World Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! == Conceptions == Different fields often work with quite different conceptions of the essential features associated with the term "world".<ref name="Sandkühler">{{cite book |last1=Sandkühler |first1=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie.html |chapter=Welt}}</ref><ref name="Mittelstraß">{{cite book |last1=Mittelstraß |first1=Jürgen |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie |date=2005 |publisher=Metzler |url=https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476021083 |chapter=Welt|isbn=9783476021083 }}</ref> Some conceptions see the world as unique: there can be no more than one world. Others talk of a "plurality of worlds".<ref name="Lewis">{{cite book |last1=Lewis |first1=David |title=On the Plurality of Worlds |date=1986 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LEWOTP-3}}</ref> Some see worlds as complex things composed of many substances as their parts while others hold that worlds are simple in the sense that there is only one substance: the world as a whole.<ref name="Schaffer">{{cite web |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |title=Monism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 April 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> Some characterize worlds in terms of objective spacetime while others define them relative to the horizon present in each experience. These different characterizations are not always exclusive: it may be possible to combine some without leading to a contradiction. Most of them agree that worlds are unified totalities.<ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> === Monism and pluralism === [[Monism]] is a thesis about oneness: that only one thing exists in a certain sense. The denial of monism is [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]], the thesis that, in a certain sense, more than one thing exists.<ref name="Schaffer"/> There are many forms of monism and pluralism, but in relation to the world as a whole, two are of special interest: existence monism/pluralism and priority monism/pluralism. Existence monism states that the world is the only concrete object there is.<ref name="Schaffer"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |title=From Nihilism to Monism |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=2007 |volume=85 |issue=2 |pages=175–191 |doi=10.1080/00048400701343150 |s2cid=7788506 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHFNT}}</ref><ref name="Sider">{{cite journal |last1=Sider |first1=Theodore |title=Against Monism |journal=Analysis |date=2007 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00641.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAM}}</ref> This means that all the concrete "objects" we encounter in our daily lives, including apples, cars and ourselves, are not truly objects in a strict sense. Instead, they are just dependent aspects of the world-object.<ref name="Schaffer"/> Such a world-object is simple in the sense that it does not have any genuine parts. For this reason, it has also been referred to as "blobject" since it lacks an internal structure like a blob.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Horgan |first1=Terry |last2=Potr |first2=Matja |title=Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence |journal=Facta Philosophica |date=2000 |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=249–270 |doi=10.5840/factaphil20002214 |s2cid=15340589 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HORBAI}}</ref> Priority monism allows that there are other concrete objects besides the world.<ref name="Schaffer"/> But it holds that these objects do not have the most fundamental form of existence, that they somehow depend on the existence of the world.<ref name="Sider"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Steinberg |first1=Alex |title=Priority Monism and Part/Whole Dependence |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2015 |volume=172 |issue=8 |pages=2025–2031 |doi=10.1007/s11098-014-0395-8 |s2cid=170436138 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STEPMA-2}}</ref> The corresponding forms of pluralism state that the world is complex in the sense that it is made up of concrete, independent objects.<ref name="Schaffer"/> === Scientific cosmology === Scientific cosmology can be defined as the science of the universe as a whole. In it, the terms "[[universe]]" and "[[cosmos]]" are usually used as synonyms for the term "world".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bolonkin |first1=Alexander |title=Universe, Human Immortality and Future Human Evaluation |date=26 December 2011 |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-12-415801-6 |page=3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TuWQx58ZnPsC |language=en}}</ref> One common definition of the world/universe found in this field is as "[t]he totality of all space and time; all that is, has been, and will be".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Zeilik |first1=Michael |last2=Gregory |first2=Stephen A. |title=Introductory Astronomy & Astrophysics |publisher=Saunders College Pub. |isbn=978-0-03-006228-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iH7vAAAAMAAJ |language=en |chapter=Glossary|year=1998 }}</ref><ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> Some definitions emphasize that there are two other aspects to the universe besides spacetime: forms of energy or matter, like stars and particles, and laws of nature.<ref name="Duco">{{cite book |last1=Schreuder |first1=Duco A. |title=Vision and Visual Perception |date=3 December 2014 |publisher=Archway Publishing |isbn=978-1-4808-1294-9 |page=135 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I7a7BQAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref> World-conceptions in this field differ both concerning their notion of spacetime and of the contents of spacetime. The [[theory of relativity]] plays a central role in modern cosmology and its conception of space and time. A difference from its predecessors is that it conceives space and time not as distinct dimensions but as a single four-dimensional manifold called [[spacetime]].<ref name="Fraassen">{{cite journal |last1=Fraassen |first1=Bas C. van |title='World' is Not a Count Noun |journal=Noûs |date=1995 |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=139–157 |doi=10.2307/2215656 |jstor=2215656 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VANWIN}}</ref> This can be seen in [[special relativity]] in relation to the [[Minkowski metric]], which includes both spatial and temporal components in its definition of distance.<ref name="Zeilik25"/> [[General relativity]] goes one step further by integrating the concept of [[mass]] into the concept of spacetime as its curvature.