Free will Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! == Western philosophy == {{See also|Free will in antiquity}} The underlying questions are whether we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. These questions predate the early Greek [[Stoicism|stoics]] (for example, [[Chrysippus]]), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these centuries.<ref name=Nagel> {{cite book |title=The View From Nowhere |author=Thomas Nagel |chapter=Freedom |quote=Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed. |isbn=978-0-19-505644-0 |year=1989 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=112 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5cryOCGb2nEC&pg=PA112}} </ref><ref name=Searle> {{cite book |title=Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power |chapter=The problem of free will |quote=The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress. |author=John R Searle |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yL7BZ-UibFQC&pg=PA37 |page=37 |isbn=978-0-231-51055-4 |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=2013}}</ref> On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads them to believe that they have free will.<ref> {{cite book |title=Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TvvaM77QC44C&pg=PA8 |page=8 |author=Gregg D Caruso |isbn=978-0-7391-7136-3 |year=2012 |publisher=Lexington Books| quote=One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing..}} </ref><ref> {{cite book |title=Freedom of choice affirmed |author=Corliss Lamont |publisher=Beacon Press |year=1969 |page=38 |isbn=9780826404763 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iWu4AAAAIAAJ&q=%22+the+unmistakable+intuition+of+virtually+every+human+being%22}} </ref> On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.<ref name=Baumeister2 /><ref name=Clark> {{cite journal|author=TW Clark |title=Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of ''The Volitional Brain''. |quote=Feelings or intuitions ''per se'' never count as self-evident proof of anything. |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=6 |issue=8–9 |pages=279–93 |year=1999 |url=http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020008/979 }} Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: ''The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will'' For full text on line see [http://www.naturalism.org/fearof.htm this] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130505091649/http://naturalism.org/fearof.htm |date=2013-05-05 }}. </ref> It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the physical world can be explained entirely by [[physical law]].<ref name="Velmans2002">{{cite journal |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=9 |issue=11 |pages=2–29 |author=Max Velmans |title=How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? |url=http://cogprints.org/2750/ |year=2002}}</ref> The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either [[causal closure]] or [[physical determinism]] ([[nomological determinism]]) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the ''problem of free will'' or sometimes referred to as the ''dilemma of determinism''.<ref name=WJames>{{cite book |title=The Will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy |author=William James |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y2Tw28d-85wC&pg=PA145 |pages=145 ''ff'' |chapter=The dilemma of determinism |publisher=Longmans, Green |year=1896}}</ref> This dilemma leads to a [[morality|moral]] dilemma as well: the question of how to assign [[moral responsibility|responsibility]] for actions if they are caused entirely by past events.<ref name=Bargh> {{cite web|title=Free will is un-natural |author=John A Bargh |url=http://www.yale.edu/acmelab/articles/FreeWillIsUnnatural.pdf |access-date=2012-08-21 |date=2007-11-16 |quote=Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, ''etc.''), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states? |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120903230023/http://www.yale.edu/acmelab/articles/FreeWillIsUnnatural.pdf |archive-date=2012-09-03 }} Also found in {{cite book|title=Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_t4k_r7-2jgC&pg=PA128 |pages=128 ''ff'' |chapter=Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |editor=John Baer |editor2=James C. Kaufman |editor3=Roy F. Baumeister |isbn=978-0-19-518963-6 |author=John A Bargh }}</ref><ref name=Russell> {{cite book |title=Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility |author= Paul Russell |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cxUfOoGQaPwC&pg=PA14 |chapter=Chapter 1: Logic, "liberty", and the metaphysics of responsibility |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-19-515290-6|page=14|quote=...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.}}</ref> Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective.<ref name=Shariff>{{cite book |title=Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_t4k_r7-2jgC&pg=PA193 |page=193 |editor1=John Baer |editor2=James C. Kaufman |editor3=Roy F. Baumeister |author1=Azim F Shariff |author2=Jonathan Schooler |author3=Kathleen D Vohs |isbn=978-0-19-518963-6 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |chapter=Chapter 9: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will}} </ref><ref name=VelmansM> {{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JGYfMiVd8lQC&pg=PA11 |page=11 |title=Understanding Consciousness |author=Max Velmans |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2009 |edition=2nd |isbn=978-0-415-42515-5}} </ref> Classical [[compatibilism|compatibilists]] have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced.<ref name=strawson>{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT1 |title=Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.) |last=Strawson |first=Galen |publisher=London: Routledge |orig-year=1998 |year=2011 |encyclopedia=Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy |access-date=12 December 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120826083716/http://rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT1 |archive-date=26 August 2012 }}</ref> Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of ''action'', that is, separating [[freedom of choice]] from the freedom to enact it.<ref name=OConnor>{{cite encyclopedia |author=O'Connor, Timothy |title=Free Will |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition)|editor=Edward N. Zalta|url= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/freewill/ |date=Oct 29, 2010|access-date=2013-01-15}}</ref> Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition.<ref name=Greene> {{cite book |author1=Joshua Greene |author2=Jonathan Cohen |title=Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics |chapter=For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything |editor1=Judy Illes |editor2=Barbara J. Sahakian |isbn=978-0-19-162091-1 |year=2011 |publisher=Oxford University Press|quote= Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)}} referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by {{cite journal |author=DC Dennett |title=The self as a responding and responsible artifact |journal =Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|volume=1001 |issue=1 |pages=39–50 |year=2003 |url=http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/SelfasaResponding.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091109234957/http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/SelfasaResponding.pdf |archive-date=2009-11-09 |url-status=live |doi=10.1196/annals.1279.003|pmid=14625354 |bibcode=2003NYASA1001...39D |s2cid=46156580 }} </ref><ref name=Freeman1> {{cite book |title=How Brains Make Up Their Minds |author=Walter J. Freeman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BLxUytGDQesC&pg=PA5 |page=5 |isbn=978-0-231-12008-1 |year=2000 |publisher=Columbia University Press |quote=Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of brains.}}</ref> Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the [[ability]] to make rational decisions. A different approach to the dilemma is that of [[incompatibilism|incompatibilists]], namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an [[hard determinism|illusion]]. [[Metaphysical libertarianism]] is the form of incompatibilism which posits that [[determinism]] is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will).<ref name="stanfordcompatibilism" /> This view is associated with [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|non-materialist]] constructions,<ref name=Baumeister2 /> including both traditional [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Substance or Cartesian dualism|dualism]], as well as models supporting more minimal criteria; such as the ability to consciously veto an action or competing desire.<ref name="Libet 2003">{{Cite journal |last=Libet |first=Benjamin |year=2003 |title=Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity? |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=10 |issue=12 |pages=24–28|citeseerx=10.1.1.5.2852 }}</ref><ref name="RKane1" /> Yet even with [[indeterminism|physical indeterminism]], arguments have been made against libertarianism in that it is difficult to assign ''Origination'' (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices). Free will here is predominantly treated with respect to [[physical determinism]] in the strict sense of [[nomological determinism]], although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismarguments /> For example, logical and [[theological determinism]] challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of [[destiny]] and [[fate]], and [[biological determinism|biological]], [[cultural determinism|cultural]] and [[psychological determinism|psychological]] determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.<ref name="stanfordforeknowledge">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Zagzebski |first=Linda |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Foreknowledge and Free Will | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Fall 2011 | year=2011 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/free-will-foreknowledge}} See also {{cite encyclopedia|last=McKenna |first=Michael |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Compatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Winter 2009 | year=2009 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism}}</ref> Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings. ===Incompatibilism=== {{Main|Incompatibilism}} Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as [[Baron d'Holbach|d'Holbach]], are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, "[[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|metaphysical libertarians]]", such as [[Thomas Reid]], [[Peter van Inwagen]], and [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]], are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true.