Good

=== Plato and Aristotle ===
[[File:Socrates Pio-Clementino Inv314.jpg|right|thumb|150px|Bust of Socrates in the [[Vatican Museum]]]]
Although the history of the origin of the use of the concept and meaning of "good" are diverse, the notable discussions of Plato and Aristotle on this subject have been of significant historical effect. The first references that are seen in Plato's ''The Republic'' to the [[Form of the Good]] are within the conversation between [[Glaucon]] and [[Socrates]] (454c–d). When trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of [[justice]], Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves”, which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508a–c) Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight", but it is "the cause of sight itself". As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the [[Intelligibility (philosophy)|intelligible]] realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge".
 
Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain that "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e).<ref name=Reeve>{{cite book|last=Plato|translator=C.D.C. Reeve|title=Republic|date=1992|publisher=Hackett Publ. Co|location=Indianapolis, Ind.|isbn=978-0-87220-136-1|edition=2nd}}</ref>

In contrast to Plato, [[Aristotle]] discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the ''[[Eudemian Ethics|Eudemian]]'' and ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]''. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good thereby, is irrelevant to human ethics.<ref name=plat>{{cite book|last=Fine|first=Gail|title=Plato on Knowledge and Forms|url=https://archive.org/details/platoonknowledge00fine_595|url-access=limited|date=2003|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=0-19-924559-2|pages=[https://archive.org/details/platoonknowledge00fine_595/page/n361 350]}}</ref>

Plato and Aristotle were not the first contributors in ancient Greece to the study of the "good" and discussion preceding them can be found among the pre-Socratic philosophers. In Western civilisation, the basic meanings of κακός and ἀγαθός are "bad, cowardly" and "good, brave, capable", and their absolute sense emerges only around 400 BC, with [[Pre-Socratic philosophy]], in particular [[Democritus]].<ref>[[Charles H. Kahn]], ''Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology'', The American Journal of Philology (1985)</ref> Morality in this absolute sense solidifies in the dialogues of [[Plato]], together with the emergence of [[monotheistic]] thought (notably in ''[[Euthyphro]]'', which ponders the concept of piety ([[:wikt:ὅσιος|τὸ ὅσιον]]) as a moral absolute). The idea is further developed in [[Late Antiquity]] by [[Neoplatonists]], [[Gnostics]], and [[Church Fathers]].