<ref name="Zeilik25">{{cite book |last1=Zeilik |first1=Michael |last2=Gregory |first2=Stephen A. |title=Introductory Astronomy & Astrophysics |publisher=Saunders College Pub. |isbn=978-0-03-006228-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iH7vAAAAMAAJ |language=en |chapter=25. Cosmology: The Big Bang and Beyond|year=1998 }}</ref> [[Quantum cosmology]] uses a classical notion of spacetime and conceives the whole world as one big [[wave function]] expressing the probability of finding particles in a given location.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Dongshan |first1=He |last2=Dongfeng |first2=Gao |last3=Qing-yu |first3=Cai |title=Spontaneous creation of the universe from nothing |journal=Physical Review D |year=2014 |volume=89 |issue=8 |page=083510 |doi=10.1103/PhysRevD.89.083510 |arxiv=1404.1207 |bibcode=2014PhRvD..89h3510H |s2cid=118371273 }}</ref> === Theories of modality === The world-concept plays a role in many modern theories of modality, sometimes in the form of [[possible worlds]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Parent |first1=Ted |title=Modal Metaphysics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=9 April 2021}}</ref> A possible world is a complete and consistent way how things could have been.<ref name="Menzel">{{cite web |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Possible Worlds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 April 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> The actual world is a possible world since the way things are is a way things could have been. There are many other ways things could have been besides how they actually are. For example, Hillary Clinton did not win the 2016 US election, but she could have won them. So there is a possible world in which she did. There is a vast number of possible worlds, one corresponding to each such difference, no matter how small or big, as long as no outright contradictions are introduced this way.<ref name="Menzel"/> Possible worlds are often conceived as abstract objects, for example, in terms of non-obtaining [[states of affairs]] or as maximally consistent sets of propositions.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jacquette |first1=Dale |title=Propositions, Sets, and Worlds |journal=Studia Logica |date=1 April 2006 |volume=82 |issue=3 |pages=337–343 |doi=10.1007/s11225-006-8101-2 |s2cid=38345726 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11225-006-8101-2 |language=en |issn=1572-8730}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Possible Worlds > Problems with Abstractionism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/problems-abstractionism.html |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=9 April 2021}}</ref> On such a view, they can even be seen as belonging to the actual world.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Actualism > An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/possible-worlds.html |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=9 April 2021}}</ref> Another way to conceive possible worlds, made famous by [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]], is as concrete entities.<ref name="Lewis"/> On this conception, there is no important difference between the actual world and possible worlds: both are conceived as concrete, inclusive and spatiotemporally connected.<ref name="Menzel"/> The only difference is that the actual world is the world ''we'' live in, while other possible worlds are not inhabited by us but by our ''counterparts''.<ref name="Bricker">{{cite journal |last1=Bricker |first1=Phillip |title=David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds |journal=Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After |date=2006 |pages=246–267 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIDLO |publisher=Acumen Publishing|doi=10.1017/UPO9781844653621.014 |isbn=9781844653621 }}</ref> Everything within a world is spatiotemporally connected to everything else but the different worlds do not share a common spacetime: They are spatiotemporally isolated from each other.<ref name="Menzel"/> This is what makes them separate worlds.<ref name="Bricker"/> It has been suggested that, besides possible worlds, there are also impossible worlds. Possible worlds are ''ways things could have been'', so impossible worlds are ''ways things could not have been''.<ref name="Berto">{{cite web |last1=Berto |first1=Francesco |last2=Jago |first2=Mark |title=Impossible Worlds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Zalta |first1=Edward N. |title=A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds |journal=Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic |date=1997 |volume=38 |issue=4 |pages=640–660 |doi=10.1305/ndjfl/1039540774 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZALACT|doi-access=free }}</ref> Such worlds involve a contradiction, like a world in which Hillary Clinton both won and lost the 2016 US election. Both possible and impossible worlds have in common the idea that they are totalities of their constituents.<ref name="Berto"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Ryan |first1=Marie-Laure |title=Immersion and Distance |date=2013 |publisher=Brill Rodopi |isbn=978-94-012-0924-3 |url=https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789401209243/B9789401209243-s006.xml |language=en |chapter=Impossible Worlds and Aesthetic Illusion}}</ref> === Phenomenology === Within [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], worlds are defined in terms of ''horizons'' of experiences.<ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> When we perceive an object, like a house, we do not just experience this object at the center of our attention but also various other objects surrounding it, given in the periphery.<ref name="Embree">{{cite book |last1=Embree |first1=Lester |title=Encyclopedia of Phenomenology |date=1997 |publisher=Kluwer Academic Publishers |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EMBEOP |chapter=World}}</ref> The term "horizon" refers to these co-given objects, which are usually experienced only in a vague, indeterminate manner.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 April 2021 |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Joel |title=Phenomenology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=9 April 2021}}</ref> The perception of a house involves various horizons, corresponding to the neighborhood, the city, the country, the Earth, etc. In this context, the world is the biggest horizon or the "horizon of all horizons".