<ref name="Wagen">{{Cite book |last=van Invagen |first=P. |title=An Essay on Free Will |publisher=[[Clarendon Press]]|isbn=0-19-824924-1 |year=1983 |location=Oxford}}</ref> Another view is that of hard incompatibilists, which state that free will is incompatible with both [[determinism]] and [[indeterminism]].<ref name="Derk1">{{cite book |author=Pereboom, D. |year=2003 |title=Living without Free Will |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9sKZ1rAO2BwC |isbn=978-0-521-79198-4}}</ref> Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an "[[intuition pump]]": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot, then people must not have free will.<ref name="Wagen" /><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Fischer | first1 = J.M. | year = 1983 | title = Incompatibilism | journal = Philosophical Studies | volume = 43 | pages = 121–37 | doi = 10.1007/BF01112527 }}</ref> This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as [[Daniel Dennett]] on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways.<ref name="DD1"/> Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain". Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that someone must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. They must be ''[[causa sui]]'', in the traditional phrase. Being responsible for one's choices is the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if everything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kane |first=R. |title=The Significance of Free Will |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1996 |isbn=0-19-512656-4 |location=Oxford}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Campbell |first=C.A. |title=On Selfhood and Godhood |publisher=George Allen and Unwin |year=1957 |isbn=0-415-29624-2 |location=London}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=J.P. |title=Being and Nothingness |publisher=Washington Square Press |year=1943 |edition=reprint 1993 |location=New York}} Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in ''bad faith''.</ref> This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fischer |first=R.M. |title=The Metaphysics of Free Will |publisher=Blackwell |year=1994 |location=Oxford}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Bok |first=H. |title=Freedom and Responsibility |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1998 |isbn=0-691-01566-X |location=Princeton}}</ref> A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by [[Carl Ginet]] in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the ''consequences'' of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the ''consequence argument''.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ginet |first=Carl |title=Freedom and Determinisim |publisher=Random House |year=1966 |editor-last=Lehrer |editor-first=Keith |pages=87–104 |chapter=Might We Have No Choice}}</ref><ref name="Ving">{{Cite book |last1=van Inwagen |first1=P. |title=Metaphysics: The Big Questions |last2=Zimmerman |first2=D. |publisher=Blackwell |location=Oxford |year=1998}}</ref> [[Peter van Inwagen]] remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s.<ref>{{Citation |last=Inwagen |first=P. |title=How to think about free will |url=http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/HowThinkFW.doc |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080911064556/http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/HowThinkFW.doc |at=p. 15 |archive-date=2008-09-11}}</ref> The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained standing, if she had so desired. But it [[Logical consequence|follows from]] the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".<ref name="Ving" /> [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Lewis]] suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if ''different circumstances'' had actually obtained in the past.<ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x | last1 = Lewis | first1 = D. | s2cid = 170811962 | year = 2008| title = Are We Free to Break the Laws? | journal = Theoria | volume = 47 | issue = 3| pages = 113–21 }}</ref> Using ''T'', ''F'' for "true" and "false" and ''?'' for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:<ref name=Strawson> {{cite book |title=Freedom and belief |url=https://archive.org/details/freedombelief00stra |url-access=limited |author= Strawson, Galen|page=[https://archive.org/details/freedombelief00stra/page/n66 6] |isbn=978-0-19-924750-9 |edition=Revised |year=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press}} </ref> {| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center; width:50%;" |+Galen Strawson's table<ref name=Strawson/> |- | ! scope="col" | 1 ! scope="col" | 2 ! scope="col" | 3 ! scope="col" | 4 ! scope="col" | 5 ! scope="col" | 6 ! scope="col" | 7 ! scope="col" | 8 ! scope="col" | 9 |- !scope="row"| Determinism ''D'' |T |F |T |F |T |F |? |? |? |- !scope="row"| Free will ''FW'' |F |T |T |F |? |? |F |T |? |- |} ''Incompatibilism'' may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to ''soft determinism''. Position (1) is ''hard determinism'', and position (2) is ''libertarianism''. The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that ''D'' implies ''FW'' is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that ''FW'' implies ''D'' is untrue. Position (9) may be called ''hard incompatibilism'' if one interprets ''?'' as meaning both concepts are of dubious value. ''Compatibilism'' itself may occupy any of the nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to ''compatibilism'' is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3).<ref name=FischerFour2009>{{cite book |pages=44 ''ff'' |author= Fischer, John Martin |title=Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy) |isbn=978-1-4051-3486-6 |year=2009 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |chapter=Chapter 2: Compatibilism}}</ref> [[File:Toppledominos.jpg|thumb|A [[domino effect|domino's movement]] is [[Determinism|determined]] completely by laws of physics.]] [[Alexander Rosenberg|Alex Rosenberg]] makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where; "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them."<ref name=Rosenberg> {{cite book |title=Philosophy Of Science: A Contemporary Introduction |author=Alex Rosenberg |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OenUbcvgoi4C&pg=PA8 |page=8 |isbn=978-0-415-34317-6 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |publisher=Psychology Press}} </ref> [[Determinism#Quantum mechanics and classical physics|Physical determinism]] is currently disputed by prominent [[interpretations of quantum mechanics]], and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic [[indeterminism]] in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the [[uncertainty principle]].<ref name="Bohr1"/> The relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is, however, contested,<ref name="Bohr"/> even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events.<ref name="RKane1"/><ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 | pmid=16783870 | last=Lewis | first=E.R. |author2=MacGregor, R.J. | year=2006 | title=On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain | journal=[[Journal of Integrative Neuroscience]] | volume=5 | issue=2 | pages=223–47 |url=http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608034826/http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-08 |url-status=live | citeseerx=10.1.1.361.7065 }}</ref> Below these positions are examined in more detail.<ref name=Strawson/> ====Hard determinism==== {{main|Hard determinism}} [[File:FreeWillTaxonomy4.svg|thumb|A simplified [[Taxonomy (general)|taxonomy]] of philosophical positions regarding free will and determinism]] Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism.<ref name="Parkinson2012">{{cite encyclopaedia|author=G.H.R. Parkinson|encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia of Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IqbJnEYKpW4C|access-date=26 December 2012|year= 2012|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-00323-0|title=determinism|pages=891–92}}</ref> Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will.<ref name="Viv">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Arguments for Incompatibilism |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Winter 2003 |last1=Vihvelin |first1=Kadri|date=2003 }}</ref> Hard determinism is the claim that [[determinism]] is true, and that it is [[incompatibilism|incompatible with free will]], so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to [[nomological determinism]] (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.<ref name=VanArragon2010 /> Relevant forms of determinism include: ;[[Causal determinism]]: The idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen.<ref name=stanfordmoralresponsibility /> In its most common form, [[nomological determinism|nomological (or scientific) determinism]], future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.<ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00266.x | last1 = Suppes | first1 = P. | s2cid = 14586058 | year = 1993 | title = The Transcendental Character of Determinism | journal = Midwest Studies in Philosophy | volume = 18 | pages = 242–57 }}</ref><ref name=determinism> The view of ''scientific determinism'' goes back to [[Pierre Simon Laplace|Laplace]]: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state." For further discussion see {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. N–Z, Indeks, Volume 1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=od68ge7aF6wC&pg=PA198 |pages= 197 ''ff'' |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2006 |chapter=Determinism |isbn=978-0-415-93927-0 |editor=Sahotra Sarkar |editor2=Jessica Pfeifer |editor3=Justin Garson |author=John T Roberts}} </ref> ;[[Logical determinism]]: The notion that all [[proposition]]s, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.<ref name="Viv" /> ;[[Theological determinism]]: The idea that the future is already determined, either by a [[creator deity]] decreeing or [[omniscience|knowing]] its outcome in advance.<ref name="FischerGod1989">{{Cite book |last=Fischer |first=John Martin |title=God, Foreknowledge and Freedom |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=1989 |isbn=1-55786-857-3 |location=Stanford, CA}}</ref><ref name="Watt">{{Cite book |last=Watt |first=Montgomery |title=Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam |publisher=Luzac & Co |year=1948 |location=London}}</ref> The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in time. Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as [[biological determinism]], the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment, [[cultural determinism]] and [[psychological determinism]].