Cosmological argument

== Versions of the argument ==

=== Argument from contingency ===

In the [[scholasticism|scholastic]] era, [[Aquinas]] formulated the "argument from [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingency]]", following [[Aristotle]] in claiming that [[Unmoved mover|there must be something to explain why the Universe exists]]. Since the Universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably ''not'' exist (contingency), its existence must have a cause – not merely another contingent thing, but something that exists by [[INUS|necessity]] (something that ''must'' exist in order for anything else to exist).<ref>''Summa Theologiae, I:'' 2, 3</ref> In other words, even if the Universe has always existed, it still owes its existence to an [[Primum movens|uncaused cause]],<ref>Aquinas was an ardent student of Aristotle's works, a significant number of which had only recently been translated into Latin by [[William of Moerbeke]] .</ref> Aquinas further said: "...&nbsp;and this we understand to be God."<ref>''Summa Theologiae, I: '' 2,3</ref>

Aquinas's argument from contingency allows for the possibility of a Universe that has no beginning in time. It is a form of argument from universal [[Causality|causation]]. Aquinas observed that, in nature, there were things with contingent existences. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which these things did not in fact exist. Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If this is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Contingent beings, therefore, are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings: there must exist a ''[[INUS|necessary]]'' being whose non-existence is an impossibility, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is ultimately derived.

Aquinas' argument from contingency may also be formulated like this: if each contingently existing being considers himself Bn, then, because he exists contingently, he depends for his existence on a prior being Bn-1. Now, Bn-1 likewise, if it is contingent, depends on Bn-2. Nevertheless, this series cannot go on until Infinity. At a certain time, we will arrive at a B1, the First Being in existence, and since there is no "zeroth" Being or B0, B1 exists Necessarily, i.e. is not a contingent being. This was Aquinas' Third Way, under Question 2, Article 3 in the Summa Theologica<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3 | title=SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The existence of God (Prima Pars, Q. 2) }}</ref>

The German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] made a similar argument with his [[principle of sufficient reason]] in 1714. "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition," he wrote, "without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing?  The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."<ref>''Monadologie'' (1714). [[Nicholas Rescher]], trans., 1991. ''The Monadology: An Edition for Students''. Uni. of Pittsburgh Press. [http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibmon.pdf Jonathan Bennett's translation.] [http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm Latta's translation.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117200947/http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm |date=2015-11-17 }}</ref>

Leibniz's argument from contingency is one of the most popular cosmological arguments in philosophy of religion. It attempts to prove the existence of a necessary being and infer that this being is God. [[Alexander Pruss]] formulates the argument as follows:

# Every contingent fact has an explanation.
# There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
# Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
# This explanation must involve a necessary being.
# This necessary being is God.<ref>Quoted from The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, by Alexander R. Pruss, pp.25-6</ref>

Premise 1 is a form of the [[principle of sufficient reason]] stating that all contingently true sentences (i.e. contingent facts) have a sufficient explanation as to why they are the case. Premise 2 refers to what is known as the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (abbreviated BCCF), and the BCCF is generally taken to be the [[logical conjunction]] of all contingent facts.<ref>Oppy, Graham. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008300?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents "On 'a new cosmological argument'"]. ''Religious Studies''.</ref> It can be thought about as the sum total of all contingent reality. Premise 3 then concludes that the BCCF has an explanation, as every contingency does (in virtue of the PSR). It follows that this explanation is non-contingent (i.e. necessary); no contingency can explain the BCCF, because every contingent fact is a ''part'' of the BCCF. Statement 5, which is either seen as a premise or a conclusion, infers that the necessary being which explains the totality of contingent facts is God. Several philosophers of religion, such as Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly, have argued for the inference from (4) to (5).<ref>Rasmussen, Joshua. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/40270260?seq=1 "From a Necessary Being to God"]. ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion''.</ref><ref>Byerly, Ryan T [https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/79/1/10/5032496 "From a necessary being to a perfect being"] ''Analysis'', Volume 79, Issue 1, January 2019, pages 10-17</ref>

=== ''In esse'' and ''in fieri'' ===

The difference between the arguments from causation ''[[Becoming (philosophy)|in fieri]]'' and ''[[Essence|in esse]]'' is a fairly important one. ''In fieri'' is generally translated as "becoming", while ''in esse'' is generally translated as "in essence". ''In fieri'', the process of becoming, is similar to building a house. Once it is built, the builder walks away, and it stands on its own accord; compare the [[watchmaker analogy]]. (It may require occasional maintenance, but that is beyond the scope of the first cause argument.)

