Epistemology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==The regress problem== {{Main|Regress argument}} The [[Regress argument|regress problem]] (also known as [[Agrippa's Trilemma]]) is the problem of providing a complete logical foundation for human knowledge. The traditional way of supporting a rational argument is to appeal to other rational arguments, typically using chains of reason and rules of logic. A classic example that goes back to Aristotle is deducing that ''Socrates is mortal''. We have a logical rule that says ''All humans are mortal'' and an assertion that ''Socrates is human'' and we deduce that ''Socrates is mortal''. In this example how do we know that Socrates is human? Presumably we apply other rules such as: ''All born from human females are human''. Which then leaves open the question how do we know that all born from humans are human? This is the regress problem: how can we eventually terminate a logical argument with some statements that do not require further justification but can still be considered rational and justified? As John Pollock stated, <blockquote>to justify a belief one must appeal to a further justified belief. This means that one of two things can be the case. Either there are some beliefs that we can be justified for holding, without being able to justify them on the basis of any other belief, or else for each justified belief there is an infinite regress of (potential) justification [the nebula theory]. On this theory there is no rock bottom of justification. Justification just meanders in and out through our network of beliefs, stopping nowhere.<ref name="Pollock1975"/>{{Rp|26}}</blockquote> The apparent impossibility of completing an infinite chain of reasoning is thought by some to support [[skepticism]]. It is also the impetus for Descartes's famous dictum: ''[[I think, therefore I am]]''. Descartes was looking for some logical statement that could be true without appeal to other statements. ===Responses to the regress problem=== Many epistemologists studying justification have attempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress problem. ====Foundationalism==== [[Foundationalism|Foundationalists]] respond to the regress problem by asserting that certain "foundations" or "basic beliefs" support other beliefs but do not themselves require justification from other beliefs. These beliefs might be justified because they are self-evident, infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms. Perception, memory, and ''a priori'' intuition are often considered possible examples of basic beliefs. The chief criticism of foundationalism is that if a belief is not supported by other beliefs, accepting it may be arbitrary or unjustified.<ref name="SEP justep-foundational"/> ====Coherentism==== Another response to the regress problem is [[coherentism]], which is the rejection of the assumption that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, [[coherentism|coherentists]] hold that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some particular class of beliefs. Yet, since a system can be coherent while also being wrong, coherentists face the difficulty of ensuring that the whole system [[correspondence theory of truth|corresponds]] to reality. Additionally, most logicians agree that any argument that is circular is, at best, only trivially valid. That is, to be illuminating, arguments must operate with information from multiple premises, not simply conclude by reiterating a premise. Nigel Warburton writes in ''Thinking from A to Z'' that "[[circular argument]]s are not invalid; in other words, from a logical point of view there is nothing intrinsically wrong with them. However, they are, when viciously circular, spectacularly uninformative."<ref name="Warburton1996"/> ====Infinitism==== An alternative resolution to the regress problem is known as "[[infinitism]]". Infinitists take the infinite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to them, without having consciously thought through all of these reasons when the need arises. This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors, foundationalism and coherentism. The most prominent defense of infinitism has been given by [[Peter D. Klein|Peter Klein]].<ref name="KleinTurri"/> ====Foundherentism==== An intermediate position, known as "[[foundherentism]]", is advanced by [[Susan Haack]]. Foundherentism is meant to unify foundationalism and coherentism. Haack explains the view by using a crossword puzzle as an analogy. Whereas, for example, infinitists regard the regress of reasons as taking the form of a single line that continues indefinitely, Haack has argued that chains of properly justified beliefs look more like a crossword puzzle, with various different lines mutually supporting each other.<ref name="Haack1993"/> Thus, Haack's view leaves room for both chains of beliefs that are "vertical" (terminating in foundational beliefs) and chains that are "horizontal" (deriving their justification from coherence with beliefs that are also members of foundationalist chains of belief). Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! 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