<ref name="Viv" /> Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common. Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as [[determinism|adequate determinism]], is perhaps more relevant.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismarguments>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Vihvelin |first=Kadri |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Arguments for Incompatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Spring 2011 | year=2011 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments}}</ref> Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false – yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism.<ref name="stanfordcompatibilism">{{cite encyclopedia|last=McKenna |first=Michael |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Compatibilism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Winter | year=2009 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism}}</ref> ====Metaphysical libertarianism==== {{Main|Libertarianism (metaphysics)}} [[File:FreewillConceptsBasedUponPhilosophyOfMindCausationViews.svg|thumb|Various definitions of free will that have been proposed for Metaphysical Libertarianism (agent/substance causal,<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories/> centered accounts,<ref name="Kane2005" /> and efforts of will theory<ref name="RKane1" />), along with examples of other common free will positions (Compatibilism,<ref name="Velmans2002"/> Hard Determinism,<ref>Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, ''System of Nature; or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World'' (London, 1797), Vol. 1, p. 92</ref> and Hard Incompatibilism<ref name="Derk1"/>). Red circles represent mental states; blue circles represent physical states; arrows describe causal interaction.]] [[libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarianism]] is one philosophical view point under that of incompatibilism. Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the [[agency (philosophy)|agent]] be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.<ref name="Georgiev-2021">{{cite journal | author = Danko D. Georgiev | title = Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will | journal = Biosystems | volume = 208 | issue = | pages = 104474 | year = 2021 | doi = 10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474| issn=0303-2647 | pmid = 34242745 | arxiv = 2107.06572 | bibcode = 2021BiSys.20804474G | s2cid = 235785726 | quote = Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives. }}</ref> Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. This includes [[interactionist dualism]], which claims that some non-physical [[mind]], will, or [[soul]] overrides physical [[causality]]. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with [[physicalism]] require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Randolph |first=Clarke |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Fall 2008 | year=2008 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/incompatibilism-theories}}</ref> ====Non-causal theories==== Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm).<ref name=LumerNannini2007>{{cite book|author1=Christoph Lumer|author2=Sandro Nannini|title=Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4LzldxvSk4kC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2007|publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.|isbn=978-0-7546-6058-3}}</ref><ref name=McCann1998>{{cite book|author=Hugh McCann|title=The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom|url=https://archive.org/details/worksofagencyonh00mcca_0|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1998|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-8583-1}}</ref> Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom – intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person".<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories /> Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous. Some non-causal explanations involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities. ====Event-causal theories==== Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as ''deliberative indeterminism'', ''centred accounts'', and ''efforts of will theory''.<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories /> The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world. ''Deliberative indeterminism'' asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process.<ref name=Ekstrom2000>{{cite book|author=Laura Waddell Ekstrom|title=Free Will: A Philosophical Study|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oaOpa7qlz3kC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2000|publisher=Westview Press|isbn=978-0-8133-9093-2}}</ref><ref name=Mele2006>{{cite book|author=Alfred R. Mele|title=Free Will and Luck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MV0Ohi3z4LAC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2006|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-530504-3}}</ref> This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of ''luck'' (random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by [[Daniel Dennett]]<ref name="Dennett1981">{{cite book|author=Daniel Clement Dennett|title=Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_xwObaAZEwoC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1981|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-54037-7}}</ref> and [[John Martin Fischer]].<ref name="L. PetersonFischer1995">{{cite journal|last1=L. Peterson|first1=Michael|last2=Fischer|first2=John Martin|journal=Faith and Philosophy|volume=12|year=1995|pages=119–25|issn=0739-7046|doi=10.5840/faithphil199512123|title=Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker|doi-access=free}}</ref> An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model. ''Centred accounts'' propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen.<ref name=Kane2005>{{cite book|author=Robert Kane|title=Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9BRiQgAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-514970-8}}</ref><ref name=Balaguer1999>{{cite journal |author=Mark Balaguer |title=Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View |journal= Philosophical Studies |volume=93 |issue=2 |pages=189–211 |year=1999 |doi=10.1023/a:1004218827363|s2cid=169483672 }}</ref><ref name=Nozick1981>{{cite book|author=Robert Nozick|title=Philosophical Explanations|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1981|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-66479-1}}</ref><ref name=Sorabji1980>{{cite book|author=Richard Sorabji|title=Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-8tmAAAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1980|publisher=Duckworth|isbn=978-0-7156-1549-2}}</ref><ref name=Inwagen1983>{{cite book|author=Peter Van Inwagen|title=An Essay on Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=of1sJaUSdcYC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1983|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=978-0-19-824924-5}}</ref><ref name=Wiggins1973>{{cite book|author=Ted Honderich|title=Essays on Freedom of Action:Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_qY9AAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1973|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-7100-7392-1|pages=33–61}}</ref><ref name=Searle2001>{{cite book|author=John R. Searle|title=Rationality in Action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7GnfkbarMHsC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2001|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-69282-3}}</ref> An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision. ''Efforts of will theory'' is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]], where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort."<ref name="RKane1">{{Cite book| title=Four Views on Free Will (Libertarianism)| last=Kane| first=Robert|author2=John Martin Fischer |author3=Derk Pereboom |author4=Manuel Vargas | year=2007| publisher=Blackwell Publishing|location=Oxford| page=39| isbn=978-1-4051-3486-6}}</ref> According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will.<ref name="Kane1996">{{cite book|author=Robert Kane|title=The Significance of Free Will|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hhuyeYKsWAkC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-510550-6}}</ref> An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see [[non-reductive physicalism]]). Although at the time [[quantum mechanics]] (and physical [[Quantum indeterminacy|indeterminism]]) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book [[Miracles (book)|''Miracles: A preliminary study'']] C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.<ref name="CSLewis1">{{Cite book| author=Lewis, C.S.| title=Miracles| year=1947| page=[https://archive.org/details/giftofmiraclesma00mill/page/24 24]| publisher=HarperCollins| isbn=978-0-688-17369-2| url=https://archive.org/details/giftofmiraclesma00mill/page/24}}</ref> [[Indeterminism|Indeterministic]] physical models (particularly those involving [[quantum indeterminacy]]) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow [[Incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious [[Volition (psychology)|volition]]) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable,<ref name=quantum>{{cite book |title=Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy) |chapter=Libertarianism |author= Kane, Robert|page=9 |quote=It would seem that undetermined events in the brain or body would occur ''spontaneously'' and would be more likely to ''undermine'' our freedom rather than ''enhance'' it. |isbn=978-1-4051-3486-6 |year=2007 |publisher= Wiley-Blackwell}}</ref> and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the [[neuroscience of free will]]. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality.<ref name=Bohr1>{{cite web |author=Niels Bohr |title= The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; ''Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.''|work=The Information Philosopher, dedicated to the new information philosophy |url=http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bohr/fundamental_principles.html |publisher=Robert O. Doyle, publisher | quote=... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description. |access-date=2012-09-14}}</ref> [[Niels Bohr]], one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.<ref name=Bohr> {{cite book |journal=Nature |date=April 1, 1933 |pages=457–459 |title=Light and Life |author=Niels Bohr |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4RStj6dJDSgC&pg=PA28 |doi=10.1038/131457a0 |volume=131|issue=3309 |isbn=978-0-444-89972-9|quote=For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.