''In esse'' (essence) is more akin to the light from a candle or the liquid in a vessel. George Hayward Joyce, [[Society of Jesus|SJ]], explained that, "where the light of the candle is dependent on the candle's continued existence, not only does a candle produce light in a room in the first instance, but its continued presence is necessary if the illumination is to continue. If it is removed, the light ceases. Again, a liquid receives its shape from the vessel in which it is contained; but were the pressure of the containing sides withdrawn, it would not retain its form for an instant." This form of the argument is far more difficult to separate from a purely first cause argument than is the example of the house's maintenance above, because here the first cause is insufficient without the candle's or vessel's continued existence.<ref>Joyce, George Hayward (1922) ''Principles of Natural Theology''. New York: Longmans Green.</ref>

The philosopher [[Robert Koons]] has stated a new variant on the cosmological argument. He says that to deny causation is to deny all empirical ideas – for example, if we know our own hand, we know it because of the chain of causes including light being reflected upon one's eyes, stimulating the retina and sending a message through the optic nerve into your brain. He summarised the purpose of the argument as "that if you don't buy into theistic metaphysics, you're undermining empirical science. The two grew up together historically and are culturally and philosophically inter-dependent&nbsp;... If you say I just don't buy this causality principle – that's going to be a big big problem for empirical science." This ''in fieri'' version of the argument therefore does not intend to prove God, but only to disprove objections involving science, and the idea that contemporary knowledge disproves the cosmological argument.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://training.sbtexas.com/onlinetraining/new-proofs-for-gods-existence/325/|title=Online Training &#124; Southern Baptists of Texas Convention}}</ref>

=== Kalām cosmological argument ===
{{Main|Kalam cosmological argument}}
[[William Lane Craig]], who was principally responsible for re-popularizing this argument in [[Western philosophy]], presents it in the following general form:<ref>{{cite web |last=Craig |first=William L. |title=The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe |work=Truth Journal |publisher=Leaderu.com |access-date=22 June 2008 |url=http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html }}</ref>
# Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
# The universe began to exist.
# Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

Craig analyses this cause in ''The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology'' and says that this cause must be uncaused, beginningless, changeless, timeless, spaceless, extraordinarily powerful, and personal.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Craig |first1=William Lane |title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology |last2=Moreland |first2=J.P. |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4051-7657-6 |location=UK, Croydon, CR0 4YY |pages=194}}</ref><!--
# the form advocated by Aquinas based on the impossibility of the "essential" ordering of an infinite regress; Aquinas argues that  only an "incidental" ordering among causes, but not an "essential" ordering, can reach back forever.
# the argument that an infinite regress is impossible because an [[actual infinity]] is impossible; this form is called the [[kalam cosmological argument]] by Craig, as he traces its first formulation to [[Al-Ghazali]].
# the argument from the [[principle of sufficient reason]], presented by Leibniz and Clarke.

A version of the cosmological argument could be stated as follows:

# Every finite and [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]] being has a cause.
# A [[Causality|causal]] loop cannot exist.
# A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
# Therefore, a first cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.
-->

===Metaphysical argument for the existence of God===

[[Duns Scotus]], the influential Medieval Christian theologian, created a metaphysical argument for the existence of God. Though it was inspired by Aquinas' argument from motion, he, like other philosophers and theologians, believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered separate to Aquinas'. His explanation for God's existence is long, and can be summarised as follows:<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B|title=Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q2B - The Logic Museum|website=www.logicmuseum.com}}</ref>
#Something can be produced.
#It is produced by itself, by nothing, or by another.
#Not by nothing, because nothing causes nothing.
#Not by itself, because an effect never causes itself.
#Therefore, by another ''A''.
#If A is first then we have reached the conclusion.
#If A is not first, then we return to 2).
#From 3) and 4), we produce another- ''B''. The ascending series is either infinite or finite.
#An infinite series is not possible.
#Therefore, God exists.

Scotus deals immediately with two objections he can see: first, that there cannot be a first, and second, that the argument falls apart when 1) is questioned. He states that [[infinite regress]] is impossible, because it provokes unanswerable questions, like, in modern English, "What is infinity minus infinity?" The second he states can be answered if the question is rephrased using [[modal logic]], meaning that the first statement is instead "It is possible that something can be produced."