Free will

====The physical mind====
{{See also|Neuroscience of free will}}

[[Compatibilist]] models of free will often consider deterministic relationships as discoverable in the physical world (including the brain). Cognitive [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]<ref name=naturalism>A key exponent of this view was [[Willard van Orman Quine]]. See {{cite encyclopedia |title=Willard van Orman Quine |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/quine/ |author=Hylton, Peter |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta |date=Apr 30, 2010}}</ref> is a [[physicalism|physicalist]] approach to studying human [[cognition]] and [[consciousness]] in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example, [[neural networks (biology)|neural networks]] and [[Cognitive robotics|cognitive robots]]), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the [[Behavioural sciences|behavioral]] and [[cognitive science]]s (''i.e.'' [[neuroscience]] and [[cognitive psychology]]).<ref name=Peruzzi/><ref name=physicalism>

A thoughtful list of careful distinctions regarding the application of empirical science to these issues is found in {{cite encyclopedia |author=Stoljar, Daniel |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/#12 |title=Physicalism: §12 – Physicalism and the physicalist world picture |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta |date=Sep 9, 2009 }}</ref> Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health, [[substance dependence]], [[Long-term depression|depression]], and various [[personality disorders]] clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is also important.<ref name=Baumeister /> For example, an [[substance abuse|addict]] may experience a conscious desire to escape addiction, but be unable to do so. The "will" is disconnected from the freedom to act. This situation is related to an abnormal production and distribution of [[dopamine]] in the brain.<ref name=Volkow>
{{cite book |title=Science In Medicine: The JCI Textbook Of Molecular Medicine |chapter=The addicted human brain: insights from imaging studies |author1=Nora D Volkow |author2=Joanna S Fowler |author3=Gene-Jack Wang |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ykvt1S9n8V0C&pg=PA1061 |pages=1061 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-7637-5083-1 |year=2007 |publisher=Jones & Bartlett Learning |editor1=Andrew R Marks |editor2=Ushma S Neill }}
</ref> The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions.

Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation.<ref name=Baumeister2 /> Such an approach has been considered a form of identity dualism. A description of "how conscious experience might affect brains" has been provided in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing."<ref name=Baumeister2 />

Recently,{{when|date=August 2018}} [[Claudio Costa (philosopher)|Claudio Costa]] developed a neocompatibilist theory based on the causal theory of action that is complementary to classical compatibilism. According to him, physical, psychological and rational restrictions can interfere at different levels of the causal chain that would naturally lead to action. Correspondingly, there can be physical restrictions to the body, psychological restrictions to the decision, and rational restrictions to the formation of reasons (desires plus beliefs) that should lead to what we would call a reasonable action. The last two are usually called "restrictions of free will". The restriction at the level of reasons is particularly important since it can be motivated by external reasons that are insufficiently conscious to the agent. One example was the collective suicide led by [[Jim Jones]]. The suicidal agents were not conscious that their free will have been manipulated by external, even if ungrounded, reasons.<ref>Claudio Costa. ''Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions'' CSP, 2014, Ch. 7</ref>