|bibcode=1933Natur.131..457B |s2cid=4080545 }} Full text on line at [http://www23.us.archive.org/stream/AtomicPhysicsHumanKnowledge/Bohr-AtomicPhysicsHumanKnowledge_djvu.txt us.archive.org]. </ref> ====Agent/substance-causal theories==== Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world.<ref name=Chisholm2004>{{cite book|author=Roderick M. Chisholm|title=Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2x2I93Ui9i4C|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-29593-2}}</ref><ref name=larke1996>{{cite journal |author=Randolph Clarke |title=Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action |journal =Philosophical Topics |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=19–48 |year=1996 |doi=10.5840/philtopics19962427}}</ref><ref name=Donagan1987>{{cite book|author=Alan Donagan|title=Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7Zc9AAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1987|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-7102-1168-2}}</ref><ref name=OConner2002>{{cite book|author=Timothy O'Connor|editor=Robert Kane|title=Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AeGC8k8xAOwC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2005|publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online|isbn=978-0-19-517854-8|pages=337–355}}</ref><ref name=Rowe1991>{{cite book|author=William L. Rowe|title=Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality|url=https://archive.org/details/thomasreidonfree00rowe|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1991|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-2557-8}}</ref><ref name=Taylor1966>{{cite book|author=Richard Taylor|title=Action and purpose|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ImgYAAAAIAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1966|publisher=Prentice-Hall}}</ref><ref name=Thorp1980>{{cite book|author=John Thorp|title=Free will: a defence against neurophysiological determinism|url=https://archive.org/details/freewilldefencea0000thor|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1980|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=9780710005656}}</ref><ref name=Zimmerman1984>{{cite book|author=Michael J. Zimmerman|title=An essay on human action|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BUMwAAAAYAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1984|publisher=P. Lang|isbn=978-0-8204-0122-5}}</ref> Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both [[George Berkeley]]<ref name="BerkeleyDancy1998">{{cite book|author1=George Berkeley|author2=Jonathan Dancy|title=A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cu7WAAAAMAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1998|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-875160-1}}</ref> and [[Thomas Reid]].<ref name="Reid2012">{{cite book|author=Thomas Reid|title=Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UdYxuQAACAAJ|access-date=27 December 2012|date= 2012|publisher=HardPress|isbn=978-1-4077-2950-3}}</ref> It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by ''luck'' (without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind – a common problem associated with [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|interactionalist dualism]]. ====Hard incompatibilism==== Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not. [[Derk Pereboom (philosopher)|Derk Pereboom]] has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following: :#Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F. :#D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F. :#D is true, and we do have F. :#D is true, we have F, and F implies D. :#D is unproven, but we have F. :#D isn't true, we do have F, and would have F even if D were true. :#D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D. ::::::Derk Pereboom, ''Living without Free Will'',<ref name="Derk1"/> p. xvi. Pereboom calls positions 3 and 4 ''soft determinism'', position 1 a form of ''hard determinism'', position 6 a form of ''classical libertarianism'', and any position that includes having F as ''compatibilism''. [[John Locke]] denied that the phrase "free will" made any sense (compare with [[theological noncognitivism]], a similar stance on the [[existence of God]]). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to ''postpone'' a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".<ref>Locke, J. (1689). ''[[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]'' (1998, ed). Book II, Chap. XXI, Sec. 17. Penguin Classics, Toronto.</ref> The contemporary philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem.<ref name="GStraw">Strawson, G. (1998, 2004). "Free will". In E. Craig (ed.), ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 17, 2006, [http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014 ((online))] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070825055350/http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014 |date=2007-08-25 }}</ref> He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation ''S'', one must have been responsible for the way one was at ''S<sup>−1</sup>''. To be responsible for the way one was at ''S<sup>−1</sup>'', one must have been responsible for the way one was at ''S<sup>−2</sup>'', and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ''[[ex nihilo]]''. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as [[hard incompatibilism]].<ref name="GStraw"/> ===== Causal determinism ===== {{Main|Determinism}} Causal determinism is the concept that [[Event (philosophy)|events]] within a given [[paradigm]] are bound by [[causality]] in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing uncaused or [[Causa sui|self-caused]]. The most common form of causal determinism is nomological determinism (or scientific determinism), the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. [[Quantum mechanics]] poses a serious challenge to this view. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be [[causal determinism|deterministic]]. Although the scientific method cannot be used to rule out [[indeterminism]] with respect to violations of [[causal closure]], it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law. [[Interpretations of quantum mechanics]] at present are both [[deterministic system|deterministic]] and [[indeterminism|indeterministic]], and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.<ref name=GroblacherPaterek2007>{{cite journal|last1=Groblacher|first1=Simon|last2=Paterek|first2=Tomasz|last3=Kaltenbaek|first3=Rainer|last4=Brukner|first4=Caslav|last5=Zukowski|first5=Marek|last6=Aspelmeyer|first6=Markus|last7=Zeilinger|first7=Anton|title=An experimental test of non-local realism|journal=Nature|volume=446|issue=7138|year=2007|pages=871–75|issn=0028-0836|doi=10.1038/nature05677|pmid=17443179|arxiv=0704.2529|bibcode=2007Natur.446..871G|s2cid=4412358}}</ref> ===== Destiny and fate ===== {{Main|Destiny}} Destiny or fate is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos. Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations. [[Fate]] generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to [[determinism]], but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance [[theological determinism]]). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur. [[Destiny]] implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with [[incompatibilist]] free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).<ref name="Blackwell2011">{{cite book|author=Ben C. Blackwell|title=Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and Cyril of Alexandria|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WDZxSq9nx4IC|access-date=8 December 2012|year=2011|publisher=Mohr Siebeck|isbn=978-3-16-151672-6|page=50}}</ref> ===== Logical determinism ===== {{See also|B-theory of time}} Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical [[determinism]] or determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true or false), and is referred to as the [[problem of future contingents]]. ===== Omniscience ===== {{Main|Omniscience}} [[Omniscience]] is the capacity to know everything that there is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level [[predeterminism]] such as hard [[theological determinism]] or [[predestination]] – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an [[incompatible-properties argument]] for the existence of [[God]], known as the [[argument from free will]], and is closely related to other such arguments, for example the incompatibility of [[omnipotence]] with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it). =====Predeterminism===== {{Main|Predeterminism}} {{See also|Predestination}} [[Predeterminism]] is the idea that all events are determined in advance.<ref name="McKewan">{{cite encyclopedia |last=McKewan |first=Jaclyn |editor=H. James Birx"|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Time: Science, Philosophy, Theology, & Culture |title=Predeterminism |year=2009 |publisher=SAGE Publications|doi=10.4135/9781412963961.n191 |pages=1035–36|chapter=Evolution, Chemical |isbn=978-1-4129-4164-8 }}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Oxford Dictionaries |title=Predeterminism |url=http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120904051839/http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |url-status=dead |archive-date=September 4, 2012 |access-date=20 December 2012 |date=2010 }}. See also {{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Collins English Dictionary |title=Predeterminism |url=http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012 |publisher=Collins}}</ref> Predeterminism is the [[philosophy]] that all events of [[history]], past, present and future, have been decided or are known (by [[God]], [[fate]], or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking [[causal determinism]], implying that there is an unbroken [[chain of prior occurrences]] stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorised as a specific type of [[determinism]].<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>{{cite web |url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/notes-determinism.html |title=Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=10 September 2009 <!-- date found by checking page's source code where format of date given as m.d.y -->|work=Philosophy 302: Ethics |publisher=philosophy.lander.edu |access-date=19 December 2012| quote=Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.}}</ref> It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in the context of its capacity to determine future events.