Free will

====Free will as unpredictability====
In ''[[Elbow Room (Dennett book)|Elbow Room]]'', Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book ''[[Freedom Evolves]]''.<ref name="DD2">Dennett, D. (2003) ''Freedom Evolves''. Viking Books. {{ISBN|0-670-03186-0}}</ref> The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful [[demon]], and other such possibilities, then because of [[chaos theory|chaos]] and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown and unknowable future.

According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist.<ref name="DD2"/> Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance.<ref name="Kaney">Kane, R. ''The Oxford Handbook to Free Will''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-513336-6}}.</ref> More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.<ref name="CompSEP" />

In the philosophy of [[decision theory]], a fundamental question is: From the standpoint of statistical outcomes, to what extent do the choices of a conscious being have the ability to influence the future? [[Newcomb's paradox]] and other philosophical problems pose questions about free will and predictable outcomes of choices.