<ref name="Embree"/><ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> It is common among phenomenologists to understand the world not just as a spatiotemporal collection of objects but as additionally incorporating various other relations between these objects. These relations include, for example, indication-relations that help us anticipate one object given the appearances of another object and means-end-relations or functional involvements relevant for practical concerns.<ref name="Embree"/> === Philosophy of mind === In [[philosophy of mind]], the term "world" is commonly used in contrast to the term "mind" as that which is represented by the mind. This is sometimes expressed by stating that there is a gap between mind and world and that this gap needs to be overcome for representation to be successful.<ref name="Price">{{cite journal |last1=Price |first1=Huw |last2=McDowell |first2=John |title=Mind and World |journal=Philosophical Books |date=1994 |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=169–181 |doi=10.1111/1468-0149.00066 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HUWMAW}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Avramides |first1=Anita |title=Philosophy of Mind: Overview |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/philosophy-mind-overview |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Witmer |first1=D. Gene |title=Philosophy Of Mind |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/biographies/spanish-and-portuguese-history-biographies/philosophy-mind |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref> One problem in philosophy of mind is to explain how the mind is able to bridge this gap and to enter into genuine mind-world-relations, for example, in the form of perception, knowledge or action.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=10 April 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sosa |first1=Ernest |title=Mind-World Relations |journal=Episteme |date=2015 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=155–166 |doi=10.1017/epi.2015.8 |s2cid=147785165 |url=https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=SOSMR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1017%2Fepi.2015.8 |language=en |issn=1742-3600}}</ref> This is necessary for the world to be able to rationally constrain the activity of the mind.<ref name="Price"/><ref name="Brandom">{{cite journal |last1=Brandom |first1=Robert B. |title=Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=1996 |volume=7 |pages=241–259 |doi=10.2307/1522910 |jstor=1522910 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAPAR}}</ref> According to a realist position, the world is something distinct and independent from the mind.<ref name="Miller">{{cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Alexander |title=Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019}}</ref> Idealists conceive of the world as partially or fully determined by the mind.<ref name="Miller"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |title=Idealism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 April 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[transcendental idealism]], for example, posits that the spatiotemporal structure of the world is imposed by the mind on reality but lacks independent existence otherwise.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Stang |first1=Nicholas F. |title=Kant's Transcendental Idealism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 April 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> A more radical idealist conception of the world can be found in Berkeley's [[subjective idealism]], which holds that the world as a whole, including all everyday objects like tables, cats, trees and ourselves, "consists of nothing but minds and ideas".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Flage |first1=Daniel E. |title=Berkeley, George |url=https://iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref> === Theology === Different theological positions hold different conceptions of the world based on its relation to God. [[Classical theism]] states that God is wholly distinct from the world. But the world depends for its existence on God, both because God created the world and because He maintains or conserves it.<ref name="Leftow">{{cite web |last1=Leftow |first1=Brian |title=God, concepts of: Classical theism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/god-concepts-of/v-1/sections/classical-theism |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=12 April 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Britannica">{{cite web |title=Theism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/theism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 April 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Culp">{{cite web |last1=Culp |first1=John |title=Panentheism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panentheism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 April 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> This is sometimes understood in analogy to how humans create and conserve ideas in their imagination, with the difference being that the divine mind is vastly more powerful.<ref name="Leftow"/> On such a view, God has absolute, ultimate reality in contrast to the lower ontological status ascribed to the world.<ref name="Culp"/> God's involvement in the world is often understood along the lines of a personal, benevolent God who looks after and guides His creation.<ref name="Britannica"/> [[Deism|Deists]] agree with theists that God created the world but deny any subsequent, personal involvement in it.<ref>{{cite web |title=Deism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Deism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 April 2021 |language=en}}</ref> [[Pantheism|Pantheists]] reject the separation between God and world. Instead, they claim that the two are identical. This means that there is nothing to the world that does not belong to God and that there is nothing to God beyond what is found in the world.<ref name="Culp"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Leftow |first1=Brian |title=God, concepts of: Pantheism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/god-concepts-of/v-1/sections/pantheism |website=www.rep.routledge.com |language=en}}</ref> [[Panentheism]] constitutes a middle ground between theism and pantheism. Against theism, it holds that God and the world are interrelated and depend on each other. Against pantheism, it holds that there is no outright identity between the two.<ref name="Culp"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Leftow |first1=Brian |title=God, concepts of: Panentheism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/god-concepts-of/v-1/sections/panentheism |website=www.rep.routledge.com |language=en}}</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page