<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>See for example {{cite journal |author=Hooft, G. |title=How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale |quote=Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at all |arxiv=hep-th/0104219 |year=2001|bibcode=2001hep.th....4219T}}, and {{cite journal |author=Sukumar, CV |title=A new paradigm for science and architecture |quote=Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in nature. |journal=City |volume=1 |issue=1–2 |pages=181–83 |year=1996|doi=10.1080/13604819608900044|bibcode=1996City....1..181S }}</ref> Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Borst, C. |title=Leibniz and the compatibilist account of free will |quote=Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism |journal=Studia Leibnitiana |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=49–58 |year=1992 |jstor=40694201}}</ref><ref name=Society1971>{{cite book|author=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|title=Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=spkpAQAAMAAJ|access-date=20 December 2012|year=1971|publisher=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.|page=12|quote="Determinism" is, in essence, the position holding that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position holding that all behavior is caused by conditions predating behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).}}</ref> The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of [[biological determinism]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |title=Predeterminism |url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012 |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Incorporated}} See for example {{cite journal |author=Ormond, A.T. |title=Freedom and psycho-genesis |quote=The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies |journal=Psychological Review |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=217–29 |year=1894 |doi=10.1037/h0065249|url=https://zenodo.org/record/1429090 }}, and {{cite journal |author=Garris, M.D. |title=A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS) |quote=However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped. |journal=Science of Artificial Neural Networks |volume=1710 |pages=714–24 |year=1992|doi=10.1117/12.140132|display-authors=etal|bibcode=1992SPIE.1710..714G |s2cid=62639035 }}</ref> The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe. [[Predestination]] asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the [[Calvinists]] in [[Christian theology]]. Predestination is often considered a form of hard [[theological determinism]]. Predeterminism has therefore been compared to [[fatalism]].<ref>{{cite journal |author=Sherman, H. |title=Marx and determinism |quote=Many religions of the world have considered that the path of history is predetermined by God or Fate. On this basis, many believe that what will happen will happen, and they accept their destiny with fatalism. |journal=Journal of Economic Issues |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=61–71 |year=1981 |jstor=4224996|doi=10.1080/00213624.1981.11503814 }}</ref> Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future. ====Theological determinism==== {{Main|Theological determinism}} [[Theological determinism]] is a form of [[determinism]] stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or [[predestination|predestined]] to happen, by a [[monotheism|monotheistic]] [[deity]], or that they are destined to occur given its [[omniscience]]. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism.<ref name=JordanTate2004>{{cite book|author1=Anne Lockyer Jordan|author2=Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate|author3=Neil Lockyer|author4=Edwin Tate|title=Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uBVuNip8qjkC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Nelson Thornes|isbn=978-0-7487-8078-5|page=211}}</ref> * The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a [[creator deity]] dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."<ref name=Iannone2001>{{cite book|author=A. Pabl Iannone|title=Dictionary of World Philosophy|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7wBmBO3vpE4C|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2001|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-17995-9|page=194|chapter=determinism}}</ref> * The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge – "because [[God]]'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."<ref name=Huyssteen2003>{{cite book|author=Wentzel Van Huyssteen|title=Encyclopedia of science and religion|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HIcYAAAAIAAJ|access-date=22 December 2012|volume=1|year=2003|publisher=Macmillan Reference|isbn=978-0-02-865705-9|page=217|chapter=theological determinism}}</ref> There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires [[predestination]] of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all.<ref name=VanArragon2010>{{cite book|author=Raymond J. VanArragon|title=Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JyTohO1AMzwC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2010|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|isbn=978-1-4411-3867-5|page=21}}</ref> Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of [[causal determinism]], in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.<ref name=stanfordmoralresponsibility>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Eshleman |first=Andrew |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Moral Responsibility | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Winter 2009 | year=2009 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal}}</ref> With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments"/> [[File:TheologicalDeterminismXFreeWill.svg|thumb|A simplified [[taxonomy (general)|taxonomy]] of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism<ref name="stanfordforeknowledge" />]] There are various implications for [[metaphysical libertarianism|metaphysical libertarian]] free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation. * Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of ''hard theological determinism'' (equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and ''God'' has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to [[hard determinism]], although it does not invalidate [[compatibilism|compatibilist]] free will.<ref name=stanfordforeknowledge /> Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left). * Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of [[omniscience]] – and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as [[theological fatalism]]), or as ''soft theological determinism'' (terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, while [[omniscience|knowing their actions before they happen]], does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). A rejection of theological determinism (or [[omniscience|divine foreknowledge]]) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will.<ref name="stanfordforeknowledge"/> The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows: # Assume divine foreknowledge or [[omniscience]] # [[infallibility|Infallible]] foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do) # Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise) # Assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included: * Deny the truth value of [[Problem of future contingents|future contingents]], although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism. * Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by [[Boethius]],<ref>{{cite book | author=Boethius | title=The Consolation of Philosophy | chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/theconsolationof14328gut | chapter=Book V, Prose vi}}</ref> [[Thomas Aquinas]],<ref>{{cite book | author=Aquinas, St. Thomas | title=Summa Theologica | chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.126741 | chapter=Ia, q. 14, art 13.| year=1923 }} See [[Summa Theologica]]</ref> and [[C.S. Lewis]].<ref>{{cite book | author=C.S. Lewis | title=Mere Christianity | publisher=Touchstone:New York | year=1980 | page=149}}</ref> * Deny the Principle of [[Alternative Possibilities|Alternate Possibilities]]: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events.<ref name=zagzebski1991>{{cite book|author=Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski|title=The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0v9nLMBtGYcC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-510763-0|chapter=chapter 6, section 2.1}}</ref> In the definition of [[compatibilism]] and [[incompatibilism]], the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic – although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also).<ref name=VanArragon2010 /> ====Mind–body problem==== {{Main|Mind–body problem}} {{See also|Philosophy of mind|Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Monism|Physicalism}} [[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|upright|[[René Descartes]]]] The idea of ''free will'' is one aspect of the [[mind–body problem]], that is, consideration of the relation between [[mind]] (for example, consciousness, memory, and judgment) and body (for example, the [[human brain]] and [[nervous system]]). [[Philosophy of Mind|Philosophical models of mind]] are divided into [[Physicalism|physical]] and non-physical expositions. [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Substance dualism|Cartesian dualism]] holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance, the seat of consciousness and intelligence, and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body. It is suggested that although the two worlds do interact, each retains some measure of autonomy. Under cartesian dualism external mind is responsible for bodily action, although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events (for example, the instantaneous reaction to being burned).<ref name=Peruzzi>See for example: {{cite book |title=Mind and Causality |chapter=Chapter 5: Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalizing theory |author=Sandro Nannini |editor=Alberto Peruzzi |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zYEPifPTQK4C&pg=PA75 |pages=69 ''ff'' |isbn=978-1-58811-475-4 |publisher=John Benjamins Publishing |year=2004}}</ref> Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic – and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of [[incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called ''[[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Interactionism|interactionalist dualism]]'' suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the [[Popper's three worlds|"three-world" formulation]] of [[Karl Popper|Popper]].<ref name=Popper>{{cite book |title=All Life is Problem Solving |chapter=Notes of a realist on the body-mind problem |author=Karl Raimund Popper |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Pa3cZYwdq28C&pg=PA23 |pages=23 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-415-17486-2 |year=1999 |publisher=Psychology Press |quote=The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World 3'. |edition=A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972}}</ref> Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called [[epistemological pluralism]], that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include [[psychophysical parallelism]] and [[epiphenomenalism]]. