Free will

====Free will as a psychological state====
Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing&nbsp;– the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity.<ref name=Baumeister>{{cite book |title=Oxford Handbook of Human Action |chapter=Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation |author1=Roy F Baumeister |author2=Matthew T Galliot |author3=Dianne M Tice |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zFP1AZYlNmcC&pg=PA487 |pages=487 ''ff'' |editor1=Ezequiel Morsella |editor2=John A. Bargh |editor3=Peter M. Gollwitzer |isbn=978-0-19-530998-0 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience | quote=The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.}}</ref> Likewise, some modern compatibilists in [[psychology]] have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.<ref name=Baumeister0>
{{cite book |title=Oxford Handbook of Human Action |chapter=Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation |author1=Roy F Baumeister |author2=Matthew T Galliot |author3=Dianne M Tice |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zFP1AZYlNmcC&pg=PA487 |pages= 487 ''ff'' |editor=Ezequiel Morsella |editor2=John A. Bargh |editor3=Peter M. Gollwitzer |isbn=978-0-19-530998-0 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience |quote=Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.}}
</ref> Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural [[sense of agency]], where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a [[theory of mind]].<ref name="Smilansky2000">{{cite book|author=Saul Smilansky|title=Free Will and Illusion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uPUTQq7CUfwC|access-date=6 February 2013|year=2000|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-825018-0|page=96}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Gallagher | first1 = S. | year = 2000 | title = Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science | journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 4 | issue = 1| pages = 14–21 | doi=10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5| pmid = 10637618 | s2cid = 451912 }}</ref>

The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt.<ref name=Frankfurt/> Frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is identified with their effective first-order desire, that is, the one they act on, and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon, that is, the person's second-order desire was effective. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts". All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it.

The first group, ''wanton addicts'', have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Watson |first=D. |title=Free Will |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1982 |location=New York}}</ref> Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |title=Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility |last2=Ravizza |first2=Mark |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1998 |location=Cambridge}}</ref>