failed to work collectively or in coordination to the best interest of the nation. He asserted that wartime expedients that had overcome these defects proved to be the difference between victory and defeat.<ref name="mac104107">McClendon (1996), pp. 104β108</ref> Congress, at the recommendation of Truman, created the [[United States Department of the Air Force|Department of the Air Force]] with enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 ''Stat''. 495), 26 July 1947. The act established the '''[[United States Air Force]]''', a completely separate branch of the U.S. military, and abolished both the Army Air Forces and the Air Corps, effective 18 September 1947.<ref>[http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104613/the-us-air-force.aspx "The Air Force Fact Sheet"] (AF.mil) Retrieved 25 April 2016.</ref> The transfer of personnel and assets from the AAF to the USAF was effected by Transfer Order 1, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 26 September 1947.<ref name="natarc" /> The initial delineation of service roles, Executive Order 9877, was supplanted on 21 April 1948, by the approval by Truman of the [[Key West Agreement]], which outlined the air assets that each service would be permitted to maintain. The Air Force was assigned the bulk of strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft, but the issue remained divisive well into the 1950s.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 418β424.</ref> ===Legacy=== The ''Army Air Forces in World War II'', the official history of the AAF, summarized its significance as the final step to independence for the Air Force: <blockquote>By the close of the war (the AAF) had emerged as virtually a third independent service. Officially, the AAF never became anything other than a subordinate agency of the War Department charged to organize, train, and equip air units for assignment to combat theaters. Its jurisdiction was wholly limited to the Zone of Interior ''(today called the [[Contiguous United States|CONUS]])'', and it could communicate with air organizations in combat theaters only through channels extending up to the Chief of Staff, and then down through the theater commander to his subordinate air commander. The position of the AAF, in other words, was no different from that of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces, the other two of the three coordinate branches into which the Army had been divided. So, at any rate, read the regulations.</blockquote> <blockquote>Actually, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces ... functioned on a level parallel to that of the Chief of Staff. ... He moved at the very highest levels of command in the wartime coalition with Britain. He chose the commanders of the combat air forces. ... He communicated regularly (with the air commanders overseas). ... He exerted a powerful influence on the development of strategy, tactics, and doctrine wherever AAF units fought. ... A world-wide system of air transport moved at his command through all theaters, (denying their) commanders their traditional prerogative of controlling everything within their area of responsibility. Throughout the war (he ran) the air war in whatever part of the world there seemed to be need for attention by Headquarters. The contrast between theory and fact is...fundamental to an understanding of the AAF.<ref name="legacy"/></blockquote> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page