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is ''not'' reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences. A contrasting approach is called [[physicalism]]. Physicalism is a [[philosophical theory]] holding that everything that [[existence|exists]] is no more extensive than its [[physical properties]]; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive. [[Reductive physicalism]] is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively, [[non-reductive physicalism]] asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as [[qualia]]) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction, [[anomalous monism]], mental events [[Supervenience|''supervene'']] on physical events, describing the [[emergence]] of mental properties correlated with physical properties – implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as [[property dualism]] rather than [[monism]], yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism). [[Incompatibilism]] requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily, [[metaphysical libertarianism|metaphysical libertarian]] free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism). It has been noted that the [[Physical law|laws of physics]] have yet to resolve the [[hard problem of consciousness]]:<ref name=Kalat> See {{cite encyclopedia |title=The hard problem of consciousness |author=Josh Weisberg |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}} or {{cite encyclopedia |title=Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories |chapter-url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#NonPhyThe |author=Robert Van Gulick |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta |date=Jan 14, 2014|chapter=Consciousness |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }} </ref> "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane ''cause'' us to have experiences."<ref name=Goldstein> {{cite book |title=Sensation and Perception |author=E. Bruce Goldstein |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2tW91BWeNq4C&pg=PA39 |page=39 |isbn=978-0-495-60149-4 |publisher=Cengage Learning |year=2010 |edition=12th }} </ref> According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents ''the'' core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"<ref name=Baumeister2>{{cite book |title=Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will |chapter=The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_t4k_r7-2jgC&pg=PA183 |pages=183, 190–93 |editor1=John Baer |editor2=James C. Kaufman |editor3=Roy F. Baumeister |author1=Azim F Shariff |author2=Jonathan Schooler |author3=Kathleen D Vohs |isbn=978-0-19-518963-6 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press}} </ref> Others however argue that "[[consciousness]] plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."<ref name=illusion> Quote from {{cite book |chapter-url=https://www.google.com/search?q=consciousness%2Bplays%2Ba%2Bsmaller%2Brole%2Bin%2Bhuman%2Blife+intitle:User+intitle:illusion |title=The user illusion: Cutting consciousness down to size |author=Tor Nørretranders |isbn=978-0-14-023012-3 |chapter=Preface |page= ix |publisher=Penguin Books |year=1998 |edition=Jonathan Sydenham translation of ''Maerk verden'' 1991}} </ref> ===Compatibilism=== {{Main|Compatibilism}} [[File:Thomas Hobbes (portrait).jpg|upright|thumb|[[Thomas Hobbes]] was a classical compatibilist.]] Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. They believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance, [[courts of law]] make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly, [[political liberty]] is a non-metaphysical concept.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rawls |first1=John |title=Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical |journal=Philosophy & Public Affairs |date=1985 |volume=14 |issue=3 |pages=223–251 |jstor=2265349 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265349 |access-date=4 December 2023 |issn=0048-3915}}</ref> Likewise, some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'',<ref>{{Cite book |author-link= Susan Sauvé Meyer|last=Meyer |first=Susan Sauve |title=Aristotle on Moral Responsibility |year=2012 |location=Oxford}}</ref> and the Stoic Chrysippus.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien|Bobzien, Susanne]], ''Freedom and Determinism in Stoic Philosophy'', Oxford 1998, Chapter 6.</ref> In contrast, the [[incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; though they disagree among themselves about what, in turn, ''does'' matter. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.<ref name="CompSEP">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Compatibilism |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/ |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Summer 200 |last1=McKenna |first1=Michael|date=2004 }}</ref> Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to ''implement'' that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction.<ref name="OConnor"/> Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as [[Harry Frankfurt]] and [[Daniel Dennett]], argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.<ref name="DD1">{{cite book |author=Dennett, D. |year=1984 |title= Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting |publisher= Bradford Books |isbn=978-0-262-54042-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=P4NtNzOKxycC}}</ref><ref name=Frankfurt>{{cite journal | doi=10.2307/2024717 | last1=Frankfurt |first1= H. | year=1971 | pages=5–20 |title= Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person | issue=1 | volume=68 |journal=Journal of Philosophy |jstor= 2024717 }}</ref> ====Free will as lack of physical restraint==== Most "classical compatibilists", such as [[Thomas Hobbes]], claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise, ''if the person had decided to''. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of ''will'', asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe{{sic}}<!-- sic, that is how Hobbes wrote it; don't change to "do". -->."<ref name="Hobbes">Hobbes, T. (1651) ''Leviathan'' [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm Chapter XXI.: "Of the liberty of subjects"] (1968 edition). London: Penguin Books.</ref> In articulating this crucial proviso, [[David Hume]] writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains."<ref name="Hume">Hume, D. (1740). ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' Section VIII.: "[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm Of liberty and necessity]" (1967 edition). [[Oxford University Press]], Oxford. {{ISBN|0-87220-230-5}}</ref> Similarly, [[Voltaire]], in his ''[[Dictionnaire philosophique]]'', claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs." ====Free will as a psychological state==== Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing – the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity.<ref name=Baumeister>{{cite book |title=Oxford Handbook of Human Action |chapter=Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation |author1=Roy F Baumeister |author2=Matthew T Galliot |author3=Dianne M Tice |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zFP1AZYlNmcC&pg=PA487 |pages=487 ''ff'' |editor1=Ezequiel Morsella |editor2=John A. Bargh |editor3=Peter M. Gollwitzer |isbn=978-0-19-530998-0 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience | quote=The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.}}</ref> Likewise, some modern compatibilists in [[psychology]] have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.<ref name=Baumeister0> {{cite book |title=Oxford Handbook of Human Action |chapter=Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation |author1=Roy F Baumeister |author2=Matthew T Galliot |author3=Dianne M Tice |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zFP1AZYlNmcC&pg=PA487 |pages= 487 ''ff'' |editor=Ezequiel Morsella |editor2=John A. Bargh |editor3=Peter M. Gollwitzer |isbn=978-0-19-530998-0 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience |quote=Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.}} </ref> Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural [[sense of agency]], where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a [[theory of mind]].<ref name="Smilansky2000">{{cite book|author=Saul Smilansky|title=Free Will and Illusion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uPUTQq7CUfwC|access-date=6 February 2013|year=2000|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-825018-0|page=96}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Gallagher | first1 = S. | year = 2000 | title = Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science | journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 4 | issue = 1| pages = 14–21 | doi=10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5| pmid = 10637618 | s2cid = 451912 }}</ref> The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt.<ref name=Frankfurt/> Frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is identified with their effective first-order desire, that is, the one they act on, and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon, that is, the person's second-order desire was effective. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts". All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it. The first group, ''wanton addicts'', have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Watson |first=D. |title=Free Will |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1982 |location=New York}}</ref> Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |title=Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility |last2=Ravizza |first2=Mark |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1998 |location=Cambridge}}</ref> ====Free will as unpredictability==== In ''[[Elbow Room (Dennett book)|Elbow Room]]'', Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book ''[[Freedom Evolves]]''.<ref name="DD2">Dennett, D. (2003) ''Freedom Evolves''. Viking Books. {{ISBN|0-670-03186-0}}</ref> The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful [[demon]], and other such possibilities, then because of [[chaos theory|chaos]] and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown and unknowable future. According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist.<ref name="DD2"/> Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance.<ref name="Kaney">Kane, R. ''The Oxford Handbook to Free Will''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-513336-6}}.</ref> More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.<ref name="CompSEP" /> In the philosophy of [[decision theory]], a fundamental question is: From the standpoint of statistical outcomes, to what extent do the choices of a conscious being have the ability to influence the future? [[Newcomb's paradox]] and other philosophical problems pose questions about free will and predictable outcomes of choices. ====The physical mind==== {{See also|Neuroscience of free will}} [[Compatibilist]] models of free will often consider deterministic relationships as discoverable in the physical world (including the brain). Cognitive [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]<ref name=naturalism>A key exponent of this view was [[Willard van Orman Quine]]. See {{cite encyclopedia |title=Willard van Orman Quine |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/quine/ |author=Hylton, Peter |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta |date=Apr 30, 2010}}</ref> is a [[physicalism|physicalist]] approach to studying human [[cognition]] and [[consciousness]] in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example, [[neural networks (biology)|neural networks]] and [[Cognitive robotics|cognitive robots]]), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the [[Behavioural sciences|behavioral]] and [[cognitive science]]s (''i.e.'' [[neuroscience]] and [[cognitive psychology]]).<ref name=Peruzzi/><ref name=physicalism> A thoughtful list of careful distinctions regarding the application of empirical science to these issues is found in {{cite encyclopedia |author=Stoljar, Daniel |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/#12 |title=Physicalism: §12 – Physicalism and the physicalist world picture |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta |date=Sep 9, 2009 }}</ref> Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health, [[substance dependence]], [[Long-term depression|depression]], and various [[personality disorders]] clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is also important.<ref name=Baumeister /> For example, an [[substance abuse|addict]] may experience a conscious desire to escape addiction, but be unable to do so. The "will" is disconnected from the freedom to act. This situation is related to an abnormal production and distribution of [[dopamine]] in the brain.<ref name=Volkow> {{cite book |title=Science In Medicine: The JCI Textbook Of Molecular Medicine |chapter=The addicted human brain: insights from imaging studies |author1=Nora D Volkow |author2=Joanna S Fowler |author3=Gene-Jack Wang |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ykvt1S9n8V0C&pg=PA1061 |pages=1061 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-7637-5083-1 |year=2007 |publisher=Jones & Bartlett Learning |editor1=Andrew R Marks |editor2=Ushma S Neill }} </ref> The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions. Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation.<ref name=Baumeister2 /> Such an approach has been considered a form of identity dualism. A description of "how conscious experience might affect brains" has been provided in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing."<ref name=Baumeister2 /> Recently,{{when|date=August 2018}} [[Claudio Costa (philosopher)|Claudio Costa]] developed a neocompatibilist theory based on the causal theory of action that is complementary to classical compatibilism. According to him, physical, psychological and rational restrictions can interfere at different levels of the causal chain that would naturally lead to action. Correspondingly, there can be physical restrictions to the body, psychological restrictions to the decision, and rational restrictions to the formation of reasons (desires plus beliefs) that should lead to what we would call a reasonable action. The last two are usually called "restrictions of free will". The restriction at the level of reasons is particularly important since it can be motivated by external reasons that are insufficiently conscious to the agent. One example was the collective suicide led by [[Jim Jones]]. The suicidal agents were not conscious that their free will have been manipulated by external, even if ungrounded, reasons.<ref>Claudio Costa. ''Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions'' CSP, 2014, Ch. 7</ref> ====Non-naturalism==== {{distinguish|Religious naturalism}} Alternatives to strictly [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalist]] physics, such as [[mind–body dualism]] positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts.<ref name=mnn>{{cite web |last1=Ridge |first1=Michael |title=Moral Non-Naturalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 June 2019 |date=3 February 2014}}</ref> Also consistent with both autonomy and [[Darwinism]],<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lemos |first1=John |title=Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=2002 |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=468–482 |doi=10.1111/1467-9973.00240 |language=en |issn=1467-9973}}</ref> they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nida-Rümelin |first1=Julian |title=The Reasons Account of Free Will A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid |journal=Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie |date=1 January 2019 |volume=105 |issue=1 |pages=3–10 |doi=10.25162/arsp-2019-0001 |s2cid=155641763 |language=en}}</ref> While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stump |first1=Eleonore |editor1-last=Howard-Snyder |editor1-first=Daniel |editor2-last=Jordan |editor2-first=Jeff |title=Faith, Freedom, and Rationality |date=1996 |publisher=Rowman and Littlefield |location=Lanham, MD |pages=73–88 |chapter=Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities}}</ref> ===Other views=== Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. For example, [[Ted Honderich]] holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are [[Abstract object|abstract]] entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Honderich |first=T. |title=The Free Will Handbook |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2001 |editor-last=Kane |editor-first=Robert |chapter=Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False and the Real Problem}}</ref> ====Free will as an illusion==== [[File:Spinoza.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Baruch Spinoza]] thought that there is no free will.]] :"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined." [[Baruch Spinoza]], ''Ethics''<ref name=Spinoza>{{cite book |author=Benedict de Spinoza |year=2008 |chapter=Part III: On the origin and nature of the emotions; Postulates (Proposition II, Note) |editor=R.H.M. Elwes, trans |title=The Ethics |publisher=Digireads.com Publishing |edition=Original work published 1677 |isbn=978-1-4209-3114-3 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2tTweH2JeXsC&pg=PA54 |page=54 }}{{Dead link|date=April 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> [[David Hume]] discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a ''velleity''), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.<ref>Hume, D. (1765). ''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'', Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co. Second edition. 1993. {{ISBN|0-87220-230-5}}</ref> [[File:Schopenhauer.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] claimed that phenomena do not have freedom of the will, but the will as [[noumenon]] is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free.]] According to [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], the actions of humans, as [[phenomena]], are subject to the [[principle of sufficient reason]] and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the [[Will (philosophy)|will]] [urging, craving, striving, wanting, and desiring], as the [[noumenon]] underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Book 2, Sec. 23: {{blockquote|But the fact is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as [[thing-in-itself]], but is ''phenomenon'' of the will, is as such determined, and has entered the form of the phenomenon, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence we get the strange fact that everyone considers himself to be ''a priori'' quite free, even in his individual actions, and imagines he can at any moment enter upon a different way of life... But ''a posteriori'' through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns, and, as it were, must play to the end the part he has taken upon himself.<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 1., trans. E. F. J. Payne, p. 113-114</ref>}} Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]].'' In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."<ref>[[Schopenhauer]], Arthur, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell {{ISBN|0-631-14552-4}}</ref> ====Free will as "moral imagination"==== [[Rudolf Steiner]], who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work,<ref>{{cite web|title=Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. (1894–96)|first=Rudolf|last=Steiner|url=http://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html|language=de|access-date=2007-08-02|archive-date=2018-10-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181006113213/http://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> wrote [[The Philosophy of Freedom]], which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: ''freedom of thought'' and ''freedom of action''. The controllable and uncontrollable aspects of decision making thereby are made logically separable, as pointed out in the introduction. This separation of ''will'' from ''action'' has a very long history, going back at least as far as [[Stoicism]] and the teachings of [[Chrysippus]] (279–206 BCE), who separated external ''antecedent'' causes from the internal disposition receiving this cause.<ref name=Chrysippus>{{cite book |title=The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9lRD6feR3hEC&pg=PA529 |page=529 |chapter=Chapter VI: The Chyrsippean notion of fate: soft determinism |author=Keimpe Algra |isbn=978-0-521-25028-3 |year=1999}}</ref> Steiner then argues that inner freedom is achieved when we integrate our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, with our thoughts, which lend coherence to these impressions and thereby disclose to us an understandable world. Acknowledging the many influences on our choices, he nevertheless points out that they do not preclude freedom unless we fail to recognise them. Steiner argues that outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with ''moral imagination.'' "Moral" in this case refers to action that is willed, while "imagination" refers to the mental capacity to envision conditions that do not already hold. Both of these functions are necessarily conditions for freedom. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united.<ref>Steiner, R. (1964). Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1979, 230 pp., translated from the 12th German edition of 1962 by Michael Wilson. [http://www.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/ ((online))]</ref> ====Free will as a pragmatically useful concept==== [[William James]]' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it.<ref>See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999), ''The Volitional Brain: Toward a Neuroscience of Free Will'' (Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic).</ref> Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work ''[[Pragmatism]]'', he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories.<ref name="JW">James, W. (1907) ''Pragmatism'' (1979 edition). Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press]]</ref> He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines [[meliorism]] – the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.<ref name="JW"/> ====Free will and views of causality==== {{See also|Principle of sufficient reason}} In 1739, [[David Hume]] in his ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' approached free will via the notion of causality. It was his position that causality was a mental construct used to explain the repeated association of events, and that one must examine more closely the relation between things ''regularly succeeding'' one another (descriptions of regularity in nature) and things that ''result'' in other things (things that cause or necessitate other things).<ref name=Kane> {{cite book |title=The significance of free will |author=Robert Kane |publisher=Oxford University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dBlXH3FtwJIC&pg=PA226 |page= 226 |chapter=Notes to pages 74–81, note 22 |isbn=978-0-19-512656-3 |year=1998 |edition=Paperback}} </ref> According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity."<ref name=Lorkowski>{{cite encyclopedia |author=CM Lorkowski |date=November 7, 2010 |title=David Hume: Causation |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called [[apriority]] of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world): * [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s proof in ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (which referenced time and time ordering of causes and effects)<ref>Kant argued that, in order that human life is not just a "dream" (a random or projected by subjects juxtaposition of moments), the temporality of event A as before or after B must submit to a rule. An established order then implies the existence of some necessary conditions and causes, that is: sufficient bases (a so-called sufficient reason is the coincidence of all the necessary conditions). Without established causality, both [[Transcendental apperception|in subject]] and in the external world, the passing of time would be impossible, because it is essentially directional. See [[s:Critique of Pure Reason/Volume 1/Division 1#B. Second Analogy. Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality. All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.|online text of his proof]]</ref> * [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]]'s proof from ''The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason'' (which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and [[qualia]] perceived with senses)<ref>Schopenhauer, who by the way continued and simplified Kant's system, argued (among others basing on optical illusions and the "initial processing") that it is the intellect or even the brain what generates the image of the world out of something else, by ''concluding from effects, e.g. optical, about appropriate causes'', e.g. concrete physical objects. Intellect in his works is strictly connected with recognizing causes and effects and associating them, it is somewhat close to the contemporary view of [[cerebral cortex]] and formation of associations. The intellectuality of all perception implied then of course that causality is rooted in the world, precedes and enables experience. See [[s:Page:On the Fourfold Root, and On the Will in Nature.djvu/90|online text of his proof]]</ref> In the 1780s [[Immanuel Kant]] suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects.<ref name=Hill> {{cite book |author=R Kevin Hill |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y1CHkFRdYD4C&pg=PA196 |chapter=Chapter 7: The critique of morality: The three pillars of Kantian ethics |title=Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought |pages=196–201 |isbn=978-0-19-928552-5 |edition=Paperback |year=2003| publisher=Clarendon Press }} </ref> "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be ''a priori'' judgments."<ref name=Paton> {{cite book |title=The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy |author=Herbert James Paton |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8Y7RS1cM9KUC&pg=PA20 |isbn=978-0-8122-1023-1 |year=1971 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |chapter= §2 Moral judgements are ''a priori''|page=20 }} </ref> Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses... and between the behaving animal and its environment".<ref name=Freeman>{{cite book |title=Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? |editor1=Susan Pockett |editor2=WP Banks |editor3=Shaun Gallagher |chapter=Consciousness, intentionality and causality |author=Freeman, Walter J. |publisher=MIT Press |year =2009 |isbn=978-0-262-51257-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G5CaTnNksgkC&pg=PA88 |page=88| quote=Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes.... The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world.}}</ref> In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example, [[neuron]]s and their [[synapse]]s) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both. ====Free will according to Thomas Aquinas==== Thirteenth century philosopher [[Thomas Aquinas]] viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian [[telos (philosophy)|telos]]). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism.<ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 2| issue = 2| page = 74| last = Staley| first = Kevin M.| title = Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian| journal = The Saint Anselm Journal| access-date = 2015-12-09| date = 2005| url = http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Staley.pdf| url-status=dead| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151221073832/http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Staley.pdf| archive-date = 2015-12-21}}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis| last = Hartung| first = Christopher| title = Thomas Aquinas on Free Will| access-date = 2015-12-09| date = May 2013| publisher = University of Delaware| url = http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/12979| type = Thesis}} </ref> In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by ''intellect'', ''will'', and ''passions''. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body."<ref name=Stump> A discussion of the roles of will, intellect and passions in Aquinas' teachings is found in {{cite book |title=Aquinas, ''Arguments of the philosophers series'' |author= Stump, Eleonore|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1GvL3eKhoM8C&pg=PA278 |pages=278 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-415-02960-5 |year=2003 |publisher=Routledge (Psychology Press) |chapter= Intellect and will}} </ref> Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution.<ref name=OConnor0>{{cite encyclopedia |author=Timothy O'Connor |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/freewill/ |title= Free Will |encyclopedia= The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta |date=Oct 29, 2010 |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University|quote=Philosophers who distinguish ''freedom of action'' and ''freedom of will'' do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".}}</ref> Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination").<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01656a.htm |title=Catholic Encyclopedia: Appetite |publisher=Newadvent.org |date=1907 |access-date=2012-08-13}}</ref> He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite [that is, the free-will]."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm |title=Summa Theologica: Free-will (Prima Pars, Q. 83) |publisher=Newadvent.org |access-date=2012-08-13}}</ref> A compatibilist interpretation of Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."<ref>Thomas Aquinas, ''Summa Theologiae'', Q83 A1.</ref><ref>Further discussion of this compatibilistic theory can be found in Thomas' ''Summa contra gentiles'', Book III about Providence, c. 88–91 (260–267), where it is postulated that everything has its cause and it is again and again in detail referred also to all individual choices of man etc., even refuting opposite views. [http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#88 Here the online text of the Summa] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171123185058/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#88 |date=2017-11-23 }}. In order to avoid, at least in concept, the absolution of man of any guilt he then notes the contingency of all that takes place, i.e. lack of ''direct'' necessity from God strictly with regard to a concrete ("contingent") act. A typical choice was not separately ordained to be so-and-so by God; St. Thomas says the choice is not necessary, but in fact that apparently means it was ''contingent'' with regard to God and the law of nature (as a specific case that could have not existed in other circumstances), and ''necessary'' with regard to its direct previous cause in will and intellect. (The contingency, or fortuity, is even intuitive under modern [[chaos theory]], where one can try to show that more and more developed products appearing in the evolution of a universe or, simpler, an automaton are [[chaos theory|chaotic]] with regard to its principles.)</ref> ====Free will as a pseudo-problem==== Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases like "ability to do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities". This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem.<ref name=Deery> {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates |author1=Paul Russell |author2=Oisin Deery |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CLyi7nmzr28C&pg=PA5 |page=5 |chapter=I. The free will problem – real or illusory |isbn=978-0-19-973339-2 |year=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press }} </ref> In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology.{{citation needed|date=October 2022}} Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). 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